SYRIA SITREP: A FEW THOUGHTS ON THE LATEST CONUNDRUM

By Patrick BAHZAD

 

 

"Just when I Thought I was out,
They pull me back in!»
The Godfather – Part III (1990)

 

 

You have got to wonder if that is what Bashar al-Assad is thinking somehow at the moment. Considering the string of victories he's pulling together in the fight against ISIS, while Jabhat al-Nusra and friends are trying to "backstabb" his army in Idlib country, he may certainly get the impression some of his foes will never let go. Such a view would be misguided though, as the days of the "moderate" Islamist rebels are numbered. 

To those, on the other hand, who might resent the implications of quoting a movie mobster as comparison for the head of the Syrian Arab Republic, make no mistake, Assad and his clan are gangsters, just as any Middle-Eastern government recognized by the West. So let us not get into the morality debate of whether or not he deserves to be where he is.

I will gladly leave that discussion to the neo-Con, neo-Wilsonian and R2P crew! The question, for now, is not what should have been done differently four or five years ago, but what should be done today and what is likely to happen, so we do not end up with a mess even bigger than the one we helped create in the last few years.

The Game Changer

Looking back at the developments that took place after the Russian decided to put boots on the ground (and planes in the air), it must be obvious even to the most determined anti-Assad proponents that there is way around him anymore. In the six months of their campaign, the Russians managed to turn the tables on the opposition, for the regime would have been on its way out, were it not for the massive boost the SAA and its allies received thanks to Russian airstrikes, weapons' deliveries and military training. And while the analysts of the "percentage war" might still be busy doing the math about how much (or, in their eyes, how little) territory Assad and Co have regained with Putin’s help, the whole dynamics  and momentum of the war definitely changed after October 1^st 2015.

 

Once a deal was reached with the Jordanians, so as to keep a lid on large parts of the Southern Front, the R+6 proceeded to irredeemably degrade the so-called moderate rebels in North-Western Syria. Although they had the means and the tactical opportunity to strike a devastating blow early in 2016, in a kind WWII "Kesselschlacht", the Russians finally decided against it, out of diplomatic and political considerations. If you want Assad to be able to reach out and look a reasonable enough statesman figure, you have got to leave some opposition on the ground in order to claim at least some credibility in upcoming elections.

Besides, the different factions in the Idlib to Aleppo area are so fragmented, with Jabhat al-Nusra – i.e. Al Qaeda – firmly in the driving seat, that this might still prove a very smart move, to leave opponents slug it out among themselves. Basically, another variation of the old "divide and rule". The surviving FSA groups, in particular the same Division 13 that was robbed of all its gear a week earlier, might still side with JaN when they decide it's time for yet another hopeless offensive against regime positions in South-West Aleppo, but to the civilian population as a whole, the gap is probably widening between groups wishing to come to a negotiated settlement with the Assad loyalists (not a surrender) and those "die hards" of Jihad who want to fight onto the last Syrian.

Resumption of Hostilities by JaN and Div 13

From that point of view, the resumption of hostilities both by JaN and Division 13 is likely to induce further internal strife among an opposition that is already divided, if you set aside the Saudi backed proxy groups under the influence of Jaysh al-Islam. The downing of a SyAF jet earlier today will only contribute to making the local opposition look less reliable to the international community, as well as deeply influenced by Jihadi splinter groups or affiliates of Al Qaeda central.

Maybe it’s no coincidence Al Qaeda old timer Abu Firas was taken out – with a number of fellow “Jabhat al-Nusra” and “Jund al-Aqsa” leaders – by a US airstrike, days only after the failed rebel counter-attack. There is no evidence for this of course, but the Pentagon Spokesman made it clear yesterday during his press briefing that the US considered Al Qaeda and its affiliates to be “fair game” and that Jabhat al-Nusra was in that regard pretty much “one and the same” with their head-office.

