Battle of Kursk

 

Chris Chuba wrote the following comment.  I am making it into a post. 

"I want to start a thread on the Battle of Kursk for few reasons.
1. While it's a difficult choice, I'd choose this as the greatest battle of WW2.
2. I have recently read three books that have altered my view on it.
3. I'd like to see if anyone on this board would like to contribute to this topic, including other book recommendations.

The three books are ...
1. David Glantz, "When Titans Clashed" (more of an overview of Kursk, plus I read a paper by him)
2. Niklas Zetterling, "Kursk 1943: A statistical Analysis"
3. Valeriy Zamulin, "Demolishing the Myth ..."

For those who are unfamiliar with Kursk, it was the Battle of the Bulge on the Eastern Front. It was the last, large scale offensive by the German army and the greatest concentration of German armor in a single offensive. After this battle the Red Army went over to the offensive and kept the initiative for the rest of the war.

Here is a 45 minute webisode (in English) produced by the Russians in 2102 which is a joy to watch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ichrcupEbvA

and a map depicting the original lines and high water mark of the battle https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Battle_of_Kursk_%28map%29.jpg

In the original narrative that I read many years ago, the Germans suffered massive armor losses by foolishly attacking well prepared Soviet defenses. Their defeat was a fate accompli before the attack even started.

In the revised version, the Germans had normal, but not crippling, operational losses. Their total loss of armor during the offensive phase was about 300 tanks and SPG's but they remained in capable fighting condition before abandoning the offensive on 7/17/43.

This is not to disparage the Red Army it was a solid tactical victory. The significance Kursk was that for the first time, the Red Army was able to stop a German offensive at the beginning instead of getting crushed and then having to recover like they did the previous two summers. Using a combination of numerical superiority and improved tactics, the Russians were able to force the Germans to retreat and then launch their own counter-attack. They shut down the German offensive in the north (aka the central front) after a short advance. In the south (aka the Voronezh front) they parried a more successful German advance long enough to hasten a German withdrawal on 7/17. A counter-offensive in the north by the Russians at Orel and a pending counter-offensive further south at the Mius River caused the Germans to abandon their operation.

This is by necessity a very terse overview, the Battle of Kursk has many controversies and details that I glossed over. I believe these controversies exist because the Red army had just crossed the threshold where they surpassed the German army if you factor in BOTH their superior numbers AND improved tactical skill. Man for man, the German army was still better, but the Red Army was in its ascendency, a year later they would be a much more effective army and achieve very decisive offensive victories. Whenever you have an inflection point, it creates opportunities to ponder the what if's. The what if's are interesting but to me the tide was rolling in and the outcome, while not exactly the one the Soviets has planned, was no accident.

Some observations about the battle:
1. While the Germans 'only' lost about 300 out of about 2,200 tanks/SPG's. The Red Army did manage to damage up to 1,000 more but the Germans were able to repair most of them in the field within a day or two. Unlike the battle of the Bulge, the Germans had all of their fancy logistic toys, like specialized field cranes and were well supplied with both fuel and ammunition. This surprised the Russians and may have contributed to their decision to try a head on attack at Prokhorovka as they wrongly thought the Germans were depleted.

2. By this time of the war, the T34 had gone from being a state of the art tank down to a good enough tank. The German tanks and SPG's outgunned T34 and could destroy it at any practical combat range. Meanwhile, the T34, in the worst case match up, could only destroy a Tiger tank by shooting at its side armor from a range of 500m and was totally ineffective against its frontal armor (as were just about all of the Red Army's field guns). To make matters worse, the Russians had a surprisingly large number of light T70 tanks, comprising about 30% of their tank force. In 1944 the Russians would significantly close this quality gap with their next generation armor but none of this was available in 1943 at Kursk.

3. David Glantz emphasizes the increased competency of the Red Army while Zamulin, a former Director of a museum at Prokhorovka, shows a view of an army in transition; giving examples of brilliant competence along with tragic mistakes. Fighting defensive battles against a competent enemy is tough and the Germans were at the top of their game. Zamulin mentions that the approach of the 5th guards tank army at Prokhorovka was the first example of a forced march by a Russian mechanized group, over a long distance, about 400 miles, that experienced very few losses from either mechanical failure or air attacks which were common in previous attempts. He believes this to be an overlooked accomplishment as they arrived just as the last defensive belt was being tested by the 2nd SS Panzer Corp.

4. Zetterling's main theme is that this was not a blood fest as compared to previous battles on the eastern front. This makes sense to me. The Russians were more professional. The Germans would encounter a well placed Russian strong point and stop, they don't do stupid attacks. The Germans would wait for combined arms, artillery, air force, etc. However, this gives the Russians an opportunity to either retreat in good order or reorganize their defense; this is less costly but slows down the pace of their advance.

5. That Prokhorovka itself was not the largest single tank battle in history, is not that interesting to me. It was a large tank engagement, as many as 400 Russian vs about 200 or less German tanks. Zamulin makes an additional point that much of it was against well prepared German anti-tank guns. Overall, Kursk was the largest concentration of German armor during the war.

