Syrian Update - TTG

Shortly after announcing their de-escalation zone plan, the R+6 began their wide offensive to the east. It’s time for a review of operations and possible plans for future operations. We’ll begin with the a cogent and concise comment made on 27 June by alexandar. 

**************************

Securing the Salamiyah-Resafa road is very important as it will reduce the Tiger Forces supply line from 225 km to 65 km. In case the Tiger Force goes on the offensive toward the Euphrates River, having a shorter supply line is necessary. That's IMO the only COA possible for the Tiger Force. All roads south of Rusafa are mountainous, with few to no possibility to bypass and take IS blocking forces by the rear. Akin of operations zones in Lebanon or Afghanistan where a single platoon can stop a brigade days after days and delay his move forward. It will be a long and deadly COA through these mountains.

A three axis move :

- North : Tiger Forces up to Euphrates River to cut Raqqa-Deir Ezzor road.

- Center : 5th Corps to fix as much as possible IS forces to defend Al Suknah.

- South : 5th Corps+Hezbollah + Hashd Al-Sha’abi + Liwaa Fatemiyoun conquer T2 and then Al Bukamal to cut the IS supply line from Iraq

IS will have to fight on three different fronts at the same time with no tactical priority, each of these three offensives being able to end the Deir Ezzor siege. 

Well, unless TRUMP begins WW3 following a new false chemical attack.

**************************

It’s hard to argue with alexandar’s logic and reading of the military situation. I especially appreciate his analysis of the terrain between Rusafa and Deir Ezzor. The Tiger Forces are currently clearing the Salamiyah-Resafa road. They are now 15 to 17 km from doing so. A question remains whether they will close the gap and encircle the IS forces north of the road or allow them to evacuate that area before becoming encircled. Once that is done, the Tiger Forces will turn back to the east with the goal of interdicting the IS forces that are bound to leave Raqqa enroute to Deir Ezzor. I believe that COA would be more effective in relieving pressure on the defenders of Deir Ezzor than attempting the difficult route south to Deir Ezzor. 

The IS salient south of the Salamiyah-Resafa road and east of Homs is now being addressed by another SAA offensive spearheaded by the newly reequipped and retrained Desert Hawks. A video of the Hawks arrival in the area just east of Salamiyah show a large number of T-90 main battle tanks and BMP-1s on tank transporters. There are also plenty of technicals including Toyota Land Cruisers and 6x6 trucks mounted with ZSU-23-2 guns. Accompanying the Hawks are the Military Shield Forces and National Defense Forces (NDF) in this developing offensive. This large offensive will force the IS to either remain/reinforce their positions in this area or pull back towards Deir Ezzor and cede close to a hundred IS-held villages that span across eastern Hama and eastern Homs. to the advancing SAA forces. Either option benefits the SAA more than IS.

On the Palmyra front, the 5th Legion and the 18th Tank Division continue their push towards Al Suknah. Progress is steady, but slow. IS forces have been fortifying positions along this most likely axis to Deir Ezzor for well over a year. The pressure will continue, but I, along with a few other armchair observers, no longer see this as the most likely axis for the eventual relief of Deir Ezzor. Nor do I see the drive to Al Bukamal and north along the Euphrates as the most likely axis. That run along the Syrian-Iraqi border to Al Bukamal will continue, but the populated area along the Euphrates is also strongly held by IS forces. It will not be an easy drive along the river.

I believe the most likely route for the relief of Deir Ezzor is northeast across the flat desert from the Humaymah-T3 area directly towards the hills overlooking the airport at Deir Ezzor. The R+6 seems to be reinforcing the success in this area with highly mobile mixed forces fully capable of taking advantage of the open terrain and lack of fortified IS positions. This video of the SAA taking of the Zenobia Desert Camp offers a superb glimpse of the make up of the SAA and allied forces engaged in battle in this area and the nature of the battle itself.

