Sic Semper Tyrannis

The Evolution of USCYBERCOM - TTG

New Thinking Taking Root 

The essays in this volume describe ways in which U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has evolved over the decade since Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed its establishment in June 2009. Its current commander, Gen. Paul Nakasone, divides the history of the command into overlapping chapters, or “acts.” Act 1 was standing up the command in May 2010. Act 2 was the team-building phase. In 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) began building 133 teams - 6,187 people, both military and civilian. Over the ensuing four years, the Cyber Mission Force increased its capacity and capability, reaching full operational capability in 2018. During act 3, those teams were employed. While still building the force in 2016, Joint Task Force–Ares supported U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command by conducting operations to defeat ISIS in virtual space. In 2018, the Russia Small Group, a USCYBERCOM partnership with the National Security Agency, in coordination with other members of the interagency community, assisted in securing the 2018 midterm elections.

These organizational and operational milestones have been accompanied by an equally important “conceptual” transformation, characterized by General Nakasone in his 2019 Joint Force Quarterly article as a pivot from a “response force” to a “persistence force.” The commander writes, “USCYBERCOM initially focused on defending DOD networks[,]… executing counterterrorism operations, planning to support conventional forces in crisis scenarios, and maintaining capacity to respond to an attack of significant consequence against our critical infrastructure.” The response force concept, holding forces in reserve for war or responding to attacks after the fact, proved to be no match for increasingly capable adversaries operating continuously below the threshold of armed conflict against our critical infrastructure, government networks, defense industries, and academia. “A persistence force has a much higher chance of disrupting adversary plots and protecting Americans, compared with a force that is confined to sporadic reconnaissance” and episodic engagement.  (US Naval War College)

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This is from a chapter in a Naval War College publication entitled “Ten Years In: Implementing Strategic Approaches to Cyberspace.” This particular chapter is by Emily O. Goldman called “The Cyber Paradigm Shift.” These two paragraphs capture the evolution of USCYBERCOM quite nicely. I will add that there is no Cyber Force as a new service to accompany this functional combatant command although the idea has been bandied about for decades. Like other combatant commands, it has service components as shown in the organizational chart above. CYBERCOM’s largest and central component is JFHQ-DODIN (Joint Force Headquarters-Department of Defense Information Network) comprised of all DoD computer networks, some 15,000 networks, their infrastructure and the quarter million personnel (military, civilian and contractor) who run those networks. In essence, this is CYBERCOM’s AOR. This grew from DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency) as it was known in my day.

The final component of CYBERCOM is the Cyber National Mission Force consisting of 133 Cyber Mission Force Teams. These teams are what I would consider the maneuver units of CYBERCOM. The following is from an ARCYBER fact sheet:

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The Cyber National Mission Force plans and conducts cyber operations aimed at disrupting adversaries. The group works against specific nation-state threats and aims to engage those enemies as a means of preventing cyber intrusions. It is often described as having Cyber Command’s best operators.

The Cyber National Mission Force is considered one of the leading groups at Cyber Command in carrying out Nakasone’s philosophy of “persistent engagement.” This approach recognizes that cyber forces must be in constant contact in cyberspace with competitors day to day. A key pillar to that concept is what defense officials are calling “defending forward,” which involves operating outside U.S. networks to face threats as far away from the United States as possible.  (ARCYBER)

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These teams are trained, equipped and maintained by the services. They appear to be platoon size elements of military and civilian personnel. I don’t know if they also have contractors assigned to these teams. Although this is a new concept to me that came about after my retirement, I see how the idea evolved. I created and ran a HUMINT collection detachment that combined clandestine collection, linguistic and technical skills to conduct long term collection operations online. We were a military, civilian and contractor mix from both DIA and NSA in near daily contact with analysts from DIA, NSA and FBI. We provided direct support to JTF-CND (Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense) which operated under SPACECOM. While JTF-CND had numerous surveillance capabilities trying to detect attacks on our systems, we were the only reconnaissance element available to them at the time. We operated in the wild to identify threats and threat actors before, during and after attacks on our systems. We operated in cyber no man’s land and behind enemy lines… over the long haul. I believe we were a, but not the only, precursor to Nakasone’s concept of persistent engagement. My detachment operated under intelligence authorities and restrictions. These cyber mission teams operate under Title 10 authorities. My guess is that their guiding authorities will in many ways mirror those of JSOC forces. 

This cyber national mission force is a very different approach than the creation of the Space Force. One similarity will be that both forces will be comprised of a large number of specially skilled civilians, perhaps even the preponderance of personnel. Time will tell if it works. Contributing to future success is the service’s creation of officer, warrant and enlisted cyber career fields. I’m sure the highest aspiration of uniformed members of these career fields is to be assigned to these cyber mission force teams. 

TTG 

More reading:

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=usnwc-newport-papers (The full Naval War College publication)

https://www.disa.mil/-/media/Files/DISA/News/Events/Symposium-2019/1---COL-Craft_Fight-the-DODIN_approved-Final.ashx   (A short, but informative, PowerPoint briefing on JFHQ-DODIN)

https://www.fifthdomain.com/workforce/career/2017/07/25/heres-how-dod-organizes-its-cyber-warriors/

https://www.lawfareblog.com/defend-forward-us-must-strengthen-cyber-mission-force  (Contains a brief discussion of evolving of cyber resourcing concepts and authorities)

HARPER: THE LESSONS OF STALINGRAD BY STEVE DOUGLAS

After hearing a lecture by my friend Steve Douglas on the lessons of the battle of Stalingrad, I urged him to write this essay on the topic.  Given the current toxic relationship between the United States and Russia--the two predominant thermonuclear-armed states--it is a useful reminder of a crisis moment in world history when the U.S. and Russia were allies against a great common threat.  it primarily serves as an invaluable lesson in the role of the subjective factors and leadership in warfare. 

 

STALINGRAD: A LESSON IN THE PRIMACY OF THE SUBJECTIVE IN WAR

November 19, 2020 marked the 78th anniversary of the strategic counteroffensive that the Soviet Red Army launched against the German Wehrmacht at Stalingrad in World War II. The vast, surprise double-pincered armored envelopment that the Soviets launched that day---from apparently out of nowhere---sealed the fate of the German Army in Russia. It was arguably the turning point of the entire war.

Stalingrad was the biggest battle in the most destructive war in the history of mankind. Soviet casualties in the battle that raged between August 23, 1942 and the surrender of Field Marshal Paulus’s 6th Army on February 2, 1943 numbered 1,129,619, including 478,741 personnel killed or missing. That is, the Soviets suffered more dead and wounded in the Battle of Stalingrad, than the U.S. Armed Forces suffered on all fields of battle combined during the entirety of World War II! (982,800 total casualties, including 416,800 killed or missing).

By the time that the Soviets unleashed their November 19th counteroffensive, the badly battered 62nd Army of General Chuikov, which was the principal Soviet military formation in the meager thousands of square meters that remained of Soviet-controlled Stalingrad, numbered only about 6000 men. What had once been a full-sized army of over 100,000 soldiers, had been reduced in size to less than half of an undersized division! And it was facing round-the-clock assaults from the elite formations of Paulus’s 6th Army and the German Luftwaffe that were more than 30 times its size, with seemingly infinitely greater firepower.

What sustained the Soviet soldiers in the face of these indescribable, almost unimaginable horrors? What enabled them to triumph against such overwhelming odds? Insofar as the imperial arrogance of the members of today’s anti-Russia lobby ominously echoes the anti-Soviet arrogance of German political and military strategists in Hitler’s time, they would be well-advised to consider the answers to these questions, before proceeding any further with their dangerous, ill-considered provocations.

77th Brigade revisited

"The personnel of 77^th Brigade is not that of your typical military unit.

Soldiers in the 77th Brigade, which was formed in 2015, are based in Berkshire and spend their time producing video and audio content, using data to understand how the public receives different messages, and creating “attitude and sentiment awareness” from large sets of social media data

One of their most infamous members is Gordon MacMillan, a Senior Twitter executive. He joined the social media company’s UK office in 2013, and has for several years also served with the 77th Brigade, a unit formed in 2015 to develop “non-lethal” ways of waging war.

The 77th Brigade uses social media platforms such as Twitter, Instagram and Facebook, as well as podcasts, data analysis and audience research to conduct what the head of the UK military, General Nick Carter, describes as “information warfare”.

Carter says the 77th Brigade is giving the British military “the capability to compete in the war of narratives at the tactical level” and to shape perceptions of conflict. Some soldiers who have served with the unit say they have been engaged in operations intended to change the behaviour of target audiences.

What exactly MacMillan is doing with the unit is difficult to determine, however: he has declined to answer any questions about his role, as has Twitter and the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Twitter would say only that “we actively encourage all our employees t  o pursue external interests”. The MoD said that the 77th Brigade had no relationship with Twitter, other than using it for communication.

The current training regime of the soldiers is unclear. Back in 2008, an annual report by 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group showed that there was a “robust training” going on for all incoming troops, and current ones as well.

This involved internal, as well as external trainings."

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There is something vaguely ominous about all this.  The US capability to do similar things is spread all over the government;  CIA, USAID, Army Psyops, USIA, etc.

This UK thing is consolidated, has a lot of social media people and academics as reservists and has the typical clubbiness of British upper class institutions.  I wonder what the tie looks like.

The White Helmet film company has to be connected to this as well as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Interesting.  pl

https://southfront.org/influence-and-outreach-the-uks-evolving-psyops-capability/

Happy Anniversary to The World Turned Upside Down by Fred

On the 17th of October, 1781 – General Charles Cornwallis offers his surrender to the Americans at Yorktown, Virginia. Let's raise a glass and listen along to the song that brings such cheer.

"HOUTHIS STRIKE RIYADH WITH MISSILES AND DRONES..."

"Late on September 10, the Saudi capital of Riyadh came under a missile and drone attack from the Ansar Allah movement (more widely known as the Houthis).

The Yemeni missile and air forces, loyal to the Houthi government, announced that they struck a “high-value target” in Riyadh with a Zulfiqar ballistic missile and three Samad-3 suicide drones.

“The attacks are a response to the enemy’s permanent escalation and its continuing blockade against our country,” Brig. Gen. Yahya Sari, a spokesman for the Armed Forces of the Houthi government, said in a statement promising more attacks on Saudi Arabia if the Kingdom “continues its aggression and siege” on Yemen.

The Houthis revealed the Samad-3 combat drone, which also can be used as a loitering munition, in 2019. At that time, they claimed that it has a range of up to 1,500km. As to the Zulfiqar ballistic missile, it is one of a variety of ballistic and even cruise missiles widely employed by the Houthis against Saudi-affiliated targets.

Commenting on the September 10 attack, a spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition said that Houthi forces launched the missiles and drones at civilian targets in Saudi Arabia, without giving more details.

Every Houthi strike on a target inside Saudi Arabia is a painful blow to the Kingdom. Even without the almost lost war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been passing through an economic and political crisis. So, it prefers to deny any damage or casualties as a result of such attacks, simultaneously censoring and silencing reports in social media."  SF

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I wonder if Pompous the Great is still mocking and menacing analysts in State INR when they try to tell him that the Yemenis are the people shooting up Saudi deep targets and not the Iranians?  The Iranians have trained a number of Houthi and Yemeni Army engineers but they are building on skills that were already there.  When I was DATT in the YAR in the early 80s, the Yemen Air Force had SCUDS that they operated successfully against rebel targets in the SE quadrant of North Yemen. 

Marib Province is the eastern, desert  region of norther Yemen.  It extends for some distance into the Rub al Khali (Empty Quarter) desert of Saudi Arabia.  Some of the most recent Houthi missile and drone attacks were directed at Saudi sponsored military activities in that region even as the Ansar Allah (Houthis) advance into that region.  There are important oil/gas deposits in the province and the Houthis could use the money.  pl

https://southfront.org/houthis-strike-riyadh-with-missiles-and-drones/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%CA%BCrib

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samad_(UAV)

The labyrinth known as Libya - TTG

When we last visited Libya, we saw the demise of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi at the hands of various Libyan rebel forces. Those videos are now tagged with a graphic content warning on YouTube. His gruesome death with a knife up his arse, a bullet in his head and his carcass on display in a Misrata grocer’s freezer should have been a warning of what was to come. Even Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, on the day of his capture issued a strong warning to his captors about Libya’s new radical leaders and the risk of internal divisions. Of course he was only talking about particular Islamist leaders among the rebels. Even he didn’t foresee the danger of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  Those jihadists had their moment, but neither of the current warring factions in Libya have any use for them. At least there’s that.

Ah yes. How could I forget Benghazi. We all remember the killing of Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi on 11 September 2012 and the ensuing four years of Congressional investigations. But that’s another story.  

Some time after the killing of Ambassador Stevens, the USG started developing plans to begin rebuilding a new Libyan Army starting in 2015. It definitely would have been a much tougher mission than rebuilding the Lebanese Army in 1983. It would have taken an entire SF Group and various supporting elements fully deployed for several years. Given our existing deployments at the time, I doubt this mission ever got past the initial planning stage… if that far. If we were at all serious about this endeavor, we should have started planning before the first American bomb fell on Qadaffi’s forces.

 

"Not good at the 'vision thing.'" George Bush '41

"Between 1995 and 2009, $32 billion was expended on programs such as the Future Combat System^[220] (2003-2009), with no harvestable content by the time of its cancellation.^[221] The Army has not fielded a new combat system in decades.^{[222][93][223][224][35]}

Secretary of the Army Mark Esper has remarked that AFC will provide the unity of command and purpose needed to reduce the requirements definition phase from 60 months to 12 months.^{[225][25][54]} A simple statement of a problem (rather than a full-blown requirements definition) that the Army is trying to address may suffice for a surprising, usable solution. —General Mike Murray, paraphrasing Trae Stephens^{[43]:minute 41:50} (One task will be to quantify the lead time for identifying a requirement; the next task would then be to learn how to reduce that lead time.—Gap analysis )^{[30]:minute 11:00[226][227][5]} Process changes are expected.^[226][48] The development process will be cyclic, consisting of prototype, demonstration/testing, and evaluation, in an iterative process designed to unearth unrealistic requirements early, before prematurely including that requirement in a program of record. The ASA(ALT) Bruce Jette^[156] has cautioned the acquisition community to 'call-out' unrealistic processes which commit a program to a drawn-out failure,^[228] rather than failing early, and seeking another solution.^[229]

Secretary Esper scrubbed through 800^[230] modernization programs to reprioritize funding^[231] for the top 6 modernization priorities,^[60] which will consume 80% of the modernization funding,^[232] of 18 systems.^[232] The Budget Control Act will restrict funds by 2020.^{[233][234][235][236][237][238][239][240][241][31][32][242][243][244]} Secretary McCarthy has cautioned that a stopgap 2019 Continuing resolution (CR) would halt development of some of the critical modernization projects.^[245][246] Realistically, budget considerations will restrict the fielding of new materiel to one Armor BCT per year;^[247] at that rate, updates would take decades.^[247][243] The Budget Control Act (BCA) expires in 2022.^[248][249] The "night court" budget review process realigned $2.4 billion for modernization away from programs which were not tied to modernization or to the 2018 National Defense Strategy.^[250] The total FY2021 budget request of $178 billion is $2 billion less than the enacted FY2020 budget of $180 billion.  wiki on AFC

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Me dear ol' da' (a cynical old soldier if ever there was one) served for 34 years and cautioned me that "in the Regular Army we cut off anything that sticks out."  That glorious tradition is still alive.

The Army Futures Command, like many previous attempts at enabling rigorous but unimaginative thinkers to try to do "the vision thing"  will probably solve few problems.  The folks they are dealing with just aren't up to the task.  These guys are better suited to drawing up railroad timetables than they are at making an intuitive leap.

This reminds of the British Army leadership who tried to resist the introduction of machine guns before 1914 and who thought that motor vehicles were a bad thing because they would frighten the horses.  To be fair the Ordnance Department of the US Army successfully resisted the introduction of breech loading cannon and repeating rifles on the basis of an anticipated prodigal use of ammunition by the troops.  That was in 1860.

