SYRIA SITREP: A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE LATEST CONUNDRUM

By Patrick BAHZAD

 

 

"Just when I Thought I was out,
They pull me back in!»
The Godfather – Part III (1990)

 

 

You have got to wonder if that is what Bashar al-Assad is thinking somehow at the moment. Considering the string of victories he's pulling together in the fight against ISIS, while Jabhat al-Nusra and friends are trying to "backstabb" his army in Idlib country, he may certainly get the impression some of his foes will never let go. Such a view would be misguided though, as the days of the "moderate" Islamist rebels are numbered. 

To those, on the other hand, who might resent the implications of quoting a movie mobster as comparison for the head of the Syrian Arab Republic, make no mistake, Assad and his clan are gangsters, just as any Middle-Eastern government recognized by the West. So let us not get into the morality debate of whether or not he deserves to be where he is.

I will gladly leave that discussion to the neo-Con, neo-Wilsonian and R2P crew! The question, for now, is not what should have been done differently four or five years ago, but what should be done today and what is likely to happen, so we do not end up with a mess even bigger than the one we helped create in the last few years.

The Game Changer

Looking back at the developments that took place after the Russian decided to put boots on the ground (and planes in the air), it must be obvious even to the most determined anti-Assad proponents that there is way around him anymore. In the six months of their campaign, the Russians managed to turn the tables on the opposition, for the regime would have been on its way out, were it not for the massive boost the SAA and its allies received thanks to Russian airstrikes, weapons' deliveries and military training. And while the analysts of the "percentage war" might still be busy doing the math about how much (or, in their eyes, how little) territory Assad and Co have regained with Putin’s help, the whole dynamics  and momentum of the war definitely changed after October 1^st 2015.

 

Once a deal was reached with the Jordanians, so as to keep a lid on large parts of the Southern Front, the R+6 proceeded to irredeemably degrade the so-called moderate rebels in North-Western Syria. Although they had the means and the tactical opportunity to strike a devastating blow early in 2016, in a kind WWII "Kesselschlacht", the Russians finally decided against it, out of diplomatic and political considerations. If you want Assad to be able to reach out and look a reasonable enough statesman figure, you have got to leave some opposition on the ground in order to claim at least some credibility in upcoming elections.

Besides, the different factions in the Idlib to Aleppo area are so fragmented, with Jabhat al-Nusra – i.e. Al Qaeda – firmly in the driving seat, that this might still prove a very smart move, to leave opponents slug it out among themselves. Basically, another variation of the old "divide and rule". The surviving FSA groups, in particular the same Division 13 that was robbed of all its gear a week earlier, might still side with JaN when they decide it's time for yet another hopeless offensive against regime positions in South-West Aleppo, but to the civilian population as a whole, the gap is probably widening between groups wishing to come to a negotiated settlement with the Assad loyalists (not a surrender) and those "die hards" of Jihad who want to fight onto the last Syrian.

Resumption of Hostilities by JaN and Div 13

From that point of view, the resumption of hostilities both by JaN and Division 13 is likely to induce further internal strife among an opposition that is already divided, if you set aside the Saudi backed proxy groups under the influence of Jaysh al-Islam. The downing of a SyAF jet earlier today will only contribute to making the local opposition look less reliable to the international community, as well as deeply influenced by Jihadi splinter groups or affiliates of Al Qaeda central.

Maybe it’s no coincidence Al Qaeda old timer Abu Firas was taken out – with a number of fellow “Jabhat al-Nusra” and “Jund al-Aqsa” leaders – by a US airstrike, days only after the failed rebel counter-attack. There is no evidence for this of course, but the Pentagon Spokesman made it clear yesterday during his press briefing that the US considered Al Qaeda and its affiliates to be “fair game” and that Jabhat al-Nusra was in that regard pretty much “one and the same” with their head-office.

