The Collapse of Deterrence with Iran by Christopher J. Bolan

Earlier this month, the U.S. administration announced its decision to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).  Just this week, the Trump administration said that it will no longer exempt any country from U.S. sanctions if they continue to buy Iranian oil.  These moves are justifiably sparking renewed debate about U.S. strategy for Iran. 

The White House portrays these steps as a natural progression in its ‘maximum pressure’ campaign to deprive Iran of “funds that it has used to destabilize the Middle East for decades.”

The reaction among policy pundits has been mixed but imminently predictable.  Supporters of regime change in Iran, like Mark Dubowitz at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, have long pushed for such moves.  On the opposing side, advocates of rapprochement such as Trita Parsi have sounded alarmist assessments indicating that the IRGC designation alone represents a dangerous escalation that might well lead to war.  Still others see the combination of the IRGC designation and the imposition of crippling new sanctions as part of an orchestrated public information campaign to build a U.S. case for war against Iran. 

Meanwhile, others in the analytical community including Suzanne Maloney at Brookings have characterized the IRGC designation as an action that will ultimately prove to be of little consequence.  Similarly, while the threat of additional U.S. sanctions on countries importing Iranian oil have already predictably led to a short-term increase in oil prices, some oil analysts have suggested that the U.S. drive to get Iranian oil exports to zero will ultimately fail and characterize such policies as more “feel-good rather than strategy-driven.”

Whichever side of this debate you find yourself, it is imperative to recognize that – whether by happenstance or design – these steps are dangerously degrading the pillars of a successful U.S. deterrence strategy against Iran. 

One of the most essential components of a successful U.S. deterrence strategy is clear communications.  As Thomas C. Schelling observes in his classic exposition of deterrence theory, “The victim has to know what is wanted, and may have to be assured of what is not wanted.” Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has failed on both counts.  This continued uncertainty and lack of clarity in terms of U.S. expectations for Iran’s behavior are the anti-thesis of what is required for a coherent and realistic deterrent policy.

In terms of what constitutes unacceptable behavior on Iran’s nuclear activities, President Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the meticulously negotiated and internationally sanctioned Iran nuclear deal (formally named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) has unnecessarily and recklessly muddied the waters.  For now Iran continues to adhere to the terms of the JCPOA despite the re-imposition of stringent U.S. unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions.  But the basic terms of the deal which involved Iran agreeing to verifiable restraints on its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief have been clearly violated and upended by the U.S. itself.  In the absence of the JCPOA’s promised rewards, it is only a matter of time before Iranian hardliners begin to test the limits of a severely weakened international agreement. 

The Trump administration has offered no more clarity regarding Iran’s troubling behaviors outside the nuclear file.  U.S. Secretary of State’s purported New Iran Strategy announced in May 2018 contains a grab bag of demands including ending all enrichment activities, guaranteeing unrestricted access to any Iranian facilities whether military or civilian, halting all ballistic missile development, ceasing support to Iran’s regional proxies and militias, a full withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria, and stopping all unspecified “threatening behavior.”  This list of U.S. expectations amounts to a demand for Iran to end efforts to exercise any influence outside its own borders.  In an open letter, more than 50 former senior U.S. government officials have dismissed these U.S. demands as leaving “Iran the option of either capitulation or war.”

Moreover, this U.S. approach fails to give any confidence to leaders in Tehran that any changes in its behavior will actually serve to avoid punishment or result in any measurable benefit.  The U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA despite Iran’s compliance has reinforced perceptions among hardliners in Tehran that nothing short of wholesale regime change will satisfy leaders in Washington.   Indeed, the rhetoric from senior Trump officials has taken an increasingly hostile tone since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA.  In a speech in Cairo early this year, Pompeo cast Iran clearly as an “enemy” while offering U.S. support for the Iranian people to rise up against “the mullahs in Tehran” as they did during the Green Revolution in 2009.  Meanwhile, National Security Advisor John Bolton issued what some have reasonably interpreted as a direct threat to the regime on the 40^th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution saying, “I don’t think you’ll have many more anniversaries left to enjoy.”

Additionally, the Trump administration’s unilateral approach to Iran has perilously undermined the credibility of its deterrent posture by fracturing the broad international coalition that had imposed a stringent set of multilateral sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table in 2015.  Instead of a unified global or Western front focused on challenging Iranian transgressions, we are now witnessing European countries and other U.S. allies devising financial mechanisms to expressly evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.  At the same time, what should be low-hanging fruit in terms of U.S. efforts to forge an anti-Iran coalition among long-time U.S. Arab allies is also collapsing of its own weight as most recently illustrated by Egypt’s withdrawal from the so-called ‘Arab NATO’ plan. 