I wish Esper and McCarthy lots of luck in this effort to induce streamlined, creative thought.  They will need it.  The desire to reduce such thought to smaller and smaller bits run by interlocking committees is overwhelming among the people they are working with.  pl

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Futures_Command

Marine Corps returning to its roots - TTG

"The 2018 National Defense Strategy redirected the Marine Corps’ mission focus from countering violent extremists in the Middle East to great power/peer-level competition, with special emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. Such a profound shift in missions, from inland to littoral, and from non-state actor to peer competitor, necessarily requires substantial adjustments in how we organize, train, and equip our Corps. A return to our historic role in the maritime littoral will also demand greater integration with the Navy and a reaffirmation of that strategic partnership. As a consequence, we must transform our traditional models for organizing, training, and equipping the force to meet new desired ends, and do so in full partnership with the Navy." (Department of the Navy)

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This is the lead paragraph of “Force Design 2030” laying out the USMC Commandant’s guidance for transforming the Corps from a land force competing with US Army missions to an integral part of the US Navy focused on littorial operations. It is a long overdue return to the Corps’ original mission and focus much like the Pacific island hopping campaign of World War II.

 The majority of the articles dealing with this are focusing on the decision to jettison the three Abrams tank battalions. The Marines will also drop three infantry battalions and exchange most of its tube artillery for rocket artillery (perhaps MLRS) as well as a good chunk of its vertical lift capability and even some of its assault amphibian capabilities. They also plan to greatly increase the UAV capability and reduce the manpower of the remaining 21 active infantry battalions by 200. In conjunction with the Navy, the Marines are planning for smaller, lower signature and more affordable amphibious assault ships even mentioning an LST sized ship.

As important as these changes will be, the more important change is in how the Marines intend to fight. Rather than the standard two up, one back, high-diddle-diddle, straight up the middle approach, the Commandant says his Marines must be capable of distributed operations. I first read of these distributed operations about 25 years ago when the Marines conducted a field exercise with an infantry battalion operating as small independent units over a wide battlefield. The results of the exercise impressed USMC leadership. General Michael Hagee, then Marine Commandant, defined it thusly. “Distributed operations is the coordinated interdependent action by dispersed small units that are task organized for the mission, throughout the breadth and depth of the battlespace, ordered and connected within an operational design focused on a common aim,  and with increased access to functional support.” 

Small units operating independently is not new. Companies, platoons and even squads operating independently is something widely practiced in the Army and probably in the Marines as well. The difference lies in a high degree of inter-coordination among these independent units along with a high degree of coordination with supporting fires. Every rifle squad must be capable of also functioning as scout-snipers and an ANGLICO team. In addition, Marines will have to know how to set up, operate and secure unsupported FAARPs and temporary MLRS firing points. That’s a lot to ask of a jarhead. SOF practice these things. Jarheads don’t. Nor do grunts. To this end, General David Berger, the current Commandant of Marines, calls for a complete revamping of current entry level and advanced infantry training programs to meet the demands of distributed operation. Although he doesn’t mention it, this doctrinal change will call for an equally far reaching revamping of Marine officer training. 

These changes are a tall order. At least they won’t be wasting their time trying to compete to be another Army. They may end up being a much smaller Corps than envisioned in “Force Design 2030.” That’s not a bad thing if they become a littorial force capable of distributed operations.

BTW, the painting above is the "Attack on Derna" by Charles Waterhouse. It shows Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon and his Marines attacking Derna. What the Marines don't tell you is that the attack was led by US Army Captain William Eaton. Eaton was also the US Consul at Tunis. With little support and fewer resources, Eaton raised an army of Arab tribesman and Greek mercenaries. He attacked and took Derna with the help of Lieutenant O'Bannon's Marines. I like to think of Eaton as a forerunner of the Green Berets. DOL 

TTG

https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460

https://news.usni.org/2020/03/23/new-marine-corps-cuts-will-slash-all-tanks-many-heavy-weapons-as-focus-shifts-to-lighter-littoral-forces

On War - BOOK 3 • CHAPTER 5 "The Military Virtue of an Army" Clausewitz

("Heads up gentlemen!  Those are bullets not turds.")

Someone wrote yesterday to express the belief that the capability of the SAA must have greatly declined over the past years.  He said he believed thaton the basis of the SAA's long experience of war in their homeland against a cruel medieval collection of fanatics who give no quarter and ask none.  And now the SAA faces a huge national army heavily equipped  and commanded at the political level by a scoundrel who has no shame and who has largely destroyed the republican qualities instilled into the Turks by the father of their country Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.  

It is an error to believe that the quality or strength of an army necessarily declines in a long war.  In fact the opposite is often true as experience, the great teacher, instructs in ways that training courses never can. Leadership improves as the incompetent and cowardly depart.  The pride of the soldiers in their units grows as they come to think of themselves as members of brotherhoods for whom only the ultimate end can mark a limit of their fellow feeling.  If there is added to that a substantial recruitment of new men who can be brought into that brotherhood and first rate equipment replacements of the sort the Russians provide, there is no reason that what Clausewitz calls military virtue should not steadily grow.  pl

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"This is distinguished from mere bravery, and still more from enthusiasm for the business of war. The first is certainly a necessary constituent part of it, but in the same way as bravery, which is a natural gift in some men, may arise in a soldier as a part of an army from habit and custom, so with him it must also have a different direction from that which it has with others. It must lose that impulse to unbridled activity and exercise of force which is its characteristic in the individual, and submit itself to demands of a higher kind, to obedience, order, rule, and method. Enthusiasm for the profession gives life and greater fire to the military virtue of an army, but does not necessarily constitute a part of it.

War is a special business (and however general its relations may be, and even if all the male population of a country, capable of bearing arms, exercise this calling, still it always continues to be), different and separate from the other pursuits which occupy the life of man.—To be imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this business, to make use of, to rouse, to assimilate into the system the powers which should be active in it, to penetrate completely into the nature of the business with the understanding, through exercise to gain confidence and expertness in it, to be completely given up to it, to pass out of the man into the part which it is assigned to us to play in war, that is the military virtue of an army in the individual.

However much pains may be taken to combine the soldier and the citizen in one and the same individual, whatever may be done to nationalise wars, and however much we may imagine times have changed since the days of the old Condottieri, never will it be possible to do away with the individuality of the business; and if that cannot be done, then those who belong to it, as long as they belong to it, will always look upon themselves as a kind of guild, in the regulations, laws and customs of which the spirits of war fix themselves by preference. And so it is in fact. Even with the most decided inclination to look at war from the highest point of view, it would be very wrong to look down upon this corporate spirit (esprit de corps) which may and should exist more or less in every army. This corporate spirit forms the bond of union between the natural forces which are active in that which we have called military virtue. The crystals of military virtue have a greater affinity for the spirit of a corporate body than for anything else.

An army which preserves its usual formations under the heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch, which, proud in the feeling of its victories, never loses its sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat; an army with all its physical powers, inured to privations and fatigue by exercise, like the muscles of an athlete; an army which looks upon all its toils as the means to victory, not as a curse which hovers over its standards, and which is always reminded of its duties and virtues by the short catechism of one idea, namely the honour of its arms;—Such an army is imbued with the true military spirit.

 

Some thoughts on Idlib Dawn - TTG

The seesaw events of the last few days can be examined from the political dancing and posturing of the major players and from the combatants’ maneuvers on the battlefield. Obviously there is a lot of interplay between the two, but I think it is the soldiers who are driving this train rather than the politicians. I'm also way more comfortable at the grazing fire level than wallowing among the political class.

The SAA still is composed of a few well trained, well led and well equipped combined arms units capable of sustained heavy combat. They are constantly moved to where they are needed most. Most of the SAA positions are manned by lightly armed National Defense Forces (NDF) and local militias. These forces essentially man a picket line against the jihadis. They can defend against light probes, but cannot withstand a major jihadi assault especially when those jihadis are supported by Turkish artillery and armor. That is what happened at Saraqib when the 25th Division and Liwa al Quds were withdrawn to attack the al Zawhiya Mountains and the M4 from the south. It happened again when the 25th and Liwa Al Quds pulled out of that offensive to deal with Saraqib for the second time. Fortunately, the NDF and militias were able to withdraw rather than being overrun and destroyed.

In the face of the SAA success in Operation Idlib Dawn, Erdogan slowly ratcheted up the use of the Turkish Army to bolster his jihadi allies on the battlefield. The SAA adjusted. However, bombing of the convoy resulting in the death of thirty plus Turkish soldiers drove Erdogan to find a way to assuage his embarrassment. I think his retaliation with MLRS, artillery and drone strikes surprised the SAA and the Russians as well. Perhaps the Russians first thought the Turkish strikes were a face saving measure and would stop after the initial strikes. Erdogan thought this Russian pause was a sign of weakness and did not stop his attacks. Another blunder. The R+6 adjusted once again. SAA air defenses were moved to the battlefield. Russian air strikes increased. It appears Russian EW units are now in action against Turkish drones. The SAA is still not directly targeting the Turks, but if the Turks are hanging abound the jihadis, the SAA does not hesitate to strike. With all the Turkish equipment and uniforms supplied to the jihadis, it getting difficult to tell them apart. Russia has told Turkey they could not guarantee the safety of Turkish aircraft over Syria. I believe the Iranians have also warned Turkey that all those surrounded Turkish observation posts were under direct observation and could easily be under direct fire. Erdogan’s bluff has been called.

The jihadis are suffering from a lack of sufficient assault troops in spite of Turkish largesse. After retaking Saraqib with several days of relentless assaults and heavy casualties, they pulled many of their fighters off the battlefield to address the threat to the M4 to their west. They could not hold Saraqib and attack south of the M4 at the same time. Their chance to retake Saraqib is now gone. The Russians have moved their MPs into Saraqib as a signal to Erdogan that it is forever part of Syria.

The jihadi counteroffensive in southern Idlib was blunted in a unique way. The SAA in Kafr Nabl let the word that they have withdrawn from Kafr Nabl be spread on social media. In reality, the SAA remained in hidden positions in the town hoping to lure the jihadis into an ambush. It worked. The jihadis advanced and were annihilated. The SAA immediately counterattacked and retook two additional towns. I don’t know what SAA unit this was. It could very well have been an NDF outfit. They are learning. The jihadis are whining about Spetsnaz operating in the area. Maybe they are, maybe they’re not. I actually hope there are Russian advisors working with those second tier NDF units, advising and calling in air strikes. This ambush is something I would have advised them to do. I love the ambush.

The Russians are rapidly replacing the SAA’s battlefield losses in equipment and are not withholding air support to the SAA. Neither Moscow nor Damascus are impressed by Erdogan’s latest histrionics. Trump and the DoD has said no dice to Erdogan’s request for help. It does appear that Pompeo is still trying to drum up some kind of support for “our staunch NATO ally.”

I predict the R+6 will secure both the M4 and M5 in the coming weeks, but will leave Idlib city for another day. They have to let the Turkish frog boil a little longer before he will accept the fact that Idlib is a Syrian city without throwing another hissy fit. He’ll also have to figure out what he’s going to do with all those jihadi friends of his. Libya isn’t going his way, either. 

TTG 

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-retakes-the-large-city-of-saraqib-after-fierce-battle/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/russia-deploys-military-to-saraqib-in-clear-message-to-turkey/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-turns-the-table-in-southern-idlib-retakes-ground-in-jabal-al-zawiya/

“Syrian Army in full control of Aleppo-Damascus Highway for first time 8 years” - TTG

BEIRUT, LEBANON (12:10 P.M.) – The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is officially in full control of the Aleppo-Damascus Highway (M-5) after eight years of battle. The Syrian Army said they captured the last points along the highway on Tuesday evening, when their forces took control of the strategic town of Khan Al-‘Assal and the nearby Rashiddeen 4 sector in southwestern Aleppo.

According to the Syrian Army, their forces were able to achieve this imperative victory after capturing several important sites in eastern Idlib, including the cities of Saraqib and Ma’arat Al-Nu’man. While the Aleppo-Damascus Highway is under their control, the roadway will not likely be reopened to the public until the Syrian Army pushes west towards the Turkish border.

The reason for this is due to the fact that the jihadist rebels of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and their allies from the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front (NLF) still maintain a presence along the western part of the Aleppo-Damascus Highway. Furthermore, there are still grave concerns of a potential large-scale Turkish military offensive to reclaim the areas lost by the jihadist rebels over the last few weeks.  (AMN)

————

A lot went on in the last week to get to this point. I and other observers saw this clearing of the M5 as the objective of this phase of operation Idlib Dawn. The SAA is still on the offensive and may be aiming for more. One thing is for certain. The jihadis are having their asses handed to them.

Let’s look at the SAA’s progress in maps. I wish I could make one of those animated battlefield maps like the American Battlefield Trust created for many of our Civil War battles, but that’s beyond my reach.  You’ll have to settle for this series of borrowed maps along with my comments. Most of the recent action took place well north of Saraqib and Idlib.  The 25th Special operations Division continued to move north along the M5 forcing the jihadis east of that highway to retreat to avoid encirclement. The 25th linked up with the Republican Guard near Al Barfoum and Zerbeh along the M5 on 8 February. At that point, the 25th did the unexpected. They struck northwest from ICARDA agricultural research station towards Kafr Aleppo.

 

The axis of this advance took the high ground in the middle of the Idlib plain. It appeared the 25th was heading towards Kafr Nouran, Al Atarib and the Bab al Hawa Highway, Turkey’s main supply route to Idlib.

Operation Idlib Dawn Resumes - TTG

Front lines prior to the start of the offensive

During the last few weeks, the SAA redeployed its forces to the eastern side of the Idlib front. This included moving the 4th Armored Division from Jish al Shigour to Aleppo. In addition to the 4th Division, the SAA order of battle along this front includes three divisions of the 3rd and 4th Corps, 4 brigades of the 5th Corps, the Republican Guard 30th Division along with the 25th Special forces Division and Liwa al Quds.  

The northern sector of this front, west of Aleppo was the most difficult area to make an advance due to the urban density of the western suburbs and strong jihadi defenses. The jihadis brought reinforcements into this area during the last weeks, most of them with experience in urban combat. This area is far more critical to the jihadis’ and Turkey’s desire to maintain a presence in the Aleppo-Idlib region. This is where the jihadis will defend. To the south, especially in the Maarat al Numan area, the jihadis probably see the will of Allah in eventually being driven out just as they were from Khan Sheikhun. 

The offensive operation began on 24 January and unfolded as expected. SouthFront did a good writeup of the actions of the weekend along with a nice little video. I recommend you review that article and video, along with the maps I’ve included, for a good synopsis. 

https://southfront.org/syrian-war-report-january-24-27-2020-maarat-al-numan-is-about-to-fall-to-syrian-army/

SAA gains on 26 January
SAA gains on 27 January

I watched as various tweeters and rumor mills reported the actions during the weekend. I am not surprised as the SAA’s progress. I gather Erdogan is not surprised either. At the same time he was sending a couple thousand of his jihadis to Libya, he was crying like a rat eating onions to Putin begging for a ceasefire in Idlib. Russian and Syrian aerospace forces have been pounding the living daylights out of the jihadis for weeks, slowing only during occasional bouts of bad weather. I noticed a video of jihadis all in helmets and body armor. I’m sure this is in response to the continuous R+6 air and artillery bombardment. 

I think the overall plan for this offensive was brilliant. The SAA massed enough forces along the entire front to prevent the jihadis from launching a successful counterattack to relieve pressure on Maarat al Numan or the western outskirts of Aleppo. This also prevented the jihadis from concentrating their forces as either of these objectives. 

Conservation of forces seems to be the order of the day for both sides. The jihadis are choosing to withdraw under heavy air and rocket fire (SAA BM-21 Grad) rather than DIP (die in place). As the jihadis withdraw, the SAA is not rushing in immediately. They have learned that the jihadis often launch strong counterattacks before the SAA can consolidate on the objective. I disagree with SouthFront about the SAA storming Maarat al Numan. I believe they are trying to force them to vacate the city on their own. The Syrian Army Air Force has already destroyed several jihadi convoys as they attempted to flee to the north on the M5 and to the west. The SAA also discovered and destroyed a large tunnel from Maarat al Numan to the Idlib countryside. Rather than storming the city or fully surrounding it, I believe the 25th Special Forces Division (formerly known as the Tiger Force) will advance north along the M5 towards Saraqib. This will support the SAA units attacking from the east. 

