The Battle for Mosul: IS' swansong or yet another shapeshifting ? (part 1)

By Patrick BAHZAD

 

This is it then. The battle for Mosul, which had first been announced (a bit hastily) by Iraqi government officials in mid-2015, has finally begun. An improbable alliance of Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, Sunni tribesmen and Shia militias, some of them supported and trained by Western advisers, is now besieging IS' Iraqi capital, with Coalition aircraft ruling the skies over Northern Iraq. Considering the various forces involved, there is not much doubt left over the outcome of the battle. The combined might of Western air forces and Special Ops, regular Iraqi units and various ethnic and sectarian militias will prevail against the armies of the Caliphate, at least what is left of them inside Mosul. Yet, the careful optimism displayed by many in the media could be proven wrong somehow, especially with regardsto the prospects for long term survival of the "Islamic State".

The high plains of Northern Iraq have probably not seen anything like it since the Mongol armies arrived in the region and pretty much smashed anything that got in their way in their late 13th century. Back then, they destroyed Mosul after its ruler sided with their ennemies, the Egyptian based Mamluks. Now, in late 2016, tens of thousands of troops have gathered again in Nineveh, mostly to the East and South of Mosul, and have begun closing in on the defenses IS' has had two years to build up, both around and inside the city.

The Symbolism of Mosul

The highest priority for those involved in retaking Mosul will be to avoid the scenario that the Jihadis are probably bracing themselves for: a protracted siege dragging on for weeks or months, involving heavy civilian casualties and featuring the kind of doomsday narrative that IS used to prophesize for its Dabiq outpost in Northern Syria, now lost to Turkish sponsored groups.

The highly symbolic nature of the coming fight cannot be overstated. What is at stake, is not just the future of Mosul, not even the destruction of the territorial and economic base of the Caliphate in Iraq. It is actually the future of the whole country that will probably be shaped along the lines of the events to come. Actually, there is no lack of symbolism when it comes to Mosul's recent past and its significance for its immediate future.

Mosul is the city where Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday ("Ace of Hearts") and Qusay ("Ace of Clubs") were taken out by members of TF20 and the 101st Airborne, on July 22nd 2003. They did not go easy though and it took a four hour gunfight –with an A-10 and an OH-58 involved – to level their safehouse to the ground. But instead of Mosul turning into the place of death for the heirs to the Baathist "monarchy" of Iraq, the city became the place of birth to the "Caliphate" of Abubakr al-Baghdadi, a somewhat bizarre, yet not totally unlikely successor to Saddam Hussein.

Proclaimed by IS' spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, on June 29th 2014, the "Caliphate" had Mosul as its first capital, after the city fell in IS' hands, in an operation that stunned the world and had everybody waking up to the dangers of the reborn Jihadi threat coming out of Iraq. Five days later, on July 4th, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance at the balcony of the Great al-Nuri Mosque, calling onto all "believers" to rally to him and join him in his global Jihad.

Geopolitical Implications

Those years, between 2003 and 2014, have probably shaped Iraq's destiny for years to come still. In hindsight, in 20 years or so, the so-called "Caliphate" proclaimed by Adnani and incarnated by Baghdadi will probably look like just one more event in a sequence of highs and lows that is likely to carry on for an undetermined period of time. However, the battle that is about to begin has the potential to impact on these long term trends in various, opposing ways. This could be "the beginning of the beginning of the end" to a vicious circle of violence or, on the contrary, the last nail in the coffin of the Iraqi State.

The plains of Nineveh are a place where local and regional actors are heavily involved, which bears testimony to the geopolitical context in which the battle is taking place. Mosul is at the junction of several areas of influence. Beyond the Iraqi State (meaning the Abadi government), countries like Turkey and Iran also have a stake in this fight, and they are actively supporting their proxies in Mosul. As far as Ankara is concerned, neo-Ottoman dreams of past grandeur - when Mosul province was part of the empire - as well as concerns about Kurdish national ambitions, are the main drivers. Tehran, on the other hand, has been taking part in the grand game that is played in Iraq ever since the start of "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Regional powerplay, support for their Shia brethren in Iraq and the confrontation with the Saudi arch-enemy all play a role in Iran's plans. Finally, the Kurds of Iraq, as well as other minorities, also have an interest in seeing this battle through.