In addition to the broad offensive to the east, the R+6 is engaged with the jihadists formerly known as Al Qaeda at Quneitra near the Golan Heights. Here the jihadists launched a three pronged offensive to take Baath City a few days ago. HTS and the FSA established a new “operation room” and announced the start of operation “Road to Damascus” on 24 June. The jihadists in this area have received substantial logistical and medical support from the Israelis. Over the last few days, they have also also received Israeli tactical air support from IAF F-16s and armed drones. These air attacks were aimed largely against the SAA artillery positions in the area. I’m sure the IDF is also represented in the “operation room” established to support this jihadi offensive. After some initial success, the jihadists were beaten back by the SAA allied Golan Regiment and  Quneitra Hawks militias. Fighting is continuing at this front.

Throughout Syria, the forces allied with Damascus are doing well. The Russian program to reorganize and modernize the SAA and Air Force is bearing fruit. Iran and Hezbollah are playing a substantial role in this success. But the war is far from over. To the north, Turkey is still longing to establish a substantial presence in Aleppo and is making noises towards Afrin. I believe this threat is being addressed behind the scenes by Putin and Lavrov. They have substantial carrot and stick leverage against Erdogan. I don’t think they are hesitant to use either one. The Coalition will continue to use the Kurds in an attempt to partition Syria. I am also convinced that Putin and Lavrov are working behind the scenes to convince the Rojava Kurds to pursue a more reasonable road within a united Syria. What these two are saying to the Israelis and Saudis is also of great interest to me. All in all, I feel what’s going on behind the diplomatic scenes is as important as what’s happening on the battlefield to the future of Syria.      

Aleksandar, my apologies for taking the liberty of making minor changes to your original comment. I trust I have not changed any of the points you made. Your command of the English language is “not so bad.”

TTG

https://elijahjm.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/who-is-losing-and-who-is-winning-in-syria/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-army-turns-tables-al-qaeda-rebels-despite-israeli-airstrikes/

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/israeli-air-force-helps-jihadist-rebels-beat-back-syrian-army-offensive/

Comments

[The Twisted Genius]

pl,

I'll have to take a much closer look at a map to compare the open country to the roads up the Euphrates valley. I'm just apprehensive of any defenses built by the jihadis among the many villages in the valley.

[turcopolier]

sid_finster

Ritter? He got a lot of publicity by going to places that DIA and CIA sent him to and then writing a book about it. Ho Hum!. pl

[turcopolier]

TTG

Pretty sure there is a border road on the Syrian side of the Iraqi border. That would be a lot easier going than cross compartment in a hilly, stony desert. Resistance I villages? That is what CAS is for. pl

[Thirdeye]

Couple of things jumped out at me while considering the dash-through-the-desert scenario. One is how exposed ISIS' LOC to Suknah would be to any move north from the Abar al Mawahib - Humaymah line. They have about 60 km of road to defend in front of that line if they want to keep the way open. SAA seizing that road and rolling into the rear of the defenses at Suknah could give ISIS in Suknah a real problem. Another is the possibility of an advance centered on the road from T2 to Al Mayadin, a tad under 40 km east of Deir Ezzor. And a dash-through-the-desert could be launched anywhere along that same road if if SAA wanted to go more directly to Deir Ezzor.

Anybody have a comment on what appears to be an imminent Turkish offensive against the Kurds in Afrin?

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/turkish-army-offensive-begin-weekend-expel-kurds-northern-aleppo/

[Babak Makkinejad]

Chemical weapons casualties; without a doubt.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Both civilian and soldiers.

[Bill Herschel]

This reminds me of the story, not particularly relevant, of the southern surgeon who, after having his resident fumble up pretty much everything he was trying to do in the operation, finally said, "Son, if you're ever in the woods and you see me wrasslin' a bear, help the bear."

[Fred]

Babak,

I believe the Russina ICBM capabilities have been forgotten only by the Borg. The current occupant of the WH probably thinks Hunt for Red October was a documentary.

[sid_finster]

I don't see how that bears on the truth or falsity of what Ritter writes.

[Outrage Beyond]

re: Is it true to any extent to say that ISIS is the Sunni Iraqi Army blowing back?

Of course. They didn't acquire their military training from nowhere. Saddam's military was fired by Paul Bremer. They became the brains of the insurgency, and then ISIS.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Bucca#Role_in_formation_of_ISIS

[mike]

Many of the civilian victims were Iraqi Kurds who fled Saddam's attempted genocide across the border. But Chemical Ali reached them there also in Sardasht, Sarpol, Gharb, Shno, Marivan, et al.