Judging by the videos, this still appears to be a platoon leader’s war. Assaults are undertaken by groups of 20 to 30 infantryman supported by a tank and a couple of BMPs. Perhaps that’s why consolidation on the objective remains such a fragile time for the SAA. This also is a caveat about the SAA order of battle. All those divisions and brigades are nowhere near the size of Western units. If those regiments and brigades are battalion size, I’d be surprised. SAA tanks are often used as sniper platforms. I have seen no videos of mass armor assaults even though this seems to be excellent tank country. The reason for this may be that this is also excellent country for ATGMs. This emphasis on conservation of forces developed during the darkest days of the Syrian war before the Russians were persuaded to intervene by Qasem Soleimani. The SAA could not afford to squander the few forces it had left. It's a healthy approach for any military.

I’m confident that this offensive will end with the entire M5 under the SAA’s control at the very least. The question is what’s next? Will the SAA head for the city of Idlib and approach Jisr al Shigour from the west or will they concentrate on widening control around Aleppo. All in good time, my friends, all in good time.

TTG

The Strike - TTG

It’s been a good 48 hours since Iran’s missile strike at Ayn al-Assad and Erbil. Both Washington and Tehran stared into the abyss and did not like what they saw. We averted a full fledged shooting war through a little skill, a lot of fear and a healthy dose of luck. I’m sad to say that the skill was Iranian, particularly the skill of the IRGC Aerospace Force.

There is still no Western consensus on the number of missiles fired or what type were fired. Based on various reports, the IRGC Aerospace Force launched anywhere from ten to twenty two missiles. Most of the missiles were solid fueled one stage Fateh type SRBMs (short range ballistic missiles), either Fateh-313 or Zolfaghar. The Fateh-313 became operational in 2015 and has a 500 km range and is touted as being highly accurate due to Iranian advances in satellite guidance systems made in the last fifteen years. The Zolfaghar, developed from the Fateh-313, has a range of up to 800 km was introduced in 2016. Both these SRBMs have an estimated CEP (circular error probable) of 100 meters. In addition to the Fateh-313 or Zolfaghar SRBMs, a smaller number of Qiam-1 SRBMs were fired, probably at Erbil. The Qiam-1 is a liquid fuel SRBM with a range of 800 km, a payload of 750 kg and a CEP of 500 meters. The IRGC fired both Zolfagars and Qaiam-1s into the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria in June 2017 targeting IS jihadis. All these SRBMs are roughly equivalent to Russia’s Iskandar SRBM.

A CEP of either 100 or 500 meters is not pinpoint accuracy. But the Pentagon is saying that Iran intentionally missed US troops at the bases. This demonstrates one thing… Iran has a high degree of confidence in her missiles. You don’t launch  missiles over hundreds of miles, with the intention of deliberately missing your enemy’s troops, unless you are really confident in your missiles’ CEP. Last year’s DIA study on “Iranian Military Power” had this to say on the precision of Iranian missile forces.

“The use of improved guidance technology and maneuverability during the terminal phase of flight enables these missiles to be used more effectively against smaller targets, including specific military facilities and ships at sea,” the Defense Intelligence Agency said in its most recent assessment of Iran’s military. “These enhancements could reduce the miss-distance of some Iranian missiles to as little as tens of meters, potentially requiring fewer missiles to damage or destroy an intended target and broadening Iran’s options for missile use.”  (DIA)

Even so, I seriously doubt the IRGC made a special effort to not kill or injure Americans. Although it was not the primary objective of the strike, they certainly wouldn’t have cried over our casualties. However, Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force did say during a press conference today that “the strikes were not meant to cause fatalities. We intended to deliver a blow to the enemy’s military machine.” He also said he fired only thirteen missiles, but prepared several hundred for launch. He was clearly not worried about some level of US casualties, not with the possibility of hundreds of missiles. He definitely got our attention and with only thirteen missiles and a threat to take the crazy train all the way to Hell if that's what we wanted. Even General Milley said he believed the attack was meant to be deadly. At least he got that right.

I was shocked that not one Iranian missile was intercepted. It appears CENTCOM did not even have a capability to intercept missiles at the Ayn al-Assad Air Base. That is military incompetence. A slew of officers should be relieved for that egregious incompetence including the CINC CENTCOM. No wonder the neocon wonder boys in the Pentagon and White House decided not to join the dance in the wee hours after the Iranian strike. Talk about scared straight.

Iran is not done. As General Hajizadeh said in today’s briefing, the strike “was the starting point of a great operation.” The Iranians and their regional allies are controlling the tempo of operations to their advantage. They will now fight us on their terms to pursue their immediate goal of removing our forces and influence from Iraq and Syria. As Colonel Lang said, we should get out of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and not stop there. We need to leave Israel, Jordan Saudi Arabia and Lebanon as well. 

TTG

https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf

https://southfront.org/top-irgc-commander-confirms-iranian-missile-strike-was-aimed-at-military-machine-not-troops/

Idlib battle footage - TTG

ANNA News has some excellent footage of recent combat in Idlib. It shows some 25th Special Mission Forces Division units on the attack. You get a good feel for the nature of the combat with small, combined arms units operating over fairly open terrain. Note the centrality of light infantry even in what can be best considered tank country. Note that this light infantry is unburdened by a 100 pounds of high speed gear, body armor or even helmets. I can relate to that. Note also the extensive jihadi trench works and underground shelters facing that light infantry. The 25th makes good use of various direct fire supporting weapons as well as artillery and aerial support. 

Bad weather is grounding/limiting Russian and Syrian air support for a few days. The 25th has paused their offensive while it rests and resupplies before continuing their attacks. The 5th Corps and Liwa Al Quds are keeping the pressure on the jihadis. The SAA goal is to take both Ma’arat Al-Nu’man and Saraqib to the north. Saraqib is at the critical junction of the M4 and M5 highways.

TTG

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/never-before-seen-battle-footage-from-syrian-army-offensive-in-southeast-idlib/ 

SAA at the gates of Ma’arat Al-Nu’man - TTG

BEIRUT, LEBANON (12:20 A.M.) – The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) continued their advance in the southeastern countryside of the Idlib Governorate this evening, as their troops seized more ground from the jihadist rebels. Led by the 25th Special Mission Forces Division (formerly Tiger Forces), the Syrian Arab Army has announced the capture of Al-Ghadfah after advancing north of Jarjanaz and east of Khirbat Ma’ratah in southeastern Idlib.

At the same time, the Syrian Army’s 5th Corps is still pushing northwest towards the Idlib-Hama Highway as they look to isolate another Turkish observation post in the Idlib Governorate.

As a result of these latest advances, the Syrian Arab Army now finds themselves approaching the gates of Ma’arat Al-Nu’man, which is a major city along the Idlib-Hama Highway.

In the coming hours, the Syrian Arab Army will attempt to capture the last remaining towns and villages under militant control before they begin the encirclement of Ma’arat Al-Nu’man. (Al Masdar News)

—————

The SAA has been preparing for an offensive to take Ma’arat Al-Nu’man for several weeks at least. In addition to the 25th Division, the 5th Corps and Liwaa Al-Quds are spearheading the offensive along with a host of supporting troops and militia units. Enough mass, I believe, to sustain the offensive until victory is achieved.

Just prior to the start of the SAA offensive, the jihadis of HTS launched their own offensive, a spoiling attack. The gamble did not pay off. The jihadis were able to advance in the first few hours, but were then beaten back… badly. Jihadi losses were around two hundred KIA/WIA along with a lot of equipment. These losses left the jihadis ill prepared to face the SAA offensive. Jihadi defensive positions, already shattered by weeks of aerial and artillery bombardment, fell quickly all along the front. In four days of fighting, the SAA took 35 towns and villages.

This will be a decisive victory with Damascus regaining control over most of the M5 and a good part of Idlib governorate. The Turks will probably have to relocate two, if not three, of their OPs.

In the meantime, Christmas celebrations continue in Aleppo.

Through the efforts and sacrifices of the SAA, these scenes will one day be possible throughout Syria. FIDO, my brothers, FIDO!

TTG

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-nearly-at-the-gates-of-maarat-al-numan-in-southeast-idlib/

https://southfront.org/russian-military-200-militants-killed-wounded-in-southern-idlib-clashes/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-scores-another-big-advance-in-southeast-idlib-3-towns-captured/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-completes-encirclement-of-turkish-military-post-in-southeast-idlib/

You do not deliberately kill civilians or prisoners!

"Lieutenant Lorance was convicted at trial in 2013 for ordering the shooting of a group of civilians in Afghanistan, an order he then tried to cover up. He was given a full pardon.

Chief Gallagher was charged with the murder of a captive in Iraq but was acquitted this summer of all charges except for the minor charge of posing for a photo with a corpse.

Major Golsteyn was awaiting trial on charges that he murdered an unarmed Afghan in 2010.  NY Times

-------------

Someone asked me today what I thought of these pardons.  This is a tough one because war is inherently violent and violence means killing people as well as the destruction of mere things.

Situations on an active battlefield are often ambiguous and peoples' blood is up in the heat of battle.  Are enemy wounded often killed in the midst of an ongoing action?  Yes they are and to think that will change is to betray ignorance of what it is to fight.  Soldiers are not policemen.  They exist to kill people and destroy things in pursuit of their country or movement's policy.  If you cannot cope with that reality, then you should campaign endlessly for universal disarmament and an end to nations. 

To take some of the edge off the savagery of war, the West developed  codes of rules, customs and laws that attempt to impose limits on the  conduct of war.  These have often been violated.  Winston Churchill wrote in "The River War"  of the way the completely victorious Anglo-Egyptian Army left the Mahdi Army's wounded to die on the battlefield at Omdurman.  There were thousands of them.  "Dead men don't bite" was the spirit of the day.  The crimes of the Imperial Japanese Army in WW2 were too numerous to need recounting.  This in spite of Japan having adhered to the various Geneva Conventions.  I have always been strongly opposed to the Strategic Air Power doctrines of various air forces.  These concepts were originated by Douhet, Trenchard, Curtis Lemay and many others  They can be summarized as advocating bombing civilian populations until they force their governments to surrender.

For the ground forces soldier the basic law of war both international and national is that you do not kill or injure prisoners in your possession so long as they accept their status and you do not deliberately harm civilians so long as they do not take up arms against you.  Do you shell towns that you have to attack even though the towns may contain civilians?  You do.  There seems to be no way to avoid that.

To that end UCMJ is very clear.  It is quite well established in US military law that this law will be applied, and I support that policy.  In addition to the immorality of of killing the helpless it is true that soldiers who are allowed to kill or maim unarmed people quickly become unmanageable as individuals or as a force.

Any officer with combat experience knows that.  pl

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/us/trump-pardon-military.html

Ap Bu Nho - A Remembrance for Veteran's Day

 

Garryowen in Glory, the 7th Cavalry Regiment at Ap Bu Nho 

By a quirk of fate, “D” 2/7 Cavalry, was given the chance to demonstrate the plausibility of Spinoza’s despair several weeks later.  A Montagnard agent reported that the 141^st NVA Regiment was temporarily in position just to the west of the Montagnard resettlement village of Ap (village) Bu Nho about 20 kilometers southwest of Song Be.  This village, like several others in Phuoc Long province, had been created in the course of earlier years of war and migration throughout Indochina.  It was perfectly rectangular, three streets wide and five hundred feet long with the long axis running east-west, with a dirt road extending to the tar two lane road connecting Song Be with the south.  The Song Be River passed north-south to the west of the village.  There was a roughly circular patch of woods just northwest of the village.  The wood was about one kilometer in diameter.  The river ran along the west side of the wood.  On the eastern side of the wood, there was a large open “field” covered with grass nearly hip high.  The field extended along the whole northern side of the village out to the tar road and beyond.  The inhabitants were three or four hundred in number, living in tribal style in long houses and other small flimsily built shacks.  They had originally lived in the area of Camp Roland in the northeastern corner of PhuocLongProvince, and had moved or been moved to this site during the First Indochina War.  They were S’tiengan people.  The agent was one of them and lived in Bu Nho. 

I drove to Landing Zone  “Buttons” with this information to visit the command post of the Second Battalion, Seventh Cavalry, then operating out of the landing zone.  In the underground facility, I talked to the S-2 (Intelligence Staff Officer) of the battalion.  I had been providing this officer with information for some time.  An example had been the information that led to the BDA mission mentioned above.  While we two intelligence officers were discussing the report, the lieutenant colonel commanding 2/7 Cav entered the command post.  He was new, having arrived in country within the previous month, and having joined the battalion the week before.  In his late thirties, blond, and in his new found dignity, he had a “lean and hungry look.”  The S-2 introduced me to him, told him how valuable the detachment’s information had been in the past.  The Bn. CO seemed to have a hard time understanding who I was.  In talking to me he seemed to be more interested in “showing off” for his operations staff who had followed him into the bunker than in listening.  The idea of an intelligence officer resident in the province who had brought him information seemed more than he could handle.  After a few minutes, he tired of the whole thing, and asked to be shown on the map.  After a glance, he asked the S-3, another superior being and soi-disant tactical virtuoso, what “D” Company was doing the next day.  The major said that “D” was in LZ “Buttons” resting and refitting.  The CO casually said “Well, put’em in there at first light.”  His finger indicated the big, grassy clearing in the angle between Bu Nho and the round woods to the west.  The S-2 looked at me, opened his mouth and then said nothing. 

I thought  What the hell!  I don’t work for this man..  “Colonel,” I began, “there is at least a battalion of the 141^st NVA Regiment in that wood.  They are the best troops in the 7^th NVA Division, which is the best in their army.  They have been in that wood for at least two weeks.  They will be ready.”  The CO was irritated.  “That’s all right, Captain,” he said.  “You are really a captain, aren’t you?  We’ll take it from here.  Most of these reports are untrue.  Why, when I was here as an adviser in the Delta, none of the stuff we got from you people was true.”  So, the man didn’t believe the report and was just looking for something for “D” Company to do.  This was a delicate situation.  “I must protest, sir,” I began.  “I would be negligent...”  “That will be all!” the CO barked.  “Good Day!”  The sycophants on the staff  bristled in the hope that their master would recognize them as the good dogs they were. 

I drove back to Song Be and called my higher headquarters to tell them that a disaster was about to occur.  The foreseeable reply from 525^th  MIG in Saigon was that they would not attempt to interfere with the exercise of command by a line officer in command of troops in the field.   I then asked for a helicopter to come to Song Be to be at my disposal the next day.  This was agreed.  The “Huey” showed up early and I was sitting in the thing at 3,000 feet listening to the 1^st Cavalry Division when the fire preparation of Ap Bu Nho commenced. 

“They will not grow old, as we who are left grow old,

Age will not weary them, nor the years condemn.

At the going down of the sun, and in the mornings,

We shall remember them..”

                                                            A.E. Housman - inscribed in Washington Arch at VMI

First, there was a lot of fire from corps heavy artillery batteries, including the one at Victor 241 airfield.  Then, there were Tacair fighter strikes with bombs and rockets, then there was a massive fire preparation by armed helicopters, of which the 1^st Cavalry Division had many.  The bombs, shells, and rockets searched the round wood and the big, grassy field.  While the armed helicopters were still working on the patch of forest, the twenty odd “Huey Slicks”, (transports unarmed except for a machine gun on each side), swooped onto the scene from the east, having picked up “D” Company at LZ “Buttons.”  Throughout the preparation, there had not been a shot fired from the area under bombardment.  I could hear the Cavalry Division talking about it on the air.  Their opinion was that this would be a “cold” LZ, and that the enemy were not present.  With mixed feelings, I watched the assault unfold. The landing was in two columns of helicopters, which were perhaps fifty yards apart.  There were about ten helicopters in each column.  The cavalry troops scrambled out and headed for the round wood. 

 

Shut up old man! - TTG

A couple of days ago, Colonel Lang asked a question about HUMINT support to SFOD Delta in light of the recent raid on Barisha.

PL> Woolsey just said on Fox that CIA was the main support for the raid. Do the two of you agree with that?

TTG> I personally think Woolsey is talking out his ass. DoD and JSOC in particular has developed a lot of capability in this area. DIA was doing the same. We had people integrated into the various task forces in Afghanistan and Iraq for years. CIA is still involved, but not to the extent it was decades ago.

I listened to the Woolsey comment today. I am now even more convinced he was talking out his ass. He represents the old CIA attitude of undeserved superiority and misplaced disdain for military intelligence. It’s a common attitude for a lot of these old fossils. I’ve seen it many times.  It was annoying. Well, times have changed. As I told Colonel Lang, military intelligence has changed dramatically in recent years. I witnessed a lot of these changes first hand working at DIA. I will be careful about what I say since many of the details of these changes remain classified. I will say only what I can find in unclassified, printed documents. Here are three documents you can review yourselves at your leisure.

