Russia Prepares for a Big War: The Significance of a Tank Army

 
By Patrick Armstrong 

People who already understand how armies are put together should skip Part 1.

Part 1. How armies are put together

One of the things that I find irritating about battles in movie is that the director seems to think that battles are about getting an inchoate mass of soldiers together, giving a rousing speech and yelling "Charge!" That is absolutely not how it works nor ever has worked. Real armies are assembled out of groupings made from smaller groupings, themselves made from still-smaller groupings and so on down to the smallest group.

The smallest group is about ten soldiers. This is the fundamental bonding size – these are your buddies, the people you will really remember, the ones you depend on and who depend on you and for whom you will fight and sacrifice. Yes, you're fighting for Freedom or some other Large Cause, but it's really your buddy you're doing it for. So we start with about ten soldiers.

In the Roman Army this was the contubernium – a corporal, seven legionaries plus two servants who shared a tent and ate together. The fundamental tiny piece out of which everything else was constructed.

The next thing to know is the span of command or control. The commander of each level, is trying, in very difficult circumstances, to get his subordinates to do something they would never do in their right minds. They know perfectly well that the first guy in the house, the lead guy attacking the machinegun post, the first guy out of the trench, the first guy out of the landing craft is almost certain to be killed or injured. It is very difficult to get people to do this and long experience shows that a commander can only control three to five elements.

The next principle to remember is square or triangular. Armies are usually constructed by making the next level of organisation out of three or four of the lower level. Why? With three, you can have two engaged and one in reserve. (A great deal of the problem of a commander, once battle is joined, is knowing where and when to commit his reserves). The "square" structure allows two in contact, one in reserve and one resting, or two up, one in reserve and one manoeuvring. Five or six are too many but two are too few. This introduces the fundamental principles of "fire" (applying the destruction to the enemy) and "movement" (moving so as to apply that destruction most efficaciously). (Movie battles have lots of the first, but little of the last.)

Finally, we have the combat arms – infantry, armour (cavalry in its time) and artillery – and supporting arms. "Combat arms" because they directly apply the violence. Other specialities assist them: engineers help them move, transport moves them, medical patches them up, signals communicate, logistics supplies them and so on. No army can function without them.

In what follows I will discuss infantry organisations because they are the purest soldier – the other two combat arms are machines, whether tanks or guns, and the support arms are functions. But, the principles of infantry organisations are followed in the other components. It should be noted that different military traditions have different names for some of these things but it's all the same principle.

Three or four "tents" (sections) make a platoon; three or four platoons a company; three or four companies a battalion. At battalion level some specialisation will appear: it may have a mortar platoon, or a machinegun platoon, there will be a simple first aid element, some light engineers, communicators, headquarters and so on. But they are all capable of being ordinary riflemen if needed. The battalion is the first construction that is capable of some sort of independent action – it has enough companies to provide fire and manoeuvre and reserves, its machinegun or mortar elements give it some support. But it is still infantry and still pretty "light".

The next level is a brigade of three or four battalions. But there is a decision point here: do you envisage this brigade being an "independent brigade" or a sub-division of a larger formation? If the former we introduce the other arms, if the latter it remains all infantry.

An independent brigade, or brigade group, will have, in proportions depending on what you want to do, infantry, tank and artillery battalions from the "combat arms" as well as "support" elements: like combat engineers, medical and dental, post offices, laundry facilities, possibly a helicopter battalion and on and on. It is an independent military town of 4000 to 6000 people which needs almost everything a civilian town needs while also being capable of moving anywhere at a moment's notice. This formation is intended to carry out military tasks by itself with help from the air forces.

The brigade that is intended to be a piece in the next largest structure would have three or four infantry battalions and would still be mainly riflemen with very little added from the other arms. Next level is the division made of infantry, tank and artillery brigades in the proportion thought useful. In the Second World War divisions were usually the smallest thing one would see on the battlefield that could be given an independent task.

A tank division would be constructed the same way except that the basic "tent" is tank itself, three or four make a platoon, and then companies, battalions and brigades. Artillery would only rarely be organised into independent structures because while it has fire, it does not have much movement. The supporting arms – engineers, signals, logistics, medical and so on, because they exist for support, rarely appear as independent structures. In short "divisions" are infantry-heavy or tank-heavy (bitter experience has taught and re-taught that none of the combat arms can function alone).

Moving up, three or four divisions make a corps; two to four corps an army and a couple of armies make an army group.

So, a whole gigantic army group is assembled, step by step, out of our little "tents".

Part 2. What's All This Mean?

How big a war do you anticipate? A smallish one, a bigger one or a really big one? Your answer will determine the formations that you construct.