But as if that was not enough, the situation is further complicated by the other war that is being fought in the region, in neighbouring Syria, on the other side of a now almost non existant border. Whether or not Mosul will turn into Aleppo's Iraqi twin remains to be seen, in all likelihood it won't, but the implications of Mosul for the war in Syria are obvious. The outcome of the battle will translate into effects onto the players there, notably the Kurdish YPG or AQ's franchise in the Levant, formerly known as "Jabhat al-Nusra". But the wrangling for influence between the US and Russia will also be affected. Therefore, the various constellations that could emerge depending on the outcome of Mosul are hard to predict, even and in particular for the West.

Another refugee wave of even modest proportions could tip the balance in more than one EU-country, and so could Jihadi returnees staging attacks against Paris, Berlin or London. When we are dealing with Mosul, we are treading on very thin ice and one can only hope that the Powers that be are well aware of all the facets to the problem they set out to solve. Of course, driving out the "Islamic State" is the highest and most immediate priority. It is a legitimate one. The complexities of such an undertaking should not be underestimated however.

Forces involved

On paper, this looks like an uneven fight. The forces assembled at the gates of Mosul look quite formidable indeed. Various Iraqi government outfits – including the much vaunted "Golden Division" (a part of Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service), Federal police and Military Intelligence, as well as regular army units – are positioned at different locations to the North, East and South of Mosul. Also moving in on the city are Sunni tribesmen ( "Hashd al-Asha'ri" and "Hashd al-Watani"), sponsored either by Baghdad or the Turks. Shia PMF militias are present en masse, with their sectarian flags on top of almost every vehicle, as are Kurdish Pershmerga and armed groups formed by smaller Northern minorities (Christians and Yazidis for example). Western Specials Ops roam the frontlines, and they are probably not just there in an advisory capacity. Last but not least, US and French artillery is ready to pound IS positions and Coalition aircraft is flying CAS missions and carrying out targeted strikes on the outskirts of Mosul.

Overall, there could be as many as 60 000 to 80 000 men encircling the city and its Jihadi garrison, estimated at roughly 5 000 to 7 500 fighters. This ratio of 10 to 1 in favour of the Coalition should leave no doubt as to the likely end result of the operation. However, there are various aspects that need to be factored into the equation, slightly changing its terms. The issue is not so much about whether or not Mosul will be freed from the head-choppers. It will. But what is unclear at this point is under what circumstances, how long it will take and what aftermath lies in waiting for the Iraqis, and quite frankly, for all of us.

Militarily, it is an open secret how the Coalition intends to proceed. Shaping operations are mostly over and the forces are now regrouping before the push into Mosul. In the South, Qayyarah with its strategic airbase and bridge over the Tigris is firmly at the hands of the Iraqi army and Federal police. This is a major disruption to the territorial continuity of the "Caliphate" in the area, as IS forces around the city of Hawija (South-East of Mosul) are now isolated. Much of the Tigris valley up to Qayyarah is also controlled by the Coalition, which means the logistical trail up to Qayyarah is pretty safe.

Probable COA ?

The North and East of Mosul has been secured by Kurdish Peshmerga units which are also moving into Nineveh plains, but they will not take part in the assault on the city. So far, the circumvallation has not been completed, as a corridor to Western Anbar has been left open. One possible explanation is that the Coalition wants to "offer" a potential exit to IS' fighters not willing to die inside the city. Once in the open, they would however become much easier targets for Coalition aircraft. Another reason might be the city of Tal Afar, which lies West of Mosul and could potentially erupt into sectarian violence if Shia PMF clash there with Turkish sponsored groups. The latest news is that PMF units have already begun moving towards Tal Afar, which could delay the entire timeline for the assault on Mosul.

However, the Tal Afar sideshow set aside, and with most of the surroundings South, East and North of Mosul already secured, the assault should begin quite soon, but this is also where the dynamics of the battle could change. Most likely, there will be a multipronged assault on the Eastern part of Mosul: the various axis of advance will probably coincide with the major LOCs leading into the city (Highway 2 in the North and East, highway 80 in the South-East and Highway 1 in the South).