The jury is still out on the implications of such a statement, but the truth is that never before, especially not since the Russian intervention, has there been a US airstrike that far up in North-Western Syria, against a gathering of Jihadi leaders of very serious stature. Of course, there have been strikes before, targeting Al Qaeda’s controversial “Khorasan Group” on several occasions, both in 2014 and in 2015, or “Ahrar al-Sham” in 2014. But the closest strike the US have launched is near Aleppo and that was in July 2015, i.e. before the Russians upgraded and integrated the Syrian air defence system.

In other words, this strike must at least have been coordinated with the R+6, using the agreed on protocols. In my opinion, the message this sends to rebel groups in the North-West is clear: playtime is over! There’s a sheriff in town, actually two of them, and it looks like they intend to enforce the rules. Come to think of it, you might even suspect that it could have been a deliberate move to target Abu Firas and his crew through a US airstrike, so as not to give the rebels any more ground for further cease-fire breach, in case the RuAf or SyAF stepped in and started pounding Idlib countryside again. What will come out of this is uncertain, but it is more than likely that none of it will strengthen the Islamists’ case against Assad.

Assad Fighting ISIS

Another aspect which is not going to help the rebels' PR-campaign is the regime's highly successful offensive against the Islamic State. For months, even years, we have been spoon-fed the story according to which Assad and ISIS were two sides to the same coin. Worse, Assad had created ISIS and only if he left was there a chance of fixing the ISIS issue. I have always wondered how anybody in his right mind could come up with that twisted a logic and still get such a warm reception in so many parts of the world.

The Islamic State, in its present form, has been around since 2006 at least. It was born in Iraq, which still is its centre of gravity, and a large number of its most senior executives are Iraqis. The Islamic State’s expansion into Syria is as much the result of some cynical moves made by the Syrian regime (in particular the release of Islamist detainees early in 2011), as it is the end-product of sectarian politics in Iraq (where Sunnis still feel pretty much second-class citizens), US failure to properly deal with the issue when they still had the chance and Western blindness as to what was at stake in the region in general. Add to this the Saudi war by proxy against Iran, as well as neo-Ottoman thoughts of “grandeur”, and you get a highly volatile environment.

But now, that narrative of "Assad must go", combined with "Assad is not fighting ISIS" has lost a lot of traction. Probably even more so among ordinary people in Western Europe and the United States than among elites and an establishment that has been busy selling us the pipedream of a democratic and peaceful future for Syria. Sadly, there was never any chance the toppling of Assad by the opposition would end in anything else than large-scale bloodshed, death and chaos. Libya by contrast would look like a walk in the park compared to what Syria would have turned into, if the regime change crowd had had it their way. 

Victory at Palmyra

Be that as it may, nobody can deny the fact that the SAA is now the only Arab army inflicting one defeat after the other to the Caliphate's armies: the first of those, probably more symbolic than anything else at that point, was lifting the three-year siege of Kweires airbase, back in November 2015. This victory, largely underestimated by our very own armchair strategists, gave a huge boost to the morale of the SAA, and its foreign allies (Hezbollah, IRGC and Iraqi or Afghan Shia militias).

Fast-forward to March 2016 and what you see unfold is the result of the multipronged strategy implemented under Russian guidance: an international negotiation mechanism has been agreed to, with all its flaws, but it has enabled the regime to move forces from the North-West into the Centre-East of the country, putting ISIS under so much pressure that it finally crumbled first in Palmyra, and now in Qaryatayn.

Pushing the Jihadis out of Palmyra was undoubtedly the biggest of Assad’s victories so far, also from a PR point of view. There has been some debate about whether it made more sense for the SAA to go for Palmyra first, instead of Tabqa, which would have opened the road to Raqqa, the Caliphate’s capital in Syria. Overall however, the choice of an offensive towards Palmyra made much more sense: Assad managed to claim back a piece of world heritage from "the barbarians", which gave him extra press and media cover at a time he needed to boost his image during the latest round of Geneva negotiations.

