The Battle for Mosul: IS' swansong or yet another shapeshifting ? (part 1)

By Patrick BAHZAD

 

This is it then. The battle for Mosul, which had first been announced (a bit hastily) by Iraqi government officials in mid-2015, has finally begun. An improbable alliance of Iraqi security forces, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, Sunni tribesmen and Shia militias, some of them supported and trained by Western advisers, is now besieging IS' Iraqi capital, with Coalition aircraft ruling the skies over Northern Iraq. Considering the various forces involved, there is not much doubt left over the outcome of the battle. The combined might of Western air forces and Special Ops, regular Iraqi units and various ethnic and sectarian militias will prevail against the armies of the Caliphate, at least what is left of them inside Mosul. Yet, the careful optimism displayed by many in the media could be proven wrong somehow, especially with regardsto the prospects for long term survival of the "Islamic State".

The high plains of Northern Iraq have probably not seen anything like it since the Mongol armies arrived in the region and pretty much smashed anything that got in their way in their late 13th century. Back then, they destroyed Mosul after its ruler sided with their ennemies, the Egyptian based Mamluks. Now, in late 2016, tens of thousands of troops have gathered again in Nineveh, mostly to the East and South of Mosul, and have begun closing in on the defenses IS' has had two years to build up, both around and inside the city.

The Symbolism of Mosul

The highest priority for those involved in retaking Mosul will be to avoid the scenario that the Jihadis are probably bracing themselves for: a protracted siege dragging on for weeks or months, involving heavy civilian casualties and featuring the kind of doomsday narrative that IS used to prophesize for its Dabiq outpost in Northern Syria, now lost to Turkish sponsored groups.

The highly symbolic nature of the coming fight cannot be overstated. What is at stake, is not just the future of Mosul, not even the destruction of the territorial and economic base of the Caliphate in Iraq. It is actually the future of the whole country that will probably be shaped along the lines of the events to come. Actually, there is no lack of symbolism when it comes to Mosul's recent past and its significance for its immediate future.

Mosul is the city where Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday ("Ace of Hearts") and Qusay ("Ace of Clubs") were taken out by members of TF20 and the 101st Airborne, on July 22nd 2003. They did not go easy though and it took a four hour gunfight –with an A-10 and an OH-58 involved – to level their safehouse to the ground. But instead of Mosul turning into the place of death for the heirs to the Baathist "monarchy" of Iraq, the city became the place of birth to the "Caliphate" of Abubakr al-Baghdadi, a somewhat bizarre, yet not totally unlikely successor to Saddam Hussein.

Proclaimed by IS' spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, on June 29th 2014, the "Caliphate" had Mosul as its first capital, after the city fell in IS' hands, in an operation that stunned the world and had everybody waking up to the dangers of the reborn Jihadi threat coming out of Iraq. Five days later, on July 4th, al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance at the balcony of the Great al-Nuri Mosque, calling onto all "believers" to rally to him and join him in his global Jihad.

Geopolitical Implications

Those years, between 2003 and 2014, have probably shaped Iraq's destiny for years to come still. In hindsight, in 20 years or so, the so-called "Caliphate" proclaimed by Adnani and incarnated by Baghdadi will probably look like just one more event in a sequence of highs and lows that is likely to carry on for an undetermined period of time. However, the battle that is about to begin has the potential to impact on these long term trends in various, opposing ways. This could be "the beginning of the beginning of the end" to a vicious circle of violence or, on the contrary, the last nail in the coffin of the Iraqi State.

The plains of Nineveh are a place where local and regional actors are heavily involved, which bears testimony to the geopolitical context in which the battle is taking place. Mosul is at the junction of several areas of influence. Beyond the Iraqi State (meaning the Abadi government), countries like Turkey and Iran also have a stake in this fight, and they are actively supporting their proxies in Mosul. As far as Ankara is concerned, neo-Ottoman dreams of past grandeur - when Mosul province was part of the empire - as well as concerns about Kurdish national ambitions, are the main drivers. Tehran, on the other hand, has been taking part in the grand game that is played in Iraq ever since the start of "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Regional powerplay, support for their Shia brethren in Iraq and the confrontation with the Saudi arch-enemy all play a role in Iran's plans. Finally, the Kurds of Iraq, as well as other minorities, also have an interest in seeing this battle through.