The jury is still out on the implications of such a statement, but the truth is that never before, especially not since the Russian intervention, has there been a US airstrike that far up in North-Western Syria, against a gathering of Jihadi leaders of very serious stature. Of course, there have been strikes before, targeting Al Qaeda’s controversial “Khorasan Group” on several occasions, both in 2014 and in 2015, or “Ahrar al-Sham” in 2014. But the closest strike the US have launched is near Aleppo and that was in July 2015, i.e. before the Russians upgraded and integrated the Syrian air defence system.

In other words, this strike must at least have been coordinated with the R+6, using the agreed on protocols. In my opinion, the message this sends to rebel groups in the North-West is clear: playtime is over! There’s a sheriff in town, actually two of them, and it looks like they intend to enforce the rules. Come to think of it, you might even suspect that it could have been a deliberate move to target Abu Firas and his crew through a US airstrike, so as not to give the rebels any more ground for further cease-fire breach, in case the RuAf or SyAF stepped in and started pounding Idlib countryside again. What will come out of this is uncertain, but it is more than likely that none of it will strengthen the Islamists’ case against Assad.

Assad Fighting ISIS

Another aspect which is not going to help the rebels' PR-campaign is the regime's highly successful offensive against the Islamic State. For months, even years, we have been spoon-fed the story according to which Assad and ISIS were two sides to the same coin. Worse, Assad had created ISIS and only if he left was there a chance of fixing the ISIS issue. I have always wondered how anybody in his right mind could come up with that twisted a logic and still get such a warm reception in so many parts of the world.

The Islamic State, in its present form, has been around since 2006 at least. It was born in Iraq, which still is its centre of gravity, and a large number of its most senior executives are Iraqis. The Islamic State’s expansion into Syria is as much the result of some cynical moves made by the Syrian regime (in particular the release of Islamist detainees early in 2011), as it is the end-product of sectarian politics in Iraq (where Sunnis still feel pretty much second-class citizens), US failure to properly deal with the issue when they still had the chance and Western blindness as to what was at stake in the region in general. Add to this the Saudi war by proxy against Iran, as well as neo-Ottoman thoughts of “grandeur”, and you get a highly volatile environment.

But now, that narrative of "Assad must go", combined with "Assad is not fighting ISIS" has lost a lot of traction. Probably even more so among ordinary people in Western Europe and the United States than among elites and an establishment that has been busy selling us the pipedream of a democratic and peaceful future for Syria. Sadly, there was never any chance the toppling of Assad by the opposition would end in anything else than large-scale bloodshed, death and chaos. Libya by contrast would look like a walk in the park compared to what Syria would have turned into, if the regime change crowd had had it their way. 

Victory at Palmyra

Be that as it may, nobody can deny the fact that the SAA is now the only Arab army inflicting one defeat after the other to the Caliphate's armies: the first of those, probably more symbolic than anything else at that point, was lifting the three-year siege of Kweires airbase, back in November 2015. This victory, largely underestimated by our very own armchair strategists, gave a huge boost to the morale of the SAA, and its foreign allies (Hezbollah, IRGC and Iraqi or Afghan Shia militias).

Fast-forward to March 2016 and what you see unfold is the result of the multipronged strategy implemented under Russian guidance: an international negotiation mechanism has been agreed to, with all its flaws, but it has enabled the regime to move forces from the North-West into the Centre-East of the country, putting ISIS under so much pressure that it finally crumbled first in Palmyra, and now in Qaryatayn.

Pushing the Jihadis out of Palmyra was undoubtedly the biggest of Assad’s victories so far, also from a PR point of view. There has been some debate about whether it made more sense for the SAA to go for Palmyra first, instead of Tabqa, which would have opened the road to Raqqa, the Caliphate’s capital in Syria. Overall however, the choice of an offensive towards Palmyra made much more sense: Assad managed to claim back a piece of world heritage from "the barbarians", which gave him extra press and media cover at a time he needed to boost his image during the latest round of Geneva negotiations.