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Administration_and_Management/09-F-0656_DoDD_5200.37_Management_and_Execution_of_Defense_Human_Intelligence_02-09-2009.pdf?ver=2017-05-15-135557-533

https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf

https://info.publicintelligence.net/CALL-CommandersGuideHUMINT.pdf

The first document is the culmination of a multi-year struggle by DIA and USD(I) to provide better and more timely HUMINT support to the commands and task forces operating in Afghanistan and Iraq. We created a new category of controlled collection operations called military source operations (MSO). The most significant change wrought by the creation of MSOs is that ultimate approval/coordination lies with USD(I) for the most sensitive category of MSOs. Other MSOs are approved at lower DoD levels. Prior to this, all controlled collection operations required CIA coordination/approval. CIA didn’t like this change, but DIA, the Army and the combatant commands loved it.

The remaining two documents are Army publications. They discuss a new prominence for HUMINT operations at the combatant command and joint task force (JTF) levels. A robust J2X is established at these levels to oversee and control HUMINT operations. In addition to controlled HUMINT operations, the J2X controls debriefing and interrogation operations. DIA also began to emphasize this full range of HUMINT in support of joint commands in Afghanistan, Iraq and other regions where JTFs operated. This included various JSOC JTFs.

Now back to Woolsey’s comments. He was fishing for nice words from Trump for his old CIA. He still lives in a world where CIA dominated the HUMINT world, a world where everyone only thinks of the CIA when HUMINT is mentioned. I still see this. People look at me cross eyed when I tell them I worked for DIA. They say, “What’s DIA? Do you mean CIA?” At least we got a mention from Woolsey. He did say, “I’m sure there were other agencies involved, Defense and so forth, too, but the CIA pulled the main strings on human intelligence there and it was brilliant.” Shut up, old man. I don’t buy it. I’m sure the CIA was represented in the J2X and had collectors and analysts involved, but HUMINT support to these JTFs are now a DoD affair.

So who did provide the key HUMINT support to the raid on Barisha? According to Polat Can, it was the YPG. Polat Can is a senior adviser to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and former Representative of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) to the International Coalition. I wouldn’t be surprised if my old unit was involved with the YPG Huminters. We did a lot of that kind of liaison work in support of Delta and ST6. We often passed ourselves off as CIA when he did so. It saved a lot of questions.

Here’s Polat Can’s account on twitter:

@PolatCanRojava   SDF Senior Advisor  (28 August)

1- Through our own sources, we managed to confirm that Al Baghdadi had moved from Al Dashisha area in Deir Al Zor to Idlib. Since 15 May, we have been working together with the CIA to track Al Baghdadi and monitor him closely.

2 - One of our sources was able to reach the house where Al Baghdadi was hiding. Al Baghdadi changed his places of residence very often. He was about to move to a new place in Jerablus.

3 - Our own source, who had been able to reach Al Baghdadi, brought Al Baghdadi’s underwear to conduct a DNA test and make sure (100%) that the person in question was Al Baghdadi himself.

4- More than a month ago, the decision was made to eliminate Al Baghdadi. However, the US withdrawal and the Turkish invasion prompted us to stop our special operations, including the pursuit of Al Baghdadi. The Turkish invasion caused a delay in the operation.

5- All intelligence and access to Al Baghdadi as well as the identification of his place, were the result of our own work. Our intelligence source was involved in sending coordinates, directing the airdrop, participating in and making the operation a success until the last minute

6 - All armed groups and elements surrounding the village of Barisha were Daesh (ISIS) terrorists, operating under various names. In the airdrop operation, all their military posts and positions were targeted.

7- Terrorist Abu al-Hassan was on a special mission to Jerablus to secure Al Baghdadi’s transfer to his new home. There was a plan B to target Al Baghdadi in his new home if he had moved before the planned strike in Barisha. Abu al-Hassan was closely monitored by SDF intelligence

TTG

Killing Baghdadi - TTG

The first indications that something unusual was going on in Idlib was a series of tweets from @WithinSyriaBlog late last night. I saw this before I saw Trump’s tweet of “Something very big has just happened!”

————

@WithinSyriaBlog

Breaking: Several attack helicopters coming from Turkey reportedly attacked several Jihadists' targets in southern Idlib.

2:41 PM - 26 Oct 2019
At first locals said that the helicopters were only flying, later several sources confirmed that they carried out attacks. Some said they responded to AA fire. However, this was also denied by locals.
Locals are saying that the helicopters are of the Turkish military. However, there is a good chance the alleged attack was carried out by US-led coalition helicopters.
Now locals are saying that the helicopters were chasing a convoy of cars, claiming at least two actually landed ... Sounds like a well-planned raid.

@WithinSyriaBlog

Summary of what is going on west the town of Barisha in northern Idlib, this thread will be updated:

2:58 PM - 26 Oct 2019
1- Eight helicopters came from the direction of Turkish border, began conducting strikes on targets west of the town of Barisha. Warplanes and UAVs are covering the helicopters.
2-Local sources denied that the helicopters carried out the strikes in response to AA fire. The attack was apparently planned, well planned.
3-At least two of the eight helicopters landed west of Barisha. However, it is unclear if a some special operation is being carried out there now.
4-Additional 4 helicopters joined the force around 15 min into the attack. At least 12 helicopters are now operating west of Barisha.
5-Local sources are talking about an operation to capture or kill a senior Jihadi figure. Unconfirmed reports says that at least one TIP militants has been killed, so far.

————

This morning President Trump addressed the nation and announced the killing of Abu Bakr al—Baghdadi by US Special Operations Forces. I’m sure most of us either watched this or heard of it by now. More details will surely come out over the next few days. Hopefully not a lot more. Here’s a few details that I find interesting.

1 - A Squadron, SFOD Delta was the primary assault force. A Delta squadron consists of two assault troops and one reconnaissance troop. This may sound like a lot but in my experience a special operations squadron often consists of less than fifty troops. The operation was probably supported by some number of Rangers. That’s a common method of operation. 

2 - Photos of 30mm HEDP shells from the raid area are now online. That indicates MH-60L helicopters from the 160th Special Operations Wing were providing support with their M230 chain guns.

3 - Time line for the operation was givens as one hour, ten minutes in, two hours on the ground and one hour, ten minutes out. They could have flown from Incirlik Air Force Base, but I think they flew from the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Battle Group in the Mediterranean. It would have been more secure and would account for more “nap-of-the-earth” flying time across the hills and mountains of Hatay Province.

4 - Barisha is located in Idlib Governorate north of Idlib and west of Aleppo very close to the the major crossing point into Turkey. What was Baghdadi doing there? Barisha is the headquarters of Huras Din. Huras Din was created last February, mainly from senior Non-Syrian members of Hayet Tahrir Sham, HTS (created from Al-Qaida in 2016). It was HTS that provided security for Turkey while setting up its twelve observation posts. This area is critical to both Turkey’s and the jihadi’s goal of retaining control of Idlib. Again, what was Baghdadi doing there?

5 - Vice President Pence said this morning that we had intelligence of Baghdadi’s location earlier last week and more a specific location only Saturday morning.   Did Turkey provide this information? I doubt it. Russia and the SAA have been running reconnaissance and spying missions throughout Idlib for quite a while. Between those missions and R+6 SIGINT, I think Russia provided critical information to USI in the lead up to this raid. The coordination between the US and Russia was probably a lot more that just informing them that we were coming in as Trump said in his address this morning.

This is a good day for America, a good day for President Trump and a good day for the R+6. I also think it's a bad day for the jihadis and Turkey. As I said, a lot more will come out in the coming days. Actually, a lot more is already out there. But this is enough for now. 

TTG  

"Nasr min Allah! Nasr min Allah!" (a victory from God Almighty) Somebody show this to Trump!

One of our correspondents was kind enough to send me this link.  We should all watch it.  It has a quality much like "The Battle of San Pietro,"  a film from the Italian Campaign in WW2.

It depicts a running battle through the mountains along the excellent road from Najran City as the Saudi and and allied Yemeni forces (referred to as traitors in the film) flee to the east trying to escape the giant, well laid ambush that was set as a trap by the Houthis and the Salih loyalist part of the Yemeni Army.

Evidently the senior Saudi commanders mostly deserted their men and fled early and swiftly.  As a result the Saudi forces surrendered en masse, abandoning armored vehicles and civilian type trucks stuffed full of weapons, supplies and ammunition.  Many of the vehicles, including armored vehicles are in running condition and in the film one can see Yemeni soldiers mount the vehicles and drive them off  Among these vehicles are fully tracked M-113 US made APCs that are carriers for radar trained air defense Gatling guns,   These will be very useful in the future.

Some of the vehicles are marked in Arabic as belonging to the Saudi National Guard (SANG) and from their condition I suppose that these troops were from the Modernized SANG that the US has worked hard to train and equip for fifty years or more.  The easy surrender of these beduins is very bad news for the Saudi monarchy.

The many, many prisoners seem to be humanely treated.  There are Houthi medical personnel on the scene treating enemy wounded.  If I were the Rebel commander I would truck all these prisoners down to Sanaa and invited the International Red Cross and UN in to register them and start a stream of food, water and shelter supplies coming in to care for all these men.

Someone please show President Trump this film.  It makes the lies of creatures like Pompeo obvious.

https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2019/09/29/607432/Yemeni-Army-release-footage-of-Victory-from-God-Almighty-offensive-against-Najran

Another Operation Idlib Dawn Update - TTG

Things have been going swimmingly for the SAA for the last couple of weeks. Initial SAA operations were characterized by slow going with jihadi counterattacks often succeeding. This was to be expected. The jihadis have been concentrating in the Idlib area for years, replenishing, refitting and preparing defenses. SAA operations were frequently halted by unexplainable ceasefires. But the combined air attacks by Syrian and Russian air assets and SAA indirect fire finally took their toll on the jihadis. The result was the encirclement of Khan Sheikhoun and all the jihadis south of there. The resulting cauldron was quickly reduced leaving the Turkish observation post at Morek surrounded by SAA and Russian troops. I bet the Turks feel silly sitting there. Operation Idlib Dawn continues.

—————

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies have secured the key town of al-Tamanah in the southeastern countryside of Idlib. In the early hours of August 30, the army was able to besiege the remaining militants inside the town after capturing the northeastern hill of Soukaiyate and the northwestern hill of Sidi Ali. After securing the town, the SAA began a new push in the western direction, capturing the hilltops of Jabal Saghir, Turki and Sidi Jaffar. 

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the al-Qaeda-affiliated Wa Harid al-Muminin operations room and the Turkish-backed National Front for Liberation (NFL) attempted to hold onto their positions in al-Tamanah and its surroundings with their full strengths.

Pro-government sources are now claiming that the SAA will continue its operation and advance towards the city of Ma`arat al-Nu`man. However, this is yet to be confirmed.  (South Front)

—————

Al Tamanah lies about six miles east of Khan Shaikhoun. Its capture by the SAA secures the recent gains spearheaded by the Tiger Force or I should say the SAA’s new 25th Special Forces Division as the Tiger Force is now called. As part of the new name, the 25th is now fully integrated into the SAA command rather than being a militia force affiliated with Syrian Air Force Intelligence. This is a wise move undoubtedly orchestrated by the Russian advisors. There is no change in leadership within the 25th and probably no major organizational changes. What this does is normalize the Tiger Force and improve command/control and logistical support.

The real question is what’s next for Operation Idlib Dawn. Will the SAA move to take Kabani and the al Ghaab Plain or will the 25th Division spearhead a drive up the M5 to Ma`arat al-Nu`man? I don’t know and neither do the jihadis. That’s the way it should be. Slap a violent surprise on those sons of bitches.

Today the Russian Reconciliation Center announced another one sided ceasefire. These are exasperating to this observer. However, there may be a good reason for this. The Khan Sheikhoun cauldron collapsed quickly, perhaps too quickly. I saw no reports of jihadis streaming northward to avoid the encirclement. Perhaps they went to ground in tunnels, caves and among the locals. This hidden enemy must be dug out and exterminated in order to eliminate the possibility of an ugly surprise when the SAA does move north to liberate more of Idlib governorate. 

I hope the SAA doesn’t move too cautiously, though. The jihadi defenses appear to be rapidly collapsing and their ability to counterattack appears to be near gone. The SAA should not allow them to recover once again. Fortune favors the bold. 

TTG   

https://southfront.org/syrian-army-secures-al-tamanah-captures-three-new-hilltops-west-of-it-map-photos/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/tiger-forces-renamed-and-placed-under-command-of-syrian-army/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/ceasefire-announced-in-northern-syria-after-syrian-army-captures-new-town-in-idlib/

Operation Idlib Dawn Update - TTG

BEIRUT, LEBANON (7:00 A.M.) – The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) scored a big advance in the southwestern countryside of the Idlib Governorate this past weekend. Led by the Tiger Forces, the Syrian military meticulously advanced along the Hama-Idlib axis over the weekend, seizing one site after another from the militants.

This advance by the Syrian Arab Army eventually led to the capture of Al-Hobeit in southwestern Idlib, marking the first time that they have established a foothold in this part of the governorate since 2014.

In the Anna News video below, the Syrian Arab Army’s operation is chronicled from its start to its conclusion:  (Al Masdar News)

—————

Yes, the SAA’s strategy of careful conservation of their forces while pressuring the jihadis with a mixture of surprise maneuvers, persistence and the application of massive, precision firepower is bearing fruit. The Anna News video explains much of this quite well. Pay particular attention to the use of night assaults and long range precision sniping with T-72 and T-90 tanks equipped with thermal imaging sights. Air and artillery precision strikes are aided by aerial drones. As far back as the mid-70s, the Benning School for Boys taught us that if you can be seen, you can be killed. We learned to make use of “the minute folds in the terrain” as cover and concealment to keep our light infantry asses from being blown off. You can see the SAA infantrymen doing the same thing. “Those are regulars, by God!” 

This victory is more than just another town in Idlib. It is of great military significance. As someone mentioned in the video, Khan Sheikhoun and the M5 is within sight of al Hobeit at a distance of eight kilometers. How confident are the Syrians that they can keep this town? On August 12 the Syrian Defense Minister visited al Hobeit. That’s confidence. 

The jihadis in Khan Sheikhoun not only have to sweat the Tiger Force at al Hobeit, they face a similar threat to their east. In a surprise assault, the SAA took the high ground of Tal Sukayk and the town of Sukayk capturing large quantity of jihadi arms and ammunition in the process. These SAA forces are now ten kilometers from Khan Sheikhoun. A massive jihadi counterattack on Tal Sukayk was repelled with massive losses to the jihadis in both men and equipment. The SAA is moving more forces into both these fronts. The goal appears to be an envelopment of Khan Sheikhoun from the east and west isolating a cauldron of jihadis in their strongholds of Latamanah and Morek. The jihadis have two choices. Either die in place without Turkish resupply or have the living Jesus knocked out of them by Syrian and Russian air assets as they evacuate through Khan Sheikhoun.

This is not the only good news from Idlib Dawn. The 4th Armored Division is finally on the verge of entering Kabani. The 42nd Brigade has seized the entire Zuwayqat Mountains south of Kabani from the jihadis. In this battle, Russian assault helicopters, including the all weather Mi-28N attack helicopters, lead the assault in close coordination with the 42nd Brigade’s advance. The Zuwayqat Mountains and the town of Kabani overlook the entire al Ghaab Plain and the important town of Jish al Shigour. That the 42nd Brigade was able to do this after more than two months of heavy offensive operations is a testament to their discipline and professionalism. 

As of this morning, the Tiger Force has advanced past al Hobeit to Kafr Ayn, Mantar and Tal Aas. They are now three kilometers from Khan Sheikhoun. I smell a bubbling cauldron forming... with a Turkish observation post inside.

TTG

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/new-video-shows-syrian-army-operation-that-led-to-large-scale-advance-in-idlib/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-closes-on-jihadist-stronghold-after-seizing-new-sites-in-idlib/

A "safe zone" in Rojava is averted… for now - TTG

BEIRUT, LEBANON (5:00 P.M.) – Turkish Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar said on Wednesday that talks with the U.S. on a safe zone in northern Syria have been ‘positive’ after a previous meeting left Ankara agitated. “We witnessed with satisfaction that our partners grew closer to our position. The meetings were positive and quite constructive,” Akar stated, as quoted by state-owned Anadolu Agency. “Our plans, preparations, the deployment of our units in the field are all complete. But we said we wanted to act together with our friend and ally, the United States,” Akar continued, adding “if that isn’t possible, we have said multiple times that we will do what is necessary.”

