SYRIA : THE FALLACIES OF THE PERCENTAGE WAR

By Patrick Bahzad

    (source: IHS Conflict Monitor)

The year 2016 has only just begun, but to the Neo-Cons, Neo-Wilsonians and other R2Pers, future developments in Syria already seem pretty certain. The only noticeable exceptions to this unanimous media landscape are the rather refreshing account given in today's Washington Post ("Russian Airstrikes are working in Syria") and another piece by the LA Times, published a couple of days ago. Other than that, the silence among the media crowd and the political establishment is quite deafening. However, as evidenced by Col. Lang’s recent pieces, all these folks string together a story that can best be described as a mixture of self-hypnosis and self-delusion. With absolutely no background in military and strategic matters, the song that is being sung is simple: the Russians will inevitably get stuck in a quagmire and the only way out will be to cooperate with the White House and State Department, on the US administration's terms of course.

This is the world we are living in: everybody is entitled to an opinion, however wrong and misguided it may be. The good thing on the other hand is that sooner or later reality will come back and bite you in the ass, when you are living in lalaland.

Things are quite simple really: the only basis – other than a partisan agenda – on which the Borgists build their opinion and outlook is the “metrics” of recent operations. Those “metrics” are about the one thing they are willing and maybe capable to understand: easily quotable figures and numbers that give the uninformed viewers a sense of certainty about the narrative they are being fed.

Borgist Story-telling

There is no need to go any further than the NYT for a soft version of the deeply flawed methodology that presides over the Borg’s analysis of military matters. You just have to “do the math”, as they say, to realize Putin is not doing very well: dozens of aircraft deployed, Russian advisers deployed with SAA frontline units, allied troops (Hezbollah, IRGC, Iraqis and Afghan militias) mobilized by the thousands and barely 1.3 % of Syrian territory having changed hands in the three months since the Russian intervention started. Worse even, ISIS bombed a civilian Russian airliner out of the skies, killing 224 people, Turkey shot down a Russian military aircraft and two Russian servicemen were killed in the incident.

No question asked about their goals, strategy and tactics, other than the same old “Putin wants to prop up Assad” and “the Russians are targeting moderate groups, supported by the US”. Nothing about the cost/benefit ratio, or the sustainability of their effort. And I'm not even talking about the strategic points the Russians have already scored. The killer-argument of course, the one that is hammered home every time a representative of the Borgist narrative is interviewed, is the territorial argument: Assad and the Russians have recovered little ground despite weeks of intensive airstrikes and the only way for Putin to alter the dynamics of the war is to get involved ever more into the conflict, thus risking “another Afghanistan”.

According to Borgist logic, the Russians will therefore come to the realization that their enterprise is futile and the US should then seize the opportunity and impose their own agenda – and that of their local allies. Watching MSM news and debates about the latest round of fighting in Syria is a bit of a strange experience, not unlike discussing a football game with some friends of yours and getting the feeling you’ve actually seen a totally different game. The linear logic that is at work here is quite surprising in the sense it is utterly non-sensical.

History as a lesson

The underlying rationale for a linear development in military matters is a farce: it is like assuming that the stocks exchange will gain or lose X % in the three months to come, just because it won or lost same X % during the previous three months. Any fund adviser giving you guidance based on such a logic should and would be fired within a minute, yet a number of talk show guests speaking about Syria have been spreading a narrative far more toxic than that of the 2008 “Sub-primes”. Basing an allegedly informed opinion about the course of a war on sole percentages of territory won or lost, casualties sustained or inflicted, is a fallacy that can have wide-ranging consequences. History is awash with examples of such falsehoods and there is usually a blood price to pay for believing and acting on such lies and misconceptions.

For a US audience, no need to look any further than Vietnam and the “body bag” logic to get an example of such dangers. US military analysts had done the math and found out the VC and NV would crumble once 300 000 of their men had been killed by US forces. Well, it turned out the 300 000 marker was not enough and the war kept going. America’s armed forces may not have lost one single major engagement, yet the North Vietnamese prevailed.

WWI provides for other similarities with the current situation in Syria. For years, the front-lines barely moved, with both sides seemingly stuck in a stalemate, until the German spring offensive of 1918. To the German high command, victory was within reach now that they could rely on the extra divisions they had brought back from the Eastern front, where Russia had capitulated in 1917, signing the humiliating Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. The Germans had done the math too. Their numerical advantage, rather than any decisive manoeuvre or strategic stroke of genius, would bring the Allies to their knees. We all know the rest …

The art of dissecting the “metrics” of war based on a mathematical basis, such as it was theorized recently by IAF Major General Ben-Israel for example, or the CIA’s Richard Heuer, may have an added value, there is no doubt about that. This quantity over quality approach however does not tell the whole story and it is only valid if seen in relation to other indicators. Comparative studies, prospective analysis, risk assessments as well as solid foundations in strategic thinking and knowledge should always be taken into consideration as well.

