The Athenaeum

"A failure in generalship" Yingling

"For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress."  Yingling

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This is a visionary article written by a man who would rather tell the truth than be promoted.  His appeal to Congress to reform the Army's promotion system highlights the system's inability to change itself.  It is too dominated by a self perpetuating clique of conformists to be capable of that.

He insists that the great majority of Army generals still do not understand the war in Iraq.  He is correct. 

Frederick would deal with these generals.

pl

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198

"Casey's Curmudgeons?"

This post is about the ongoing process of transformation of the US Army.  It will not seem so at first, but I will get "there."

There is a whole genre of enjoyable escapist fiction that "runs" under the rubric, "combat science fiction."  The "Hammer's Slammers" series is one of the best. It was written by David Drake.   A pioneering work of this type was "Starship Troopers" by Robert Heinlein.  I read that as a teenager.  The wretched movie inspired by it does not compare except for the shower room scene which IMO should be retained in any re-make. In the Heinlein book the Mobile Infantry platoon is informally known as "Racszak's Roughnecks" for a long dead platoon commander.  This is great stuff to read at the beach or somewhere like that.

What does this have to do with US Army transformation?  Maybe not much except that some of the conversations and writing about "the transformation" begin to seem after a while as though they were inspired by an early and persistent exposure to this kind of literature.

If you read the remarkably good Wiki piece below on transformation, you will see that what is being done is revolutionary, not evolutionary.  The army that will emerge from the process described will have deployable forces centered on brigade combat teams that are essentially miniature "divisions" containing all arms and services and reinforced through "attachment" with whatever other modular support units that are deemed necessary for a given situation.  These forces will have only a fraction of the artillery fire support available in the past and will be frighteningly dependent on the air forces for the close air support which is expected to substitute for the missing artillery.  LOL on that one. 

I had understood that all "that" was inspired by the need to deal with 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) enemies.  If that is so, then why are the forces destined to emerge from this process and described in the literature not specifically designed to deal with 4GW enemies.  4GW enemies are supposedly enemies that are irregular, lightly armed and usually not representatives of a state, at least not officially. 4GW enemies can be combated with light infantry forces, SF types to organize and lead anti-irregulars, effective human oriented intelligence people, some Delta type "door kickers" to chase the "underground," and some light aircraft for fire support and transport.

The forces described in the "transformation" are mostly armored in one way or another.  The Army is seeking the funds to buy a whole new "fleet" of multi-role combat vehicles, the Future Combat System (FCS) program, for the purpose, I suppose of re-equipping the mechanized BCTsof the "transformed force."  The intelligence and reconnaissance elements of the "transformed" force are the same kind of electronic sensor "happy" technically oriented people who have done so poorly against a low-tech 4GW set of enemies in the last five years.  The force described makes more sense if it is designed, in fact, to fight small to medium sized conventional wars in an "expeditionary" role. Maybe that is why Rumsfeld kept calling it an expeditionary army.

Now, I know that the Army will still have Green Berets to deal with the "natives," Foreign Area Officers (cultural specialists) (FAOs,) to do whatever it is that disdainful "line "officers" are willing to let them do, and some light infantry,  but the "transformed" force is not maximized for the GWOT or whatever they are calling it these days.

It will be argued that the Army needs to be ready for a variety of enemies.  That is true, but common sense would dictate creation of a force that is maximized against one's most likely opponents.

Perhaps that is what they are doing.  pl

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transformation_of_the_United_States_Army

On the price of opium - De Ludendwarf

Our friend, DeLudendwarf wrote from the beautiful Shenandoah Valley to ask if the "felllows" of "The Athenaeum" have any sage thoughts converning the mysterious market price of opium.  pl

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/24/AR2007042401508.html?hpid=opinionsbox1

"Shooter" a movie review

Download Shooter.doc

by Alan Farrell

Anon sent this

About Population Decline:

"Oh boy... something I know a little bit about. Below are some internet resources. Harvard has a good site on broad overview of world aging and demographic transitons in different countries and cultures. UC Berkeley demography has what I think is some of very best research on long term financial and economic issues that the military and geopolitical strategic sorts who inhabit this blog might find interesting.

But in some ways this is old news. The poor (and usually implicitly assumed to be inferior) masses have been growing more rapidly the the delicate high quality rich SOB's for centuries. But we are still here and making every more rapid progress even though the master races and classes have been going extinct for centuries. The problem was mentioned as far back as ancient Egypt I think... when the old-style dudes were being outbreeded by crazy Libyans, threatened by the Hyksos and conguered once or twice by the Nubians -who thought they were the keepers of the old aristocratic and noble Egyptian virtues, complicating the traditional upper classes' narrative a bit.)

introductory article

http://longevity-science.org/Population_Aging.htm

(via wikipedia article on aging:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aging_population

)

world demography of aging

http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/pgda/

If you want to understand the economics of retirement and medical care for for aging and social security, UC Berkeley Department of Demography about the best place to go, especially Prof. Ronald Lee. (bottom line, no long term social security or economic bust due to aging in the US... Medicare is another story, though) UC Berkeley department of Demography

http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/faculty/demog_faculty.html

Demographic transition sites

http://www.uwmc.uwc.edu/geography/Demotrans/demtran.htm

http://geography.about.com/od/culturalgeography/a/demotransition.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition

Anon"

Another Art Quiz?

-Title?

-Artist?

-Date?

-Hangs Where?

You did so well with the last one.  pl

Population Decline

"Are Germans an endangered species? Stunning as it may seem, a steep decline in the German population since 1972 and fears the trend will gain pace have led demographers to warn of unsettling consequences.