Tabqa in comparison might only have gotten him 1/10 of coverage in the international media, even though it is much more important militarily, and gives quicker access to IS LOCs to and from Raqqa. So it was basically down to choosing between what made most sense militarily and what could be used best in Geneva and as PR. Also, the chances of quick military victory at Palmyra stood much better than a thrust into 40 miles of desert road that could lead to the same kind of skirmishes and ISIS raids than the Khanasser road into Aleppo.

The Way Ahead

Developments in North-Western Syria, where JaN and Div 13 of the FSA decided to go "all in" will not alter the equation fundamentally. At this point, they have become a sideshow that will not be tolerated, not by the Russians and Syrians, and not by the US either, which may come more as a surprize to JaN's backers in the region. At best they can achieve minor frontline corrections, but nothing of the scale necessary to modify the balance of power.

Obviously, their intent was to trick the R+6 into overreaction, possibly even force them to divert resources necessary in the fight against ISIS. The response they got through the strike on Abu Firas, symbolic as it may be, will send a powerful signal to anybody wishing to interfere with the current negotiation logic. Therefore, even if hostilities flare up around Idlib, the most likely COA is that they will not interefere with the main offensive against the "Islamic State".

With Qaryatayn now also firmly in the hands of the SAA, this will open the way to an offensive towards Sukhna, ISIS’ first defensive line now on the way to Deir-ez-Zor, possibly in combination with YPG and SDF coming from the North, through Shahadi (only 25 miles North of Deir-ez-Zor). The logistics involved in such a ground operation are complex however, and a step-by-step approach is the most likely scenario in this case. Getting to Deir-ez-Zor might be worth it though, as this would not only achieve another highly symbolic victory (lifting yet another epic siege), but would seriously disrupt one of the core areas of ISIS, namely the Euphrates valley, thereby cutting off their entire logistics trail.

The other tactical options for the R+6 are mainly twofold: either clear the East of Homs province, which is still pretty much in ISIS hands, as a way to securing the “Khanasser road” into Aleppo, or pushing from Ithriyah (North-East of Salamiyah, on that exact same Khanasser road) right into Tabqa through the oilfields that ISIS needs so direly now. Both actions could also be combined, depending on progress made on either axis of advance.

A Mirror Image of the 2007 Surge

Strategically, the idea at work here is at the exact opposite of what the US Surge had to achieve in 2007. Back then, one of the main objectives was to get AQI (or the ISI) out of its strongholds in Baghdad and the cities it controlled in Anbar. That was the rationale of the battle for the Baghdad belts, which turned out to be more of an ethnic cleansing operation subcontracted to local "Special Police Commandos" and various Shia militias, and the systematic (physical) suppression of Jihadi groups in a number of towns and cities in Anbar province. As a sidenote, it should be remembered that the most successful aspects of this Surge were cinetic military action performed by groups such as "Task Force 145", and not the COIN campaign based on winning over "hearts and minds" that was sold to the American public.

This is a lesson that needs to be taken into consideration in today's fight. Of course, the overall situation and circumstances are quite different, and so are their contingencies. In the absence of massive US manpower, taking back IS controlled cities takes a lot more effort and coordination. The already announced offensive on Mosul, probably some kind of counter-PR to the actual SAA offensive on Palmyra, will take months before it even reaches the outskirts of the Northern Iraqi city. As for Raqqa, it will probably be the first capital IS will lose, but here too, coordination between various groups from various coalitions will take some effort.

Thus, the most promising strategy for pushing back IS on the ground is to isolate its core areas by cutting off LOCs, thereby disrupting territorial continuity, and then organising some "quadrillage" in the areas controlled by the SAA (or the ISF for that matter). This MO seems to be working much more efficiently with the SAA, or the Kurdish YPG militias, than with the ISF, but the aim is identical: isolating the different power centres of ISIS from each other (Raqqa, Mosul, Deir-ez-Zor, etc.), grinding down their territory, and making the grip tighter and tighter around Raqqa and Mosul, until they're ripe for the final onslaught.

