SYRIA SITREP: What now ?

By Patrick BAHZAD

It has been a little over two months now since Russia started its air campaign in Syria. An already complex equation on the ground, this game-changing move was further complicated by events having taken place over recent weeks in the larger Middle-East and in Europe. While it is now more difficult to forecast the timeline of possible military developments, a few conclusions can nonetheless be taken away from the latest round of fighting in Syria.

More than anything else, what is striking about the last month is the number of factors that have come to play an additional role in what was already a very entangled situation. In that regard, one of the most interesting events from an information point of view is Western media reports and analysis regarding the downing of the Russian airliner over the Sinai Peninsula, in late October. There is quite a paradox in the MSM's reactions to this terrorist attack, which killed 224 innocent people.

The Russian airstrikes

On the one hand, we were told for over a month that the Russian airstrikes were not intended at degrading ISIS, but at bolstering Assad's grip on power and at destroying Western backed "moderate rebels", an expression now so widely used it can mean almost anything bare ISIS itself. Statistically, it is true that most of the Russians strikes hit rebels in the Aleppo, Idlib and Hama area, meaning rebels not affiliated with ISIS. However, some 10 % of these strikes were directed at ISIS positions in the first five weeks of the Russian airstrikes, then some 20 % in the following month, bringing the average ratio of Russian anti-ISIS strikes to somewhere around 15 %.

Admittedly, not an overwhelming figure, but these 15 % are far in excess of anything the Western and GCC coalition has done in the same period. The decision to target ISIS' fleet of tanker trucks in particular implies a Russian strategy that is more comprehensive, in terms of targeting the finances of the "Caliphate" as well as its Turkish connection, than anything the Obama administration or other Western governments have come up with so far.

In the past eight weeks or so, more than 1 000 trucks were destroyed that way, out of a fleet that totals roughly 8000 vehicles. This is far from being insignificant and any truck owner or driver moving to and from the "Islamic State" will have gotten the message loud and clear.

"Tahrir" and "Takbir"

Not much of this has made the headlines in the MSM though, quite the opposite. It is the continuous criticism about so-called "moderates" bearing the brunt of the Russian strikes that has been a recurring theme in most of the big news outlets in the US and Western Europe. The fact these moderates include outfits that are barely any better than ISIS, basically sharing the same ideology and performing similar atrocities on the ground, doesn't seem to stand in the way of the Putin bashers.

In truth, there is one common denominator all rebel groups share basically and it can be summed up with two expressions: 'Tahrir' (freedom … from Assad obviously), and 'Takbir' (the Arabic term for the expression "Allāhu Akbar", meaning they want a State ruled by the laws of Islam). Democracy is not part of the deal and it is no coincidence that the initial rag tag army of anti-Assad rebels was called the "Free Syrian Army" not the "Democratic Syrian Army", or the "Free Democratic Syrian Army". Freudian slips happen in the Arab world as much as in the West ...

Be that as it may, the loudest critics of the Russians' involvement in the conflict hardly managed to hide a satisfactory smile when news were confirmed that ISIS had downed the Russian airliner over the Sinai. The same commentators and pundits who had been arguing only days before that Putin was not targeting ISIS were now claiming that Putin was "cashing in" on his reckless and irresponsible policy in Syria.

 Downing of Russian Airliner Reveals Western Schizophrenia

The obvious contradiction in acknowledging an ISIS terror attack on the one hand, and denying Russia's action against the "Islamic State" on the other, did not seem to bother many, as long as Vladimir Putin's strategy seemed to take a serious hit. That contradiction however is pretty straight forward: why would ISIS take out a Russian airliner, were it not for Russia's aggressive military action in Syria ? Statements made out of Raqqa and Mosul, both in Arabic and in Russian, confirmed that Abubakr al-Baghdadi's troops did not share the MSM's view about the focus of the Russian airstrikes.

Schizophrenia has taken over so much, that even AQ's franchise "Jabhat al-Nusra" is now being considered a potential partner in the anti-ISIS fight on the ground. However, the latest ISIS inspired shooting in San Bernardino and the alleged connections between one of the shooters and terror suspects close to "Jabhat al-Nusra" may temporarily change that equation again, which would probably be for the best.