Turkey previously threatened to launch a large-scale military operation to capture the eastern region of the Euphrates River Valley. According to Ankara, the eastern Euphrates region is controlled by ‘terrorist’ groups allied to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). In particular, the Turkish regime has accused the U.S. Coalition of harboring the Kurdish-led People’s Protection Units (YPG), who Ankara says is an offshoot of the PKK.

Washington has denied coordinating with the YPG, but maintains that they work with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who is made up of several ethnic groups, including Kurds and Arabs. (Al Masdar News)

——————

That’s the Turkish view of the just completed negotiations in Ankara with the US Embassy to work toward establishing a “safe zone” along the entire northern border with Syria. The US Embassy issued a short, terse statement:

From August 5-7, 2019, U.S. and Turkish military delegations met at the Turkish Ministry of Defense to discuss plans to coordinate the establishment of a safe zone in northern Syria.

The delegations agreed on the following:

a) the rapid implementation of initial measures to address Turkey’s security concerns;

b) to stand-up a joint operations center in Turkey as soon as possible in order to coordinate and manage the establishment of the safe zone together;

c) that the safe zone shall become a peace corridor, and every effort shall be made so that displaced Syrians can return to their country.

Mazlum Abdi, an SDF spokesman, said this after the US-Turkish agreement was announced: “With regard to the safe zone, we certainly accept it and support it if it is intended to support stability and peace in the region, and we have shown a lot of flexibility so far in this context, but there are Turkish conditions that are completely rejected. Turkey wants to stay in the region and control it, or pushing militant factions to be part of the safe zone, this is not acceptable in any way. But in the framework of coordination With the coalition forces and the U.S army, monitoring patrols can be conducted”

In my view, Turkey is holding a strong hand and is playing it well. Turkey has been massing its forces and especially her jihadi allies across her southern border east of the Euphrates in preparation for an invasion to drive the Kurds away from that border. Surely the purpose of this offensive is not so much to eliminate this perceived threat, but to expand the new Ottoman Empire at the expense of Syria. The US agreed to establish a joint headquarters for this safe zone in a desperate effort to stave off this Turkish offensive. The Kurds, who remain the backbone of the SDF, would have rushed to the border to defend Rojava from a Turkish invasion. Although the Kurds would make the Turks and their jihadi allies pay dearly for every inch of Rojava, they are no match for the full might of the Turkish military. Even so, I don’t think Erdogan is ready to risk throwing his full military force into an invasion. An invasion may also spread his jihadi allies too thin. He may very well lose Idlib and the area around Aleppo as the price of gaining a strip of Rojava. For now he is content with what he has extracted from the US Embassy.

Neither the Syrian forces nor the YPG forces are in a position to defend that border against a full scale Turkish incursion. They are both otherwise occupied. Russia has influence, but I don’t think she is willing to bloody Erdogan’s nose or even demand he abandon his dream of a new Ottoman Empire. Russia has a longer term goal concerning her relationship with Turkey. The US dreads an open conflict with a NATO ally and does not have sufficient forces in the area to successfully deter Erdogan’s aspirations. So, although a wide scale invasion of Rojava has been temporarily averted, Erdogan is left sitting in the catbird seat at least for now.

TTG  

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/turkey-says-talks-with-us-on-syria-safe-zone-have-been-positive/

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/08/07/turkish-assault-kurdish-held-syria-averted-agreement-us-safezone/

“US Ramps Up Online Attacks on Russian Power Grid, NYT Says” - TTG

Walrus has already started an engaging conversation on this subject. As someone deeply involved in the early development of DoD cyber operations, I wanted to add  my two cents from a different angle. I am not as horrified by this development as many here are. But I am very uneasy with the apparent involvement of Bonkers Bolton. That creature is as dangerous as a malfunctioning Dalek. I'm pretty sure he doesn't understand these things. Even if he did, he wouldn't care.

—————

The U.S. is stepping up digital incursions into Russia’s electric power grid in a warning to President Vladimir Putin, the New York Times reported, citing current and former government officials. While the U.S. has probed the Russian grid since at least 2012 and there’s no evidence it has turned off power, the Trump administration’s strategy has shifted more toward offense with the deployment of U.S. computer code inside the grid and other targets, the newspaper said. The effort has gotten far more aggressive over the past year, the Times quoted an unidentified senior intelligence official as saying.

The administration declined to disclose specifics, according to the report. However, National Security Adviser John Bolton said publicly on Tuesday that the U.S. is taking a broader view “to say to Russia, or anybody else that’s engaged in cyberoperations against us, ‘You will pay a price,”’ the Times said. (Bloomberg)

—————

This is a far cry from our early attempts at preparing to conduct offensive cyber operations. I remember attending several briefings at one of these early organizations at the NSA. The control of offensive tools was as restrictive as the control of nuclear weapons. It was obvious these things scared the crap out of DoD and NSA back then. It’s equally obvious DoD and now CYBERCOM have learned to stop worrying and love the “Cyber-Bomb.” Our use of the Stuxnet worm to sabotage Iranian centrifuges was proof of our growing comfort with these things. 

However, Stuxnet was used against Iran. We’re comfortable with raining all kinds of death and destruction throughout the Middle East. Now we’re taking actions to disrupt Russia’s power grid. That’s playing with raining death and destruction upon a nuclear capable peer competitor. Hacking the grid is one thing. We’ve all done that for many years. That’s just part of the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). Implanting weapons to disable the Russian grid is a leap beyond that. Seems CYBERCOM has embraced the concept of operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB), a concept widely practiced in JSOC and in other parts of the special operations community. MG Michael Repass, a former 10th Group Commander, wrote a paper in 2003 describing these things. 

"Advanced Force Operations consists of US SecDef-approved military operations such as clandestine operations. It is logically part of Operational Preparation of the Battlespace (OPB), which follows the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, a concept well-known in U.S. and NATO doctrine, OPB is seldom used outside of SOF channels. OPB is defined by the U.S. Special Operations Command as "Non-intelligence activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-Hour, in likely or potential areas of employment, to train and prepare for follow-on military operations.” 

I don’t think this was ever official policy, but OPB was widely viewed as a powerful tool to break the CIA’s stranglehold on covert action, at least on the operational level. Given that CYBERCOM is a unified combatant command finally gaining independence from NSA and the IC in general, this embrace of OPB is a natural progression. What else CYBERCOM copies from JSOC’s authorities and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) will be interesting. It could also be quite dangerous. Cyber operations are here to stay. They are becoming more effective for reconnaissance and attribution, for disrupting a target’s networks and infrastructure and for perception management. The inhibitions against engaging in these operations are relaxing.

An interesting point in the NYT story is that it appears Trump has not been briefed on this stuff. Perhaps CYBERCOM and DoD don’t consider this level of OPB rising to the level of Presidential decision making. Pulling the trigger on grid disruption certainly should. Why wouldn’t they brief the President? Is it to keep him in the dark out of a lack of trust? That’s disheartening. Now with the story published all over the world, DoD should feel impelled to fully brief the President. The best outcome would be Trump pushing for negotiations with Russia, China and maybe others to develop a de-escalation/non-proliferation treaty on cyber operations with the same vigor and earnestness that we once approached nuclear weapons.

TTG

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-15/u-s-ramps-up-online-attacks-on-russian-power-grid-nyt-says

“Combating Terrorism with Preparation of the Battlespace”

“Trump calls newspaper report on Russia power grid treason”

Comments on Official Response by OPCW to the Engineering Assessment on Douma

Comments on official response to the release of the Engineering Assessment of the Douma cylinders

Paul McKeigue, David Miller, Jake Mason, Piers Robinson

Members of Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media

• 1 Introduction
• 2 OPCW’s response to the release of the document
  • 2.1 Official response
  • 2.2 Unofficial briefings
  • 2.3 What the channelling of off-the-record briefings tells us
  • 2.4 Discrepancies between versions of OPCW’s response
• 3 Government responses to an alleged chlorine attack on 19 May
  • 3.1 Reports of the alleged attack
  • 3.2 UK response
  • 3.3 French response
  • 3.4 US response
• 4 Comparison of the Engineering Assessment with the published Final Report

1 Introduction

This post comments on the response to our release of the Executive Summary of the Engineering Assessment of the Douma cylinders on 13 May 2018. All emphases in quoted passages are added by us. After OPCW had confirmed the document to be genuine, the story was covered extensively by Russian media. An informed commentary by Professor Hiroyuki Aoyama in Tokyo has been published on Yahoo News’s Japanese site. The only coverage in western corporate media has been by Peter Hitchens in the Mail on Sunday, Robert Fisk in the Independent and Tucker Carlson on Fox. Other journalists who have been in touch with us have told us that their stories were spiked by editors. As expected, the story has reached much larger numbers through websites and videos that have disseminated it.

2 OPCW’s response to the release of the document

2.1 Official response

In an email dated 11 May and shown to us, Deepti Choubey, the head of OPCW Public Affairs, wrote:

Thank you for reaching out to us. It is exclusively through the Fact-Finding Mission, set up in 2014, that the OPCW establishes facts surrounding allegations of use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 1 March 2019, the OPCW has issued its final and only valid official report, signed by the Director-General, regarding the incident that took place in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018. The document you shared with us is not part of any of the material produced by the FFM. The individual mentioned in the document has never been a member of the FFM.

A subsequent email on 16 May stated:

The OPCW establishes facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic through the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which was set up in 2014. The OPCW Technical Secretariat reaffirms that the FFM complies with established methodologies and practices to ensure the integrity of its findings. The FFM takes into account all available, relevant, and reliable information and analysis within the scope of its mandate to determine its findings. Per standard practice, the FFM draws expertise from different divisions across the Technical Secretariat as needed. All information was taken into account, deliberated, and weighed when formulating the final report regarding the incident in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018. On 1 March 2019, the OPCW issued its final report on this incident, signed by the Director-General.

2nd Bn, 2nd Infantry Regiment "Noli Me Tangere"

Hossein Salami calls it an intelligence war - TTG

We are still living under the cloud of a shooting war with Iran. Trump blows hot and cold. One day he declares he does not want a war and even wants to talk with the Iranian leaders. The next day (today actually) he threatens that he will end them as a nation. It’s hard to follow. 

Over the weekend, Colonel Lang pointed me to an opinion piece in the NYT. I found two on the subject. Maureen Dowd made the point that Trump doesn’t want a war. He wants maximum chaos leading to a negotiated good deal, just like he’s attempting with North Korea. The true danger is coming from that idiot Bolton. He doesn’t want chaos. He wants a shooting war and regime change. Ross Douthat is even more direct in his opinion piece, “Don’t Fight Iran.” Douthat also thinks Trump does not want a war, but notes Iran is not North Korea. War with Iran would be monumentally destructive and stupid. Hard to argue with that unless you’re Bolton or one of his neocon asshat compadres.

I found another article of interest coming out of Tehran rather than Gotham. It deals with comments made by the new IRGC commander, Major General Hossein Salami. He declared the US was already waging a full scale intelligence war against Iran.  

——————

TEHRAN (FNA)- Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Hossein Salami warned of the US full-scale intelligence war against Iran, saying that Tehran will defeat Washington in this front.

"We are able to defeat the enemy in intelligence war; breaking the enemy's will to use power means disarming the enemy," General Salami said, addressing the IRGC intelligence officials in Tehran on Saturday. He added that the range of the IRGC intelligence operations includes the Islamic Republic, the Islamic Revolution and the geography of threats against Iran.

General Salami warned that the US has launched a full-scale intelligence war against Iran which includes psychological and cyber operations, military moves, public diplomacy and induction of horror among people, meantime, saying that despite its ostentatious appearance, the US is suffering from "osteoporosis".

"Our other enemies act based on rules, similar to the US, and whenever they feel danger, they stay away from us. They believed that the more they increased the pressures, the more the Iranians more be reluctant to show reaction, but the Islamic Republic caused a collapse of their assumptions by means of its recent decision-makings and moves," he explained.

In relevant remarks on Wednesday, General Salami underlined that the enemies of Iran have exhausted all their attempts to defeat the country but in vain, adding that they have reached the end of line. "Our enemies have reached the end of the line", General Salami said, addressing the IRGC commanders. "This is the most decisive moment for the Islamic Revolution, because the enemy has come to the battlefield with all of its capacities at its disposal," he added.

General Salami also warned that Iran is "on the verge of a full-scale confrontation" with the enemies," adding that they are trying to crush the Iranian nation's resistance through "the strategy of maximum pressure and by using all of their capacities". However, they will fail once again to achieve their goal, he stressed.  (FARS)

——————

I like Salami’s characterization of the present situation as an intelligence war. For someone steeped in unconventional warfare, intelligence collection operations and various aspects of information operations, it’s a comfortable place to be. Too bad I have no idea of the nuances of what this means in Farsi. Salami said this type of war includes “psychological and cyber operations, military moves, public diplomacy and induction of horror among people.” And that bit about the "range of the IRGC intelligence operations" is certainly intriguing... confusing, but intriguing. Again, studying this in Farsi would be most interesting.

The danger in this characterization is that the current IRGC commander already considers us to be at war. It’s just a matter of degree. And a dangerous place to be with a blustering bluffer for a president and a warmongering fool as a presidential advisor.

TTG

"Will Trump be the Sage One?" by Maureen Dowd

"Don’t Fight Iran" by Ross Douthat

"IRGC Top Commander: Iran Able toDefeat US in Intelligence War" in FARS News Agency

Analysis is not advocacy. The Lebanese should understand that truth.

(This is ONE B-52 plane load)

"Analysis is not advocacy."

How many times have I written that on SST?

Unless you want to live in fantasy you must have the ability to think outside the box created by what you want rather than what is or is likely to be.

The Israelis live in such a box.  In their box the world is filled with gentile monsters who must be dominated and manipulated.  The manipulation part of that illusion is reinforced in their minds by their incredible success in forming public opinion in the US.

The Lebanese live in a different box in which they, in their collective mind's eye, are far more important to the rest of the world than they really are.  A Lebanese I knew well often told other Lebanese that their mistake was in thinking that Bill and Hillary woke up every morning and asked each other " I wonder what is happening in Beirut today?"  The truth is that Lebanon is only important to the Lebanese and that has always been true.  It is particularly true now in the age of neo-neocon domination of US foreign policy.  The cartoon like simplicity with which Bolton, Pompeo and Trump misunderstand realities on the ground in places like Lebanon is striking.

In service to Israeli ambitions for hegemony throughout the ME, these people have no interest whatever in the welfare of the Lebanese.  In particular they are incapable of seeing Hizbullah as anything like an integral part of Lebanese society.  No, they see these Lebanese Shia as nothing more than a threat to Israel.  As I have pointed out, war against Hizbullah is already authorized under American law by their designation as a terrorist group and the AUMF against terrorism.

The Lebanese in Lebanon should understand that US Embassy Beirut has no policy influence in Washington.  None!  The true believer neo-neocons have no interest whatever in the opinions of State Department career bureaucrats who usually do not share their imperialist faith in the global destiny and mission of the US.  Remember that truth when you are tempted to shower praise and attention on the inhabitants of Fort America in east Beirut.  They are in exile among you.

Does any of this mean that I favor the aggressive and disrespectful bullying that emanates from Washington in the era of the neo-neocons?  It does not, but I can recognize reality and this attitude toward Lebanon is real and must be recognized.  The neo-neocons would not shrink from devastating southern Lebanon in order to wreck Hizbullah.  pl 

“A terrible, terrible thing” - TTG

"(CNN) - India's anti-satellite missile test created at least 400 pieces of orbital debris, the head of NASA says -- placing the International Space Station (ISS) and its astronauts at risk. NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine said Monday that just 60 pieces of debris were large enough to track. Of those, 24 went above the apogee of the ISS, the point of the space station's orbit farthest from the Earth.

"That is a terrible, terrible thing to create an event that sends debris at an apogee that goes above the International Space Station," Bridenstine said in a live-streamed NASA town hall meeting "That kind of activity is not compatible with the future of human spaceflight." He added: "It is not acceptable for us to allow people to create orbital debris fields that put at risk our people."