Comments

[The Twisted Genius]

pl,

Amazing coincidence that you would write this today. With yesterday's announcement of the death of Merle Haggard, I was flooded with memories of my old mentor, MSG Albert H. Rivers. At one of the RPI ROTC military balls, he commented "That damned band ain't any good. They can't do any Merle Haggard." At various times he was with 46th SF Company in Thailand and a RT leader in CCC. RT Nebraska, I believe. He only left VN because the US Army left. He brought his Thai wife with him to become father goose to us ROTC cadets at RPI. I learned more from that man than from all the military schools I ever attended.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Barish,

You're free to believe what you like. Just don't insult my intelligence pretending to lecture me about Sednaya or Syria in general. I'm also far better acquainted with the mechanics of the Syrian security apparatus and its work than you imagine.

[LeaNder]

Hmm, OK, one angle.

[YT]

RE: M. Vandenberghe

Chapeau...

[Bob]

Sir:
1. As you are aware I concur with your post from 2009 on the subject of COIN and Afghanistan, and believe that it also applies to Iraq, and now Syria. Concur with Patrick's excellent suggestion that this deserves to be a separate topic.

2. Despite my experience, knowledge of Iraq and the Middle East, and good looks; I was not selected by GEN Petraeus to join his "Council of Colonels" who wrote Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, even though I had just finished working for/with him in Iraq when he commanded MNSTC-I. I don't necessarily disagree with the concepts expressed in it, but I've always been unable to understand how we could apply it in Iraq. In Iraq COIN never made any sense to me because there were never enough resources to apply it, and from Petraeus on down our military commanders were either in denial or just ignorant about the conditions of the environment in Iraq. From 2003, many of the same geniuses who wrote the COIN doctrine were too dumb to adequately resource, or worse, refused to force the resourcing of the key mission of training the ISF (building partnership capacity), and unable to understand or accept the realities of Iraqi history, culture, politics and what was really possible in Iraq. When we tried to help them understand we were rebuffed, like when you came to Kuwait in early 2003 and gave talks to three different groups of cheering planners, intel analysts and senior staff officers; and offered to be the CFLCC Cdr's PolMil Advisor in early 2003; or my own relationship with Petraeus during the surge in 2007-8 when he refused to accept the sectarian realities of the Maliki regime.

[Patrick Bahzad]

LeaNder,

Not sure what you're trying to say, just don't be a smartass. Got anything of substance to add, feel free to do so.

[Barish]

No offense intended, and I do take note that pressure to make concessions was only one part of the pile of fragments that led things to where they went, and still are.

[turcopolier]

Bob et al

I feel compelled to state that in spite of all the good things we did with the indigenous tribals and "rallied" assets in SEA we still lost the war on the home front when public opinion support collapsed behind us. That is perhaps, the greatest lesson to be learned regarding COIN as a concept. As Fall said, to my seminar in 1964 at Bragg, "you can win the counterinsurgency and still lose the war." BTW, you are right about resources. We were properly resourced for the nation building mission in COIN and fully engaged in COIN from 1967 at all levels of VN governance but still lost. the level of resources available in Iraq and Afghanistan was pathetic by comparison to the CORDS effort. COIN is not a useful doctrine unless the local government can handle it without much assistance. pl

[Bob]

Sir:
Agree.
Returning to Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan, I only see very limited possible ways ahead, not much different from what we have been doing, precisely because of the realities of the "local government", realities that "wishful thinking" can't change.
In Iraq, there is no future in training the ISF or establishing fire bases in a trail for the ISF/PMF to notionally follow to Mosul. "Build it and they will come" doesn't often work in FID.
Our assistance to the KRG and to arming Iraqi Sunni tribes to kill ISIL should be outside of Shia GOI control.
In Syria, I think we can coordinate on a limited basis with R+6, provide T&E to the SDF(AKA YPG), continue to try to build some consensus with the GCC and AL, provide humanitarian relief to refugees/IDPs, and whack Jihadi targets when available.
In Afghanistan, the conditions don't exist to reduce troops levels IAW the plan, so we need to keep them there.
In all three places (and elsewhere across the Islamic world from Mali to Bali...) we attempt to build consensus with our allies, even those who are difficult and tied to the Jihadis, like the Turks and and Saudis...
V/r,
Bob

