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12 August 2016

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different clue

b,

Did Clinton break it? Or did Congress prevent it and cancel it?

Babak Makkinejad

Not any longer; Pakistan is now safe from India behind her nuclear weapons.

Aka

About North Korea, it seems that the South Koreans have very little interest in starting war let alone a occupation of NK.

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-ultimate-nightmare-why-invading-the-north-korea-really-12157?page=2

SmoothieX12

He did serve and is, actually, featured in Tolstoy's War And Peace precisely during last meeting between Pierre and Andrei on the eve of Borodino. While passing the barn where Pierre and Andrei speak Carl and other Germans speak about necessity to "expand war into the (battle)space", to which Prince Andrei sardonically responds:

"Der Krieg muss in Raum verlegt werden. Der Ansicht kann ich nicht genug Preis geben,"* said one of them.

*"The war must be extended widely. I cannot sufficiently commend that view."

"Oh, ja," said the other, "der Zweck ist nur den Feind zu schwachen, so kann man gewiss nicht den Verlust der Privat-Personen in Achtung nehmen."*

*"Oh, yes, the only aim is to weaken the enemy, so of course one cannot take into account the loss of private individuals."

"Oh, no," agreed the other.

"Extend widely!" said Prince Andrew with an angry snort, when they had ridden past. "In that 'extend' were my father, son, and sister, at Bald Hills. That's all the same to him! That's what I was saying to you- those German gentlemen won't win the battle tomorrow but will only make all the mess they can, because they have nothing in their German heads but theories not worth an empty eggshell and haven't in their hearts the one thing needed tomorrow- that which Timokhin has. They have yielded up all Europe to him, and have now come to teach us. Fine teachers!" and again his voice grew shrill.

Peter Reichard

The Straits of Malacca are as economically important to China as the Panama Canal ever was to the US. The bases in the Spratly Islands are a means to project power towards and to secure from hostile closure this vital naval choke point.
China's preposterous territorial claim to the entirety of the South China Sea is all about its energy and seafood resources. Their foolish greed is already driving the other claimants into the US orbit and is counterproductive to China's goal of regional hegemony.

turcopolier

Aka

"little interest in starting war let alone a occupation of NK." Yes, but what crazy ideas might the US have in that instance? pl

David Habakkuk

SmoothieX12,

Back in 2009, the British historian Dominic Lieven published a study entitled ‘Russia Against Napoleon.’

(See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UzElqomAATI .)

Its conclusions were summarised in a lecture which Lieven gave at the LSE the following year, entitled ‘The Tsar Liberates Europe? Russia Against Napoleon, 1817-14.

From the introduction:

‘In 1812-14 Alexander I defeated Napoleon's invasion of Russia and then created and led a European alliance all the way to Paris. This lecture explains why and how he did this. It discusses Russian grand strategy, diplomacy and espionage, as well as the tsarist military machine, and the mobilisation of the home front. In both Western and Russian historiography the Russian achievement in 1813-14 is greatly underestimated, which seriously distorts understanding of European power politics and the causes of Napoleon's demise. The lecture explains this underestimate partly as a legacy of Leo Tolstoy but also because while 1812 was traditionally seen by Russians as a national war, the victories of 1813-14 were interpreted as the triumph of the dynasty and empire.’

A central part of the book’s argument is that, for all the brilliance of ‘War and Peace’, it simply misses the fundamental point that Napoleon lost because Alexander I and his advisors were better strategists. They had worked out well in advance the kind of war Napoleon could not afford to fight, and ensured that he fought it.

The account Lieven gives here ‘meshes’ with a piece which appeared on the ‘Russkiy Mir’ site in April 2012, under the title ‘Two Hundred Years of Russian Intelligence.’

It opens:

‘Field Marshal Barclay de Tolly, whose merits before Russia are great indeed, is not deprived of his share of regard on the part of his descendants. It is no surprise that his monument was set up in front of Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg adjacent the Kutuzov monument. But among all of his merits there is one that is seldom discussed: just before the War of 1812, he established Russia’s military intelligence.’

(See http://www.russkiymir.ru/en/publications/139713/ .)

There is another irony here, perhaps. The great Russian interpreter of Clausewitz was Aleksandr Svechin, one of the most brilliant of the former Tsarist ‘genstabisty’ who taught the Red Army how to fight.

What Svechin always insisted was that – as indeed one might expect, given his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars – Clausewitz was two-sided: the emphasis on the decisive importance of the offensive is balanced by an insistence on the strengths of the defensive. The art of strategy is knowing what is appropriate in given circumstances – and when to switch from one to the other.

In the event, Tukhachevsky’s insistence on the overriding importance of the offensive was adopted as orthodoxy by the Red Army in 1926, and Svechin’s views marginalised.