But as if that was not enough, the situation is further complicated by the other war that is being fought in the region, in neighbouring Syria, on the other side of a now almost non existant border. Whether or not Mosul will turn into Aleppo's Iraqi twin remains to be seen, in all likelihood it won't, but the implications of Mosul for the war in Syria are obvious. The outcome of the battle will translate into effects onto the players there, notably the Kurdish YPG or AQ's franchise in the Levant, formerly known as "Jabhat al-Nusra". But the wrangling for influence between the US and Russia will also be affected. Therefore, the various constellations that could emerge depending on the outcome of Mosul are hard to predict, even and in particular for the West.

Another refugee wave of even modest proportions could tip the balance in more than one EU-country, and so could Jihadi returnees staging attacks against Paris, Berlin or London. When we are dealing with Mosul, we are treading on very thin ice and one can only hope that the Powers that be are well aware of all the facets to the problem they set out to solve. Of course, driving out the "Islamic State" is the highest and most immediate priority. It is a legitimate one. The complexities of such an undertaking should not be underestimated however.

Forces involved

On paper, this looks like an uneven fight. The forces assembled at the gates of Mosul look quite formidable indeed. Various Iraqi government outfits – including the much vaunted "Golden Division" (a part of Iraq's Counter-Terrorism Service), Federal police and Military Intelligence, as well as regular army units – are positioned at different locations to the North, East and South of Mosul. Also moving in on the city are Sunni tribesmen ( "Hashd al-Asha'ri" and "Hashd al-Watani"), sponsored either by Baghdad or the Turks. Shia PMF militias are present en masse, with their sectarian flags on top of almost every vehicle, as are Kurdish Pershmerga and armed groups formed by smaller Northern minorities (Christians and Yazidis for example). Western Specials Ops roam the frontlines, and they are probably not just there in an advisory capacity. Last but not least, US and French artillery is ready to pound IS positions and Coalition aircraft is flying CAS missions and carrying out targeted strikes on the outskirts of Mosul.

Overall, there could be as many as 60 000 to 80 000 men encircling the city and its Jihadi garrison, estimated at roughly 5 000 to 7 500 fighters. This ratio of 10 to 1 in favour of the Coalition should leave no doubt as to the likely end result of the operation. However, there are various aspects that need to be factored into the equation, slightly changing its terms. The issue is not so much about whether or not Mosul will be freed from the head-choppers. It will. But what is unclear at this point is under what circumstances, how long it will take and what aftermath lies in waiting for the Iraqis, and quite frankly, for all of us.

Militarily, it is an open secret how the Coalition intends to proceed. Shaping operations are mostly over and the forces are now regrouping before the push into Mosul. In the South, Qayyarah with its strategic airbase and bridge over the Tigris is firmly at the hands of the Iraqi army and Federal police. This is a major disruption to the territorial continuity of the "Caliphate" in the area, as IS forces around the city of Hawija (South-East of Mosul) are now isolated. Much of the Tigris valley up to Qayyarah is also controlled by the Coalition, which means the logistical trail up to Qayyarah is pretty safe.

Probable COA ?

The North and East of Mosul has been secured by Kurdish Peshmerga units which are also moving into Nineveh plains, but they will not take part in the assault on the city. So far, the circumvallation has not been completed, as a corridor to Western Anbar has been left open. One possible explanation is that the Coalition wants to "offer" a potential exit to IS' fighters not willing to die inside the city. Once in the open, they would however become much easier targets for Coalition aircraft. Another reason might be the city of Tal Afar, which lies West of Mosul and could potentially erupt into sectarian violence if Shia PMF clash there with Turkish sponsored groups. The latest news is that PMF units have already begun moving towards Tal Afar, which could delay the entire timeline for the assault on Mosul.