The forces involved in the operation will then sweep through the city, trying to get as quickly as possibly to the centre and the Tigris river bridges, possibly with the help of Western Special Ops and local anti-IS fighters already inside the city. When the Tigris river bank will be reached, forces might possibly regroup before launching the second and last phase of the assault, i.e. liberating the Western parts of Mosul and mopping up IS "leftovers".

The Western corridor could possibly stay open for the entire duration of the operation, if the Coalition is in a position to prevent IS reinforcements from entering the city from that direction. If that is the case, this corridor might well turn into a "kill zone" once the less determined Jihadis chose to leave and our aircraft can pick their targets. But that is the theory. In practice, there many contingencies that need to be taken into account and the number of potential difficulties that will need to be overcome is quite staggering.

(to be continued)

Comments

[elaine]

That mosuleye blog is really interesting & intense. I noticed in the comment
section someone posted a very anti-U.S. link. That was disconcerting.

[Pundita]

1.DEBKAFile runs hot and cold but my understanding is that their sources among the Kurdish commands are very good. Any case, this report is wall-to-wall bad news:

"Pro-Iranian Shiites ready to lead Mosul operation
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report
October 29, 2016 - 12:23 PM (IDT)
https://www.debka.com/article/25747/Pro-Iranian-Shiites-ready-to-lead-Mosul-operation

[...]
"DEBKAfile’s military sources note that coalition commanders erred by not taking Tal Afar in the early stage of the Mosul offensive and so blocking ISIS supply lines.

"The offensive was hobbled two days day earlier by the Kurdish decision to withdraw Peshmerga fighters from the operation to retake Mosul. President Masoud Barzani of the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government stated Wednesday, Oct. 26, that his army had ended its role in the warfare, after cleansing dozens of mostly uninhabited villages on the road to Mosul, and did not intend to enter the city at this time.

"This decision by the KRG in Irbil was not published.

"Since the Kurds and the Shiite militias are out of it, who is left to finish the job and go into Mosul?

"The mission which started out as a grand coalition enterprise has been left now to US forces and the Iraqi army.

"However, Iraq’s elite 9th Golden Division and its federal anti-terror police unit have not made much headway in their advance against ISIS forces east of Mosul. Their commanders now warn the government in Baghdad that they can’t go any further without reinforcements.

"But there are no Iraqi military reserves to draw on, without stripping any more main Iraqi towns of their defenses and laying them open to Islamists assaults, like those ISIS staged successfully last week on the oil city of Kirkuk, the Kurdish town of Sinjar and Rutba near the Jordanian border.

"The long and short of it is that the Mosul offensive has virtually ground to a halt.

[...]"

Maybe the US can talk some of these people back into the coalition but if the DEBKAFile report is correct, this is a disaster.

2. Get past CNN's somewhat misleading headline ("Thousands of displaced people flood Mosul as ISIS loses ground") to learn that as IS has fallen back from villages surrounding Mosul it's been driving the villagers toward Mosul in what looks to analysts as a tactic to add tens of thousands more human shields to the ones already captive in the city.

CNN reports these villagers are in poor condition, with no food. They've probably been starved as well by IS. So they're in no condition to protest when IS herds them toward Mosul.

CNN report filed by Sheena McKenzie and Tim Lister
Updated 7:36 PM ET, Sat October 29, 2016
http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/29/middleeast/iraq-mosul-isis-civilians/

A UN report tends to back up the CNN one. From the DEBKAFile report above:

"The UN Human Rights agency reported Friday that, since the Mosul offensive began on Oct. 17, Islamic State forces in Iraq have abducted tens of thousands of men, women and children from areas around Mosul and are using them as "human shields" in the city as Iraqi government troops advance."

See also this Oct 29 datelined CNN report about the UN one.
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/28/middleeast/iraq-mosul-isis/index.html

3. The DEBKAFile report also claims:

"Following their raids on key Iraqi cities, the Islamist State is preparing to launch surface missiles against Baghdad. ISIS may not confine its missile attacks to targets in Iraq. Our military sources report that the jihadists have laid hands on Syrian and Iraqi ground-to-ground missiles with a range of 500km and are holding them ready for attacks on Iraq’s neighbors, which could be Jordan. Israel too is in their sights."