As Andrei Kokoshin noted in a paper which has just appeared on the site of the Belfer Center of Harvard University, the Red Army paid a terrible price for Tukhachevsky’s victory in the summer and autumn of 1941.

(See http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Blitzkrieg%20Final.pdf .)

By the time the war broke out, both Svechin and Tukhachevky had been shot.

As I understand it, however, the former’s strategic approach was very clearly exemplified in the command style of Konstantin Rokossovsky.

BraveNewWorld

First let me say great idea looking at the Far East as well. If your going to be serious about looking at any piece of geo-poitics you have to look at the big picture as well as it is all connected, no more so than the cross roads of the world, the Middle East.

Some thing many people may not know is that South Korea built the Kaesong Industrial Region inside North Korea. This provided NK with some desperately needed currency but also brought some of the modern world to NK. It of course also gave SK access to cheap labour. It all came crashing down in February for numerous reasons including NKs bomb test and rocket launch but also changing politics in SK. The Kaesong project has been stopped before so may get going again some where down the line. But right now it doesn't look good.

The creation of the zone involved considerable interaction between the Koreas and the people working in the industrial area would have been able to tell other North Koreans how life in that bubble was different from what they have in the rest of NK.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-satellite-kaesong-idUSKCN0VK0CO
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/when-sunshine-ruled-on-the-korean-peninsula/


One thing to keep in mind when talking about the Koreas is that China really, really does not want an American aligned, united Korea on it's border. Look at how the US reacted to Cuba and a few missiles. Scale that up to the size of a united Korea to see the problem.

Every one would be better off if the US packed up and went home.

SmoothieX12

it simply misses the fundamental point that Napoleon lost because Alexander I and his advisors were better strategists. They had worked out well in advance the kind of war Napoleon could not afford to fight, and ensured that he fought it.

It is, certainly, true in a sense that Tolstoy remained consistent throughout W&P with his "swarm" view of history. Anatol Rappoport makes a wonderful argument with Tolstoy in his rather lengthy Editor's Introduction to Penguin's Edition of Vom Kriege. In W&P Alexandr I is portrayed as a sensitive man who is far removed from operational realities of the war, and even Kutuzov is portrayed as a man who merely follows a larger and much more powerful social and military laws perceived only by him and no one else. Hence Tolstoy's insistence on Kutuzov "surrendering" in his decision to fight Borodino, which allegedly Kutuzov didn't want to fight. Tolstoy's writer genius screwed it up for many who began to perceive War of 1812 only through the wonderful lens of W&P, later augmented with probably the best epic movie of all times--Bondarchuk's cinematographic masterpiece.

The lecture explains this underestimate partly as a legacy of Leo Tolstoy but also because while 1812 was traditionally seen by Russians as a national war, the victories of 1813-14 were interpreted as the triumph of the dynasty and empire.’

Very true.

What Svechin always insisted was that – as indeed one might expect, given his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars – Clausewitz was two-sided: the emphasis on the decisive importance of the offensive is balanced by an insistence on the strengths of the defensive. The art of strategy is knowing what is appropriate in given circumstances – and when to switch from one to the other.

Clausewitz, of course, was more complex than it is usually perceived and his maximum exertion of force principle applies equally to offense and defense. Vom Kriege, however, goes even further into the almost metaphysical world of the nature of war. Vom Kriege is to military word is what Pink Floyd's The Dark Side Of The Moon to (rock)music.

In the event, Tukhachevsky’s insistence on the overriding importance of the offensive was adopted as orthodoxy by the Red Army in 1926, and Svechin’s views marginalised.

As Andrei Kokoshin noted in a paper which has just appeared on the site of the Belfer Center of Harvard University, the Red Army paid a terrible price for Tukhachevsky’s victory in the summer and autumn of 1941.

Totally agree. Tukhachevsky came into prominence for his good looks and using somebody's ideas. He was an average (to put it mildly) military leader but extremely ambitious. His, at some point of time in 1990s, almost cult status among Russian "reformers" was primarily inspired by him being purged--as an additional argument against Stalin. The truth (I do respect Kokoshin) of him and others from "old guard" contributing to the Red Army's demise in 1941 was not a popular topic then. Actually, I am describing a somewhat similar situation, such as the ideas of late Vitaly Shlykov, which almost cost Russian Armed Forces its combat ability in my blog.

b

The agreement the U.S President Clinton made on behalf of the U.S. with North Korea was broken by the U.S. Why should North Korea, or anybody, care what political shenanigans within the U.S. were involved in this?

Clinton negotiated a deal he could not pay for. His fault.

kxd

true enough.

But is Pakistan safe from the gulfies and their merry band of radical offspring?

I'm more worried of them losing their nukes than war between USA and Russia.

kao_hsien_chih

I suppose, in a sense, I should have remarked that Clausewitz's Russian experience made a big impression on him.... ;)

kao_hsien_chih

It is equally unclear that SK leadership is especially interested in continuing to be a close ally of US, or whether the Chinese would actually pay the price that would satisfy South Koreans.