Finally, any strong deterrent posture runs the risk of provoking retaliatory steps by the targeted state which could set off an unpredictable tit-for-tat retaliatory escalation leading potentially to open conflict.  The U.S. and Iran appear to be engaged in just such a provocative and potentially dangerous exchange.  In responding to the U.S. designation of the IRGC as an FTO, Iran’s Supreme National Council retaliated by designating U.S. CENTCOM and all its forces as terrorists.  In response to U.S. efforts to eliminate Iran’s ability to sell any oil on the international market, senior Iranian military officials have renewed threats to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz saying “If we are prevented from using it, we will close it.”  The current atmosphere of intensifying tensions could lead to an unintended escalation that neither side is willing to walk away from.

The traditional measures essential to developing a successful deterrence include clear and consistent communications of what specific behaviors are acceptable and which actions will result in credible and punishing reprisals.  Unfortunately, the steps taken thus far by the Trump administration have increased tensions with Iran and U.S. allies alike, weakened international resolve to pose a united front against Iran, and do not present Iranian leaders with a viable path forward to avoid confrontation with the U.S.  Regrettably, this approach is far more likely to result in open conflict than to deter or curb undesirable Iranian behaviors.

Comments

[Amir]

Maybe a difficult question to answer from your perspective but what are the Iranian options to deter an attack? With more chutzpah, I expand on this question by asking from a retired US colonel, what would be their best grand strategy, campaign and tactic to ensure minimal damage to itself, considering it’s weak defensive posture?

[turcopolier]

amir - I am not at liberty nor do I wish to advise Iran.

[Eugene Owens]

Agreed. Bolan is a smart cookie. We need more like him.

[Turcopolier]

He was my student at West Point and was a star man.

[Andrei Martyanov (aka SmoothieX12)]

Agree. Moreover, I don't think Russia will provide any, realistically. I think Russia is not against Iran getting its wings slightly clipped in Syria. As per Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz--it is a completely different game. If to believe news, I don't have 100% assurance on that, that Iran does have P-800 Onyx (apart from Iran's indigenous systems--how good they are I don't know), Iran can make both areas a shooting gallery which will make naval operations extremely dangerous.

[O'Shawnessey]

Hmm. Seems like Shoigu and Co. flat-out defeated the FUKUS hybrid war on Syria without downing a single "coalition" plane, and now the FUKUS folks and Li'l Jeff at UN are pulling every dirty trick in the psychopath playbook to prevent the rebuilding of Syria.

[Amir]

To follow up on your remark, Iran seems to have no answers:
"Iran left with few choices as Trump steps up pressure
US president’s decision to revoke oil sanctions waivers could push Tehran to war" https://www.ft.com/content/a40ec2e0-672a-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056

[Artemesia]

Gorka may be in the "immigrant neocon class," but as harmful to USA foreign policy as is Khalilzad, Gorka is not in his league: Gorka is a mediocre-talent, blowhard Wannabe.
--

re Mr. Bolan's critique of US "diplomacy" with Iran: a threshold question I ask is, By what right?
What right has USA to demand that Iran "change its behavior."

The response from the neocon community was voiced most recently in a discussion titled, Countering Violent Extremism https://www.c-span.org/video/?460029-1/us-institute-peace-hosts-forum-combating-violent-extremism moderated by David Ignatius and including such stellar 'diplomats' as Bushites Madeleine Albright, Michael Singh and Stephen Hadley: USA created the "international order" post-WWII and the institutions and values of that "international order" have maintained "peace, stability and prosperity" in the world ever since. The proof: "there have been no major wars between European powers since WWII." Democracy and stability are the keys to defeating "violent extremism" and maintaining the international order.
To maintain that Pax Americana, the US is entitled undermine the sovereignty of-; destabilize - , and impoverish any and all nations that resist its stabilizing efforts.

[Fred]

Norbert,

Destroy the waterworks of all the gulf states? with what? Saudi oil production declines? The US is the largest oil exporter right now. The World economy is destroyed? Really? Does that include Israel's? Somebody better tell Bibi and Jared. On a bright note I guess that means no more migration into the US.