6. The Germans had 146 Tiger tanks at Kursk, sure, you can disable its tracks and then drop artillery shells on top of them but not having field guns that can take it out directly from its front armor was a disadvantage that troubled the Russians. The impact of the Tigers was larger than their numbers wouldo indicate. A total of 10 were lost by 7/17, more would have been disabled but that number is hard to pin down. Zetterling dedicated his book on German losses, armor strength, etc, while it's a statistical analysis it is actually good reading. He has a knack for presenting the material in a very readable manner. I especially liked how he compares the matchup between the German vs. Russian armor in the field.

7. It's fair to say that both the Germans and the Russians surprised each other at Kursk. The German advance was much slower than in previous summers. In 1941, Army Group Center was able travel 140 miles in 11 days, they encircled Minsk and the Red Army lost 350k soldiers. At Kursk, they only penetrated 20 miles in 12 days in the southern sector, and cut off one rifle corp which inflicted 15k losses. However, things did not go as planned for the Red Army. They intended to pin the Germans in between the first and second defensive belts, wear them down, and then launch their counter-attack. Instead, the 2nd SS Pz corp was able to break through both defensive belts, test the last defensive belt, and the Russians were forced to call up their strategic reserve to prevent a break out but they were able to do it.

8. If anyone wants to discuss the Manstein controversy, feel free, I have an opinion but my post is already too long."  pl

Comments

[Chris Chuba]

To All, I think that the 'Lucy' connection is being over emphasized. Yes, I am certain that British intelligence was given to the Russians prior to the German attack and that this was factored into the Red Army's defense. However, the Russian's were always suspicious of planted stories and would only act on leads if it was corroborated by other intelligence.

Zhukov himself mentions that the Red Army's preemptive artillery barrage was about an 1hr too early to achieve maximum effectiveness. Many German's were still bunkered and it was based on captured sappers. Also, German plans in early Spring are not going to be detailed down to the actual hour on D-Day. Finally, there is plenty of evidence that the Russian's did NOT know the exact disposition of the German army. They over budgeted the defense of the Central front as compared to the Voronezh Front.

[Chris Chuba]

Ulenspiegel I just wanted to say that I appreciated a lot of your comments but I didn't respond to them because they were buried in very detailed, nested threads.
I too think that 1942 was Germany's best shot at defeating the Soviet Union. I am thinking that Caucus campaign to take the Baku oil field. If they did that then Russia loses 90% of their oil production, game, set, match. The funny thing is that when I read Zhukov's biography, I get a real sense of urgency here but on the German side it seems that only Hitler was enthusiastic for this campaign. To some extent, perhaps this was telling in and of itself.

I agree with your assessment that the tank killing ratio at Kursk was unsustainable for the Red Army so that it was as good a strategy as any. In fact, that was the spirit of my original post. Kursk was not an attritional loss for the German army, it was a strategic victory for an every increasing competent Red Army.

Regarding the delay of the start of the Battle of Kursk, I forgot to mention that the Luftwaffe did get new Cannon equipped Stukas which proved to be very effective tank killers so this is one way in which a delay favored them, the German army also got a few more Tiger tanks. Finally, one point I didn't mention, the PzIV had a similar silhouette to a Tiger so being confused with a Tiger helped because sometimes the Russians would withhold fire thinking that they had to get in closer range than necessary.

[SmoothieX12]

Sir John Keegan was a proverbial Russophobe. I also don't know what "consensus" are we talking here about re: Keegan? Consensus among who?

[William R. Cumming]

Was the book entitled ON WAR?

[William R. Cumming]

Which side had the best tank and armor recovery units for battle damage?

[rjj]

Is this the text?

http://erenow.com/ww/ahistoryofwarfare/3.html

If so, I can't find an offending passage. He writes about Cossacks from Clausewitz's perspective. From his own perspective they are an eastern variant of Border Rievers.

Why then did he find the horrors of the Cossack pursuit of the French so particularly horrible? The answer is, of course, that we are hardened to what we know, and we rationalise and even justify cruelties practised by us and our like while retaining the capacity to be outraged, even disgusted by practices equally cruel which, under the hands of strangers, take a different form.

another case of cultural blinkers: German Stalingrad survivors in BBC interviews said absolutely without irony that the Chuikov street fighting methods were thuggish, uncivilized, and pretty much what you can expect of "zeeeese peeeeeople."

[Chris Chuba]

The Germans definitely had better field recovery logistics than the Red Army at the Battle of Kursk. I don't know if things changed later in the war. The Germans also had the advantage that they controlled most of the battlefield since they were on the offensive. They had easy access to their damaged tanks and were able to demolish any Red Army tanks before leaving.

The Russians were able to repair 100 of 400 damaged tanks within a few days after 7/12. They had some turretless T34's that they used to tow damaged tanks from the battlefield.

I'm adding this here to reduce moderation overhead ...

One of the things that stuck with me from the Zamulin book regarding the first day of the attack, 'Each regiment of the 52nd Guards division faced one Panzergrenadier division ... [later referring to 3 of its rifle company's] Unfortunately, it is difficult to reconstruct the events of this unequal battle because none of the defenders survived it'

[Nik]

For french readers I recommend "Koursk : Les quarante jours qui ont ruiné la Wehrmacht" by Jean Lopez at edition Economica that brings new light on the operations of the Summer 1943.