ISIS – A Black Hole in the Heart of the Middle-East: The Armies of the Caliphate

Someone said to me that we here on SST have not written much on IS.  This is re-posted to answer that.  pl

 

By Patrick Bahzad

After the Islamic State’s recent and overwhelming victory in Ramadi, the Iraqi government as well as analysts in D.C. seemed to be in a state of shock and disarray. ISIS is officially losing ground since the start of the US led airstrikes in September 2014. With the rout of the Iraqi army in Ramadi however, this narrative becomes harder and harder to sell. Earlier this year, victory of Shia militias in Tikrit had been seen as the beginning of the end for Abubakr al-Baghdadi’s organization. That assessment has now been called seriously into doubt, as the armies of the Caliphate seem to march on. Even though it is difficult to give an accurate estimate of ISIS’ military capabilities, they’re a force to be reckoned with, and they can challenge anything the current Iraqi government can muster against them.

Why months of airstrikes and hundreds of “sorties” haven’t stopped the Jihadis has several reasons. On the one hand, there are undoubtedly unresolved issues between Washington and Baghdad that have a bearing on the proficiency of the counter-IS campaign. Recent reports by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), stating that “coalition” airstrikes killed 170 ISIS members in the past months in Syria, should be taken with utmost caution. An allegedly independent opposition NGO, the SOHR is run out of London by a few individuals with a dubious track-record. According to – hopefully – more reliable accounts, i.e. the daily briefings of US Central Command, the first three months of consistent airstrikes managed to hit about 300 vehicles, but only 25 ISIS fighters …

This sobering result is more in line with developments we're seeing on the ground, as the death of several mid- to high-ranking ISIS leaders has not been enough to halt the overall momentum of the Caliphate’s troops, at least for now. The fact of the matter is, the Islamic State is an organization that has survived years of attempts by the Americans to destroy it. They know how to survive against an enemy that rules the skies and can see about everything that moves on the ground. They’re also hard to penetrate or read, which is very much related to the experience brought forward by former Baathist army and intelligence officers who joined the organization. What recent events in Ramadi have shown to those who might have forgotten about it, is that the Caliphate actually has an army. It is not exactly built along the same rationale as Western armed forces, but it has structure, “command and control” and a genuine ability to maneuver and fight, unlike some of the Iraqi government troops.

The question of manpower and “Martyr Operations”

Estimates about ISIS’ total number of troops aren’t exactly consistent. According to conservative – one might say optimistic – estimates, they can field about 20 000 men. A mid-range estimate, as good a guess as any, might give them 25 000 to 30 000 foot-soldiers and finally, the most pessimistic observers, some of whom have actually been in the field in Syria, report up to 50 000 fighters.

Like any army, the Islamic State's forces have various branches. Considering what their MO has been in recent battles, we will only be considering those units that played a role in the fighting. Obviously, when you come to think about ISIS ground forces you're almost inevitably drawn into the debate about the use of suicide bombers. These stormtroopers of death have a significant role in the Islamic State's overall strategy of spreading fear and showing they can hit anybody, anywhere, anytime. Their place on the battlefield however is well defined, as fighting in Ramadi has shown.

The man in charge of the “martyrs” training and recruitment is a former officer of Saddam Hussein's army who has joined the Islamist insurgency very early on. Interestingly, he's not Arab, but a Turkman from Tefallah, in Northern Iraq. A long time associate of Abu Ali al-Anbari, he was in charge for a while of creating ISIS cells in Tripoli, Northern Lebanon, which has since turned into a stronghold of the organization outside of its heartland.

Recruitment and training of suicide bombers

Potential candidates for “martyr operations” are recruited all over the area under ISIS control, but it is in Iraq, in the provinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala that the cells are most active. In these areas, there are potentially several dozen people being trained to blow themselves up when ordered to.

The training is fairly basic. It's actually closer to a brainwashing operation than an actual military training. The Islamic State has “scouts” on the lookout for young men, sometimes teenagers, who are fanatical – or stupid – enough to be drawn into this. Children of ISIS fighters, having already grown into an environment in which death as a martyr is more revered than anything else, feature among the most willing recruits.