Tabqa in comparison might only have gotten him 1/10 of coverage in the international media, even though it is much more important militarily, and gives quicker access to IS LOCs to and from Raqqa. So it was basically down to choosing between what made most sense militarily and what could be used best in Geneva and as PR. Also, the chances of quick military victory at Palmyra stood much better than a thrust into 40 miles of desert road that could lead to the same kind of skirmishes and ISIS raids than the Khanasser road into Aleppo.

The Way Ahead

Developments in North-Western Syria, where JaN and Div 13 of the FSA decided to go "all in" will not alter the equation fundamentally. At this point, they have become a sideshow that will not be tolerated, not by the Russians and Syrians, and not by the US either, which may come more as a surprize to JaN's backers in the region. At best they can achieve minor frontline corrections, but nothing of the scale necessary to modify the balance of power.

Obviously, their intent was to trick the R+6 into overreaction, possibly even force them to divert resources necessary in the fight against ISIS. The response they got through the strike on Abu Firas, symbolic as it may be, will send a powerful signal to anybody wishing to interfere with the current negotiation logic. Therefore, even if hostilities flare up around Idlib, the most likely COA is that they will not interefere with the main offensive against the "Islamic State".

With Qaryatayn now also firmly in the hands of the SAA, this will open the way to an offensive towards Sukhna, ISIS’ first defensive line now on the way to Deir-ez-Zor, possibly in combination with YPG and SDF coming from the North, through Shahadi (only 25 miles North of Deir-ez-Zor). The logistics involved in such a ground operation are complex however, and a step-by-step approach is the most likely scenario in this case. Getting to Deir-ez-Zor might be worth it though, as this would not only achieve another highly symbolic victory (lifting yet another epic siege), but would seriously disrupt one of the core areas of ISIS, namely the Euphrates valley, thereby cutting off their entire logistics trail.

The other tactical options for the R+6 are mainly twofold: either clear the East of Homs province, which is still pretty much in ISIS hands, as a way to securing the “Khanasser road” into Aleppo, or pushing from Ithriyah (North-East of Salamiyah, on that exact same Khanasser road) right into Tabqa through the oilfields that ISIS needs so direly now. Both actions could also be combined, depending on progress made on either axis of advance.

A Mirror Image of the 2007 Surge

Strategically, the idea at work here is at the exact opposite of what the US Surge had to achieve in 2007. Back then, one of the main objectives was to get AQI (or the ISI) out of its strongholds in Baghdad and the cities it controlled in Anbar. That was the rationale of the battle for the Baghdad belts, which turned out to be more of an ethnic cleansing operation subcontracted to local "Special Police Commandos" and various Shia militias, and the systematic (physical) suppression of Jihadi groups in a number of towns and cities in Anbar province. As a sidenote, it should be remembered that the most successful aspects of this Surge were cinetic military action performed by groups such as "Task Force 145", and not the COIN campaign based on winning over "hearts and minds" that was sold to the American public.

This is a lesson that needs to be taken into consideration in today's fight. Of course, the overall situation and circumstances are quite different, and so are their contingencies. In the absence of massive US manpower, taking back IS controlled cities takes a lot more effort and coordination. The already announced offensive on Mosul, probably some kind of counter-PR to the actual SAA offensive on Palmyra, will take months before it even reaches the outskirts of the Northern Iraqi city. As for Raqqa, it will probably be the first capital IS will lose, but here too, coordination between various groups from various coalitions will take some effort.

Thus, the most promising strategy for pushing back IS on the ground is to isolate its core areas by cutting off LOCs, thereby disrupting territorial continuity, and then organising some "quadrillage" in the areas controlled by the SAA (or the ISF for that matter). This MO seems to be working much more efficiently with the SAA, or the Kurdish YPG militias, than with the ISF, but the aim is identical: isolating the different power centres of ISIS from each other (Raqqa, Mosul, Deir-ez-Zor, etc.), grinding down their territory, and making the grip tighter and tighter around Raqqa and Mosul, until they're ripe for the final onslaught.