A comparative analysis

Despite all the claims made by the proponents of the Borg, they have told us very little about the actual operations currently undertaken by the R+6 in Syria. What these armchair analysts (I dare not use the word “strategists”) are missing, is that the Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict already has changed the course of the war, at relatively low costs, contrary to the anti-ISIS strategy of the White House. Indeed, applying the same “metric” analysis to the “degrade and destroy ISIS” would make for a sobering account.

Fifteen months of airstrikes by the US led Coalition and Baghdadi’s “Caliphate” has barely lost any ground. True, Ramadi was reclaimed by the Iraqi army recently, in a very publicized effort, but the town was basically reduced to a pile of rubble. Ramadi is a sort of Iraqi equivalent to Kobane, the Kurdish town that US airstrikes saved from Baghdadi’s Jihadis. Going to Kobane and having a look at the result of that “great” victory against the throat-cutters brings backs memories of Ben Tre: “we had to destroy it to save it”. The same goes basically for Ramadi.

Besides, the ongoing campaign against the “Islamic State” has already cost the US taxpayers some 5.5 billion dollars and the return on investment doesn’t look great so far. Talk about a winning strategy ! Lecturing the Russians about their failing campaign sounds actually quite ironic in that context. You might as well have a look at genuinely interesting “metrics” and realize Putin is all but failing in Syria. How many Russian casualties ? Well, if you exclude the Russian airliner from the equation, almost none. To the contrary, public opinion stands united behind its strongman President. And there are roughly 5000 Russian troops in Syria, which can hardly be considered a major deployment. 

The Counterfactual

And yet, the shock wave this deployment has sent through the Beltway still has some hysterics shaking in their boots. In the three months since they launched their air campaign, at a cost of under one billion dollars per year, the Russians have not just stabilised Assad and made sure no military victory is possible any more for the rebels. They have also boosted Russia's image as a major power, at the cost of antagonizing the Saudis and to a lesser degree Turkey (even if it seems the opposite in the short run), but they have also designed a global strategy that encompasses military, diplomatic/political and economic aspects. They have local allies on the ground, something the US can only dream about in that magnitude. And they are implementing a battle-plan that is not relying on yet another revisited version of COIN, but on the hard edge of conventional military combat and manoeuver in the Soviet style.

This is the counterfactual the Borg is ignoring. They're blabbering about the (non)-achievements of the Russian intervention, but they are forgetting what might have happened without it. For one thing, the long awaited offensive of the "Southern Front" never took place and, as a matter of fact, the moderates in the South are basically dead in the water. Those still coordinating with Jordan have been called back, the rest are on their own. And things don't look particularly good for them, even less so now that their most charismatic leader, Zahran Alloush (from the "Jaysh al-Islam" coalition) was killed in a Russian airstrike.

We'll get more into the operational details of the current fighting in the next SITREP, but anybody following SST in recent days must have realized that the rebels are not exactly gaining ground on any of the battles currently taking place. They may be able to stage small "offensives", more like company sized counter-attacks in areas that have not been cleared yet, but their ability to conduct joint operations, exercising effective command and control over large troops has deteriorated beyond anything the Beltway experts are willing to hear.

Formerly staunch allies of the US have entered deals with the Russians (Jordan for example), anti-Assad groups trained and supported by US forces are negotiating with the regime and Russian emissaries (the Kurdish YPG) and some rebel groups, only a handful so far I'll give you that, have actually sided with the Russians. Putting this in context with a diplomatic timetable that is very favourable to the Russian and Syrian agenda, and you get a counterfactual that is all but the one described day in day out in the main news outlets.  

A couple of Strategic Pointers

There is however mounting concern, especially among those who have at least an ounce of common sense left, about the likelihood of a decisive battle in the North-Western corner of Syria. This is the area where most of the so-called "moderate" rebels have their bases, and if military logic prevails, there will not be much left of them in a couple of months, based not on some vague metrics but on the principles of war.

That is the beauty of military strategy. There is nothing linear about it. One day you may find yourself in a favourable spot, the next day you're in a stalemate, and if you're not careful enough, or don't have the means to prevent it, that stalemate can be turned into strategic disaster once a situation you considered given and permanent starts to vanish into thin air. When you reach such a "breaking point", which was the topic of my previous piece, there is no way back. You may realize what is going on but it is too late to prevent the outcome, regardless of any of "metrics" and percentages.