How much stock to put into the claim about the missiles -- who knows, but the question would be how much Iraq/US commands are willing to take the claim into account.

4. "Iraq: Hundreds of Foreign Female Terrorists Driving ISIL's Suicide Vehicles
October 29, 2016
FARS
http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13950808001352

"TEHRAN (FNA)- The ISIL is using hundreds of female terrorists from different world countries to drive suicide vehicles of their husbands during the Mosul liberation operation by Iraq's joint military forces, media reports said.

"Most of ISIL's foreign terrorists and their wives have enrolled for suicide attacks," the Arabic-language media quoted a local force as saying.

"He reiterated that a sum of 450 ISIL terrorists and their wives who are mostly French or from the former Soviet republics have registered their names to take part in the suicide missions.

"The women have been ordered to drive the bomb-laden vehicles of their husbands to help them get closer to the Iraqi troops, while their husbands spray bullets at the Iraqi forces," the source added.

"Earlier on Saturday, Hashd al-Shaabi started its long-waited offensive against the ISIL West of the Northern Iraqi city of Mosul.

“The operation aims to cut supplies between Mosul and Raqqah (in Syria) and tighten the siege (against the ISIL) in Mosul and liberate (the town of) Tal Afar,” Ahmad al-Assadi, a spokesman for the forces said.

[...]"

[LG]

Raqqah became hot on the Turkish-American table when Abadi ordered PMU to take Talafar: Elijah J. Magnier
http://alrai.li/kjx72dh

[Laguerre]

"so probably their best fighters have already left - and if they fled en masse,"

Funny how no actual news of such massed flight has come out.

[Laguerre]

"Maybe the US can talk some of these people back into the coalition but if the DEBKAFile report is correct, this is a disaster."

I don't think that either the Shi'a militia or the Peshmerga were ever expected to go into Mosul city. The Shi'a presence would be too provocative, and the Peshmerga have no interest in losing men to take a city they can't keep. Whether Mosul can be taken by the Iraqi army alone (+ US airstrikes) is another question, and no doubt why Da'ish is not running away.

[LeaNder]

that the U.S. intends to let ISIS flee to Raqqa and keep it under "control" there

I would have been very, very disappointed, b, if this would have been missing in your list.

[Origin]

As the jihadists rumble and quote the Koran, there is an interesting description of an earlier exposition on politics of Syria and Iraq in the obscure Old Testament book of Nahum. The region seems to be eternally cursed. Probably worth the read.

[BraveNewWorld]

The White Helmet are AQ this is Daesh. But point taken.

[mike allen]

EOD techs around Mosul seem to be dying at a fast pace. Why aren't they destroying these IED's in place instead of trying to disarm them? Detonating mines or booby traps used to be doctrine as I recall. But I guess they are suspicious of Daesh using chemical agents within an IED. or perhaps they have seen that in previous IED explosions.

It is not just Navy Chief Jason Finan, but two peshmerga EOD techs as well in different incidents. Those pesh EOD teams only gear is old set of TL-13 pliers or a leatherman tool. They have none of the protective gear, and none of the high tech radiographic X-ray gear, ceramic tools, jammers, robots, etc that are SOP for modern day bomb squads and EOD units.

http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/291020166

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/isis-mosul-american-allies_us_58064530e4b0dd54ce354532

There were also a British contractor killed two months ago doing EOD work in Ramadi, another was wounded:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/22/briton-killed-defusing-bomb-iraq-ramadi

[Pundita]

There are plenty of other questions as well. One is how many IS fighters are actually in Mosul. I've misplaced a report from about a week ago but it was to the effect that IS has been putting fighters into the city in very small numbers so as to avoid notice. How long they've been doing this, I don't recall the report said, but surely they started when the US coalition announced its intention.

Meanwhile, intel on what's happening inside the city is very poor. Although it's now instant death for a civilian to be caught with a cell phone, CNN reported a few days ago that some are calling to the outside world to report whatever they can observe. But but these calls are broken off at a second's notice by bad connections or by caution.