Comments

[Barish]

Thanks for the overview, and also for picking up on today's episode of Nusra and friends downing a warplane. I do note that it isn't even hushed up that Nusra took credit there, for both the shoot-down as well as the capture of the pilot (Gods help the poor man), and the noises made by this "Division 13" (how'd they come up with that numbering for those unicorn outfits, drawing lots?):

http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:7d2db4bd879d49dea7048d7d9f0d0094

"A spokesman for a U.S.-backed division of the Free Syrian Army accused the government of scrapping the cease-fire and undermining the Geneva talks. The group said one of its fighters was killed in the offensive against government forces in the south Aleppo countryside.

"The truce is considered over," Zakariya Qaytaz of the Division 13 brigade told AP through Twitter. "This battle is a notice to the regime."

The United States and Russia had hoped a halt in fighting would cause opposition factions to distance themselves from extremist groups such as the Nusra Front. Instead, rebel militia seem to have united in their opposition to the government.

The nationalist Division 13 brigade is now fighting alongside Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, a powerful jihadist militia that is internally divided over its association with the al-Qaida affiliate.

Qaytaz said his faction remained wary of the Nusra Front after the latter stole their weapons and expelled them from the town of Maarat al-Nouman in March.

The Nusra Front posted videos on social media showing mortars and tanks firing on what it said were government positions in the Aleppo countryside Saturday. An opposition media outlet later posted a report from inside a village said to be Tel al-Ais, with artillery sounding in the distance. Syria's state news agency acknowledged fierce clashes in the area Friday."

At least this lot isn't pretending who's throwing the ceasefire by the wayside. On the other hand, as you observed: this "Division 13" makes itself look just as bad as its jihadi brothers-in-arms with that type of action and diction. Beyond regaining Tal al-Eis from unicorn control, what could be potential goals for SAA and allies in this area?

Further, there's a couple things I wonder about in the following:

"The Islamic State’s expansion into Syria is as much the result of some cynical moves made by the Syrian regime (namely the release of some Islamist detainees early in 2011), as it is the end-product of sectarian politics in Iraq (where Sunnis still feel pretty much second-class citizens), US failure to properly deal with the issue when they still had the chance and Western blindness as to what was at stake in the region in general."

Wasn't it the case that as early as 2011, the "international community" demanded the government release "political prisoners", of whom various Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, who are very open to al-Qaida, were a significant part? A detail that said "community" would have been aware of had they cared to look into it back then. And then there is the fact that irregardless of whether they were released by the Syrian authorities, they were still fully supported by various interested parties - case in point being Zahran Alloush, the late leader of Jaish al-Islam whose group enjoys full support by al-Saud, and whose relative - a cousin? - is heading the Saudi-sponsored "High Negotiation Committee" in Geneva.

Finally, beyond Deir-Ezzor, should that be the next stop after Palmyra, how feasible would it be for SAA and allies to try and shore up Syria's border with Iraq?

[Bob]

Patrick:
Excellent analysis. Agree with all on Syria. I think you are correct about the tactical/operational relevance versus information operations value of Palmyra/Tadmur, although I expected you to note that it ceased to be strategically important after it was destroyed by the Romans in 273 AD, and generally lost any operational importance of its own after the Mongols destroyed it in 1400. I have been surprised that the Russians have been able to keep operations against the Southern Front and the flow of refugees towards Jordan at a minimum. I think people need to manage their expectations of what is possible with the YPG/SDF axis.
With respect to Iraq, I am even more pessimistic than you about possibilities for ISF operations in the near term, as it still doesn't seem to be in the interest of the current Dawa Party government or the Shia militias that make up the ISF and PMF to do so . You are being mischievious (but technically correct) in your use of the term "ethnic cleansing" in reference to the 2007 Surge operations in the Baghdad Security Belts, but will confuse those who don't know their history. However, the term is useful, as the PMF is only likely to decide to continue operations against ISIL in Anbar and Ninewah if it senses it can conduct more ethnic cleansing, and that's what the Iranians and anti-ISIL Coalition will be asked to provide fire support for.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I think that Russia also has been able to successfully maintain political discipline on Iran and Syria.