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced on March 27 that the country had achieved a "historic feat" by shooting down its own low-orbit satellite with a ground-to-space missile. Only three other countries -- the US, Russia and China -- have anti-satellite missile capabilities."  (CNN)

—————

What did we think was going to happen? When our Space Force, Russia’s Aerospace Force and/or what ever China is calling their military space capability come to blows, this is what’s going to happen. Now throw India and Lord knows who else into the mix. We will be blowing each other’s satellites out of orbit and launching replacement satellites as fast as we can. The process will then repeat itself until no one’s satellites will survive in low Earth orbit... for a long, long time. It should cause our military and space leaders to contemplate a space MAD situation.

We have agreed to keep nuclear weapons out of space. The ABM treaty limited anti-satellite weapons in space, but that was shot to hell long ago. There are no other limitations on blowing each other’s satellites out of orbit including nothing in the laws of war. 

I suggest that this is a fertile field for a grand international agreement. Let Trump lead such an effort. Obviously the negotiations will be long and technical, but I think Trump is the ideal person to push such an idea. Let him make space safe for international exploration or even a peaceful space race. 

TTG

https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/02/india/nasa-india-anti-missile-test-intl/index.html

 

A few thoughts

1.  My gums have healed nicely.  I had NY Strip steak and eggs with grits for breakfast this day at Bob and Edith's Diner.  That was about $15.  A good day.The temperature in the back yard is around 80 degrees Fahrenheit and my chipmunks have come back to the surface.

2.  Trump ought to consider trying to get GM to sell or lease Lordstown to General Dynamics as a place to build some of the Army's new family of vehicles.  The place employs 4500 people from all over that part of Ohio when at full capacity.

3.  A border closure will hut Mexico badly and might force Mexico to impede these migrants but the back-pressure from businesses in the US is going to be very tough to face up to.  Cutting off aid to Central America won't do much.  We have been funding CA economic development since 1960 with n0 visible effect.  The local elites just soak up the money.  That is unlikely to change.  The elites are glad to see these people leave.  They are a distraction from the process of stealing American money.  Since the Congress will not change the asylum law, we have no choice but to build a barrier system strong enough to keep a lot of them outside the country until the poss arrives.  The Democrats want open borders so that a flood of illegals can be voted eventually after they are disguised by things like motor voter laws.

4.  Trump should follow the advice he is getting and de-classify and disclose every single thing that Barr, Mueller and Rosenstein can manage to do.

5.  The Deep State villains in the US and the UK should be pursued and punished.  pl

"Russian Army is Radically Upgraded" * by Sergei Shoigu - TTG

In his latest Russian Federation Sitrep, Patrick Armstrong mentioned a speech given by Sergei Shoigu to a Duma committee. In this speech Shoigu reels off a litany of new weapon systems now in the hands of Russia’s defense forces. Impressive, but still just a list. A few days ago, Colonel Lang asked me to take a closer look at the speech. Clearly he saw something I missed in my initial cursory reading. I read it again. It is one hell of a speech. Shoigu says a lot more than merely listing what new weapons are in the hands of Russian soldiers. “SouthFront” offered an English translation of the speech which first appeared at “Red Star,” the official newspaper of the Russian Federation MOD. The “SouthFront” article begins as follows.   

“Russian Defense Minister Army General Sergei Shoigu took part in the extended meeting of the Defense Committee of the State Duma. The head of the defense ministry gave a detailed update to those in attendance about the results of the six-year large-scale work to strengthen the defense capability of the Russian state by increasing the combat power of our Armed Forces. In fact, Russia now has a completely different army compared to the one it had prior to 2013. Today we are publishing the full text of a speech by Army General Sergei Shoigu at an expanded meeting of the Committee on Defense of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.”

The speech is filled with numbers and facts and is blessedly short of propagandistic hyperbole. Who needs propaganda when the facts speak for themselves. First some of the facts. Improvements to the strategic rocket forces include 12 RS-24 Yars MIRV ICBM regiments (109 missiles), 108 submarine launched ICBMs, probably the new Bulava missiles and 3 Borei class missile submarines built to use the new Bulava missiles.

 

“Watch the film the Israeli lobby didn’t want you to see” - TTG

Congresswoman Ilhan Omar has caught intense flak over her comments questioning the influence of the Israeli lobby in US foreign policy and the split allegiances of some Jewish-Americans. The vociferous attacks on the Congresswoman coalesce around one theme, criticism of Israel equals antisemitism. This is a consistent theme. Walt and Mearsheimer endured the same accusations when they wrote their essay, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” in 2006. The attacks did not let up with the publication of their book of the same name in 2007. At that time, Mearsheimer and Walt described the Israel lobby as a loose coalition. Perhaps at that time it largely was a loose coalition brought together as a counter against the ugliness of antisemitism. I think it was more than that back then and it is certainly more than that now. It is a far reaching and powerful phenomena largely consisting of a coordinated information operation run out of the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs to further Israeli government policies.

Al Jazeera has put together an excellent series on this phenomena. The first piece of in depth investigative reporting examined the activities of the Israel lobby in Britain entitled “The Lobby.” They followed this series up with “The Lobby - USA” covering the lobby’s actions in the US in 2016. So far I watched the first part of this four part series focusing on the campaign to derail the BDS movement on the UC Davis campus and in Washington DC. This is how modern information operations are conducted. The series was released by the Electronic Intifada rather than Al Jazeera because Qatar censored the series after being pressured by Washington, Tel Aviv and probably Riyadh. 

———————

"The Electronic Intifada has obtained a complete copy of The Lobby – USA, a four-part undercover investigation by Al Jazeera into Israel’s covert influence campaign in the United States. We are releasing the leaked film simultaneously with France’s Orient XXI and Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar, which have respectively subtitled the episodes in French and Arabic. The film was made by Al Jazeera during 2016 and was completed in October 2017. But it was censored after Qatar, the gas-rich Gulf emirate that funds Al Jazeera, came under intense Israel lobby pressure not to air the film. Although Al Jazeera’s director-general claimed last month that there were outstanding legal issues with the film, his assertions have been flatly contradicted by his own journalists."

"In March, The Electronic Intifada was the first to report on any of the film’s specific content. We followed this in August by publishing the first extract of the film, and shortly after Max Blumenthal at the Grayzone Project released others. Since then, The Electronic Intifada has released three other extracts, and several other journalists have watched the entire film and written about it – including Alain Gresh and Antony Loewenstein. Now The Electronic Intifada can reveal for the first time that it has obtained all four parts of the film."  (Electronic Intifada)

———————

The first episode of the series offers a graphic portrayal of a a modern information operation. It largely centers on the activities of one Julia Reifkind, an American employed first by AIPAC and then by the Israeli Embassy. She reported to the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs (MSA) with its office in the same building as the Israeli PM. On a daily basis she monitored BDS social media communications and activity using pseudonyms. She gave the collected info to her Embassy boss who transmitted the info back to the MSA. The MSA would pass instructions back to Rifkind through the DC Embassy. She also conducted activities including direct IO action on the UC Davis campus at the direction of the MSA. Dual allegiance my ass! She’s an American citizen employed as an Israeli intelligence and action agent. Her only allegiance is to Israel.

In all of Reifkind’s pro-Israeli activities, she probably didn’t break any US laws, just Facebook TOS in using her pseudonyms. What Al Jazeera did is what we should do. Expose this activity to the light of day. At a minimum, we could be aggressively publicizing this Al Jazeera documentary. I don’t blame the Israeli government for conducting these intelligence and IO activities any more than I blame Russia, China and others for undertaking these activities in their own interests. It’s not war, but we shouldn’t sit back and let this stuff go on unchallenged. We should officially encourage more of this kind of investigative reporting and commence a vigorous public awareness campaign concerning this threat. Expose the vampire to sunlight and holy water. Beyond that, LEA, IC and CYBERCOM elements should be tearing into foreign country’s activities and capabilities in this area without mercy. After all, it’s not war.

In the case of Israeli IO, we must work to break the idea that opposition to Israeli governmental policies and actions is equivalent to antisemitism. Given the persistence of that idea and the lengths the Israeli government goes to reinforce that persistence, this is a tall order. However, it must be confronted. In this vein, I welcome those voices in the Democratic Party who are speaking out in defense of Ilhan Omar. If it causes strife within the Democratic Party, so be it. Some fights are worth the price.

TTG

https://electronicintifada.net/content/watch-film-israel-lobby-didnt-want-you-see/25876

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lSjXhMUVKE  (The Lobby - USA, episode 1 - The Covert War) 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XytkI7afHcQ  (The Lobby - USA, episode 2 - Managing Elites)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mm-Dm4pO0xY  (The Lobby - USA, episode 3 - The Witch Hunt)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_1OgxfCT044  (The Lobby - USA, episode 4 - Marketing Occupation)

The future of aviation

"The drone was developed in connection with the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Defence Science & Technology (DST) Group. Boeing further partnered with other defense firms such as BAE Systems Australia, Ferra Engineering, RUAG Australia, Micro Electronic Technologies, AME Systems, and Allied Data System, for the ATS development program.

“The partnership will produce a concept demonstrator of a low cost unmanned ‘Loyal Wingman’ aircraft, capable of operating in concert with Air Force’s fifth generation air combat capability,” Minister Pyne said in a statement.

“There is significant value investing in innovative, future leaning initiatives like this, particularly in the early conceptual stages where Defence can explore concept  s and define the role such capabilities can play in our national security framework.”

The first version of the ATS will employ electronic warfare sensors. Boeing said future versions of the drone would incorporate various types of advanced weaponry."  Mister Pyne

------------

I would suppose that USAF is not supportive of this development.  USAF, for all its blather about "the future," is a club for pilots, a club in which they are paid to do what they most want to do in life.  This flying automated beast is a vision of the real future, a future in which pilots are people who fly the airplanes from seats in air conditioned rooms that can be thousands of miles from the action.  Or perhaps they have very little role at all because the airplanes will fly themselves.  In a 5G world, the various airplanes will be talking to each other yet further reducing the need for wild blue yonder flights of fancy. "Reached up and touched the face of God," etc.

Australia, OTOH, has a much smaller and less powerful aviator club and finds the idea of reduced pilot training and maintenance programs attractive.  After all, UAVs do not have survivor families.  Nor do they have downstream financial costs like retired pay and medical benefits.  pl

https://southfront.org/boeing-unveils-wingman-combat-drone-that-supports-stealth-jets/

Analytic piece on staged chemical attacks

" ... weaponized disinformation campaigns, staged videos and fake news are common approaches used by the US military and special services to promote their own agenda around the world. The US was actively using these tools during its intervention in Iraq and after it.

According to the later revelations, the employed programs were varying from placing Pentagon-provided articles in Iraqi newspapers as “unbiased news” to producing footage, which were made to look as if they had been “created by Arabic TV,” and CDs with fake al-Qaeda videos, which then distributed through various channels.

The employed propaganda approaches are constantly evolving. Therefore, propaganda coverage of the conflict in Syria has some differences with those which were observed in Iraq. Now, mainstream media, the Pentagon, the intelligence services and diplomats are actively using Hollywood-style approaches. This style of the coverage is based on providing catchy, even if horrible, pictures and videos influencing the emotions of the audience rather than convincing it with logical conclusions.

Just like with Hollywood movies, the mainstream news has increasingly been turning away from the logical narration of stories with realistic motivations to emotional judgements based on anonymous sources, non-verified images, pocket citizen journalists and even open speculation. The content developed within the framework of this approach is usually based on the results of social and psychological research. This allows results to be maximised by the targetted development of content and appropriate segmentation of the audience. An interesting and successful example of this audience reaction modelling can be seen in the mainstream media coverage of the Salisbury incident, which gave rise to large-scale hysteria in Western countries about Russian spies."  SF

-------------

Well, pilgrims,  you heard it first here and often over the last years.  This piece speaks for itself.  pl

https://southfront.org/staged-chemical-attack-videos-and-other-trends-in-modern-propaganda/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wag_the_Dog

Syrian Kurds close to making deal with Damascus - TTG

BEIRUT, LEBANON (9:30 P.M.) – A deal with the Syrian government is ‘inevitable’ at this juncture in the Syrian crisis, a Kurdish official told the AFP News Agency on Saturday. Redur Khalil, a commander in the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces alliance, told AFP that Kurdish authorities and Damascus were bound to reach a deal. “Reaching a solution between the autonomous administration and the Syrian government is inevitable because our areas are part of Syria,” said Khalil.

According to Redur, negotiations are ongoing between the government and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) for a final deal on the key city of Manbij in northeast Aleppo. “Negotiations are ongoing with the government to reach a final formulation for administering the city of Manbij,” Khalil told AFP, adding that talks had shown “positive signs”.

If that leads to a solution that “protects the rights” of Manbij residents, a similar arrangement could be applied to SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzor province, east of the Euphrates river, he said.

The deployment of government forces along the Turkish border could not be ruled out, he added. “The tasks of these forces could change, but we will not withdraw from our territory,” Khalil said, adding Kurdish fighters could be integrated into the Syrian army.  (Al Masdar News)

***************************

Redur Khalil is the second highest ranking official within the YPG and PYD, not some talking head. He’s been fighting IS jihadis since before the siege of Kobani. He is well a respected  leader of the Rojava Kurds. His words matter. His call for Russia to act as the guarantor of any agreement between the YPG/PYD and Damascus is significant. Integrating Kurdish fighters into the SAA is a wise and necessary move. The SAA has welcomed far more wayward sons back into the fold than the YPG. Syria, all of Syria, is headed for better times.

One of the biggest threats to this better future is the desperate wish of the neocons that US forces remain in Syria. These people, like that son of a bitch Bolton, need to be resisted. I fervently wish Trump would fire this insolent ass. I also hope my GB brethren embedded among the YPG fighters follow the advice given by my first team sergeant: “Well goddam sir, the first thing we gotta do once we hit the goddam DZ is put a goddam round through that goddam radio.” My team sergeant’s name was Ricochet Roy Bishop and he lived up to his name. No matter what the politicians and generals say, the best possible course of action for those SF teams is to prepare their Kurdish counterparts for a smooth demobilization.

This is what the 1990 version of FM 31-20 “Doctrine for Special Forces Operations” says about the final phase of a US sponsored unconventional war.

“Demobilization is an important and difficult phase of UW, yet is often neglected in initial UW planning. Demobilization planning should begin as soon as the US government decides to sponsor a resistance organization. Once the resistance organization accomplishes its objectives, it should demobilize. Its shadow government may become the newly established government of the country. Resistance forces should be integrated into the reconstituted national army, even if this integration is only a transition stage toward their eventual return to civilian life. The manner in which the demobilization occurs will affect the postwar attitudes of the people and the government towards the United States.“

“Because of their knowledge of resistance organization and history, SF teams initially remain in their operational areas to assist in demobilization. The SF team commanders and their supporting CA and PSYOP elements ensure transfer of US responsibility without loss of control, influence, or property accountability. The key to long-term strategic success in UW is the planning and execution of SF post-conflict responsibilities. “

It surely won’t go totally by the manual. It never does, but this is an opportunity for SF to successfully complete a demobilization phase leaving the Syrians and especially the Rojava Kurds to find their own better future.

TTG, DOL

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-kurds-close-to-making-deal-with-govt-report/

Underwater Currents of Naval Strategy - by Andrei Martyanov

Late Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov at the peak of the Soviet naval development in late 1970s to mid-1980s continued to stress his seemingly simple idea, first officially articulated in his 1976 treatise The Sea Power of the State, that modern (Soviet) navy must be balanced.[1] Gorshkov's idea of balanced fleet was that of a navalist, who envisioned modern navy capable to conduct global operations ranging from amphibious landings, to global anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, to nuclear deterrent. Yet, throughout Gorshkov's long tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy one platform above everything else remained dominant in his thinking—a submarine. Unsurprisingly, 1968 Time magazine cover featured image of Admiral Gorshkov superimposed on the background with a submarine at the periscope depth. With all the Soviet Navy's impressive development of its surface fleet at that time, these were primarily submarines which USSR developed at a break-neck speed and eventually equaled or surpassed US Navy's submarine forces not only in quantity but in quality too, with even US Navy grudgingly admitting in 1988 that project 971 (NATO Akula-class) nuclear submarine being the best in the world.[2]  

Gorshkov knew, as well as contemporary Russian naval commanders know that no balanced fleet is possible without powerful submarine component. Even in the worst times of post-Soviet collapse, with what became Russian Navy's surface component rusting away and disintegrating in 1990s, submarine development never stopped in Russia because submarine forces were and are viewed still as one of the major elements of national security. Submarines, apart from strategic missile submarines serving as a crucial pillar of the national nuclear deterrent, are indispensable in ASW role, they are also a major factor in operations, both as a defender and otherwise, on the Shipping Lanes of Communications (SLOC). This fact is important when considering what is emerging as a flash point, one of many, between China and the United States in the oceans, Indian and Pacific Oceans to be precise. There is very little doubt that any American Administration, as recent experience with Donald Trump's affection for the most extreme neoconservatives, such as John Bolton or Mike Pompeo, demonstrated, will pursue the most aggressive policies both in relation to Russia and China. This is today the nature of the American state, driven by crusading spirit of exceptionalism and desperate vain desire to not allow emergence of economic and military peers. China long ago surpassed the US economically. In terms of naval development, however, some questions still remain as of today. 