However, the Tal Afar sideshow set aside, and with most of the surroundings South, East and North of Mosul already secured, the assault should begin quite soon, but this is also where the dynamics of the battle could change. Most likely, there will be a multipronged assault on the Eastern part of Mosul: the various axis of advance will probably coincide with the major LOCs leading into the city (Highway 2 in the North and East, highway 80 in the South-East and Highway 1 in the South).

The forces involved in the operation will then sweep through the city, trying to get as quickly as possibly to the centre and the Tigris river bridges, possibly with the help of Western Special Ops and local anti-IS fighters already inside the city. When the Tigris river bank will be reached, forces might possibly regroup before launching the second and last phase of the assault, i.e. liberating the Western parts of Mosul and mopping up IS "leftovers".

The Western corridor could possibly stay open for the entire duration of the operation, if the Coalition is in a position to prevent IS reinforcements from entering the city from that direction. If that is the case, this corridor might well turn into a "kill zone" once the less determined Jihadis chose to leave and our aircraft can pick their targets. But that is the theory. In practice, there many contingencies that need to be taken into account and the number of potential difficulties that will need to be overcome is quite staggering.

(to be continued)

Comments

[JohnH]

IMO much of this is electioneering--see? Obama is 'doing something' about ISIS!

As for any results (or not), we will find out (or not) after the election...

[BraveNewWorld]

Thanks for that great post. I have to ask though, wouldn't the main roads into Mosul be among the most heavily defended parts of Mosul? Once you actually get to the city there are a lot of alternate routes. Wouldn't they look for some thing softer?

[b]

1. Pat will call this economic determinism and laugh about it. But hydrocarbons play a serious role in the "game". Here is a good, very interesting look, supported with many maps, on the issue:
Politics, Population, and Hydrocarbons: Preparing for Mosul’s Aftermath
http://warontherocks.com/2016/10/politics-population-and-hydrocarbons-preparing-for-mosuls-aftermath/

2. There is concern voiced by Syria and Russia and other people, that the U.S. intends to let ISIS flee to Raqqa and keep it under "control" there - i.e. to use it against Syria. Having seen that the U.S. led ISIS escape from Fallujah and only the Iraqi air force, without U.S. consent, came to destroy them, I have a lot of sympathy for that point of you.
The Iraqi government has now send the PMF to take Tal Afar and to close one path of such an escape route. The groups include some 6,000 Sunnis and 3,000 Iraqi Turkmen originally for Tal Afar.

But the area between Mosul and Syria is mostly desert and even if Tal Afar is under control there will be lots of escape routes still open. I doubt that the U.S. will put any significant effort to stop them It is just too convenient to have them in Syria. If only as excuse to further meddle there and to occupy its east.

3. The fight in Mosul will be determined by the population. How many locals are part of or will support ISIS versus how many will fight on the side of the Iraqi government. We have too little reliable information to estimate that.

4. The U.S. announced to soon take on Raqqa - bullshit. It has no troops to do that. The Kurds will not go as they need to defend against Turkey. The Russians will not let the Turks go that far south. The "Arabs" in south-east Syria are with the government or some with ISIS. They will not be enough or ready to take on a city.

[turcopolier]

b

Pat sees economic factors as among those things that influence the course of history. pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

CENTCOM expects the battle to end no earlier than January 1st 2017. I'm pretty sure there will still be violence after that, regardless of the criteria applied to define "victory".

[Patrick Bahzad]

roads would be axis of advance, doesn't mean they gonna stay on the roads once they encounter IS fighters... As for the most heavily defended areas, I doubt it will be on those roads.

[turcopolier]

Patrick Bahzad

I am inclined to think that regain control of Mosul will take a lot longer than CENTCOM estimates. pl

[A. Pols]

Where are the "White Helmets" to run towards cameras with "wounded" children in their arms and who will call war crimes for atrocities against civilians, bombing schools and hospitals?

[Patrick Bahzad]

PL,

I'm inclined to think along the same lines ... Mosul is a huge city: combing through it, even with the Iraqi flag flying from every government building, will take weeks ! And that's after major fighting is over.

[Laguerre]

Akin Ünver's article is very pro-Kurdish, and I wonder whether he is not Turkish Kurdish himself. He doesn't say it, and being born in Ankara is no bar, not in that generation. All his work has been about the Kurdish question in Turkey.