[tjfxh]

In my view this is part of a larger picture that Bolan doesn't consider. There are reasons that the Trump team has not been more specific about desirable behavior: The desired behavior is for the regime to leave. The alternative to voluntary departure is overthrow. Actually, it can be argued that the US powers that be have been quite clear about this.

1. Regime change is the US major objective toward Iran, Russia, China, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. The rest is subterfuge. (Europe, Japan and South Korea are already occupied and controlled, and most of the rest of Latin America is controlled, too.)

2. a. The ultimate goal is to break up China and Russia into smaller countries that can never threaten the us.

2. b. The US also has to control the development of India to maintain hegemony, but that is now is mostly on the table economically.

2. c. Longer terms the US also has to control Africa, which is going to be a significant player later in this century. The US is already committing significant special operations forces there. (Regime change in China and Russia would go a long way to securing Africa with minimal effort.)

3. Islamic militancy is here to stay. It will continue to be a thorn, but probably won't be able to become a spear. However, thorns can do significant damage, like putting out an eye. This is an issue not only in MENA but also in most of Africa.

4. The strategy is based on hybrid warfare, employing information warfare, economic warfare, cyber-warfare to the extent possible and to folllow with special operations, proxy war.

5. Kinetic warfare using the US military will only be applied if absolutely necessary unless the objective can be accomplished quickly, since the US public has little tolerance for protracted warfare that results in more than minimal US casualties.The specter of Vietnam still hovers, and 17 years in Afghanistan are still a reminder.

6. China and Russia know this, and so do smaller countries that are on the hit list. The smaller countries are stepping stonds toward China and Russia and no one is in the dark about this.

This is basically the Wolfowitz doctrine, the Bush doctrine, and the grand chessboard as set forth by Zbig, based on Halford Mackinder's analysis and modifications by Nicholas Sykper. All one has to do is look at the China plan for the BRI to see that what is happening. The US leadership is now convinced that US hegemony is under direct attack by China, and the other countries slated for remine change are all part of the bigger picture in this regard.

7. This is a red line for the US. What are the red lines for China, Russia, and Iran. The US is probing to determine that.

[Procopius]

The article is bases on a false premise. U.S. policy is not deterrence. U.S. policy is total capitulation. "This continued uncertainty and lack of clarity in terms of U.S. expectations for Iran’s behavior are the anti-thesis of what is required for a coherent and realistic deterrent policy." The only thing the Iranians could do would be to dissolve their current government, repeal their constitution, and, I suppose, reinstate the Shah This has been U.S. policy since October 2001. See the letter Project for a New American Century (which was actually published in 1998). There is no excuse for any knowledgeable person to pretend otherwise. Therefore the current activities are well understood on both sides. I think the next step for the Iranians is to announce that they are prepared at any time to close the Straits of Hormuz, which I would expect to raise insurance rates, reducing the flow of oil without actually initiating combat. The U.S. cannot counter this move without actually invading Iran, which will be a disaster for them, given the strained condition of the All Volunteer Army.

[DC Steve]

Procopius is absolutely right. The only thing the ayatollahs could do for the US is die. They nurse an salvable humiliation over the hostage crisis of 39 years ago. Iran must be punished and humiliated. Trump, Pompeo and Bolton are supreme narcissists who have to have an axe to grind. The only thing is that if they did ultimately beat Iran, they wouldn’t know what to do with it. They’d be like the dog that caught the car.

[Norbert M Salamon]

US Energy Information Administration for January 2019
Total oil products 20452K barrels per day
of which imports 9693K barrels per day
export 8104K barrels per day

from the above it follows that the USA has not reached self sufficiency in crude production; therefore can not be the greatest net exporter

All those missiles Iran has are for local [eg Gulf/Israel limit] quite capable of reaching most desalination places[check the map of the Gulf]

The USA can not balance lost Persian Gulf production if the Strait is closed, thus world economy greatly constrained....

[Chris Bolan]

President Obama expressly eschewed a policy objective of regime change and instead sought limited accommodation that would minimize the prospect of Iran developing a functional nuclear weapons program. Moreover, it's important to recognize that even if the Trump administration's ultimate goal is 'capitulation' or 'regime change', it would nonetheless benefit from an effective deterrence strategy aimed at preventing Iran from striking out in dangerous ways that would seriously damage US and allied interests. Sec State Baker's warnings to Saddam against employing WMD in advance of Desert Shield/Desert Storm are a classic case of employing deterrence even on the verge of war. Perhaps the Trump administration can muster such diplomatic competence and sophistication....but perhaps not.