 

USSPACECOM and the circle of life - TTG

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Establishment of United States Space Command as a Unified Combatant Command

Pursuant to my authority as the Commander in Chief and under section 161 of title 10, United States Code, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I direct the establishment, consistent with United States law, of United States Space Command as a functional Unified Combatant Command.  I also direct the Secretary of Defense to recommend officers for my nomination and Senate confirmation as Commander and Deputy Commander of the new United States Space Command.

I assign to United States Space Command:  (1) all the general responsibilities of a Unified Combatant Command; (2) the space‑related responsibilities previously assigned to the Commander, United States Strategic Command; and (3) the responsibilities of Joint Force Provider and Joint Force Trainer for Space Operations Forces.  The comprehensive list of authorities and responsibilities for United States Space Command will be included in the next update to the Unified Command Plan.

Consistent with section 161(b)(2) of title 10, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, you are directed to notify the Congress on my behalf.

You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

DONALD J. TRUMP

************************************

USSPACECOM existed as a unified combatant command from 1985 to 2002 headquartered at Peterson AFB along with NORAD. NORAD and the Cheyenne Mountain Site were part of USSPACECOM at the time. VP Pence announced the new headquarters will be at the Kennedy Space Center. That will make Florida home to four unified combatant commands. There will be Congressional turf battles over that decision.

My experience with the old USSPACECOM started when they picked up the DOD’s computer network defense (CND) mission. I was recognized as knowing something about computers and, along with the Defense HUMINT Service Y2K preparations, was given the CND portfolio. I made one trip out to Peterson AFB. The area is beautiful. I made it to the top of Pikes Peak in a pigged out rental car that had no business being up there. General Ralph Eberhart was CINCUSSPACECOM at the time. He was a hoot.  He made it clear that he knew precious little about CND, but pledged his and his command’s full support for the mission and the Joint Task Force - Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND), the unit charged with carrying out that mission. My time supporting  USSPACECOM and JTF-CND was exciting, challenging and fruitful. But that’s another story.

I applaud Trump’s decision to reestablish USSPACECOM. The stated mission is pure and simple and without the distractions of CND and other ancillary missions. I also applaud its basing in the Kennedy Space Center/Patrick AFB area. It will be a constant reminder of the command’s singular mission. As with the old command, the Air Force Space Command will be the foundation upon which the new command will be built. I’m sure its headquarters will move to Patrick AFB where the 45th Space Wing is already located. Other elements of USSPACECOM will remain based throughout the country. 

An article in “Politico” says Trump is taking this step because Congress is fiercely skeptical of the idea of establishing a Space Force as a separate service. I agree that Space Force is a premature idea. However, the immediate reestablishment of USSPACECOM is a necessary move. Good on ya, Mr. President, for making it so.

TTG

https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/18/white-house-establishes-us-space-command-1038139

Perhaps time is up in Idlib.

That is the old Saraya Difaa' companies insignia.  4th Armored Division, SAA is descended from them.

Reporting in the last two days indicates that 4th Armored Division is re-deploying some units to the western arc of the Idlib pocket outside the supposed "de-militarized" belt agreed on by Russia, Turkey, and Syria.

At the same time units of 5th Corps, SAA and of the Republican Guard have been deploying to the east side of the Idlib Pocket.

HTS has repeatedly violated the terms of the agreement.  Thus far Russia and Syria have refrained from taking definitive and decisive action, but Russia's recent political wounds brought on by incidents in Ukraine  may have decided for Russia the question of whether or not it is worthwhile to humor the US in the hope of better relations with the US.

We will see.  pl

https://southfront.org/syrian-military-deploys-5th-assault-corps-and-republican-guard-troops-east-of-idlib-video/

https://southfront.org/units-of-4th-armored-division-deploy-near-idlib-demilitarized-zone-amid-looming-collapse-of-ceasefire/

https://southfront.org/more-than-15000-terrorist-in-idlib-russia-is-ready-to-assit-syrian-army-to-elimiate-them/

Incident in the Kerch Strait - TTG

Earlier today Russian Navy, Coast Guard and Aerospace Forces intercepted and captured three Ukrainian vessels as they attempted to pass through the Kerch Strait en route to Mariupol. Russian authorities claim the Ukrainians failed to coordinate the passage and illegally entered Russian territorial waters. Ukraine claims their ships were illegally seized during a routine transit of the Strait. A detailed account of the incident, including a video of the deftly executed collision with the tugboat, can be read on the SouthFront site and many other sites by now.

These types of incidents occur from time to time. Remember the Navy patrol boats seized by the Iranians? They’re eventually resolved after much huffing and puffing and diplomatic activity. What strikes me about this incident is the lengths the Russians went to in stopping one Ukrainian tugboat and two small gunboats. The passage under the Kerch bridge was blocked by a large cargo ship. Two each Su-25 aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters flew overhead. The surface fleet consisted of several Sobol and Mangust class fast patrol craft, and a Svetlak class corvette. That tugboat was not going to pass through the Strait or get close to that new Crimean Bridge. Was there more to this than a mere provocation or coordination SNAFU? The following anonymous comment is from a SouthFront article. It may be just a conspiracy theory from a tinfoil hat wearing crazy. The commenter definitely has a flair for the dramatic. It may be disinformation. But what if there’s some truth in it? If so, holy crap!

************************

Very important Info appeared briefly on Russian media (before being scrubbed) that a NATO SADM, possibly a Diver deployable device, was being transported by Ukrainian and British Special Forces to the Kerch Straight to be used on the Crimean bridge. The device was being tracked by the Russians and they knew it had been loaded on to a Ukrainian Tug (escorted by 5 warships!! - 3 in the Black Sea, including one NATO vessel, and 2 waiting in the Sea of Azov).

This is why the Russians acted!

They never react with force and have never blockaded the Sea of Azov. Ground attack jets and Helicopter gunships, plus a warship armed with ASM and Torpedos were waiting.

This level of force would not be used just for a tug and a few old Ukrainian ships. But a tug carrying a tactical nuclear device about to bring down one of the worlds most strategic bridges, a bridge hated by NATO - as per the recent Op Ed in the 'Washington Examiner' (Ukraine should bomb the Crimean Bridge).

Ukraine regularly provokes Russia to little effect, but today the Russians acted to stop a terrible event.

Ukraine is now in panic mode and there may be direct NATO intervention if the to cover this, if the Russians make this public.

The device may have come from the UK. 

The UK have been psychologically preparing their people for a war with Russia.

The SADM explosion would have brought down the bridge and melted the foundations, but looked like a conventional IED blast from above due to the underwater detonation and relatively low yield of less than 1KT.

This was a WW3 level provocation STOPPED by the Russian FSB and SF's!

All traces of these reports are being scrubbed as I write!

Get this out before the story is completely scrubbed.

I will not contact you again.  (SouthFront comments)

TTG

https://southfront.org/russia-ukraine-black-sea-military-crisis-on-the-brink-of-war/

https://southfront.org/poroshenko-regime-is-provoking-conflict-with-russia-in-waters-off-crimea/

A Murder in Bamako - TTG

Nov. 15 (UPI) -- The US Navy charged two Virginia Beach-based Navy SEALs and two Marines in the 2017 strangulation death of U.S. Army Green Beret Staff Sgt. Logan Melgar. The Navy accused the suspects of strangling Melgar in a chokehold after breaking into his room while he was sleeping and restraining him with duct tape they acquired from Marine quarters.

The four service members, whose names were not released, were charged Tuesday with felony murder in Melgar's death at age 34, and were also charged with involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, hazing and burglary. If the charges result in conviction, they could face the death penalty or life in prison without parole.

Melgar, who was assigned to the 3rd Special Forces Group in Mali, West Africa, to counter terrorism, and served two tours in Afghanistan, was found dead on June 4, 2017, in embassy housing, in the Malian capital, as first reported by The New York Times. In May, his name was inscribed on the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Memorial Wall at Fort Bragg, NC.

Admiral Charles Rock, commander of Norfolk-based Navy Region Mid-Atlantic, decided to move forward with charges after he obtained a Naval Criminal Investigative Service report into Melgar's death.A preliminary hearing on the charges is set for Dec. 10 at Naval Station Norfolk.

A US Special Operations Command spokesperson said the charges should not tarnish the reputation of U.S. Special Operators worldwide. "We will not allow allegations or substantiated incidents of misconduct erode decades of honorable accomplishments by the members of U.S. Special Operations Command," Captain Jason Salata said. "If these allegations of misconduct are substantiated, they represent a violation of the trust and standards required of all service members."  (UPI)

******************

Colonel Lang asked me to write something about this. Naturally I have strong feelings concerning this incident, but finding the right words was difficult. I am enraged by the murder of one of my Special Forces brethren. I am viscerally disgusted by the behavior of the SEALs and Marine Raiders. Although not convicted, they have continued to lie through their teeth as each preceding lie is exposed. They marked themselves as men void of all truth. That alone should be cause for stripping them of all rank, honors and privileges. They should each receive a BCD after a stint in the brig. If convicted of murder, they should hang… literally.

Why were these men in Bamako in the first place? This was an intelligence collection mission in support of US, French and Malian operations targeting AQIM terrorists in Mali. They were probably conducting military source operations (MSO), formerly called low level source operations (LLSO). This has long been an inherent capability of Special Forces. Advanced HUMINT training for Green Berets has increased dramatically as our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ramped up. Seems the SEALs of DEVGRU (formerly ST6) and Marine Raiders of MARSOC didn’t want to be left out. I see no logic in this. These commandos are not suited for HUMINT controlled collection operations. They should stick to kicking in doors and killing bad guys. This abomination in Bamako proves that. 

Since the initial reporting of this murder back in June 2017, stories circulated about the reason for the assault. The SEALs were skimming intelligence contingency funds, money meant to pay sources. That’s a mark of death among case officers. It’s a crime of unlimited opportunities. The only defense is the integrity and discipline of the practitioners. SSG Melgar reportedly called the SEALs on their transgressions and was prepared to report their crimes. That the SEALs may have committed a murder to cover up their crimes of theft and breach of trust is especially enraging.

At least one report I read said SSG Melgar also confronted the SEALs about their poor fieldcraft or tradecraft. The special operations ethos doesn’t lend itself to running agents. That requires the finesse, patience and humility more common to my Special Forces brethren. 

My experiences with the SEALs of DEVGRU did not leave me overly impressed. I and a couple of former Det Berlin Green Berets noted that their fieldcraft was shit when they weren’t assaulting an objective or swimming in the surf. I don’t know if this was a trait of the DEVGRU SEALs or all SEALs. I had a former Viet Nam era SEAL as one of my RECONDO instructors in Hawaii. He was indistinguishable from my former MACV-SOG instructors. Quiet professionals, the lot of them. Maybe it’s generational. I thank God I had the humility and patience to learn from that generation. DOL

TTG

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2018/11/15/Navy-charges-4-in-2017-Green-Beret-death/1941542307484/

https://www.thedailybeast.com/seals-marines-charged-with-green-beret-logan-melgars-murder

Excellent US WW2 Documentaries.

 

Worth watching.  pl

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victory_at_Sea

 

https://www.yidio.com/show/crusade-in-europe?utm_source=Bing&utm_medium=search&t_source=64&utm_campaign=778&msclkid=44e945b5787e108ada141e59ed24b1a3

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battle_of_San_Pietro 

Habakkuk to TTG on the Yeltsin period

They were indeed fascinating times, and the conversations cast a very valuable light on them.

The conclusion of Helmer’s piece I find particularly interesting:

“What a rich irony Yeltsin leaves us in this record of his dealings with Clinton,” observes a senior Soviet officer now retired in Moscow. “Yeltsin proves that because negotiations with the Americans are impossible, and because Russians will not capitulate, war is inevitable. And this from the Communist Party veteran, the Politburo member, who was brought up to believe war was inevitable between communism and capitalism. And he, self-appointed liberator of Russia from communism, ends up proving he didn’t free us from war with the Americans at all. Ha!”

As it happens, while I almost always find what Helmer has to say interesting, I also often think one needs to take what he writes with, say, a certain amount of salt.

The notion that war between the capitalist and communist worlds was in some way fatalistically inevitable, which had been central to Soviet pronouncements through until Stalin’s death, and was a significant cause of the Cold War, was actually abandoned thereafter, although the jettisoning of the whole structure of ludicrous dogma had to wait for four further decades.

That said, what Helmer writes comes together with recent reminders of my own experience of the closing years of the Soviet Union.

So, ‘C-SPAN’ have posted an interview and Q & A session given by Michael MccGwire, credited as ‘Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution,’ on 3 February 1989. The description of the origins of the Gorbachev ‘new thinking’, and the revolutionary changes it implied, was that he gave to myself and a BBC Radio colleague when we interviewed him, it would have been a few days later.

(See https://www.c-span.org/pers... )

As MccGwire said, when asked to describe himself, ‘I went to sea when I was seventeen, I’m basically an ex-naval officer.’

Actually, he had been chief cadet captain at the Dartmouth naval college, and before he turned eighteen had had a ‘worm’s eye’ view both of the crucial ‘Operation Pedestal’ convoy, which relieved Malta in August 1942, and of the North African landings the following November.

Urban Wars, Tomorrow's wars ?

By Patrick BAHZAD

 

Aleppo, Mosul, Raqqa, Ghouta … A few years ago, nobody would have known these names. With the rise of the "Islamic State" in the Middle-East, and the civil war in Syria, those cities have become battlefields of a new kind. At least, that's what they look like. Areas seized and held by a non-state actor, requiring the mobilisation of large forces to take them back, at a huge cost both in manpower, equipment and civilian life. Based on these premises, a number of analysts have posited that the way these insurgencies were able to fight back against overwhelming conventional forces is an indicator of what's to come. The future of humankind certainly trends towards growing urbanisation. Therefore, statistically, there is certainly a case to be made for a growing likelihood of urban engagements. But is the impression we're under really the result of an rational analysis or are we mistakenly projecting what might be a temporary development into a fact of future warfare ? Here are a few thoughts on the subject.

Urban warfare, not to be confused with siege warfare, is a recent phenomenon. Up until the early 20th century, and with a few exceptions, fighting for a city meant laying siege to it and finding a way to breach its walls or submitting the defenders through starvation. Either way, there was no fighting behind the city walls, in the streets or alleys. Or if there was, as in Carthage in 146 BC, there was never any doubt as to who would prevail: once the walls were breached, the city would fall.

This feature of urban/siege warfare began to change significantly with the 20th century. Although there are earlier examples of hard-fought battles in small towns and villages, the starting point of urban warfare as we know it can definitely be set at the 1930s. There are a few fundamental reasons for this. Strategically, cities were no longer military objectives per se, unless as the centre of gravity of an adversary. Whether in manoeuver or trench warfare, there was generally not much to be gained from besieging or defending a large urban area. From an attacking point of view, it meant diverting huge amounts of resources and manpower, while at the same time leaving large swaths of land uncontrolled. From a defensive point of view, it was even more counter-productive, as this was the best way for your armies to be contained and unable to manoeuver effectively.

Siege Warfare vs Urban Warfare

But ever since nation-States took over from city-States as the main actors of international politics, conventional warfare has always been more focused on seizing territory and defeating an enemy in open battle. Furthermore, as already mentioned, when it came to fighting for a city, the battle basically ceased when the walls were breached. The reason why this pattern changed in the 1930s is related neither to strategy nor to military doctrine. Rather, it was the result of technological changes that suddenly made it possible for a defender to keep on fighting in an urban area that was not protected by walls, and still be in a position to defeat an attacker.