Contradictory and disingenuous narratives did not stop with the downing of the airliner though. Some two weeks later, Paris was hit as well by a bunch of fanatic cowards. This time however – and rightly so – nobody blamed France or its President, François Hollande, for the Jihadis' retaliation at what they considered targeted strikes by the French air force in Iraq and Syria. The Paris attacks of November 13th were definitely an event of much further reaching consequences than the downing of the Russian plane, despite the number of civilian casualties being smaller.

Paris Attacks as Catalyst for a Broader Alliance

Indeed, what had been up to that date a dual effort by a Western coalition "containing" ISIS, and a Russian led alliance fighting ISIS and other Jihadi groups, now increasingly looked in need of broader cooperation and coordination. Perfectly aware of their own military shortcomings and limited capabilities, the French authorities embarked on a grand diplomatic tour, whose major aim was to reach some sort of agreement with Moscow and the "R+6". There were limits to those efforts though: France couldn't risk jeopardizing its privileged relation with the US for a "rapprochement" with Russia, nor could it put lucrative dealings with the Gulf States at risk.

The U-turn in French foreign policy thus came very gradually, but it has now been completed, at least on the diplomatic front: Assad's ouster, a long time demand by the French foreign policy establishment, was dropped and the French foreign minister – a man on his way out – publicly admitted that Assad could stay until the end of a transitional phase, for which no formal arrangements have been made yet.

While the French did not manage to bring together the US and Russia, as could be expected, they nevertheless agreed with both these partners on a series of measures likely to increase the pressure on the "Islamic State". The French move also caused some rethinking in Washington: the word in town was about intensifying efforts to "roll back" ISIS, instead of just containing it. Needless to say, these efforts also aim at preventing the Russians from getting more of a foothold in Iraq or with Kurdish groups, up until now a client State or allies of the US.

 Dubious Turkish Policies

As if the downing of the Russian airliner and the Paris attacks were not enough, a third unexpected event of major international consequence took place at the end of November. Of course, the suicide bombings that rocked South Beirut the day before Paris hardly count in that regard, but it may be worth mentioning that four ISIS suicide bombers were sent to blow themselves up in the 'Bourj el-Barajneh' suburb of the Lebanese capital. In 'expert' language, that means they were sent to a Hezbollah stronghold … Maybe, true even, but they killed 42 innocent civilians nonetheless.

In the grand-game of international politics however, 42 human lifes in South Beirut don't count for much really, and with this thought in mind we shall turn to the truly capital event that took place while French President François Hollande was in the middle of his PR-tour to Washington and Moscow. Is it a coincidence that two Turkish fighter jets shot down a Russian bomber over a 12 second incursion in Turkish airspace during that same period ? I'm not a fan of conspiracy theories and there are plenty of reasons that could explain the Turks' reckless action over an (almost) non-existent incursion. But if someone had wanted to sabotage the French diplomatic offensive, they could not have come up with a better plan.

We may never know what happened exactly over the Turkish-Syrian border. The Russian bomber may or may not have entered Turkish airspace. What is obvious however, is that this incident was not caused by some border violation. I already mentioned the possible intent at sabotaging a larger understanding between the West and the Russians, which would have been a serious threat to Turkey's President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. What is beyond doubt though is that this incident highlighted Ankara's very dubious role as a direct actor and unreliable ally in the ongoing conflict in Syria.

Contrary to the expected outcome of this act of war (which caused the death of two Russian servicemen), Russian actions will probably be affected in a way defying the whole purpose of the Turkish provocation. Edogan and Co. may have thought they could soften Putin's stance on Turkmen Islamist militias in North-Western Syria, dragging NATO into a potentially direct confrontation with Russia, but their miscalculation in this instance might cost them dearly in the end.

Major Developments on the Ground

If anything, the incident pushed the Russians into intensifying operations over Turkmen areas and bringing in additional aircraft and troops into Syria. What also came to light through this whole episode is Turkey's double standards and hypocrisy when it comes to fighting ISIS. It is now more or less obvious to anyone that the Turkish government is stirring up things on the Syrian side of the border and that the "Islamic State" is a distant second to bringing down Assad and taking apart the YPG/PKK militias that are growing in strength South of the border.