Comments

[Babak Makkinejad]

PB:

What do French news sources report?

To your point about quantity over quality - critical comments of Rene Guenon apply:

"Regne de la quantite et les signes des temps"

[b]

"For one thing, the long awaited offensive of the "Southern Front" never took place and, as a matter of fact, the moderates in the South are basically dead in the water."

A campaign took place, the Southern Storm, and it was target directly at Daraa and failed. The Operation Center in Jordan was upset because they had rejected an attack on Daraa and had preferred an attack on the supply line to Daraa. That led to a temporary end of support.

But there is now a new show going on:

https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566514-daraa-rebels-ordered-to-stop-fighting-syria-regime-report
"The Amman-based Military Operations Center (MOC) directed Southern Front factions to focus their efforts against Al-Nusra Front."

These people were promised new weapons and resources to exclusively attack Nusra and ISIS.

Indeed in this recent music video(!) of the Southern Front lots of fresh weapons can be seen including tanks and TOWs.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLO4IFFbFEI

Here is the problem: In the past the Southern Front "leaked" a lot of weapons to Nusra and to IS. The people simply sell the stuff they get to the highest bidder. This weapon load is likely to also end up with Nusra instead of being used against it.

Even some neo-cons find this weaponizing of Nusra through the backdoor that has been going with U.S. knowledge for years a bit concerning.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/01/19/the-cia-s-syria-program-and-the-perils-of-proxies.html

"With the CIA doubling down on its support for Syrian rebels, it is now more important than ever to have a candid and vigorous public debate about the agency’s program. Put simply, such an about-face in U.S. policy—backing groups that help al Qaeda to make advances, after spending a decade and a half fighting the jihadist group—should not occur without a public debate that helps Americans understand why such drastic changes in U.S. policy have occurred."

[Matthew]

Patrick: This will be the last stand. See https://twitter.com/KenRoth/status/689719257874206721

As the rebels collapse, expect to hear of an "emergency" need to protect "civilians" in rebel areas. And by civilians, I mean women, children, and armed rebels.

We will be told that we "failed" Syria just like we "failed" Rwanda.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Agree with your points.

Southern Storm was part of what was in stock in the south. Rebels in the South wanted to do as their counterparts and take a large city (and basically a border=post), just as had been done earlier in Idlib, Jisr=al=Shugourand Sukhna.

The Jordanians anyway are way past the "Southern Front" and won't agree to anything they're not comfortable with. AQ is way too close to home in their mind.

Regarding that video, I don't think it is very recent. If you've been to Jordan recently, you'll knwo they are very touchy about anything crossing into or out of Jordan.

[Jack]

Mr.Bahzad

Thanks for your continued most informative analysis.

In your opinion what can the jihadists do militarily to counter the steady strangulation and destruction by R+6 forces? How do you see the clashes in Deir Ezzor in the larger perspective of military operations?

One thing that has surprised me from my limited viewing of the videos from the battle fronts is the extent of small arms close combat in built up areas. I would have expected the Russians to introduce much more quantity of heavy artillery weapons to assist R+6 frontline forces.

[turcopolier]

PB et al

"That is the beauty of military strategy and logic. There is nothing linear about it." Ainsi soit-il. I lived through the whiz-kid era in the 60's and early seventies when MacNamara and his obnoxious creatures infested the Pentagon. This "Operations research/systems analysis" (ORSA) crowd were, IMO largely responsible for our strategic loss in VN. They were absolutely sure that men meant nothing and math meant everything. They made all kinds of judgments that simply ignored the truth that war is a human social process. You are correct. The ORSA geniuses made a big study in 1965 and decided that NVN would throw in the towel in 1967. People who have not experienced war close up should not be taken seriously when they prognosticate about it. "Grinding" continues. The rout is coming. pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

absolutely and then the NFZ and "humanitarian intervention" crowd will raise their voices again ... to no avail, unless the Russians see an adavantage in it.

[walrus]

Matthew, the "emergency" need to protect women and children is already trumpeting. Here is the URL of a serial writer about "starving children", I won't post any of the stories, they are all the same. You can read them here:

http://www.abc.net.au/news/sophie-mcneill/4516794

Following up on some of the names quoted leads you straight into academic R2P land.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roy_Gutman

http://www.hrea.org/programs/human-rights-teaching/

[Patrick Bahzad]

BM,

Indeed René Guénon was ahead of his time !

French sources haven't been any better for a long long time. There had been a slight change following the January attacks in Paris and this has been amplified now with the November 13 events.
French foreign policy has already toned down its anti-Assad rethoric, but they want to do it step by step so as not to look like the turn coats they are.