Meanwhile, a big player in this conflict is now the UN, which is watching like a hawk for civilian casualties and screaming bloody murder every time it sees any. Is this just out of the goodness of their hearts or are they carrying water for Al Saud and all Gulf governments that don't want to see IS ejected from Mosul? Or are the Russians breathing down their neck.

Anyhow, I could sit here the rest of the afternoon and list "meanwhiles."

Unless the US has rabbits up its sleeve, this plan to retake Mosul looks like amateur hour to me.

[Pundita]

It seemed a good idea to someone in the US command to attack Mosul and Raqqa simultaneously, but the brainstorm touched off an uproar that quickly descended into a muddle.

An October 28 report from Voice of America, "Allies resist US plan to attack Raqqa," has a good summary of the muddle, which finds Ankara squabbling with Washington about the use of Syrian Kurdish forces to take Raqqa, and European/British NATO members quailing at the thought of further offending Erdogan or sending non-Arab forces into Raqqa.

Piled on top of waffling and squabbling is the problem that the Syrian Kurdish YPG is the only proxy ground force NATO has on hand that would stand a chance at routing Islamic State from Raqqa.

From an October 29 FARS report, the Syrian Army has clearly decided to make hay from the muddle and move up their timetable for taking back the city. Good luck to them.

http://www.voanews.com/a/allies-resist-us-plan-to-attack-raqqa/3570491.html

http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13950808000439

[Pundita]

Patrick Bahzad -- Remembering my manners, thank you for this post, and looking forward to part 2. Putting together a picture of the Syrian War is like trying to see a pitch dark terrain only by the light of lightning flashes. Trying to see war events in Iraq is like peering into a thick fog. So yours is a hard but very necessary task, which I greatly appreciate.
Onward,
Pundita

[Pundita]

Your observations are news to me. Very troubling wrinkle if the bad guys have learned to pack chem into small IEDs/mines and do so in large number.

I wonder if sniffer military dogs could be trained to smell the different chemicals. Also the incredible giant mine-sniffing rats, who're even being taught to sniff out tuberculosis in a person.

However, even if this idea is feasible it takes time to implement. And it takes a special kind of rat -- one who is able and willing to focus for the training, which takes weeks. So I imagine there's a waiting list for the graduates. And the people who train these rats, from what I know about their organization, might not want to put them into a hot war zone.

As for war dogs -- well, would it work? If so, again, training takes time.

In any case, the Coalition has to solve this problem, if it is a problem at this stage. On the other hand, it looked to me, from the equipment I saw on the Afghan bomb sqaud reality show, that the detonation approach is very expensive. That would be one reason a lot of IEDs are still defused rather than detonated.

See the short video at Military Times about Russian sappers clearing out hundreds of mines at Palmyra this April. They did do detonations, but many were defused. Why? Beyond expense, maybe there are technical reasons? Or maybe the Russian equip. just isn't as good as US? These are wild guesses.

http://www.military.com/video/operations-and-strategy/land-mines/russian-sappers-clear-palmyra-of-mines/4841417760001

[different clue]

Thoughts of "what happens after" have kept bothering me. After going to all the trouble of re-conquering Mosul and perhaps the rest of Iraqi ISIStan, who would want ISIS 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 etc. to keep re-emerging and re-emerging and re-emerging again and again and again in Iraqi Arab Sunnistan?

Well, Israel has been referrenced, and also KSA and all the Lesser Gulfies. But they can't make the Shia Supremacist Regime in Baghdad re-oppress the Sunniraqi Arabs into calling forth another Jihadi Insurgency all over again. And neither can they prevent the Shiaraqis from doing it. Who could preVENT the Shiaraqis from re-oppressing the Sunniraqi Arabs all over again? The Government of Iran. If the Government of Iran wanted peace and order in Iraq, the G of I could beat the Baghdad Regime into submission on that point.

