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09 February 2017


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Thirdeye -

I'm no expert on geese. The article I referenced stated two other avian navaids besides magnetic fields and landmarks. Those are:

QUOTE A young bird imprints on the sun and stars to help orient it.ENDQUOTE


QUOTE Most surprisingly, a bird’s beak helps contribute to its navigational ability. The beak helps birds determine their exact position. Some researchers think a bird can smell its way across a flyway.ENDQUOTE


"So, you think the SU-24 shutting down the Aegis-equipped Donald Cook was less impressive than shutting down a Camry?"

No, I think the entire notion that the SU-24 shut down an Aegis cruiser is nothing more than Russian propaganda and they didn't even get the fictional details correct.


The DNA tests are getting to be pretty impressive. I've done several as I'm adopted and trying to determine my genetic ethnic history and potentially find biological relatives. Turns out my genetic geographical lineage is very close to my adoptive family history, at least on the paternal side.

Supposedly I have 2.5% neanderthal DNA. My wife thinks it should be higher.


For every attempt to "idiot proof" software, nature comes up with two or more better idiots. I can relate to this as I.struggled for years on the factory floor to automate machines. Another factor is as noted by a computer way, if we already making software to the best of our abilities then whatever defeats is largely beyond our ability to resolve. After a certain level of complexity, software engineering is all about error control. Given that the defender has to be right all the time, while an attacker has to get it right only once, the odds stack up in favor of an adversary. Like everything thing else made by human effort software succumbs rapidly to diminishing returns.

alba etie

Third Eye
I thought the US Air Force lost a F -117 over Kosovo and not a B 2 .
And IIRC the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was "mistakenly " bombed in Belgrade the next night after the F 117 was shot down . There was some reporting in the alter MSM that the PRC had deployed a ' phase arrayed radar suite " to that Embassy site - that may have helped down the F 117 ..


I agree that EMP could be a factor in some of these incidents.
To be effective on an aircraft's limited power supply the offensive EM blast must be focused on the target. Perhaps they've made something like a maser that fits into an avionics pod, it pumps out very fast high power pulses, timed to efficiently interfere with info transfers on computerized systems. The idea is not to hack or spoof the computers (which of course would require intimate knowledge of the system being targeted at the moment) but to merely induce enough noise onto the buslines to cause a crash and reboot.
In the Cook incident the Russian jet made repeated low level passes which would enable the pilot to effectively point such a beam on the ship.
Ships have enough capacity to install Tempest like shielding once this threat is known but missiles and small jets are more constrained.
The guidance electronics on an IR missile would of course be as susceptible as any other kind.
Just me WAGing of course.


Well total speculation, right? My wild fantasy-guess, just for fun (radar isn't my thing, at all):

If an ECM incident with the Donald Cook really took place as described, I'd guess the ship shut down once it realized it was being played with. The equipment on the Su presumably found a way to fake out its observed position and speed. Would really need to do both of those things - modest uncertainty in apparent position and big uncertainty in apparent speed should be enough to create difficulties for a fire control system. Perhaps using different methods for tricking the position and speed sensing. The position, perhaps by playing games with rapidly varying the Su's reflectivity via whatever's in the pod, timing the variations vs the ship radar's scanning. The trick would be to for the target to observe the radar's scan pattern, which of course should be a semi random scan of the space around each target (e.g., the Su) to combine those scans into a precise position. For In the vertical dimension, there is a useful thing here -- the reflection off the sea! Processing of this may allow the target to determine whether the scan is pointed directly at it, or whether the target's real position off-center vs the radar beam). Alter reflectivity in response to this (more reflective when beam is off-center) (in a *very* fast analog kind of way) to increase uncertainty in target position as observed by the ship. Wild fantasy.

This trick would only work a little bit, however. Will also need to fool the speed, otherwise the speed data can be used to correct the position data. How speed sensing works for radar is over my head, so I'm just going to wave my hands and say wacky crystal physics.

The aegis is made to track large numbers of fast targets, right? It wouldn't have much time to scan each target's space, so perhaps some compromise in robustness is made to achieve that performance, which the ECM takes advantage of.

So again, if this all is true, fun work for the radar people. Detective work to figure out how it's done, and then clever software fix to defeat it.