[turcopolier]

bob

Why do we persist in treating both the Russians and the Syrian government as adversaries? Why is it only on a "limited" basis that we can coordinate with them? pl

[Babak Makkinejad]

I thought there was no formal treaty of military alliance between any state in the Muslim world and the United States except Turkey through NATO.

Am I wrong?

[Bob]

Sir:
OK, you're right that R+6 is not a useful term here, but I was trying to be more realistic as opposed to idealistic here.
Increased CT coordination with Russia is certainly in our interest, even as we have other issues with Putin.
Extensive coordination with the Asad regime will be necessary in the course of any diplomatic solution, and to avoid fratricide while whacking Jihadis. However, even when we were eating chow together with Ali Habib and SY 9AD in the KKMC chow hall in 90-91, or along the SY-IZ border since 2003, working with the Syrians has been difficult, regardless of the Anti-Syrian lobby in DC.
Any coordination with Iran and LH and Iraqi Shia militias might be useful in reducing overall tensions, but is probably unlikely in the near term.
In the big picture, I am pleased that we've been able to start working with the Russians and Syrian govt to the degree that we have so far, despite the nut cases in high places calling for us to attack both of them.
Bob

[turcopolier]

Bob

"even as we have other issues with Putin." What "other issues?" pl

[Bob]

Babak:
1. You are of course correct there are no formal treaties of collective defense between the U.S. and any state in the Muslim world except Turkey via NATO. However, the U.S. has had Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) and other similar bilateral agreements with most of the Islamic World since the beginning of the Cold War.
2. It is OK for a retired US military officer who spent a career working with Arab Muslims to refer to them as "Allies".
Bob

[turcopolier]

Bob

To me the notion of "alliance" implies a willing reciprocity. I do not see that in the Saudis. pl

[Bob]

Sir:
You have a good point with Saudi Arabia, although there are US interests that have certainly benifited from the relationship.
We might consider Afghanistan a useful test of "willful reciprocity", and look at who has contributed, and how they contributed.
Bob

[turcopolier]

Bob

"WILLING reciprocity," not "WILLFUL reciprocity." Afghanistan? I was opposed to the adoption of a COIN strategy in Afghanistan in 2009 and said so every chance I got. I thought then that a smallish (20,000 roughly) long term commitment to CT ops and field intelligence would have been wise just to keep the jihadis screwed up, but to imagine that you could make the geographical expression called Afghanistan into a more or less modern country was just silly. It had been tried before, most recently in the '40s and '50s with large scale commitment of development resources by donor countries. You remember that we built all that now abandoned agricultural infrastructure in Helmand. Hell, there were American USAID residential camps as big as small towns down there. And, it was all for naught. Why? I tried for several years to generate business opportunities in Afghanistan for the industrial group for which I worked. What I and other people in the group learned was that there was no there there. There was no legal, or physical infrastructure to support creation of a business as we understood it. There was no labor force worthy of the name. There were no markets for anything that was not bought by foreign NGOs or AID missions. The standard conversation with Afghans always led to their insistence that you should risk your capital by taking a blind leap into the dark. the idea that they should build some basic infrastructure did not interest them because what they really wanted was their "cut" of your capital investment or a similar "cut" of some USAID contract that the you might get. COIN was never going to work in Afghanistan. You had to be an ambition driven fantasist to think it would. Now we are basically back to the CT based strategy that I hoped for in 2009. pl

[LeaNder]

Sorry, Patrick.

These type of memorytrails that for whatever reason remain on my mind no doubt must be a bit irritating. Not least the "tread host". I am working on it ...