I think the deal that would ultimately satisfy South Koreans--of ALL political stripes--is that PRC gives up North Korea as possible leverage, while letting South Korea become a neutralist state somewhat like Finland during late Cold War days, or perhaps even Belgium before World War I: friendly towards both China and U.S., not poised to become a military/strategic threat to China, but not willing to let itself be used for military/strategic advantage of China either--and, unlike Belgium in 1913, perhaps, have this status credibly guaranteed by the Chinese. In terms of foreign policy (domestic policy is an altogether different matter), the difference between SK factions is that some think that, if the Chinese can be suitably mollified, they'd pay this price, while others (including the current administration) do not believe that the Chinese would ever pay up. The value of having NK as possible source of leverage vs. both US and Japan, even if NK leadership might be nuts and troublesome for the Chinese, is enormous and the current relationship between SK and PRC is good enough that, I suspect, the Chinese will never pay a big price to satisfy the South Koreans.

Babak Makkinejad

Pakistanis are a threat to Pakistan and not Gulfies. They began to march down the dead-end path a few decades ago; when their government began defining who is or is not a Muslim. It has been down-hill ever since; in my opinion.

LeaNder

Smoothie, dear,

Hmm? War and Peace, Book 10, Chapter XXV.

I have troubles to believe Tolstoy uses German in the original in this passage. Does he? Interesting though.

In any case it's a highly odd German. Even considering the time of the translation. ... 1869 ...

http://tolstoy.thefreelibrary.com/War-and-Peace/10-25#Nur

Translators: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aylmer_and_Louise_Maude

I should spare you my comments, really.

Ok shortly "Der Krieg muss in [den] Raum verlegt werden."
Translation: War has to be relocated into space. Hasn't it always been there? The German version below mirrors your translation, but not Maude's.

Preis geben/preisgeben not the meaning they/and you want, pretty much the opposite or some even more unrelated possibilities really: Preis=price/award geben=give; preisgeben=give up, disclose, reveal ... Yes the two rather distinct possibilities "giving a price/award" versus "give up/let out/betray/reveal" weren't always distinguished orthographically, if one checks historical grammar books. You/the translator seems to want something like "emphasize".

"in Achtung nehmen" not possible, not in earlier times either. Simply "beachten" would do e.g. ... "(sich)in Acht nehmen", would be possible, but not "in Achtung".

**************
Passage from the German translation:
http://www.zeno.org/Literatur/M/Tolstoj,+Lev+Nikolaevi%C4%8D/Romane/Krieg+und+Frieden/Zehnter+Teil/25.

»Man muß dem Krieg eine weitere räumliche Ausdehnung geben. Diese Ansicht kann ich nicht genug betonen«, sagte der eine.

»Gewiß«, antwortete eine andere Stimme. »Da der Zweck nur der ist, den Feind zu schwächen, so kann auf die Verluste, welche Privatpersonen dabei erleiden, keine Rücksicht genommen werden.«

*************
Now I am curious, what Tolstoy actually wrote. ;)

LeaNder

Thanks, David, interesting documents.


SmoothieX12

Now I am curious, what Tolstoy actually wrote. ;)

Learn Russian, get 1986 Pravda edition (my favorite) 4 volume of Война И Мир and in the 3rd Volume on page 217 you'll find it.


SmoothieX12

I suppose, in a sense, I should have remarked that Clausewitz's Russian experience made a big impression on him.... ;)

Battle of Borodino alone would make an impression on anyone, forget the whole campaign. Yet, this battle is, for the most part, is not known in the West.

tim s

Any estimates on how stable these Chinese artificial islands are going to be?

kao_hsien_chih

Well, Knyaz Bolkonsky speaks fluent German, donchaknow, from his days with the NKVD deep-infiltrating the Nazis and all that. ;)

kao_hsien_chih

There are quite a few ebook editions of War and Peace in original Russian. Tolstoy did write multilingually, as you can see when you check them out. :)

LeaNder

I regret I gave it up during my studies, Smoothie. ... And sorry, for my poorly reflected interference. If you will please accept?

Thanks to everyone. Especially kao. Tolstoi is indeed multilingual. French passages surface too. Unfortunately I never moved much beyond Dostoevsky in Russian literature.

Hmm, he deals with it, via footnotes:

http://ilibrary.ru/text/11/p.211/index.html#fn2

2. Война должна быть перенесена в пространство. Это воззрение я не могу достаточно восхвалить (нем.).

3. О да, так как цель состоит в том, чтобы ослабить неприятеля, то нельзя принимать во внимание потери частных лиц (нем.).


LeaNder

Thanks, kao, yes, Russia was always an important part of European history. Even left traces in my own family.

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