At any rate, the article you cite is all about how the Kurds are going to succeed, though I agree it has many interesting things to say.

He exaggerates the importance of Mosul for the Kurds, and what they can do there. Amongst other things, the KRG can build a pipeline through Turkey without going through Mosul. It is not necessary for them.

In fact the KRG have done little to develop the oil potential they so optimisticly announced a few years back (but Ünver omits). The reason is obvious: they're bankrupt without the oil subsidies from Baghdad. To repeat the well-known, Baghdad stopped paying, because the KRG cheated on the oil agreement. But in any case, they can't pay now because of the decline in the oil price, a problem which is affecting all the Gulf.

Indeed it is an interesting question to ask how it is that the Peshmerga have been participating in the current offensive. They weren't paid for months, even possibly years, and thus did nothing for a long time. A Kurdish source a couple of months ago claimed that the US had agreed to pay the Peshmerga for ten years. Even if ten years is unbelievable, I can't see them fighting today unless there is some truth in the story.

[Laguerre]

One question that interested me was why the battle was launched now, just before election day, when the US might be seen to be bogged down in city battle on the day people go to the polls. At least it gives an opportunity to Trump. Was it thought that it would be all over by Nov. 8th? Of course, the winter weather in Mosul is not that great for operations.

[Laguerre]

Although I'm not a military man, my impression is that Da'ish is going to fight for Mosul, as the Colonel suggested was a likely choice a while back. PB's figures make victory probable, but the fighting has been hard so far. They are not running away, as the propaganda is claiming.

If it is the case that the majority of the Da'ish leadership is composed of Iraqi ex-Ba'athists (I don't believe it, but who knows who they are), then they won't want to be expelled from Iraq, and particularly Mosul. All this stuff about being offered Deir ez-Zor in exchange for Mosul is just speculation. The Iraqis, of whatever level in the Da'ish leadership, wouldn't want to lose Mosul. An existential battle, perhaps.

[ISL]

Thanks PB for Part 1. Clearly ISIS mistake was they didnt play nice with an external patron to protect their interests - true believers, one supposes, unwilling to compromise, play real politick and acquire a protector. For a while there was Erdogan, but then they bit the hand.

Clearly the time to move assets to Syria is past, so probably their best fighters have already left - and if they fled en masse, they will be goldfish in a bowl for US (or R+6 on the other side of the borde) air. So presumably the ISIS goal is reconfiguration as a guerrilla force and swearing to avenge the inevitable Mosul massacres.

However, fish cannot swim in the sea if there is no water. And whether their is water or sand (metaphorically) depends on whether ISIS gets the blame for what happens or the Iraqi Shia govt. Do you think that the array of forces that is going to face hard fighting can avoid bombing MOSUL block by block into rubble? Certainly that would lower (loyal govt) losses while placing the cost on the Sunni, and be consistent with the recent past. And would ensure plenty of water for ISIS to rebrand itself and swim in.

Second, there have been many cases of conflict spill over in the middle east, Pro-US spill-over to Syria being discussed. Assuming R+6 succeed (and that is I think the Russian flotilla will have that result by constraining NATO opportunities to continue their patronage to the unicorn army), do you see spill over back to Iraq, introducing another round of destabilization in a highly fractured and unstable country?

Thanks, I await part 2!

[kodlu]

You bring up many good points. Also, what's interesting to me vis a vis Kurdish politics is how we never hear of the PUK (Talabani's outfit), have they joined up with Barzani's KDP forces/party or are they in opposition (in addition to Goran)? PUK vs KDP has been an on again, off again conflict, sometimes armed and causing many fatalities.

[elaine]

I'm concerned about an ISIS attack on the Mosul dam. It's difficult to obtain info
on the topic other than an Italian team is repairing/maintaining it...are the
Italians there with ISIS' consent?