So why doesn't the IranGov force the Baghdad Regime to offer a New Deal to the Sunni Arabs of Iraq? Because the IranGov wants to keep Iraq disordered and too weak to become a rival Shia power center in the region. Because a perpetual Sunni Arab insurgency keeps the Iraqi Shia perpetually scared and helpless and dependent on Iranian protection and hence obedient to Iranian orders and compliant with Iranian desires. So Iran COvertly wants to preserve ISIS after ISIS after ISIS in al Anbar just as strongly as Israel Overtly wants to preserve this particular ISIS. And as long as the IranGov wants to maintain insurgency-breeding conditions in al Anbar to keep Iraq weak and dependent and obedient, those conditions will be maintained.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Battle was launched now as result of different factors. Mosul is in Iraq first and foremost, let's not forget.

As far as the US election is concerned, I think it's more about Obama admin wishing to create facts on the ground that will be binding for the next admin, regardless of who gets elected.

In any case, it won't have a bearing on the election results. The FBI investigations into HRC mails might have a much deeper impact.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Coalition is going to prevail militarily, and IS is going to lose Mosul, but it's gonna take a lot longer than many ppl think.

Beides, some military defeats can be spun for propagandistic purposes and I'm sure IS will try and do that, showing how long they managed to resist the "overwhelming" forces that were fielded against them. Something along those lines.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I don't think there will be a massive move to Syria, because that is exactly where we'd want them to go, making easy targets over large patches of desert.

Some may have moved/escaped already but remember, IS' hearland has been Iraq, always. With all the talk about Syria and IS there, that is a fact that is forgotten too often.

Many ppl in IS are Iraqis. So my guess is some of them will try and rebuild their organisation in other regions of Iraq, as they've announced themselves already (through Adnani) and they won't give up and move towards Syria.

Western Anbar and some areas of Diyala in particular could become/remain IS strongholds in Iraq.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I don't think the outcome of the battle for Mosul will determine the endresult of the war in Syria, but as I said, I think there will be important spill-over effects.

The containment strategy against Iran has already failed btw ...

[Patrick Bahzad]

AE,

Anything is possible.

[Pundita]

Just saw this, haven't read yet:

"A conversation with the general running the war against ISIS -
Peter Bergen"
By Peter Bergen, CNN National Security Analyst
Updated 5:14 PM ET, Sun October 30, 2016

http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/30/world/man-whos-running-war-vs-isis-bergen/

[Tigermoth]

Here is an RT article on the Palmyra mine clearing operation. The final stats are:

"Earlier this week Russian engineers completed clearing of explosives the architectural and historical part of the UNESCO World Heritage site. With the help of Uran-6 robots and specially-trained dogs Russian engineers have cleared 234 hectares of land, 23km (14 miles) of roads and 10 architectural objects since April 2, the head of the Russian Army's engineering unit, Yury Stavitsky, said on Thursday. In total, 2,991 explosive devices, including 432 makeshift bombs, have been defused. Ninety-eight Russian servicemen have been involved in the effort."

They didn't lose anyone in the process. If IRC the full city could be detonated by cell phone so they used jamming to prevent it, and also the explosives were wired to the power points so they would detonate when the power was restored. They said some of the IEDs were problematic because they were "backyard" engineered so were not in the "standard" playbook.

The linked article is about a discovery of a cache of over 12000 explosive devices that were the raw materials for the manufacture of IEDs. If Palmyra had 3000 IEDs when ISIS left can you imagine Mosul?

[Tigermoth]

And then on the other side you have Israel wanting more or less the same condition. What are are the chances of peace in the ME?

[mike allen]

Looks like Daesh tunnelers in Mosul have mini versions of Seattle's Big Bertha tunneling machine.

https://twitter.com/AfarinMamosta/status/793060637836533760?lang=en

I cannot tell whether it is home-made or perhaps pilfered from Iraq's fledgling mining industry. In any case, with one or two of those 'mini-Berthas' plus two years time, could they have turned the Mosul underground into a complex network of interconnecting tunnels and chambers a hundred kilometers long??? If so let us hope those warrens are full of the rabbit-hearted and not the venomous suicidal ones.

[Linda Lau]

Patrick - that you for your thoughtful analysis. What do you think about the larger Turkish role as Erdogan makes all sorts of provocative statements?

[different clue]

mike allen,

If these tunnels are interconnected, would it be possible to fill the tunnel complex up with a fuel-air aerosol or fog mixture, and then ignite it?