An important decision point, which reveals your answer, is whether you add in the other combat arms and specialised support elements at brigade (ie 5000 or so troops) or at division (10,000 or so)? If at brigade, you have made a decision that you expect your future wars to be rather small and that all-arms formations of 5000-or-so soldiers is as big as you need. If on the other hand, you decide to create divisions – formations about three times as large – you are showing that you are expecting a larger war. If you then start combining these divisions into corps, armies or even army groups, you are expecting a really big, all-out war against a first-class enemy. Something the size of World War II in fact. In 1945, for example, the Western Allies entered Germany with three army groups, totalling eight armies, totalling 91 divisions: about four and a half million soldiers.

It is possible to have a bit of both, but it's only a bit. You may decide on independent brigades but also have a divisional headquarters. But, unless the brigades routinely exercise under the command of a standing divisional headquarters, and that headquarters controls assets, only the idea of divisional operations is kept alive.

In short, if you stop at independent brigades, you are telling the world that you expect, and are planning for, relatively small wars. If you go to divisions you are expecting something larger and if you construct a corps (or army in Russian terminology) you are telling the world that you are preparing for a big war.

And so, an observer who knows how armies are put together, can tell a lot about what kind of war a country expects by understanding how it has put its "tent groups" together.

Part 3. The Russian Army

The Soviet Army was organised for a huge war: it had divisions, organised into armies (corps in Western terminology) which were organised into fronts (armies in Western terminology) and further grouped into TVDs or Theatres of Military Activity (army groups in Western terminology) all backed up by a conscription and reserve system, immense stocks of weapons and gigantic pre-positioned ammunition dumps. This time, the Soviets did not intend to fight the decisive battle an hour's drive from Moscow. When the USSR collapsed, so did that structure. The most ready elements were based in the Warsaw Treaty countries; Russia took responsibility for them and they were hurriedly moved back, shedding conscripts as they went. The formations which would have been filled up and then supported the ready elements were in Ukraine and Belarus and lost to Russia.

For some years the management of the Russian army did not appear to have understood that everything had changed – that the huge Soviet forces were gone and would not magically fill up with hundreds of thousands of conscripts to fill up the "empty formations". But, they didn't know how to make them smaller either: we were always told in talks with the Russian General Staff that the state could not afford to pay the officers the pensions and housing allowances they were entitled to. And so this once mighty army decayed.

Perhaps it was failure in the First Chechen War that finally convinced headquarters that the Russian army was not a temporarily shrunken big war army. We started being told that they were re-designing their army around independent brigades. It was clear from reading the periodic military and strategic doctrine documents that the wars that Moscow foresaw were smaller wars, on the scale of border infractions or a Chechen-sized war in which the enemy would be small agile lightly-armed groups. For such conflicts, anything larger than independent all-arms brigade-sized formations would be too large and complicated.

And, gradually, between the two Chechen wars, "divisions" (which our inspections had shown to be empty of soldiers but full of poorly-maintained equipment and under-paid dispirited officers) disappeared and were replaced by "storage bases". We assumed these to be a way of avoiding the huge retirement bill while giving officers something useful to do. At the same time independent brigade groups began to appear, with the first ones in the south where trouble was expected. This is one of the reasons why the second Chechen war was a victory for Moscow.

At this stage, (I'm looking at the 2002 CFE data now) there were entities called "divisions" and "armies" (corps) but they were very understrength – apart from the North Caucasus, there were perhaps two divisions in the western area worthy of the name; neither of them deployed to the west. The real force was in the North Caucasus: three divisions, fully staffed and an army (corps) headquarters. But the future was there too with the first two independent brigade groups setting the pattern for the rest.

In short, by the turn of the century, in their published doctrine, in everything they told us in meetings, in deployments and in their formation structures the Russians were showing us they had no offensive designs against NATO and they expected no attacks from NATO. The south was where they saw danger.

The CFE Treaty showed us all this: the Russians were obliged to give us a list of elements showing their precise location and relationship to other structures with the number of soldiers and major weapons; we could go there and check this out at any moment. Thanks to the Treaty we always knew what they had, where they had it and how it was organised. Our inspectors found no discrepancies. But the NATO member countries never ratified the Treaty, continually adding conditions to it and, after years, Russia, which had ratified it, gave up and denounced it. And so we all lost (because it was reciprocal) a transparent confidence building mechanism based on full disclosure with the right to verify.

All this time the Russians told us that that NATO’s relentless expansion, ever closer, was a danger (опасность) although they stopped short of calling it, as they did terrorism, a threat (угроза); “dangers” you watch; “threats” you must respond to. NATO of course didn’t listen, arrogantly assuming NATO expansion was doing Russia a favour and was an entitlement of the “exceptional nation” and its allies.