Once the training is over, they wait for orders from the top and get sent on their mission, blowing up people in a mosque, or driving a truck full of explosives into the enemy's front-lines. Before they spring into action however, extensive intelligence work is done by ISIS agents on the ground, which shall be the subject of another piece.

A hint at Iraqi government intelligence failures

Suffice to say that the tactics and tecnics used by the Islamic State's intelligence professionals encompass about everything Saddam Hussein's security forces used as well, meaning every dirty trick in the book, and more. What is striking is that ISIS seems to be able to move its agents into locations of interest and have them report back without suffering a significant number of casualties or arrests.

This means these people are good at what they do and they can count on the loyalty or the silence of a large part of the civilians in the areas they target. Whether this result is obtained through spreading fear or by winning over “hearts and minds” is a different issue, the outcome however is indisputable.

This in turn raises serious questions about the intelligence work of the Iraqi government, as well as the information gathered by Western intelligence agencies through means such as SIGINT or GEOINT. It is rather surprising that ISIS is able to concentrate significant forces for attacks like Ramadi, without any red flags going up in Baghdad or Washington.

The reasons for these shortcomings are probably twofold and both of them are worrying: on the one hand, the Iraqi government's intelligence services are unable to plant assets into ISIS middle or senior leadership. On the other hand the Islamic State has developed operational procedures that allow it to remain mostly invisible prior to the start of its military operations. We'll dig more into this aspect of their organization when we turn to their intelligence service.

The main military branches

Setting aside the use of suicide bombers, the armies of the Caliphate aren't that different from other armies. They use whatever branches are most adapted to the type of battles they're fighting and to the equipment they have at their disposal. In short, ISIS troops are mostly light, motorized infantry.

This infantry is structured along very decentralized guidelines. They number in between 20 000 and 30 000 men, spread over the whole territory controlled by the organization. They actually function like large cells in the area assigned to them, never more than a few hundred men at a time, and they can get called in for larger joint operations without prior notice. The degree of autonomy these infantry units enjoy is the main reason for their success. Their leaders decide independently where to station their men, preferably in small groups living among the civilian population, and avoid gathering larger groups unless absolutely necessary.

The other branches of the Caliphate's army that should be mentioned are the artillery, consisting mostly of heavy mortars coming out of old Iraqi army stockpiles and modern antitank weapons that have been bought or confiscated from the Free Syrian Army. Part of these antitank missiles have been delivered to the Syrian rebels by western nations or their Gulf allies, but ended up in the hands of the Caliphate, which uses them more proficiently than the FSA ever did.

The professionalism of the Islamic State's artillerymen – around 3 000 to 5 000 men in total – has been noted on numerous occasions, with “suicide bombers” spearheading the attack, followed in quick sequence by a barrage of pretty accurate artillery fire, before the actual assault by infantry takes place.

Snipers

In addition to its main battlefield units – suicide bombers, infantry and artillery – the Islamic State also makes extensive use of snipers, which is often forgotten by outside observers, but constitutes one of their most deadly weapons.

The “Al Kanz” sniper brigade totals around 700 men who get dispatched in small teams to the areas where they're are considered most useful. Some of these men have been trained by the US themselves, during the “Surge”, when Sunni tribal units were fighting ISIS predecessor “Al Qaeda in Iraq”. Since then, they have jumped ship and are now among the most efficient ISIS' troops.

According to a number of deserters and defectors, the man in charge of training and supervising “Al Kanz” is a Moroccan national and former member of the French Foreign Legion, whose “sniper” company in the “2e Regiment Etranger Parachutiste” is considered one of the best sniping schools in the world.

With their modern sniping rifles – including cal. 50 weapons originally delivered to the Iraqi army – the ISIS snipers have now all the tools of their trade and they are feared among their enemies, which should be testimony enough to the quality of their “work”.