[Brunswick]

Picking a nit:

" The Islamic State’s expansion into Syria is as much the result of some cynical moves made by the Syrian regime (namely the release of some Islamist detainees early in 2011), "

After several months of protests in 2011, many prisoners managed to escape. Zahran Alloush, Abu Shadi Aboud (brother of Hassan Aboud[2]) and Ahmed Abu Issa were some of the more prominent prisoners released from the prison. They proceeded to form their own Islamist groups and take up arms against the regime upon their release. Many of them became leaders of Islamist groups in the Islamic Front such as Jaysh al-Islam, Ahrar ash-Sham and Suqour al-Sham Brigade.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sednaya_Prison

While the Syrian Observatory (later claimed 1500 prisoners were released), claims at the time said 240 prisoners were released, and at the time the prisoners release was "hailed" as a "victory" for the Protestors and was a "concession" by the Syrian Regime.

The meme that the Assad Prisoner Release "created" or "strengthened" ISIS in Syria, is persistent.

The reality is that while some of the released prisoners, ( 3) went on to found Jihadi groups, ( not ISIS), the Prisoner Release in no way aided ISIS in Syria.

The series of escapes from beseiged Syrian prisons, and the capture of Syria prisons by jihadi groups, had a far greater impact, but of course, is counter to the Borg approved propaganda.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Bob,

you're right about the "ethnic cleansing" part being a bit confusing for those who are not familiar with Baghdad during that period. I slightly edited the text accordingly, although I have to say, it must have been clear from the outset that there would be a price to pay in return for the strategy chosen for securing Baghdad, i.e. cordoning off the city from its Sunni hinterland with an extra 20 000 US troops and basically letting local "assets" mop up the countless AQI and Baathist cells.

Regarding Palmyra, the historic perspective you're giving is very interesting as I am convinced, as I wrote a while ago, that ISIS (as an organisation) will end up just like the "Assassins", who got destroyed by a large Mongol army in the 14th century. Unlike the "Assassins" though, large parts of ISIS are likely to survive and merge into something new, possibly with AQ, which is something one should be ready and plan for. This will be a very long war I'm afraid.

[bth]

Bob you say Palmyra/Tadmur isn't strategically important but isn't there a critical natural gas pipelines running from Palmyra/Tadmur westward that is necessary for western Syrian electric power plants? And isn't Palmyra/Tadmur a critical stop on any SAA movement further east especially toward the small oil fields within Syria that IS occupies and Assad must have for cash?

[Patrick Bahzad]

B,

Thx for the Wikipedia link, I'm familiar enough with Sednaya and about who was released in 2011. You're right of course on a factual basis, but I didn't say Assad created ISIS.
However, this prisoner release contributed to making things worse and pushing the country over the edge, even if the regime never anticipated things to turn this bad.

[gemini33]

Off topic: Col. Lang, any insight on why there's a huge meeting of military brass at the White House? Is this just a regular thing? Obama made some statements about defeating ISIL. There's a reorg of the joint chiefs going on. I wondered if it was anything to take special notice of.

[VietnamVet]

PB

Thanks again for your updates. They are invaluable. Today’s news is truly a conundrum.

If the moderate rebels broke the cease fire by seizing territory south of Aleppo plus the introduction of MANPADS into the conflict indicated by shooting down the Syrian fighter; the Syrian civil war has re-ignited and escalated.

America’s actions appear incomprehensible. The evacuation of dependents from the NATO ally, Turkey, indicates that the war is expected to expand north. Yet, the American airstrike against a gathering of Jihadi leaders in northwestern Syria appears to been in support of the cease fire and has to be contrary to the wishes of John McCain and Lindsay Graham, the rebels’ ardent supporters.

Whoever introduced MANPADS into the Sunni Shiite Jihad does not hold shares of Emirates, Gulf Air, or Qatar Airways. With proliferation of the anti-aircraft missiles, every airport in the region will have to have exclusionary zones around them and combat landings and takeoffs. An A380 is a huge target.

[Patrick Bahzad]

VV,

Im not sure that plane today was downed by MANPAD. conflicting reports about what happened. Wait and see.