It is important to keep in mind with the everlasting charges that Russia is "weaponising" this and that, threatening everyone and everything, behaving in an "19th century fashion", invading, brutalising, and on and on, that its army structure and deployments do not support the accusations. A few independent brigades, mostly in the south, are not the way to threaten neighbours in the west. Where are the rings of bases, the foreign fleet deployments, the exercises at the borders? And, especially, where are the strike forces? Since the end of the USSR they have not existed: as they have told us, so have they acted.

They planned for small wars, but NATO kept expanding; they argued, but NATO kept expanding; they protested, but NATO kept expanding. They took no action for years.

Well, they have now: the 1st Guards Tank Army is being re-created.

This army, or corps in Western terminology, will likely have two or three tank divisions, plus a motorised rifle division or two, plus enormous artillery and engineering support, plus helicopters and all else.

The 1st Guards Tank Army will be stationed in the Western Military District to defend Russia against NATO. It is very likely that it will be the first to receive the new Armata family of AFVs and be staffed with professional soldiers and all the very latest and best of Russia's formidable defence industry. It will not be a paper headquarters; it will be the real thing: commanded, manned, staffed, integrated, exercised and ready to go.

It should be remembered that the Soviet Armed Forces conducted what are probably the largest operations in the history of warfare. Take, for example, Operation Bagration which started shortly after the D Day invasion. Using Western terms, it involved eleven armies, in support or attacking; recall that the Western allies entered Germany with eight armies – five American, one each British, Canadian and French. Tank corps (armies in Soviet/Russian) are the hammers – either they deliver the decisive counter-attack after the defence has absorbed the attack (Stalingrad or Kursk) or they deliver the offensive strike. The decision to create a tank army (armoured corps in Western terminology) is an indication that Russia really does fear attack from the west and is preparing to defend itself against it.

In short, Russia has finally come to the conclusion that

NATO's aggression means it has to prepare for a big war.

As a historical note, Dominic Lieven's book shows the preparations Emperor Alexander made when he realised that, sooner or later, Napoleon was going to come for Russia. And everyone knows how that ended. As Field Marshal Montgomery, who had more experience of big war than anyone in the Pentagon or White House today, said: “Rule 1, on page 1 of the book of war, is: ‘Do not march on Moscow’."

This is what the light-hearted decision to expand NATO, "colour revolutions", regime changes, cookies on the Maidan and incessant anti-Russian propaganda has brought us to.

And it won't be a war that NATO will win.

 

Comments

[505th PIR]

The psychological (nationalism will be huge) and material investment in the 1st Guards Tank Army along with its historical role 43-45 and throughout the Cold War will make it hard not to use, especially in a Neo-Con driven, myopic, "Borgist" world. Superb and thoughtful post Mr. Armstrong.

Could the upcoming election be more important? By the time 1GTA becomes fully operational, the next president and his/her first term/foreign policy will be up.

Gheese, what formation are these headed to: http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/04/russia-ramping-up-full-mass-production.html ?? It will be a qualitatively better unit as well as possessing shorter lines of communication and relative home turf. A political accommodation with the Chinese will be a strategic win for Russia as well, but I digress.

[Chris Chuba]

Thank you for such a detailed post, I did not know about the CFE treaty. If people in the U.S. read your summation about how the Russians reacted to it versus the U.S. and other NATO nations I would imagine that our narrative of having Russia as the big bad aggressor would not hold. We do not analyze things in terms of how military organization can telegraph a countries future intentions, instead we look at multiple headlines on Freebeacon like how Russian Jets flew in the direction of the U.K. and shriek in horror at the newly resurgent Russia.

Now thinking out loud, what type of thing could NATO actually attempt to do against a nuclear armed Russia assuming that the had this intention?
1. Encourage Ukraine to break Minsk 2 and attack the tiny Donbas enclave, yeah, this is plausible. This would be perfect, a proxy war that does not invite direct retaliation by Russia. In fact, retaliation by Russia to protect the DPR itself would be portrayed as aggression. My heart sinks, there is a high probability of more needless and unnecessary death in Eastern Ukraine because of imbeciles in the West encouraging it. How would Russia respond?

2. I can't see NATO doing anything other than stirring up trouble in the neighboring Republics or in the internal Muslim population as a direct attack on Russia would be too insane, even for a Breedlove. The indirect way seems to have a better risk / reward. Still I suppose that it is prudent of Russia to have a large Tank Army just so that they don't have to go from zero to using Nukes in the event of an attack.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I think what is insane is the inclusion of the 3 Baltic Republics in NATO.