[Matthew]

Turks to the rescue. See http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160120/1033456296/turkey-jarablus.html

What comes next?

[Patrick Bahzad]

They can try and cling onto as much border areas as they can, so as not to be cut off their logistical bases in Turkey. They can try and retreat into Turkey and stage operations from there (meaning they would become factually Turkish proxies) or they can try bridge the gap with ISIS, and some of them definitely will, and join ranks with Baghdadi's troops in the Syrian desert.

Deir ez Zor is a sideshow, the only area where ISIS is currently able to launch a significant counter=attack and try and "conquer" a new city, making up for the severe losses they've taken recently. I don't think Deir ez Zor will fall though.

Regarding Urban combat, as previously stated, it is not a priority currently for the R+6. They want to defeat the rebels in the depth of their territory and avoid long, and publicized sieges.

[walrus]

Col. Lang, the "Game Theory" academics who currently infest economics and politics are just as bad as the previous operations research fools.

[kao_hsien_chih]

Many of these people say that they are using numbers and "statistics," but they ignore the fundamental principle of statistics: every statistic is "wrong." The beauty of quantification is that you can evaluate how "wrong" your numbers are and plan accordingly. The problem is that if your argument is predicated on your supposedly "unique" understanding of the truth, you can't say that your numbers are "wrong." Thus continues the bastardization and abuse of statistics, in the name of statistics.

[SmoothieX12]

Not all "previous" operation research was in vain. I do agree, however, with your statement on present day "Game Theory" academics.

[turcopolier]

SmoothieX12

Baloney! Tell me what beside the antisubmarine battle of the Atlantic was seriously affected by this nonsense. pl

[SmoothieX12]

I read OEG's 51st Report. Post-war, a superb systematization of naval warfare issues. Modern navies grow from that. From ASW to search theory. Effectiveness criteria, which is usually a probability, is impossible to ignore when planning. Tactical and Operational Manuals are written based on both practical (combat) and theoretical (said operations research)findings. In the end, it is not only that, it is training of the staff level officer to operate within non-linear (and chaotic) environments. And then, there is an issue of calculating a required force (in Russian it is Naryad Sil) and it was done as early as 1930s, based precisely on the methods which are OR, in essence.

[mbrenner]

Do I recall correctly that Stalingrad represented less than 0,6 % of the Soviet Union's territory?

[Patrick Bahzad]

Operational and tactical manuals should be based on principles of warfare, not on modelisation of theoretical constructs.
The human factor, which is hard to bring down to figures and numbers, trumps most other !

[SmoothieX12]

every statistic is "wrong."

If that were true, Nazi Germany should have won WW II. We also wouldn't have aerospace and automotive industry, among many other things. Denying the obvious statistical fact that life expectancy grew massively in last few decades sounds a bit too far fetched to me.

[SmoothieX12]

Operational and tactical manuals (including combat manuals) ARE based on principles of warfare. I never encountered one not based on those.

[turcopolier]

SmoothieX12

Ah, you are a navy guy. That explains it. your thing is about operating large complex machines. I can see how you would be wedded to such things as OR. Humanity plays less and less of a role in maritime warfare. pl

[Dubhaltach]

In reply to walrus 20 January 2016 at 03:26 PM

And then there are the ravening hordes of MBAs and the institutions that spawn them ... ... ...

Not saying a good grasp of for example accounting or marketing isn't a damned useful thing to have but to think that any syllabus automatically makes you an expert manager is the route to that vice that the KJV warns us about:

"Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall." http://tinyurl.com/jfr8jq3

I do agree with the economists in one respect which is that when these people wreck the firms that employ them (micro economics) that the economy and society as a whole suffer (macro economics). If you're ever in need of some schadenfreude you could try mentioning to an economist or (God help us all) a business operations analyst that perhaps they should study what happened to phrenology and sit back and watch the show as they fume and boil and rant and rave and demand that all heretics be burnt.

Apparently "There Is No Alternative" - now where did I hear that one before ?

[walter]

Much appreciations to all, this is fascinating. Can someone please clarify Turkey's recent publicized military involvement described in Stratfor article and others cited here whereby it appears they are going after ISIS militarily, but harboring/helping "jihadists" on their side of the border and in ways described here at this website extesively over that last months...it is confusing as to what there motives/goals are

[Patrick Bahzad]

SmoothieX12,

Sounds like you're quite the expert in field manuals. Better stick to them then. Just don't forget to tell the enemy he's got to stick to your books as well !

By the way, what was FM 3/24 if not a construct based on misguided theories designed some 40 years earlier ? Any insights into that ?

[SmoothieX12]

I had some runs with the ground too. And I don't mean running aground.