“Special Forces” and “Border Police”

The most recent creation of the Caliphate army's branches, the “Special Forces” have actually been designed to accommodate one of ISIS most fearsome military leaders: Tarkan Batirashvili, aka “Abu Omar al-Shishani”.

Half Georgian and half Chechen, al-Shishani has made a name for himself in Syria with his mujahideen from the Caucasus. He's now in command of around a thousand men, of various nationalities, most of them Iraqis from Anbar province though, which begs the question as to whether this unit wasn't also created to keep an eye on al-Shishani, whose fame within the organization could make him a dangerous challenger to the more senior Iraqi leadership.

Finally, one of the most ignored but also most efficient branches of the Caliphate's army is the “Border Police”, created and lead by a Turkish member of the organization. Originally a rather small branch, it numbers now around 2 000 men who sometimes blend into the population of the “frontier” regions of the Islamic State.

Their mission has become more and more sensitive now that ISIS is trying to consolidate its territorial gains and build a genuine State-like structure. The “Border Police” rules with a iron fist and the hammer comes down hard on anybody attempting to leave to Caliphate without authorization. Defectors and deserters in particular are being put to the sword. Preventing infiltration by foreign agents and identifying journalists who might be kidnapped and used for ransom money is also part of their mission statement.

The overall picture

What emerges from this short description is an organization that has both a concept and the manpower and experience to implement it. The Islamic State is not just a terrorist organization anymore. It has conquered a territory equaling in size about half the United-Kingdom. It is now trying to govern and put in place structures that would ensure its survival in the areas it controls.

But the Islamic State is by far not done with its offensive operations, and Ramadi has been a reminder of that. They can still stage attacks and take new cities, even in the face of the US led coalition and airstrikes strategy. There is also a less visible side to the potency of the Islamic State's challenge, namely its ability to organize covert operations of various types, which we shall examine based on a few case studies in our next piece.

Comments

[Ishmael Zechariah]

PB,
Thanks for this. Per your description, the organization Daash has managed to construct is comparable to that of Hezbullah; IMO no other non-state, or semi state organization in ME, and this includes the Kurds, comes even close. Could you comment on what would have happened if the US viceroy in charge of Iraq had not dissolved the Baath party and fired the military cadres?

Ishmael Zechariah

[Babak Makkinejad]

Patrick Bahzad:

Do you have any insights as to the French Government's policy in regards to ISIS?

Does France consider ISIS an enemy?

Or is she neutral in regards to ISIS?

Or is ISIS a convenient thing to have around to put military pressure on Iranian, Syrian and Iraqi governments and - to at the same time - frighten the Gulfie Arabs to buy more French military hardware?

Do you know?

[Aka]

Patrick Bahzad,
I was under the impression that most ISIS suicide bombers come from foreign countries like Saudi Arabiya?

[Montmartre, I hope to see you again.]

Patrick B. Thanks for your extraordinary contributions. If you have time and are so inclined, would like to know your view on pending French spy/surveillance bill.

[LeaNder]

Pretty odd and/or rhetorical questions. I can't quite make it out.

Maybe it would help if you ask more straightforward. Maybe? I'll try.

Something like: Could you imagine to defend Iran if Isis advances?

[LeaNder]

Nasty cliffhanger. ;)

You knew, I waited exactly for that, didn't you? :-(

[Babak Makkinejad]

Not at all; as I write these lines, the economic war waged by the European Union against Iran continues.

I want to know if France is against ISIS or not.

Or is this another "Phony War", just like 1939.

[The Beaver]

Patrick

I read somewhere that SOHR is a one-man show run by Rami AbdelRahman in Coventry.
Here is another piece on him: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/08/uk-britain-syria-idUKTRE7B71XG20111208
He is a mix of Brown Moses aka Eliot Higgins combined with a bit of Chalabi

[LeaNder]

Ok, we have been there before. ...

Europe follows, personally I like headscarves, women today wear them a lot more elegantly then my grandmother, but I have a somewhat limited understanding for the idea that a woman has to hide her body beneath a burka or the shador for that matter.

I can't speak for Europe, concerning Germany I guess there are a lot of people that would love trade with Iran. They may be anywhere.