The end-result of these three separate yet linked events – the downing of the Russian airliner, the Paris terror attacks and the border incident over Turkish airspace – is that the situation on the ground has become even more difficult to assess, as intentions and means implemented by a growing number of parties play a role in the development of the conflict. The dynamics of the war can still be assessed from a strictly military point of view, but their outcome may depend more upon diplomatic and political efforts by both sides (meaning the Western coalition and the "R+6").

But as always, the determining element in any negotiation of that kind is the balance of (military) power on the ground and that is also the reason why an analysis of the sole military aspects is warranted. Over the last few weeks, military action has continued at an undiminished rate. The initiative in NW Syria still is with R+6 troops, despite their territorial gains remaining limited so far. What is apparent is that the Russian high command is gearing towards a decisive battle in the area of Idlib and Aleppo, which would break the rebels' back temporarily, thus providing Assad and his allies with a strong position at the bargaining table.

The push into southern Aleppo countryside is continuing, the aim being to cut off the rebels' supply line into Idlib. Interdicting this LOC could happen in several places, most likely along the M4 South of Aleppo, but also possibly North of the city, where SAA troops might try to join up with the Shia enclave of Zahra and Nubl. Further complicating the situation for the non-ISIS rebels, the "Islamic State" has also been trying to cut off this LOC lately, with a thrust further North still, towards Tall Rifaat, the objective there being possibly to control the border crossing of Azaz as well as adjacent territories.

Battle in the Mountains

Another border area that has been the scene of serious fighting is the Jabbal Turkman and Jabbal Akrad, North-East of Latakia, which is of vital importance both to the Syrian regime and its Russian allies on the one hand, but also to various rebel groups on the other. For the Syrian regime, taking back these wooded mountains would secure the Allawi coastal heartland around Latakia. For other reasons, namely preventing any rebel counter-attack against the increasingly present Russian expeditionary force in the region, Moscow is also interested in pushing back the frontline. Beyond these defensive goals, there is a strategic aspect to this battle as well: taking back the border-area would further cut off the rebels from their rear-bases in Turkey, and dry up their supply in weapons and fighters coming through this porous border.

Of course, from the rebels point of view, the objective is the exact opposite and the battle has become truly vital to them, insofar as the "Islamic Emirate of Idlib" is coming under increasing pressure. With the R+6 closing in from the North-East (Aleppo) and with their operations gaining momentum in the mountains to South West, rebel groups find themselves in a position where they could lose any strategic depth. This, in turn, would seriously threaten their stronghold in that part of the country.

As always when a pond gets smaller, bigger fish starts eating up the smaller one … First signs of such developments have materialized in the area between Idlib and Aleppo, as well further North, closer to the Turkish border. Competition for resources (in this case weapons, ammunition and fighters) or territory (guaranteeing access to the logistical bases in Turkey) has begun. There is no sense of panic yet among the rebels in those areas, but gun battles between factions opposing a common enemy surely are no good sign.

Palmyra and the "Southern Front"

In addition to the main theatre of operation in the North-West of Syria, where the battle will be decided, two more areas have seen serious action in the last few weeks. The "clearing" of rebel pockets all along the Southern front has continued, although at a slower pace. The agreement passed with Jordan is probably the most likely explanation for the relative quiet in that area. The only truly "moderate" rebel groups have been summoned back to their bases South of the border.

Those who remained to keep fighting the SAA – that is mostly splintered FSA units which sided with the Islamic "Jaish al-Islam" – are not in a very good position, but have been lucky so far that the current campaign is fought mostly in the North. Foreign sponsors of "Jaish al-Islam" have been pushing for a larger coalition with the hardcore of "Jaish al-Fatah" (meaning mostly "Jabhat al-Nusra", "Ahrar al-sham" and a few smaller groups), but questions remain in terms of operational command of such a new coalition, making this prospect rather unlikely in the short run.

Quite recently, the R+6 has opened a new "front" when it pushed towards Palmyra, both for military and PR reasons. Strategically, the desert town is not vital to the regime. But it is ISIS' closest position to the capital Damascus, and the cultural and archeological heritage at Palmyra – what's left of it, now that the "Islamic State" has blown ancient buildings to bits – would certainly make for good publicity for Assad and the Russians, should they manage to conquer it back. The fighting at Palmyra is also supposed to emphasize the R+6 commitment at confronting ISIS and thus at undermining the Western narrative, which keeps focusing on the offensive against so called "moderates" only.