[turcopolier]

Bob

"the tactical/operational relevance versus information operations value of Palmyra/Tadmur" So, to you the diplomatic side of the war is
"Information Operations?" pl

[KHarbaugh]

You talk about "US failure to properly deal with the issue when they still had the chance".
I am truly clueless on this issue.
Just how should the US have dealt with this issue?
Probably there is no one answer to that question, as any approach would have its plusses and minuses, winners and losers.
A "staff study" (remember those?) on the pros and cons of the various alternatives by would be of interest to me, and maybe to others :-)
If one already exists in some form that you agree with, how about a reference or link?
Thanks.

[Barish]

"If the moderate rebels broke the cease fire by seizing territory south of Aleppo plus the introduction of MANPADS into the conflict indicated by shooting down the Syrian fighter; the Syrian civil war has re-ignited and escalated."

MANPADS have been around in the Syrian insurgents' hands for a long while, as it happens:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/28/syria-middleeast

Plus, if such was used, what they hit was an old SU-22 on low altitude reconnaissance flight.

[different clue]

VietnamVet,

About our government evacuating dependents from NATO Turkey, my first assumption had been we were getting them out before they might be attacked or kidnapped by indigenous-to-Turkey bad actors . . . perhaps by clumsily disguised and implausibly deniable false flag crimes by some Erdogist-connected people.

Would that be a wrong first assumption?

[Thirdeye]

Right on cue, the State Department accuses government forces of breaching the ceasefire. No acknowledgement of the JAN/FSA assaults in southern Aleppo.

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/assads-fate-determined-syrian-people-u-s-state-department/

Stupid, stupid, stupid! With that obvious display of bad faith, the US has removed any political incentive for R+6 not to prosecute the war against JAN/FSA in any manner they see as advantageous, "ceasefire" or no.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I think there is a lot of posturing in the State Dpt at the moment: on the one hand, they can't look like they're letting down the same rebel forces they've been talking up for years. On the other, the Pentagon has made it clear that they're going after AQ and affiliates anywhere in Syria, which supposes some sort of green light from the R+6 when Us jets or drones are striking in areas covered by Russian/Syrian air defence.
The aim is clear: they don't want to let JaN highjack or sabotage the negotiation process, but they're refraining from openly criticizing remaining FSA units which participate in JaN operations.
It's probable, some help is being provided as we speak in order to put some order into the totally chaotic "FSA" scene, just as a precaution in case things get really out of hand with JaN (or in case of a failure of the negotiation process, which I consider rather unlikely though at this point).

[William R. Cumming]

Assad family mentioned in newly released Panama Papers! Implications?

[Patrick Bahzad]

KHarbaugh,
Of course there is an answer to your question. Fundamentally though, I think you should seriously wonder about the plusses of the current situation both for the US and for Syria. If you see any, please share with the rest of us !
Regarding US failure to deal with the issue, maybe you're not looking back far enough: the current conflict has deep roots and as far as the US is concerned, interference/meddling has begun even before the invasion of Iraq.
That would be a first missed opportunity: engaging Assad in 2001-2002 when he was newly in power and Syria reached out to the US after 9/11, both out of fear of being targeted in coming military operations and as an attempt to mend fences with the US. Syria engaged in a very fruitful INTEL cooperation with the US in those years and it is the ideological bias of the Neo-Cons that put an end to this. The following years were quite different on the other hand and relations worsened substantially.
But after Obama was elected, there was another missed window of opportunity again when the talks about the Golan heights seemed to be going somewhere. They didn't in the end, and therefore the US missed out on a second chance to patch things up with Syria and promote change without encouraging armed rebellion.
The third missed opportunity not to do "stupid shit" was after the Arab spring had reached Syria and the US, despite warnings by its IC, went down the path of tacit then active support for armed opposition groups which turned out to be influenced and guided by Islamist groups of various colour. There are enough Intel reports in Virginia about this to fill up a whole library. You can always start by reading the declassified DIA report of 2012 which is quite eloquent in its assessment of what was going on.
Finally, if you add Iraq (and ISIS) into the equation, there is plenty more that could have been done differently or avoided, were it not for the geopolitical blindness and open ideological agenda of at least part of the Bush and Obama administrations.