More to the point of "one angle". Releasing salafists, no doubt would have made sense considering the larger -- from Assad's perspective -- US/"Western" foreign policy double standards.

*****
I have and had a larger task over here. Meaning my presence on Pat's blog at this moment somewhat serves distraction. Admittedly not the best of all motives. ;)

Besides, more personally: Apart from the fact that my more general praise of your contributions on this tread may feel a little standard, I do mean it.

Note taken. Take care

[Babak Makkinejad]

Thank you for your comments.

You may have seen some of my earlier comments elsewhere on this forum regarding the "Rectification of Names"; we need to be clear about the meaning of words lest we be misled.

[Babak Makkinejad]

And that dam that USAID built in Afghanistan which, I assume, is unused now, on the Hirmand River, harmed the farmers of Sistan by cutting of their water.

Turned the breadbasket of Iran into a desert.

[turcopolier]

Babak

Are you from that part of Iran? I agree. The Seljuk domain and other such places in the world should make their own way. BTW, do you think we could negotiate another deal to stop Iranian ICBM development? pl

[Babak Makkinejad]

No I am not from Sistan.

But the destruction of the farming in Sistan is common knowledge in Iran; every one knows.

As far as I know Iran does not have ICBMs, only IRBMs.

And I also have read public statements by Iranian leader that they do not plan on deploying missiles with range exceeding 2000 KM.

Since US has accepted the Iranian nuclear activities within NPT, the major obstacle for strategic negogiations between US and Iran are removed; in my opinion.

US: We hate jihadists, you hate jihadists.
Iran: That is a true statement.

US: We want Afghanistan not to be used against US or anyone else.
Iran: We are on the same page.

US: We want a stable Iraq that does not threaten those despised Gulfies.
Iran: We despise them too and we do not want Iraq to be again a threat to anyone else in the neighborhood.

US: Azerbaijan is irrelevant to our security.
Iran: We have no designs on Azerbaijan.

US: We do not want Kurds to suffer in Iraq but we do not want to become independent - we are mindful of our official NATO ally - Turkey.
Iran: We have been on good terms with KRG and do not expect that to change, provided they do not go for independence.

US: We want SAR to continue to be a viable state and we won't try to change the orientation of that state from the "Resistance Axis" in the future.
Iran: That is to be expected but how about Palestine and the "Occupying Regime of Quds"?

US: I am willing to discuss Palestine but do not expect to get anything for free.

[turcopolier]

Babak

I will take your word for it on the ICBMs. But, if Iran were to breach the nuclear weapons deal and this understanding on ICBMs that IMO would require a response. The US missed the opportunity for that with China but I doubt if we will with North Korea. Just my opinion. pl

[Keith Harbaugh]

Colonel, if I might provide a quote from Michael Hayden's memoir Playing to the Edge, page 263,
that I think bears on at least the Syrian part of your question.

He was DCIA (he reserves DCI for the pre-DNI period) in 2007.
Discussing the top-level U.S. response to the discovery that
the Syrians were building a nuclear reactor at al-Kibar,
he writes (but the numbering of the issues is added by me):

“[I]n the president’s mind the real issue was Assad and overall Syrian policy, not just the reactor.
Handled well, the coming crisis could give us unexpected leverage on a host of issues:
1) Syrian support to Hamas and Hezbollah;
2) the foreign fighter pipeline into Iraq;
3) Damascus’s continued meddling in Lebanon;
4) Syria’s alignment with Iran.

“Syria had been a regular theme in White House policy discussions,
largely along the lines of peeling the Syrians off from their Iranian sponsors
or, as Steve Hadley often put it, ‘flipping Assad.’ ”

I would add the thought that if were not for Israel,
the U.S. could care less about those issues
(with regard to Iraq, that is based on my personal assumption that if it were not for Israel,
the U.S. would never have invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussein).

[turcopolier]

KH

"your question." What question? pl