"Island Hopping" for Air Bases in the Desert

Without doubt, the most interesting development both tactically and strategically has been the R+6 push for control of a larger number of air bases located in various parts of Syria. The battle for Kuweires has been over for several days already, and the siege was lifted – as had been forecast on SST – but this is not the only instance in which control of joint air bases/forward operating bases has taken place.

Kuweires is not operational yet. The perimeter around it is still in the process of being secured. When this is done however, the Syrian air force will probably resume operations there. Similar efforts are underway in two, possibly three other places, which would give the R+6 strategically important bases from which to launch airstrikes and provide close air support to ground troops:

• South-East of Homs, "Shayrat" airbase will host a large Russian fleet, together with the necessary personnel to secure and maintain it,
• further East still, en route to Palmyra,"T4-Tiyas" airbase will be used by the Iranian airforce.

Meanwhile Deir ez-Zor and Qamishli, two isolated government enclaves deep in ISIS territory also have fully functional airfields that could be used if security was provided for. While it is too early to precisely assess R+6 intentions with the push for these bases, it is already clear that the air campaign is going to be intensified.

Russia has vowed to deploy up to a hundred additional aircraft and, in such a scenario, the various airbases will be used as launchpads against rebels in the NW of the country (Jableh, Shayrat, Kuweires), while others might be tasked with sorties against ISIS targets (Shayrat, Qamishli and possibly Kuweires again).

Move for a Decisive Battle

So far, air force and artillery have proven to be insufficient to tip the balance in favour of the R+6, even though they keep the momentum and are the only side achieving at least some sort of gains on the ground. While time is not on the rebels side, the R+6 will be keen to reach their strategic objectives by mid-March 2016 at the latest, possibly earlier.

They are still on track as far as the NW of Syria is concerned, but they will need to increase the operational tempo of their offensive and go for a "decisive battle", which the rebels would be likely to try and avoid. Considering the current configuration of the battle field, the best the SAA and its allies might be able to achieve is to continue grinding down rebel defences, cut off supply lines of the non-ISIS groups and break them in a large pincher move, that will close down on "Jabhat al Nusra", "Ahrar al Sham" and others around Idlib.

In such a scenario, fighting ISIS comes a distant second, at least for now, but contacts established with Kurdish militias, both in the North-East (Qamishli-Hazakah corridor) and in the North-West (Afrin pocket) show that there is also some longer term thinking behind the current operational pace. Most likely, ISIS would be allowed to prevail in the Eastern desert, making it a problem not so much for whoever is in the charge of Syria's central and coastal areas, but for the Iraqi government and for the US-led coalition.

Comments

[Babak Makkinejad]

Patrick Behzad:

In case you did not know -

http://www.fardanews.com/fa/news/471084/4-روستای-جنوب-حلب-که-امروز-آزاد-شدتصاویر

[bell]

the western msm lost all legitimacy - a long time ago.. anyone who uses it to follow events will lose sight of the story line very quickly... if you want a good dose of propaganda - follow it.. the fact ISIS downed the russian plane speaks clearly enough on how russia has been infinitely more effective at going after ISIS then the usa or the west at any point in this... what is especially interesting is seeing turkey's close association with ISIS as well, thanks their actions in all of this..

the ''moderate'' term was a con from the get go.. western gov'ts thanks the msm have used it to help further an agenda of regime change set in motion a long time ago.. their indirect support for ISIS is seen in the continued sale of oil and funding for 'moderates' who in turn pay heed to the top dog getting the green light to continue on with the agenda - ISIS.. the west looks very bad in all of this to any observer who hasn't been indoctrinated by the western msm..

[Patrick Bahzad]

BM,

Thx, had heard some news to that effect. Guess this is confirmation of what is coming ...

[johnf]

Thank you very much Patrick for a superb Sit Rep and for all the work you must have put into it. It has given me, and I'm sure all of us, a much clearer picture of what is actually happening - as opposed to what we are told is happening.

johnf

[BostonB]

Report: In 18 months, number of foreign fighters in Syria, Iraq doubled

http://theweek.com/speedreads/592906/report-18-months-number-foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-doubled

The Soufan Group, an international consultancy firm based in New York, used UN data, figures from official government estimates, and academic resources to come up with their findings. In June 2014, 12,000 foreign fighters in the region were identified, and now, there are 27,000 to 31,000 from 86 different countries.