The number of Germans has declined by 3.2 million — the population of Berlin — over the last 30 years but demographers’ concerns have mostly been ignored until now in a country scarred by the Nazis’ nefarious procreation pressures.

German leaders have now lifted the birth rate to the top of the political agenda for the first time since the Nazi era, and the two ruling parties are trying to outdo each other with pro-family measures.

“Germans are at risk of dying out if the trend continues,” said Harald Michel, managing director of the Institute for Applied Demography. He fears the German population could shrink from 75 million to 50 million by 2050 and further after that.

“The birth rates have been below the replacement rate for 35 years — a lethal development,” he added. “Germans could become an ‘endangered people’. It’s hypothetical now but we may have to think about ‘the last German’ at some point. The problem is compounded each generation. Children not born 30 years ago obviously aren’t there to have children now.”

Germans have long had one of the lowest birth rates in the European Union at 1.3 children per woman — far below the “replacement rate” of 2.1 needed to keep the population stable and about half the rate of 40 years ago." 

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I am now interested in the counterintuitive phenomenon of population decline.  This particular article happens to deal with Germany but the prospect of fewer people appears now to be likely acroos the world.  I would welcome a discussion of this development.  pl

http://www.dawn.com/2006/01/22/int10.htm

Little Boy in Blue?

'On another recent night raid near Muqdadiyah -- based on a tip from the Iraqi police -- U.S. soldiers rolled out in six Humvees expecting to find a half-dozen al-Qaeda in Iraq members in a meeting.  Instead they found a crying mother and her terrified 13-year-old boy.  "Tell him, since he's the oldest one in the house, he's the man of the house, he needs to man-up and stop hiding behind his mother," 1st Lt. Christopher Nogle, 23, of Orlando, instructed his interpreter.  The boy covered his face and sobbed. It was 3 in the morning. He said he didn't know where his father had gone. "Does he love his father?" Nogle asked. "Does he want to see him again?" The small barefoot boy shook with fear and said nothing. "Ask him where his father hides his weapons," Nogle demanded. "I swear to God I don't know," the boy said. "He is not a man, he is scared," said his mother, who was also wailing. "He needs to quit crying. He's responsible for everybody in here right now since his father left; his father abandoned everybody else," Nogle told the boy through his interpreter. "Tell him when his father comes back later tonight or tomorrow that he needs to have a talk with his father, that his father is doing very bad things and it's getting the whole family in trouble."  Washpo

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I wonder if the reporter who wrote this piece was aware of the existence of this famous picture.

We have not had an art quiz for a while:

- Title?

- Artist?

- Where does it hang?

- What is the supposed story told by the picture?

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/21/AR2007042101467.html?hpid=topnews

The Missing Factor

"Second, it is quite clear that four years after U.S. forces first entered Baghdad, U.S. military intelligence and the CIA have failed to achieve widespread penetration of the Sunni terror bombing rings.

One of the reasons why the Viet Cong gambled so heavily on their daring but immensely costly Tet offensive in Vietnam in 1968 was that they were reeling from the success of the CIA's Phoenix counter-insurgency program. Tet was a double-or-nothing gamble to reverse the tide. Although it failed militarily, it achieved its political and strategic goals through its impact on the American public and the U.S. leadership of the time.

But so far, U.S. forces in Iraq, still hobbled by a lack of Arabic speakers and military analysts familiar with the complexities of Iraqi political culture and history, have been unable to make any inroads into the Sunni terror bomb groups comparable to those of the Phoenix program against the Viet Cong."  Sieff

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Sieff is right about the effectiveness of the CIA run Phoenix Program but apparently he is not aware of how effective US Army Intelligence was in Vietnam.  I guess our security was better.

I have attached an unclassified essay that I wrote concerning what Army HUMINT did in Vietnam so long ago.  This essay is in the public domain.

The capability described in this essay was abolished by the ARMY in the '70s and '80s.  Those interested can ask the Army why they did that.  The ability to do this kind of work in support of the field army no longer exists.

Present day tactical commanders each have small "Tactical HUMINT Teams" (THT) attached to them.  The supposed HUMINT people in these THTs are counterintelligence people who are engaged in using untrained and largely unreliable "casual" sources for the purpose of "force protection."  These "sources" are the functional equivalent of police informants rather than controlled intelligence assets.

It might be expected that the CIA or "Defense HUMINT" (DH) would perform this function for the field army but the truth is that their assets are far too thin on the ground to do the kind of "wall to wall" work needed to fully and widely penetrate the bombing networks, identify and locate their members, and enable Army combat leaders at the Brigade and Battalion level to act effectively against the bombers and other targets.

It will be said that this kind of operation is impracticable in Iraq for security reasons and the lack of access to the population that this insecurity imposes.  It will also be said that a lack of area knowledge and language ability are obstacles to "running" this kind of operation in Iraq.  In response I would say that many Army intelligence operations in Vietnam (like mine in 1968-69) were run from surrounded locations which were under more or less continuous attack and using agent handlers who often could not speak Vietnamese.

I have sought to bring this lacuna in army intelligence capability to the attention of those in charge but find them to be disinterested and/or "shy" of recreating this capability, apparently from a fear of doing something with which they are not familiar.

Instead the US Government continues to spend billions of dollars in the attempt to devise a technical or "systems" solution to the problem of finding the bombers. 

Perhaps the future will bring a change in attitude.  pl

Download clandestine_humint_in_support_of_counterinsurgency_operations.doc

http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Analysis/2007/04/18/eye_on_iraq_black_wednesday_in_baghdad/

"Root, Stem and Branch: Home-Grown Radicals and the Limits of Terrorism"

I was invited to participate in this panel at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia on 1 April, 2007.  This was the opening session of a three day conference on terrorism.  pl

http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/index.php/public/forum/forumDetail/3663