The Twisted Genius

In the early 90s I collected a lot of information about several countries R&D efforts in battle management systems. The Aegis system is a prime example of these battle management systems. The way these systems work is that sensors, often radars, key in on specific signals in an effort to identify targets. Once the signals from the sensors matches what the system expects for a target, the system keys alarm systems or weapons systems into action. If the signals captured by the sensors does not match what the system's database expects, an anomaly can occur. The anomaly can be simply a failure to trigger the associated alarm or weapons system or, perhaps, this unexpected series of signals may trigger a system error or system shutdown/reboot. This was the state of the art in the early 90s. R&D in countermeasures to these battle management systems began focusing on how to finesse the signals picked up by sensors into causing the systems to malfunction or, at least, perform in less than an optimal manner. In a way, this approach was similar to hackers discovering vulnerabilities in software in order to exploit that software. This, I believe, is how these various Russian REC systems work. It's not simply a matter of trying to overpower the signals of the enemy systems, it's a matter of engineering finesse.

The Twisted Genius


Thanks for that. I was intrigued by the illustration, but I didn't look for the article. My oldest son is an amateur radio operator. When he was still living with us, we had several antennas in the back yard and one under the eaves of the house. He speaks Russian and has contacted other radio operators in Russia. He's also still doing the morse code events with ARRL. It all reminds me of SF communications with the AN/PRC-74. We also got hold of a couple of old AN/GRC-109 sets to use in what we called guerrilla operations in urbanized terrain (GOUT). My radiomen said that 109 could "load a tin roof." Both sets used the same burst device with a spring loaded magnetic tape.



I was trained to send and receive on the 109. It is true. It would load for the ground lobe just about any metal object big enough. It was developed by an SF enlisted man. I used it with a "bug," a semi automatic side by side horizontal key that sent dots on one side and dashes on the other. It took skill. I worked for days on that before I could do that to the satisfaction of the training people at Bragg. A burst device would have made the thing much better as a defense against triangulation. pl

The Twisted Genius


The only good thing about having a lieutenant as XO on a team was that he was always made to jump with the generator seat for the radio. It had a tendency to act as a weathervane and cause a twist in the risers. Now that the XO is an experienced WO, there's no way he can be bullied into jumping with the seat. Although I doubt that seat is still in the inventory.

That burst device was simple. It still required the message to be encoded on a one time pad, tri-graphed and manually pounded onto the tape. It took a lot of pressure to ensure it transferred to the tape. I think there's a digital device that does all that now.

My son now uses a paddle to send. It sounds like your bug. I found this curious article that distinguishes the differences among a bug, paddle and key. Perhaps it will interest you. I hope it doesn't give you a flashback ;)




Much better idea IMO to have a WO as XO. I was never very good but the comms sergeants were always willing to let me play with it as part of the cross training process. pl

Clonal Antibody

You might find this interesting and relevant - This is from today - Multiple Russian Jets Buzz US Destroyer In "Unsafe" Encounter

Of particular interest -

According to the Free Beacon, the Russian aircraft operated without their electronic identifying transponders activated. Transponders on aircraft are monitored closely by air defense officers charged with protecting the ship and identifying hostile and friendly aircraft on radar. The Russian aircraft also failed to respond to several radio requests from the Porter to halt the overflights.

Surprisingly, Russia denied the close encounter had ever occured. "There were no incidents of any kind on Feb. 10, related to flights by Russian military jets in the Black Sea near the U.S. Navy destroyer Porter," Russian news agencies cited a spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry, Major-General Igor Konashenkov, as saying.

Keith Harbaugh

A 2017-04-29 article at Tass makes explicit claims for what the Khibiny did to
the Cook's AEGIS combat system and/or AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense System:
“Russia’s cutting-edge weaponry capable of ‘blinding’ enemy's army”

Here is the relevant part of that article (with emphasis added):

Khibiny EW system

The Khibiny electronic warfare system was made operational in the Russian Armed Forces in 2013 to defend aircraft against air defense systems.

The Khibiny EW system differs from the previous-generation technology by its increased power and intelligence capability. It can assist in aircraft weapons control, create a deceptive electronic environment and help break through an enemy’s layered air defenses.

This is what happened with the US destroyer Donald Cook in 2014 when the warship’s air defense systems locked on a Russian Su-24 plane.

The data appearing on the warship’s radars put the crew at a loss:
the aircraft would now and then disappear from radar screens
or suddenly change its location and speed
or create electronic clones of additional targets
while the destroyer’s information and weaponry control combat systems
were actually disabled.

Considering that the warship was in the Black Sea some 12,000 kilometers away from the US territory,
it was not difficult to imagine what the destroyer’s crew felt.

Now a new complex, the Khibiny-U, is in development for frontline aviation, in particular, for Su-30SM aircraft.

My (Keith Harbaugh's) thanks to "irf520" for pointing out that Tass article:

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