Tunisia has the largest number of recruits, about 6,000, followed by Saudi Arabia with 2,500; Russia with 2,400; Turkey with 2,100; and Jordan with 2,000, Newsweek reports. About 120 fighters left the U.S. to fight in Syria and Iraq, the report says, and 40 have returned.

[bth]

Patrick thank you for the excellent analysis.
A couple of follow-on questions.
- Do you think Turkey will move troops into Syria like it has in northern Iraq?
- How would Putin and Obama react if Trump reached out to Putin on Syria? To me this would seem like a natural Trump-ism that would feed his ego and also point out the ridiculous contradictory policies of the Administration with regard to IS.
- Is/can the Euphrates in Syria near the Turkish border be a natural barrier if the bridges are blown from the air?
- What is the significance of March 2016?
- Does Iran actually have an Air Force capable of operating in Syria? Your post was first I had heard of it.
- I think there is a critical natural gas pipeline running out to Palmyra needed to supply electrical utilities in western Syria. This might explain the current effort by SAA.

[Barish]

One minor thing:

"Meanwhile Deir ez-Zor and Qamishli, two isolated government enclaves deep in ISIS territory also have fully functional airfields that could be used if security was provided for."

Qamishly is located right on the border with Turkey, deep behind YPG-held lines as far as I understand. Given its direct proximity to Turkey and Turkish mischief shown for all to see when they shot the SU-24, wouldn't that locale be at a somewhat high risk of further such actions by Turkey?

Other than that, may one enquire what the KSA-badge posted by BM is about?

[J]

Today Russia launched missile (NATO SS-N-27A'Sizzler') strikes from their Rostov-on-Don Kilo Class sub stationed in the Med.

[Patrick Bahzad]

True about Qamishli. I didn't want to over complicate the geographical data. It is still deep behind ISIS lines if you will. There is an attempt at opening up the corridor between Qamishli and Hasakah, which could serve as an LOC for ground troops landing at Qamishli and moving into ISIS territory further south. That may be the idea behind the reinforcing of Qamishli airport.
Regarding the Turkish reaction, to be honest I don't expect them to do or try anything stupid: if ther airport was used by R+6 aircraft, they wpuld get powerful AA capabilities that would deter any Turkish interfence.
Additionally, Qamishli has been used regularly to fly in militias loyal to Assad into other areas where fighting against rebels occurred.

[Patrick Bahzad]

You're welcome !

[Patrick Bahzad]

My take on your questions:
- no
- don't think Trump would do that, but I'm not an expert in domestic US politics
- depends on the season and how much water is retained upstream
- March 2016 because of diplomatic timeline and scheduled elections in syria, additionally it's start of sand storms in eastern desert, making ground operations difficult in that period
- yes they have, of course, all depends what they are using it for. Against ISIS they can certainly do some serious damage
- true, energy might also play its part in this push.

[Akira]

Colonel Cassad on Syria:

https://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=search&rurl=translate.google.com&sl=ru&u=http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2513343.html&usg=ALkJrhhQb-myNW2fQIsvoy1djxEewF4qGw">http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2513343.html&usg=ALkJrhhQb-myNW2fQIsvoy1djxEewF4qGw">https://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=en&prev=search&rurl=translate.google.com&sl=ru&u=http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2513343.html&usg=ALkJrhhQb-myNW2fQIsvoy1djxEewF4qGw

Pierre Sprey on the Turkish ambush:

http://harpers.org/blog/2015/12/mountain-ambush/

[William R. Cumming]

Thanks Patrick for you skilled and comprehensive review!

[Mark Gaughan]

Patrick, thanks.

[cynic]

When the 'green' terrorists in the west of Syria have been defeated, might Syria and Russia return the favour in Turkey by supporting more Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turkey?

[pj]

In regards to 'regime change set in motion long ago' -

http://www.truth-out.org/progressivepicks/item/33180-wikileaks-reveals-how-the-us-aggressively-pursued-regime-change-in-syria-igniting-a-bloodbath

[Babak Makkinejad]

I am distressed to see Turks joining ISIS.