Some thoughts on Robert Fisk’s Syrian adventure - TTG

A few days ago, someone brought up Fisk’s recent article in the Independent, “After warnings of mass murder and catastrophe in Idlib, I prowled the front lines for two days. I didn’t find what I’d expected.” Fisk took a whirlwind tour of the SAA front lines surrounding Idlib in a Syrian taxi. The gist of his investigation is that he found no evidence of the massing SAA troops, tanks and artillery reported to be prepared to assault Idlib. 

Fisk may be an experienced and accomplished war correspondent, but he apparently understands little about concealment, camouflage and dispersion. These are not just field techniques. These are critical skills necessary for surviving on the modern battlefield and achieving the element of surprise, a principle of war espoused by the US and most other militaries in the world. For the Russians and their allies, the SAA, these techniques are included in doctrine of maskirovka. I found this definition of maskirovka in a 1987 paper written at the Army Command and General Staff College by an Corps of Engineers major. I think it captures the essence of these techniques and their importance to surviving and achieving the element of surprise  

“a form of security for the combat actions and daily activity of the forces; a complex of measures, directed at deceiving the enemy relative to the presence and location of forces, various combat objectives, their status, battle readiness and action, and also the plans of the command.”

Since my time as a cadet and junior officer, the maxim that if you can be seen, you can be killed was drilled into my head. To avoid being seen and killed, we practiced the arts of camouflage, concealment and dispersion. So did soldiers in every other army I know. We had no problem hiding a light infantry battalion in mountain jungle (not hard). We could also hide that infantry battalion on a barren lava field (a little harder). I have absolutely no doubt that the SAA is practicing the same skills as they mass for the coming Idlib offensive. They are using every minute fold in the terrain to hide their troops, tanks, artillery and supplies. They are well camouflaged. They are maintaining light, noise and movement discipline. They are well dispersed so the jihadis cannot discover the SAA’s immediate tactical objectives.

I am not at all surprised that Fisk did not find the SAA. The SAA is hiding from jihadi reconnaissance patrols, spies and drones, as well as Turkish and Coalition efforts to locate the massing forces. A well trained and disciplined army surely can evade a reconnaissance from the front seat of a taxi by a journalist. To Fisk's credit, he did admit that just because his cursory tour didn't reveal the SAA massing for an offensive, it did not mean that the SAA wasn't there. I find it telling that Fisk did not encounter any military convoys along his route from Hama to the Abu Dhuhour Military Airfield. That indicates that the formations and supplies for the coming offensive are in place. They are just waiting for the order to strike.

TTG

https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/syria-last-battle-idlib-robert-fisk-latest-a8530796.html

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a190836.pdf

The coming Idlib campaign in maps.

"Multiple pro-government sources speculate that the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and its allies may soon launche a military operation against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda) in the so-called Idlib de-escalation zone soon. According to these speculations, the SAA may target militant positions in northern Latakia, southern Idlib and southwestern Aleppo. The maps below provides a possible scenario of this advance."  SF

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Tactics are the art of the battle.  Operational art is the level of the campaign combining a number of battles and movements together in a sequence that drives the enemy's actions.  Strategy is the plan that designs the over all effort to win the war.  The plan represented in the graphic above is an excellent example of the operational art.

Well, this looks a lot like the campaign plan projections that we have been making on SST.  It seems that great minds run on similar paths?  The preparations for this campaign are well advanced.  The ammunition, fuel and rations have been stockpiled to sustain a continuous struggle and pursuit.  The assault and follow on troops have been positioned.  The over all fire preparation for the campaign is well advanced.  It has been ongoing for some time with major concentrations of enemy activity brought under sustained attack to weaken them before the advance begins.

Russian diplomacy appears to have neutered Turkish resistance to government re-occupation of Idlib Province.

A further White Helmet gas attack farce is likely but the presence of Russian air and naval forces will limit the scope of the consequent attacks.

Congratulations to the planners.  pl 

https://southfront.org/in-maps-possible-scenario-of-syrian-army-advance-in-idlib/

Idlib offensive begins.

 

"The known forces participating in the upcoming Idlib offensive are as followed:

• Syrian Arab Army
  • 1st Division
  • 3rd Armored Division
    • Qalamoun Shield Forces
  • 4th Mechanized Division
    • 39th Brigade
    • 41st Brigade
    • 42nd Brigade (Ghiath Forces)
    • 555th Brigade
  • 7th Armored Division
  • 9th Division
    • Shock Troops
  • 10th Division
  • 11th Tank Division
    • 47th Brigade
    • 60th Brigade
    • 87th Brigade
  • 15th Special Forces Division
  • 18th Tank Division
    • 67th Brigade
  • Republican Guard
    • 105th Brigade
    • 106th Brigade
  • Tiger Forces
• National Defense Forces (NDF)
• Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)
  • Mhardeh and Suqaylabiyah divisions
• Liwaa Al-Quds
• Al-Ba’ath Battalions

Please note: List will be expanded throughout the next few weeks as more groups join the battle"  SF

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25,000 men initially, masses of armored vehicles, lots of artillery like the battery firing in the picture, plenty of Syrian and Russian air support.

The day of reckoning for the jihadis, the FSA unicorns and the collaborators therewith who have holed up in Idlib Province has arrived.

The wretched neo-Ottoman at the head of the Turkish government has promised the Idlibians that they will be protected from the SAA.  IMO this is just another example of his essential hostility to the world that exists outside his addled brain.  pl 

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/idlib-offensive-to-have-largest-build-up-of-syrian-army-troops-full-list-of-troops/

https://southfront.org/syrian-armys-artillery-shell-militant-positions-in-southern-idlib/

https://southfront.org/turkey-promised-local-pro-militant-figures-in-idlib-to-prevent-syrian-army-advance-report/ 

Idlib offensive preparations

(4th Division "flash")

 "The Syrian Arab Army’s 4th Armored Division has left the Daraa and Sweida provinces for northwest Syria, tonight, a military source told Al-Masdar News.

According to the military source, the 4th Division left southern Syria with a large arsenal of missile launchers and armored vehicles. 

In addition to their equipment, the 4th Division is bringing thousands of soldiers that were previously deployed inside the Damascus Governorate.

The 4th Armored Division will be leading their own attack that is separate from the Tiger Forces.

The Tiger Forces will begin their attack along the Idlib-Hama axis, while the 4th Division is believed to be leading the charge in the Al-Ghaab Plain.

Both the Tiger Forces and 4th Division are two of the Syrian Arab Army’s most successful divisions and their battle experience should play an integral role in the offensive."  AMN

-----------

This is going to be one hell of a rodeo!  As the article suggests there will be secondary attacks from the west out of Lattakia Province and from the Aleppo City area pushing toward the west.  These will be intended to fix the enemy in place while the main attack drives north from Hama Province to Idlib City and then on to the north.

(shoulder "Flash" of the Defense Companies)

The 4th Armored Division is in my opinion the premier major formation of the Syrian government forces, even better than the redoubtable Tiger Forces task force.  The 4th Division was originally created from the Saraya Difaa' (Defense Companies).  The name and shoulder patch were obvious echos of Schutzstaffel  (Waffen SS).  These company sized but numerous  units were raised as an Alawi militia that had government support and were meant to protect the interests of the Alawi community.  There were persistent reports in the US Army Arabic specialist community, perhaps apocryphal, that the Saraya Difaa'  had the benefit of a former Waffen SS Standarten Fuhrer  (colonel equivalent) acting as a mercenary to organize and train these troops when they were created.  His efforts were joined by Soviet Army armored forces and paratroop instructors.

I remember seeing their infantry riding on the outside of their tanks wearing  their special pattern camouflage uniforms and that death's head patch. They certainly looked like historical memory.

Hafez al-Assad's brother Rifaat tried to use these troops in a coup and failed.  In the aftermath the Saraya Difaa' were disestablished as a group but not abolished.  Some units went into the Republican Guard and others ended up in what is now the 4th Armored Division.  In the maelstrom of the civil war they have become a simply outstanding force.  pl 

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-armys-4th-division-heads-to-northwest-syria-for-jisr-al-shughour-offensive/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defense_Companies_(Syria)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_Armoured_Division_(Syria)

Syria Notes - 29 July 2018

IMO the clean up of Quneitra Province is essentially complete.  What is next?

1.  Israel seems content with the SAA's re-occupation of the Golan frontier.  The SAA is operating in the UNDOF DMZ but that does not seem to bother the IDF very much and thus it is clear that there is an understanding between the SSA and IDF that the SAA will withdraw to east of UNDOF lines B & C  when they are finished with the rebels.  The Israels know that the pinprick rocket attacks into the occupied Golan are not the responsibility of the SAA and these will be dealt with by the Syrian side in order to have quiet on that front.

2.  The SAA have learned in the hard school of prolonged combat (and under Russian tutelage) that the way to fight is to organize into mission dictated task forces using the building block organizations contained within "standing" units of the SAA and Republican Guard.  The Germans created this combat doctrine.  They called these task forces kampfgruppen.  They could be anything in size from company to brigade (10 times as big).  The task forces are not intended to be permanent re-organizations since the parent units of the component parts are needed for training and logistics.  In such a system the existing headquarters of divisions and brigades are merely command and control nodes for kampfgruppen once the combat re-organization is made.  The US Army has been set up for this kind of battlefield flexibility. since the early 60s although in peacetime units are not scrambled much except in exercises.  In re Syria, the constant re-organization for combat often leads to errors in perception on the part of foreign observers.  Thus, task groups made up of parts of bigger SAA units and NDF are reported in various places at the same time.  This is quite useful for deception operations.

3.  In just this way elements of specific SAA units are now simultaneously reported as being in Quneitra Province, in northern Hama Province and norther Latakia Province.  The conditions necessary for a campaign of liberation in Idlib Province are rapidly being brought to fruition.  Kampfgruppen made up of parts of the Tiger Forces, Republican Guard, 4th Armored, NDF, etc. are all present in the north resting and re-fitting prior to action.

4.  I expect to see an offensive in the north that will include one or two secondary attacks intended to deceive the rebel "operations room," and fix its forces in opposition to these while  a main attack, probably from the south, waits to push north to Khan Sheikhoon, Idlib and farther north.

5.  The largely Kurdish SDF has now declared its intention to cooperate in this offensive as a preliminary effort leading to liberation of the Kurdish parts of Afrin District from Turkish domination.

6.  What will the Turks do?  IMO they will not do anything much if their "observation posts" are bypassed in the offensive and left to a realization of their uselessness post liberation. A commitment of substantial air defense assets against Turkish air will be necessary to success.  plp 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kampfgruppe

"Betting the Farm" in SW Syria

 

The Syrian military is preparing to launch their largest offensive of the war next week, as they finalize their plans to kickoff this imperative operation in the provinces of Dara’a and Al-Quneitra.

According to a military source in Damascus, the government offensive will be led by two major forces in the Syrian Arab Army: the Tiger Forces and 4th Division. 

The Tiger Forces are tasked with retaking the southern districts of Dara’a city, while the 4th Division will be split between the Al-Quneitra and Dara’a governorates.

Joining these two divisions will be a large number of soldiers and paramilitary troops that were previously deployed in the Damascus, Al-Sweida, Homs, and Hama governorates.

Below is a list of units participating in this battle:

Syrian Arab Army :

• 4th Division
  • 39th Brigade
  • 40th Brigade
  • 42nd Brigade (Ghiath Forces)
• 5th Armored Division
  • 15th Brigade
• 7th Division
• 9th Division
  • Shock Forces
• 15th Special Forces Division
• 90th Brigade
• Republican Guard
  • 105th Brigade
  • 106th Brigade
• Palestine Liberation Army (Palestinian wing of the Syrian Army)
• Tiger Forces

Paramilitaries:

• National Defense Forces (NDF)
  • Liwaa Suqour Al-Quneitra
  • Fouj Al-Joulan
  • East Qalamoun Division
  • Damascus Division
  • Homs Division
  • Dara’a Division
• Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)
• Liwaa Al-Quds (Palestinian-Syrian faction from Aleppo)
• Raqqa tribal fighters             AMN

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"Betting the Farm" is an old military saying concerning a situation in which one side in a major war decides to commit so much of its forces to an action that if failure and decimation occurs then the side suffering that will be permanently crippled.

The coming offensive in Daraa and Quneitra governorates (provinces) appears to have all the hallmarks of such an action.  Most of the first rate heavy units of the SAA will be committed  to this effort.  Presumably the SAG intends to crush the rebellion in the SW and drive its line of control up to within sight of the Israeli forts on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights. 

What will Israel's reaction to this be?  How effective will Syrian air defenses be against a reaction?  What will Russia's reaction be to Israeli attacks on its ally's forces?  pl 

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/complete-list-of-syrian-forces-taking-part-in-southern-syria-offensive/

Iranian Green Berets… Brothers in Arms - TTG

The genesis of this article stems directly from Richard Sale’s recent piece on his experiences in pre and post revolutionary Iran. It reminded me of an artifact I kept from my days in ODA 334, 10th Special Forces then stationed at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. It is a worn and stained framed photo portrait print of the Shah of Iran. It’s decorated with an even more worn and stained ribbon in the Iranian national colors. A handwritten inscription in the corner reads, “To ODA 334, Many thanks and my deep respect. Pahlavi, Shah of Iran.” This was presented to the team after the completion of an MTT (mobile training team) deployment to Iran in the 1960s long before my or any of my team mates’ time in ODA 334.

That portrait and Richard’s article set me on a quest for more information about 10th Group’s connection to Iran. ODA 334’s deployment occurred in the early to mid 60s when the entire Group was still stationed at Bad Toelz, Germany. Four ODAs conducted MTTs to train the Iranian special forces over a two year period under a MAAG Iran (Military Assistance Advisory Group) program. 10th Group MTTs also trained Iranian Kurd fighters in the northern mountains as part of this MAAG program.

Fortuitously I found a documentary produced by the US Army Signal Corps Army Pictorial Service as an episode in their “The Big Picture” weekly television series. This episode, entitled “Assignment Iran,” chronicles the journey of Captain Paul Wineman, US Army Signal Corps, as he makes his way through the Special Forces Officers Course at Fort Bragg and the Defense Language Institute in Monterey before beginning his two year assignment with MAAG Iran to oversee the program to help the Iranian Army train a special forces group of its own. Watch the documentary. You will not only learn about this fascinating episode in US-Iranian military history, but you will also learn a great deal about the essence of our Green Berets.
 

     

The Iranian unit trained and the special forces school established by these 10th Group MTTs seem to have absorbed this Green Beret essence. This is the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, a unit that has endured through the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and has sent its advisors to augment the IRGC advise and assist mission in Syria since 2016. The 65th NOHED Brigade (Farsi acronym  for airborne special forces) retains their rifle green berets. Their pre-Revolution insignia was very similar to the US Special Forces crest with its crossed arrows and dagger. The Brigade’s present day insignia retains those elements. They are not just commandos. The Brigade has sub-units dedicated to hostage rescue, psychological operations and UW (unconventional warfare). I found a YouTube video from 2017 with commentary from a 65th Brigade colonel and the daily activities of a captain and his troops from the Brigade. The video is in Farsi with no subtitles, but I found that captain and his troops' activities to be quite similar to my and my team's experiences at Fort Devens in the 80s… brothers in arms. Whether you understand Farsi or not, watch this video as well. If Babak or any other member of our committee of correspondence can provide some translation notes, I would be most appreciative. 

As a Green Beret, I’ve had the privilege of working with the Incursore of the Italian 9th Parachute Assault Regiment, the Legionnaires of the French 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment and my brave brothers of the Lebanese 8th Infantry Brigade. Such experiences allow the mind of the simple soldier to transcend the pettiness of politics and the corrosiveness of nativism. In 2012, the 10th Group and the Russian 45th Guards Independent Reconnaissance Brigade (Spetsnaz) conducted joint training exercises in the US and Russia. Perhaps some day, that exchange can continue and the 10th Group and the 65th Brigade can do the same. What if they meet on the Euphrates? NOHED, Spetsnaz and Green Berets exchanging handshakes? Wouldn't that be a hoot? 

I hope others here find this as fascinating as I do. I would very much like to continue the discussion about our and Iran’s Green Berets. DOL   

TTG

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pg48e9LWWwA  (Assignment Iran)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJepnbJ5j_M  (Iran NOHED 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade_(Iran)

http://www.hamandishi.ir/news/242426/  (An article in Farsi published on 26 May 2018 largely consisting of an interview with the commander of the 65th NOHED Brigade. Run it through Google Translate to get the gist of it. There is a wealth of information there, even for us Farsi illiterates. Perhaps Babak can provide some nuanced comments.)