[Peter AU]

TTG

Watching one of the Stone - Putin videos, Stone asked Putin if he is ever afraid. Putin answered "A hanged man cannot drown". He seemed to have the attitude you do your best and whatever happens happens. Fate decided by god type of thing and at peace with that.
Sometimes I gain the impression that some in Syria work on the same principle. Do your best and leave the rest to god. Would there be anything in that or do I have the wrong impression?

[Babak Makkinejad]

I think that the commanding officers at Mosul had been bribed to be AWOL when ISIS struck. It is a toss up whether it was Saudi money or Qatari money.

[The Twisted Genius]

Peter AU,

I think you have the right impression. I also think there are many roads to arrive at the same state of mind. My father is 86. He survived cancer, buried two wives and a young daughter. He has an unbelievably upbeat attitude, but I have never met anyone who holds the specter of impending death in such contempt. He is absolutely fearless of his own mortality. He still holds some of the ancestral pre-Christianity ways in his heart even though he was raised a Roman Catholic. Perhaps that has something to do with his attitude. Like I said, there are many roads to arrive at the same state of mind.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Yup - one wonders where the bleeding hearts of US and EU where?
Or the progressive vanguards of mankind in USSR and the People's Republic of China?
Or the Muslim Brothers & Sisters; you know, the Ummah?
Last, but not least, those small countries such as Denmark or New Zealand (the perennial supplier of passports to Israeli assains)?

[Linda]

Agree

[fasteddiez]

So the Infamous Syrian Government green buses to Idlib Province will now have a US/SAA Green Aircraft fleet to move Islamist rebels to figurative greener pastures and greater nowheres. Interestingly, the peaceful movement of rebels to new kessels is unknown to the great majority of people in the US.

[Bandit]

Can you please link to the article about the Winner-leaked NSA "assessment"? Thanks ahead.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Yup, the Protestant countries.

[aleksandar]

TTG, thank you very much but having worked for NATO I'm truly ashamed of my current english.
I agree about the fact that the drive to Al Bukamal and north along the Euphrates is not the most likely axis, too difficult with Al Mayadin half way, a big nut to crack.
But I remain convinced that ISIS reinforcement road must be cut here, and so far PMU are months away to be able to do that.
The northeast COA across the flat desert from the Humaymah-T3 area directly towards Deir Ezzor has IMO two weakness.
First it extends supply line over 100 km in the desert.
Even if SAA and co are somewhat « rustic » and with less needed supply that our armies this can put this offensive in danger without proper refuelling and rearming.
Secondly, it will be difficult to protect the flanks north and south and this supply line can be cut everywhere and anytime.
If Iran ( seems they are alredy in this move ) and Russia decide to get it over with ISIS as soon as possible and before a possible false chemical attack, I think scale of forces will be sufficient to lauch an offensive and protect the road.
Ash Shula could be Phase 1 end point, Deir Ezzor airport phase 2.
If I was always a G3 planning officier and as ISIS seems to be totally encircled in Raqqah I would propose as COA Tiger offensive from Rusafa to Al Ma'dan and At Tibni as their north east flank will be protected by SDF up to At Tibni (ph1) and then Ayash (north Dez). This COA allows Tiger to prevent ISIS reinforcement to DeZ from north east having the other bank of Euphrat under fire control.
" Keep you head low " :)

[turcopolier]

aleksander

IMO, you and TTG are gravely underestimating the difficulties involved in operating across that desert without a supply road. pl

[mike]

"Tiger Forces advancing from Rusafa axis and NDF in Ithriya axis have met up near Zakiah crossroad after capturing Masbah and Al-Alem hill."

Road linking Rusafa with Ithriya is now clear. This shortens Tiger Force LOCs (as TTG predicted) by well over a hundred miles or more. Regime sources claim Aleppo Province is now completely free of Daeshis, who reportedly withdrew south or southwest (or perhaps went into hiding in place).

[aleksandar]

Sir , that's why I would have proposed the "Tiger" north COA.
Respectfully.