That is the last best hope of Sunni Muslims, if a significant population there become Jihadi then all of us would be in very serious trouble indeed.

I wonder how long the Tunisian Experiment with "Democracy" will last; there is quite a cause for concern if Jihadist - wrapping themselves in the Mantle of True Authentic Islam - succeed in destroying that experiment.

(Very likely in my opinion.)

[bell]

patrick - thanks for the analysis.. i got so caught up in the first few paragraphs of your post, that i neglected to mention i appreciate your sharing your viewpoint here. it's a good overview and i appreciate it.. if i would say one more thing is that the turkish downing in the 12 or 17 second window of time had to have the support of the usa.. turkey wouldn't have done this on it's own.. what was interesting to me was how quickly the usa/obama came out in support of turkey having a right to protect it's territory - which coincidentally is really noticeably absent with turkeys being called up on the carpet by iraq in the past day... where is the usa in pointing any of this? absent of course! the hypocrisy is a bit more glaring then usual here..

[Jack]

Mr. Bahzad

Thank you very much for your comprehensive and information packed report.

On the military front:

1. From where are the rebels/JAN being supplied? It seems that they are slowly being surrounded by Syrian government forces.

2. There seems to be a small pocket south of Homs completely surrounded. How long can they survive?

3. Why should the R+6 care about ISIS in the short term, when they can really focus on rebel/JAN held areas closer to their areas of strength?

4. Can R+6 militarily rout the rebel/JAN in the next 6 months?

On the political front:

1. Do you think Putin will sellout Assad if the US/EU/Saudi/Turkey insist no political deal unless Assad goes?

2. How do you think US/EU group will react to increasing military assets of R+6 in Syria?

[Ishmael Zechariah]

PB,
Thanks for the analysis. You say: "Erdogan and Co. may have thought they could soften Putin's stance on Turkmen Islamist militias in North-Western Syria, dragging NATO into a potentially direct confrontation with the Russians, but their miscalculation in this instance might cost them dearly in the end."
From your pen to God's ears.
Ishmael Zechariah
P.s: https://latuffcartoons.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/erdogan-rethoric-israel-gaza-kurdish-oil.gif/

[different clue]

Cynic, If Putin is indeed doing all this at least in part out of support of various principles of non-illegal intervention and respect for national-state government sovereignty, then Putin will not turn around and do a version in Turkey of what he has condemned the Axis of Jihad for doing in Syria.

So I will guess that Putin's actions against Erdogan and the AKPists will be designed to destabilize and degrade them enough to either embolden what Kemalists remain to try taking back power from Erdogan . . . or to cause all inhabitants of Turkey such unbearable economic pain so obviously layable at Erdogan's door that the Turkish populations will turn against Erdogan to get Russia to make the pain stop.

[Aka]

sir,
Thank. BTW what is your opinion of the Turkish intentions in Iraq?

[Charles Michael]

Superbe synthèse, Bravo !

and many thanks

[Tyler]

Patrick,

Trump has been very open to the Russians taking the fight to IS and the rebels in Syria.

[glupi]

initial thoughts of mine after reading this analysis magnifique

Mr Bahzad,

Could you please explain what the standing of Hezbollah is on the Muslim street. Among ordinary Shia. In the Sunni communities.

++++

Looking at the lovely map, from a strictly military point of view, surely it is madness for Syria + Russia forces to go at the Islamic State while the 'rebel' groups jeopardise their rear & flanks?
Our 'rebels' seem truly a human shield for the bad guys

***

With France unemployment decimating the ranks and the evil Gulfies its major income partner, the Marine Le Pen success may drive the current rulers even further under Gulfie control?

by the way, it was curious to see a French Jewish organisation calling against Le Pen's National Front, while a German Jewish organisation came out strongly in favor of Pegida, Germany's Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident

+++

China's need of diversified oil&gas sources is a curse

---

Great to know that Russia's meeting with Sunni king Abdullah bore fruit.
(how come?)

***

Iraq's 'Shia' plutocracy must be dealt with

+++

Saudi Arabia is hostng a meeting aimed at uniting 100 'anti-IS' groups

---

Lawrence of Arabia would advise against a decisive battle as incompatible with the temperament of the locals

***

Thank you!