[Tyler]

PB,

Excellent article. Muchas nachos.

[Babak Makkinejad]

EU did not push 20 million Iranians into poverty over the head scarves of the Iranian women.

[William R. Cumming]

Thanks for the excellent analysis!

[The Beaver]

FWIW: What have customs got to do with economic war and sanctions against Iran?
Have I miss something?
Who wears burka in Iran ?

[AbuAbdullah]

barely germane, but it seems that Izzat Al Douri has reemerged this week with the release of an audio message after his much ballyhooed "death" last month at the hands of the Iraqi militias:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/05/izzat-ibrahim-al-douri-refutes-reports-of-his-death.php

Great analysis of the inner workings of the military apparatus, I'll be sure to pass it on. It warms the cockles of my heart to see such a multicultural equal opportunity scheme in the leadership of the organization.

[Patrick Bahzad]

IZ,

Hezbollah is part of the political process in Lebanon too. They also recognize Lebanon as a sovereign State, that they vowed to defend (in their own particular way). there's a fundamental difference here with ISIS.
Regarding their ability to field a "private" or non-state army however, you çight compare the two, but comparing doesn't mean equalling. Hezbollah's abilities on their own turf are pretty high, in particular anti-tank and anti-armour combat and maneuver. that is not the case of the Islamic State.
as for your question, you're asking me basically to give you a counter-factual which is like looking in a cristal ball, considering all the elements in the equation.
What is pretty safe to assume though, is that if Paul Bremer had not issued his CPA orders 1 and 2, things would probably not have gone that çuch out of hand ... Although in the long run, who knows. it's difficult to stabilize a country you just invaded, and even more so when you got neighbors around who don't want you there. when you do stupid things youself, it's like pouring petrol over an already burning fire.

[Patrick Bahzad]

ISIS is considered an enemy and treated as such. the French have no hidden agenda about it. I know where you're going with this, but i would have serious doubts about any conspiracy type theory ... It's just shere stupidity and short-sightedness that's been at work in France and elsewhere, the usual ingredients basically.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I resent the "phony war" reference to 1939 ... We've lost 100 000 men in that phony war in 1939-1940 ! i don't call that phony

[Patrick Bahzad]

Aka,

some suicide bombers are foreigners, libyans in particular from Benghazi have a high propensity to end up as suicide bombers. Just mentioning this as a side note of course !

I said suicide bombers were most active in Iraq, i didn't say they were actually all from Iraq themselves. And the number of foreign fighters who have come with their families is such now, that you probably even have foreigners' kids who might end up pretty soon with an explosives belt around their waist.

[LeaNder]

Evasion, nothing, but evasion. Simple as that. Chance of subject. Nothing beneath it. ;)

This feels so repetitive and, Beaver, tiring, really tiring.
I won't repeat once again, I do not and never did support sanctions against Iraq. It's a game I don't like. I also don't like to be forced by anyone to respond as the stereotypical European representative of European politics. Understand.

I don't like to dance to the pipe of someone's talking points. Over and over and over again.

[Patrick Bahzad]

short reaction: i think some of it is necessary and unavoidable, but the whole law is lacking in judicial oversight.
It's not a silver bullet either and won't stop every potential attack or attacker.

[Patrick Bahzad]

May I quote you on this ? ... ;-:

[Patrick Bahzad]

they are definitely multicultural and equal opportunity type employer when it comes to martyr operations, much less so when it's about sharing leadership and power in the top ranks !

[The Beaver]

It is Iran not Iraq. BTW: most of the European-EU- countries (I have a European passport myself btw) are speaking from both sides of their mouths. Sanctions on one side and yet Trade missions to Tehran just in case all becomes "honky dory" by July 2015.

Like it or not, no one wants Germany to pull another "trading with China" redux with Tehran as far as trade is concerned - so they are all protecting their backyards.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Evasion, she says.

The questions were not posed to her but to a French Citizen.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Don't shoot the messenger, I believe that is what the contemporary French called it at that time.