[JJackson]

Thank you - excellent briefing.

[SmoothieX12]

Excellent piece, Patrick. The division structure was coming one way or another once the cabal of the military "reformers" either died out or was removed.

[JHG]

Excellent post. One of my history professors said that the West always makes the mistake in counting Russia down and out and she always comes back. Now she has a formidable leader in Putin after that Western backed buffoon Yeltsin. We live in interesting times

[Patrick Armstrong]

We live in stupid times. I'd say. The interesting bit (in the Chinese curse sense) is yet to come.

[cynic]

Has the USA been organized for a big war all along?

[turcopolier]

All

This is a useful post in many ways. I am reminded of a meeting in the Pentagon during the Rumsfeld era, a meeting of military people who might pass on a message. There were various generals, colonels, the odd sergeant major(SOF). The generals said nothing of course. As a group they do not generally share their wisdom with the masses and they might be caught out in a disagreement with policy. Rumsfeld presided. The main briefing item was the transition of the US Army from division based structure to one in which the brigade would become the basic structure for overseas work, but in which division headquarters would be retained to oversee training in US garrisons, for the obvious purpose of having "head room" into which those with sponsorship could be promoted to general officer ranks and in which the division headquarters itself (as well as corps headquarters) would serve as a deployable command and control module for expeditionary purposes. it was clear from this that small wars on the model of COIN were anticipated. I asked Rumsfeld what would happen if the US had to fight a big war against a determined opponent who possessed a lot of good equipment. After an embarrassed moment during which Rumsfeld's retired GO counselors (different for the attendees)stared hostily, Rumsfeld said of them "well,these guys told me this would work." I was not invited again. pl

[oofda]

A good article, but one major correction- NATO countries DID ratify the CFE Treaty- they had to for it to enter into force. That isn't why it fell into obsolescence - and the Russians denounced it. It was because the former Warsaw Pact countries- and even former Soviet Republics (i.e., Baltics) had joined NATO. To the Russians, the entire purpose of the CFE Treaty- and the Vienna Document (OSCE)- was now a one-sided instrument aimed against Russia.
Patrick is correct in that the CFE Treaty declarations and inspections showed us where the Russians deemed the threat to themselves- from the South. And perhaps give reasons for the Russians going into Syria to attack ISIS.

A listing of the ratifiers of the CFE Treaty:
https://verdragenbank.overheid.nl/en/Verdrag/Details/004285

[Patrick Armstrong]

CFE Treaty went through several interations. What you're talking about was the original NATO-WTO agreement. That was ratified all round but soon became obsolete as first the WTO and then the USSR broke up. What I'm talking about was the revised treaty which was negotiated a decade later. NATOland kept sticking conditions on it and eventually Russia gave up.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adapted_Conventional_Armed_Forces_in_Europe_Treaty

[William R. Cumming]

A useful post and thread. Part of the Brigade focus IMO was unit cohesion. My basic problem with the U.S. is that military doctrine and strategy no longer aligns with the tenets of U.S. FP. Part of my long advocacy of withdrawal from NATO is that it is largely a way for the U.S. to interfere in EU politics without being a member of the EU. And the pressure to have NATO participate in out of area ops without considerations of long term deployments by all parties has led to tragic results for the alliance.

And the notion that HELP WAS ON THE WAY by the civilian leadership of the U.S. for the military was a fictional notion allowing for self-deception by all. The understanding of the military/civil interface in the U.S.A. is IMO at its lowest level [by both] since 1945.

And with the erosion of a uniformed military [in part caused by an unaccountable civilian nuclear priesthood and an expensive one at that] is rapidly leading to dissolution of the nation-state system which has to some degree maintained world order [not always successfully clearly] since 1648!

Thanks again for the excellent post Patrick! BTW Patrick what would be your guess as to active service flag rinks that have held a divisional command or higher in actual combat worldwide?

[Patrick Armstrong]

How many active? I imagine you're about to tell me, but my guess would be that the pool of US from the two Iraq wars are mostly retired. And unless you want to include the Russian commanders in 2008 or in Syria, I suppose there aren't many anywhere still serving. But, with a look at Wikipedia, neither Breedlove nor the guy commanding the US Army in Europe (Hodge?) look a bit like corridor generals to me.

[kao_hsien_chih]

It makes perfect sense if the goal is to maintain a potential stranglehold on St. Petersburg. No doubt that's how Russians view it and they have every good reason under the sun to suspect it.