[Patrick Bahzad]

WRC,

Not sure there will be any. First of all, it was an open secret, the Makhlouf clan is not new in the Syrian business world. Second, it's up to the Syrian IRS to deal with tax evasion. Third, its Assad's family not Assad himself, so the main downfall will be in terms of image, but again, nothing there the Syrians didn't already know.
Along the same rationale, you could ask that question about David Cameron whose dad is also mentioned in the PanamaPapers. Implications for Cameron the UK ? that's up to the UK authorities ...

[pantaraxia]

Picked this up from comments section of MOA.

Syrian government refutes U.S. claims of killing top Nusra commander
https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/syrian-government-refutes-u-s-claims-killing-top-nusra-commander/

“The Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faysal Miqdad released a statement on Tuesday denying the Pentagon’s claim that the U.S. Air Force killed the prominent Jabhat Al-Nusra (Syrian Al-Qaeda group) commander “Abu Firas Al-Souri” in rural Idlib.

Miqdad added that the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF) carried out the series of airstrikes that killed the Nusra commander and 25 of his associates inside the village of Kafr Jalis.

The Pentagon took responsibility for the airstrike that killed Abu Firas Al-Souri, despite the scarcity of their airstrikes against the Al-Qaeda factions in Syria.”

Besides the obvious propaganda value of claiming the ‘kill’, why would Syria contradict U.S. claim in this specific instance when it has not done so in the past (in respect to bombing runs). Could it possibly be true?

[Patrick Bahzad]

I don't think the Pentagon would claim anything that wasn't rightfully theirs. I wouldn't say as much for the Syrian government ...
Don't forget that the Syrian government also has an interest in not making this "joint effort" look too obvious, both to some of their allies (Hezbollah and Iran in particular) and their foes or partners in the ongoing negotiations.
Finally, the Syrian government has a base of its own that is not necessarily thrilled at the idea of US jets overflying government controlled areas ...

[Mick]

One of the most smart way "moderate rebels" use to resupply ISIS is to organize some fake fighting where ISIS take control of some bases of rebels where has been stored planty of supply. They shell a little bit by artillery and fire a couple of gunshot just to lead journalist to report the fighitng between rebels and ISIS but it's just a "movie" enginered to resupply ISIS.

[Matthew]

PB: And then there is this world-class cynicism: https://twitter.com/margbrennan/status/717463235025379329

Compare this to the President's comments to Tom Friedman.

Now he cares....

[LeaNder]

"are being mischievious (but technically correct) in your use of the term "ethnic cleansing" in reference to the 2007 Surge operations in the Baghdad Security Belts, but will confuse those who don't know their history."

Bob, I only read this today, thus I cannot really judge the passage as you criticized it.

Anyway, didn't the problem start with how Iraq was managed post "Mission accomplished"? In other words, if we leave out the Machiavellian schemes behind the necessities for Operation Iraqi Freedom, would someone that 'knows his history' tell me, that I am misguided, if I assume that maybe as bad as the war itself was the handling after? Put another way, somewhat in a nutshell: That it somewhat resulted in one ethnic(?) elite being supplanted by another?

Saddam's Iraq military? That cannot have been purely ethnic. At least if I am not a really bad or selective reader.

[Bob]

bth:
Yes, you are right that there is oil/gas infrastructure in the vicinity of Palmyra/Tadmur which is important in the Economic lines of operation against ISIL. However, I was just trying to agree with Patrick's excellent analytical overview, and assess that the imact of the fall of Palmyra/Tadmur was mainly upon the Information environment, not upon the Military, Diplomatic or Economic. I think that COL Lang's most excellent point is to remind me there is an interrelationship between the Informational and Diplomatic, and possibly for Russia and other parties the impact may be greater in the Diplomatic environment.
Thanks,
Bob