[turcopolier]

mike

Glad to see you back at SST. The stretch of road east of Ithria was deliberately left open for days to facilitate an IS withdrawal from the closing Khanassar pocket. People try to do that but it never works very well, as in the Falaise Pocket from which most German forces escaped because of the gap left open. Will not the Tiger forces task foce now be occupied for a while in mopping up the Khanassar pocket? pl

[David Habakkuk]

Babak Makkinejad,

As I have pointed out to you before, key Soviet-era military thinkers had more or less to be dragged kicking and screaming into acceptance of Western-style notions of ‘deterrence’.

From a 1995 account by Jacob W. Kipp, who used to head the U.S. Army’s – invaluable – ‘Foreign Military Studies Office', of a book by one of the most significant of them, Makmut Akhmetovich Gareev (note the name: he is an ‘Old Mohican’, who started out as a Tatar cavalryman from Chelyabinsk):

‘Gareev strongly disagrees with the new Russian military doctrine’s open proclamation of possible first-use of nuclear weapons and points out the serious political dangers associated with such a declaratory policy. Dismissing the need for such actions against a wide range of states and noting the terrible risks associated in the use of such weapons against another nuclear power, Gareev concludes that a defensive military doctrine and first use of nuclear weapons amount to a dangerous contradiction. It can lead to confusion in times of crisis that could result in dangerous miscalculations. The path to stable deterrence is to be found through “the rejection of the concept of global nuclear war and through planning only deterring nuclear strikes.” The impact of residual nuclear capabilities and the political deterrence associated with them is likely to make conventional war more limited in terms of objectives and even the use of conventional forces.’

(See http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/rusrma.htm .)

As I have also noted, the combination of the catastrophic collapse unleashed by Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ and Western policy has created a situation where there is a broad consensus that reliance on ‘deterrence’ is the least worst option for Russia. My own view is that Western policies which were likely to encourage this perception were very profoundly foolish.

But those of us who argued that were ‘frozen out’ a generation ago.

However, precisely the situation we now face is one where we could have ‘confusion in times of crisis which leads to dangerous miscalculations.’

As regards the Islamic Republic, my instinct – which is ignorant – has been that the current decisionmakers do not want to adopt Western-style ‘deterrence’ strategies.

So long as there was reason to believe that Saddam’s Iraq had, or was likely to have, a serious nuclear programme, Iranian strategic planners had very good reason to have one.

However, after your country’s intelligence services duped ‘useful idiots’ in Washington and London into getting rid of Saddam for them, this imperative disappeared.

My guess has been that Iranian planners would have liked to achieve a state of ‘nuclear pregnancy’.

However, it seems to me that the main focus has been on conventional ‘deterrence’ – the ability, without increasing the chances of the Israelis inveigling the United States into attacking Iran by giving good grounds for the belief that you were attempting a ‘nuclear breakout’, to make such an attack fraught with danger.

It would seem possible that a part of this is the steady build-up of missiles of increasing range, accuracy, and lethality in hardened Hizbullah positions north of the Litani.

It could be – and here I am venturing into speculation – that a hoped for side effect of this is that these will increase the pressures on members of the educated and technologically capable élites upon whom Israel depends to conclude that it makes better sense to bring up their families in San Francisco, or indeed Berlin. If they did so, they might trigger a degenerative ‘vicious circle’, and so collapse the whole Zionist project.

The fear of this happening, I have long thought, is a central driving force behind the actions of Israel and its ‘amen corner’ in the United States and other Western countries. However, this has now backfired, in at least two critical ways.

One is that, in addition to pushing Russia towards China, Western policy have created a situation where, although their perspectives and interests in regard to Syria are clearly very different, Russia and Iran have an overriding common interest in combatting Sunni jihadism. The other is that the old assumption – common among the morons whom MI6 appears to recruit – that one could use such jihadists against the (supposed) common enemies of the Saudis and ourselves has blown up in our faces.

All this is rather good news for the Islamic Republic, and I would anticipate that with Rouhani as President, rather than Ahmadinejad, its planners are in a better position to understand and exploit trends moving in their favour than they were.

Of course, I may simply be projecting my old-style ‘Perfidious Albionian’ deviousness onto innocent Iranians.