[Vince]

An excellent overview Patrick. Slightly OT but I found a free PDF at wikipedia on a little-known (outside of Russia) war of Soviet and Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945. The Soviet forces showed in this short clash (it was over in two weeks) a mastery of modern warfare which has never been equalled. I started looking for other books about this war and came across some freely dowloadable PDF files of books by a David Glantz - just enter his name in the search box at wikipedia.

August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria
David M. Glantz
Combat Studies Institute
Fort Leavenworth
February 1983

I’m only halfway through August Storm but I’m staggered by the detail this author provides before the reader ever gets to the actual battles and maneouvres - structure of Soviet forces, Structure of Japanese forces, climatic data, terrain and a host of other detail. The maps and photos are very poor quality in the PDF I downloaded but the text and commentary is excellent, as are the tables of data. Do the US still provide this high level of material for their staff officers?

Anyway, what particularly struck me were the opening Preface remarks by the author bemoaning the fact that the overall contribution of Soviet forces in defeating Nazi Germany had been seriously downplayed by Western authors and, in particular, by the surviving German generals in their memoirs in which they claim the Soviets were “artless” in warfare and that the Germans lost due to geography, climate and sheer numbers. The author strongly disagrees with this belittling of the Soviet war machine.

His concluding remarks in the Preface: “Our neglect of Soviet operations in WW2, in general – and in Manchuria, in particular – testifies not only toward history and the past in general, but also to our particular blindness to the Soviet experience. That blindness, born of the biases we bring to the study of World War 2, is a dangerous phenomenon. How can we learn if we refuse to see the lessons of our past for our future?”

The author’s remarks in 1983 show that this downsizing of Soviet achievements in WW2 is not of recent origin.

These are the other PDFs by this author on wikipedia –
(1) August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945 by LTC David M. Glantz
(2) The Soviet Airborne Experience by LTC David M. Glantz
(3) Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 by COL David M. Glantz

[Patrick Armstrong]

I knew Glanz. Very serious guy. He headed an outfit at Leavenworth that did really first class studies of the Soviet Army. I once asked him how he had ever been able to get such a thing up and running. He said he had a real protector in the Pentagon who absolutely left them alone for 3-4 years so they could get up to speed. He also insisted in hiring historians -- no IR or Poly Sci types. Don't know what's become of it.

[ISL]

Fascinating and clarifying post, thanks. Would you have any idea if the new tanks were used in Syria? Based on

http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/04/russia-ramping-up-full-mass-production.html

There is a clear need for Russia to field test these in action somewhere, but presumably without the risk of escalation to full scale nuclear war- hence probably not Ukraine

If not Syria, then Iraq, perhaps Kurds against Turkey in Iraq?

Since Russia did not under shock therapy lose its armaments industry, I am guessing that their production costs are a relatively small fraction of US costs, normalized to say the price of oil, creation of the tank army is feasible (and per wikipedia ) by 2020. In the V-day ceremony, US media was filled with how one of the tanks got stuck.

Borg-think?

[turcopolier]

PA

Dave Glantz and I were in the same cadet company at VMI. He graduated in '63 and I in '62. pl

[bth]

Would you say that the brigade structure worked satisfactorily over the last decade and a half?

[turcopolier]

bth

Yes. It has been adequate in wars fought against what are really minor opponents. pl

[Patrick Armstrong]

Apparently they did supply the latest T-90s to the Syrian Army. As the Armata "breakdown"it was at the rehearsal; I think I recall that the official explanation was finger trouble by the driver (can't find it on the Net). On The Day, several performed quite normally.

[Ishmael Zechariah]

"There is a clear need for Russia to field test these in action somewhere, but presumably without the risk of escalation to full scale nuclear war- hence probably not Ukraine

If not Syria, then Iraq, perhaps Kurds against Turkey in Iraq?"

A few questions based on this bit of prose:
1-Do you really think that the most modern Russian armour would be given to kurds without oversight?
2-Which kurds might these be?
3-Who would be the overseers?
4-Who would provide air cover?
4-If the situation spirals out of control w/ the TSK crushing these Russian-aligned kurds in Iraq (as TSK well can; we are a real army-very much as described above), can anyone guarantee that there will not be escalation?
It might be best to think twice before posting.

Ishmael Zechariah

[rjj]

Links are nice.

Glantz got heard here because the person who was supposed to lecture on "Women in WW2" couldn't get there. He was a substitute. Wondered why.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Clz27nghIg

it is less obscure - discovery Battlefield series had a section on Manchuria 1945 suitable and USEFUL for domestic (non professional) consumption.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKHZ0W6Fdu0

[visitor]

A similar observation applies to Kaliningrad.

[bth]

To say that three Baltic states have a strangle hold on St. Petersburg is just laughable.