Back in the early spring there was much media chatter about how an attack on the dam
could result in killing over a million people & now there's a near media black-out
on the topic. Does anyone have any ideas on how to protect the dam or are all those plans classified? The prevailing attitude seems to be if we just don't talk about it magically it will be ok. I almost feel guilty mentioning the topic. If there is no
response from this committee on my concerns than I'll conclude magical silence is
magical science & I'll try to never mention it again.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Patrick Bahzad:

I think you are under-stating the political significance of the war for Mosul; victory there heralds victory in Syria - and, significantly - the failure of the containment strategy against Iran.

All of this could have been avoided, in my opinion, in 2007, when US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran was leaked.

[Serge]

The dam was only shortly under ISIS control,for less than a week IIRC, until the start of US airstrikes in august 2014 resulted in them being pushed out from the area. Not in IS best interest to do anything to the dam, as those in the effected zone would all be ISIS territory

[Henshaw]

Apart from any strategic/logistical considerations, the battle for Mosul is probably starting now because it is unlikely to be bogged down before 8 November.

While the battle is in its early stages, it will provide lots of uplifting footage of armored columns advancing, fresh troops, CAS etc- all the usual stuff, before the reality of urban warfare sets in and 'unhelpful' incidents become more frequent. Unhelpful incidents might include civilian casualties, heavy Coalition casualties, downed aircraft, friendly fire etc.

Also, once the fighting enters built-up areas, it will be more difficult to avoid comparisons with the fighting in Aleppo. That's a complication many in media and government would prefer to avoid as long as possible.

[Laguerre]

The dam is currently in the hands of the Peshmerga.

In my view, the dam is not in danger. The issue was raised by the US embassy in Baghdad in order to get Da'ish to leave.

The dam is based on weak foundations, it is true. However experts have confirmed my suggestion that the lake is actually full of alluvions, that is silt deposited by the Tigris, and not ready to blow.

[alba etie]

PB
Is it possible that the military operations in Mosul against IS could help consolidate a more inclusive Abadi governance in Baghdad ?

[different clue]

Laguerre,

I remember reading that quite a few of the ISIS strategic and tactical thinking-brain planner-dogs and guide-dogs for ISIS were bitter Baathists.
I still wonder to what extent the Bitter Baathists try using ISIS as a containment dome while viewing themselves as the core. I think the Bitter Baathists will fade away at some point and leave the ISIS containment dome to fight on to the bitter end. To what extent is ISIS now an independent movement? Independent enough to prevent the Baathists from preferentially escaping? ( " If we all die, you all die with us").

And once the city is taken over, what prevents the Shia Supremacist regime in Baghdad from re-oppressing the Sunni Arab tribes all over again and preparing them to re-welcome the Bitter Baathists yet again along with whatever new "screening movement" the Bitter Baathists travel under cover of?

[mike allen]

Patrick -

Good insight, thanks for the post. I agree it is going to be weeks or maybe even months to mop up after the city has been taken. Peshmerga and Iraqi twitter accounts are relaying claims of underground IS villages with IED factories, food and ammo storage, and first aid stations. And like prairie dog cities with half a dozen entrance/exit holes for each individual burrow. One captured tunnel was described as three kilometers long, another as nine meters deep to withstand airstrikes. Hope the Iraqis and the coalition have a higher tech solution than the "tunnel rats" we used 48 years ago.

Mosuk eye is reporting that the Tigris bridges are mined: https://mosuleye.wordpress.com/

It is going to be a long hard slog.

[trinlae]

Interesting comparison with the Mongolian Empire ventures. Contemporary empires would do well to learn from the Mongolian modus operandi, sieze all logistical assets but leave local governance and religious culture intact under local control.

This would be a departure from the "you broke it, you own it" foreign policy cum business model of armed anarchy and chaos presently in vogue.

[trinlae]

" Tehran, on the other hand, has been taking part in the grand game that is played in Iraq ever since the start of "Operation Iraqi Freedom". "

Iranian interests must also reflect historical Persian Empire engagements in a manner not to dissimilar to the Turkish shadow of Ottoman Empire. Persian trading posts must have operated there for thousands of years.

Too bad people in far flung places pay the steep price for refusal of humanity to study world history!

[mike allen]

ooops! typo "Mosuk eye" should read "Mosul Eye". The link should be correct.