By Patrick BAHZAD
It has been several days since the start of the joint Syrian-Russian offensive on Aleppo and here we are again, contemplating an already familiar level of urban devastation and human suffering, wondering which turn events are now going to take in the city that epitomizes what the Syrian civil war stands for. Now obviously, there is no doubt as to the horrendous level of destruction Aleppo has suffered, at the hands of the various actors involved, but such is the fate of cities entangled in prolonged urban combat. The public outrage at the tactics employed by the SAA and its Russian backers can only be attributed to lack of understanding of the mechanics of war in such theatres of operation, combined with a healthy amount of selective memory loss. History is awash with examples of "siege" stories, sectarian strife and civil war destroying the fabric and the people of great cities. However, what is currently unfolding in Aleppo – beyond a level of violence hard to comprehend for most Westerners – is anything but a surprise. SST readers in particular will remember a number of articles published here in the past months that underlined the high probability of what is happening. But unlike six months ago, several geopolitical and military factors have substantially changed the equation and the latest round of fighting looks nothing short of a showdown for Aleppo, possibly for Syria altogether.
A word of advice however before diving into the subject: you better stop counting the stories, editorials and other pieces that our newspapers and TV networks are publishing or airing about Aleppo. Some of this journalism could be regarded as honest reporting not taking into account the contingencies of fighting an enemy embedded with the civilian population in a large urban area. But most it is tainted by a level of hypocrisy that defies the whole purpose of such pieces. What is the empathy for Aleppo worth, when you are not even willing to mention Saudi airstrikes over Yemen in a similar fashion ?
Besides, it may be dangerous to cry "war crimes" and "atrocities" at this point in time, when the US lead Coalition in Iraq is about to launch a major offensive against the so called Islamic State and its capital. The Jihadis in the Middle-East and other places will make sure to remind us of the strong wording used for Aleppo once the onslaught on Mosul will have started. And they will definitely try to point to the bias and double standard of Western media outlets if we do not display the same sense of outrage at the casualties that the offensive on Mosul might cause among the civilians there. Don't throw with stones when you live in a glass house …
Anyway, we shall see how the Coalition handles that siege. Hopefully it will not turn into a slaughterhouse like Aleppo, but in truth, it will be impossible to avoid a "minimal" level of collateral damage, unless you change the ROEs in such a way that a ground offensive will be utterly useless, which brings us back to the current topic. Looking at Aleppo and how things developed into the current situation calls for several factors to be mentioned.
The Moderates … and not so Moderates in Eastern Aleppo
One of the reasons explaining the failure of the latest US-Russian ceasefire agreement is the refusal by what is left of moderate rebels inside Aleppo to break-up with the more radical groups, first and foremost "Jabhat al-Nusra", or whatever other name they like to be called these days. The two major groups that controlled the Eastern neighbourhoods, namely the "Nour al-Din al-Zenki" movement and the "Suqour al-Sham" Brigade, actually joined the Al Qaeda Jihadis and left them in charge of the operational command inside the city.
The fact that this plays right into the hands of the Assad regime and its Russian allies is secondary in the short term, although it provides Putin, Lavrov and Co with enough ammunition to show the world that the so-called "moderates" supported by the US are actually infiltrated or even openly cooperating with Al Qaeda. A number of recent reports about the disastrous relationships between American SFGs and their local trainees bear testimony to this ancient problem.
As for Aleppo, it was definitely not helpful that Nusra moved hundreds of its fighters into the city at a time when the Northern LOC into the city was being cut off by the R+6, and moderates were deserting the city, in anticipation of an onslaught that did not come at that point. Probably, the Turkish handlers of "Zenki" and " Suqour al-Sham" also wanted to call back their local assets through the Western Bab al-Hawa border crossing and send them into their Northern buffer zone, through Bab al-Salameh this time, in order to prevent any attempt by the Kurds to achieve territorial junction between their Afrin enclave and the rest of "Rojava".
What these movements of fighters did to the rebellion inside Aleppo is pretty simple: the moderate leftovers were weakened further, both in numbers and influence, while Nusra took over command and control of the Eastern parts of the city, making good use of the 200 000 civilians living in the area to avoid turning into an easy target for the Syrian or Russian air force.
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