By Patrick BAHZAD
Another week has passed and news outlets, TV networks and social media are buzzing with information of all sorts, confirmed or credible, or not. Here is a summary of "real" recent events on the ground, together with an analysis of their potential meaning.
R+5 operations have continued and increased in pace and scope. In addition to rebel areas already under attack in NW Syria, the regime has made progress in the Damascus area in particular (Eastern Ghouta). This is important in two regards. First of all, it seems the rebels from the “Southern Front” are not able or not willing to mount a counter-attack aimed at relieving the pressure put on groups in the NW. This is a huge bonus for the R+5, as forces can thus be redeployed and used in the ongoing or coming operations up North.
All quiet on the Southern Front ... almost
One of the reasons why the “Southern Front” has been quiet and will remain so, in all likelihood, is because Russia has come to an official agreement with the Jordanians earlier this week, with the announcement of a common operation in the fight against terrorism in the region. What had previously been a tacit “non aggression” clause has now become official policy.
In other words, the Hachemite Kingdom will not allow any counter-attack being launched from rebel bases under its control. Of course, some rebel groups – like “Jaish al-Islam”, a radical faction close to “Jabhat al-Nusra” – are still fighting in Eastern Ghouta and Quneitra, but without the reinforcements and resupply from the Jordanian border, they are likely to continue taking serious casualties and loosing further territory.
The situation is very different in the NW where the R+5 has opted for offensives on multiple fronts. As explained in previous pieces, opening multiple fronts and launching operations deep behind rebel lines (around Aleppo) follows an certain operational and strategic logic. However, the tempo of military action is not in line with the requirements of modern media, thus giving the inexperienced observer the impression that not much is changing on the ground. Such a view however is deeply flawed.
Meaningless vs useful metrics
Now, it is possible obviously to assess developments through various metrics, but some of the numbers mentioned in social media and allegedly serious news outlets are totally ridiculous. Earlier this week for example, a major newspaper stated that rebel use of TOW missiles had increased by 850 % since the start of the Russian intervention, thus arguing that this increase in rebel activity nullifies – in this paper’s view – any claim as to Russian tactical gains.
Well, here is the actual truth: an increase in the use of ammunition by a factor of 8.5 in a period of major ground operation should not be a surprise to anyone. Least of all a military analyst. You might as well start counting the number of artillery shells fired by the SAA, or the number or airstrikes of the RuAF, and come up with the opposite conclusion.
These numbers mean nothing as such, in terms of which side is gaining the upper hand. The only interesting thing that can be taken from such metrics is that if the current trend continues, the rebels are going to have serious trouble very soon with their supply of TOW missiles, which might have been – partly – the idea of the R+5 all along.
Major events on the ground
Be that as it may, the major tactical developments on the ground can be summarized as follows:
- The government offensive in Aleppo, which is crucial to the outcome of the current campaign, is keeping its momentum. In south-western Aleppo countryside, government troops are still advancing towards Idlib highway, a strategic line of communication for the rebels. In the East of Aleppo, another operation should reach its goal in the days to come, when R+5 units will probably get to Kuweires airbase and cut off ISIS’ main resupply line (the highway from Mosul, through Raqqa, all the way to the Turkish border). ISIS tried to counter-attack, but was repelled so far, taking a number of casualties. They might try again though, given the high importance of this LOC.
- In the Latakia region, the SAA, NDF and Lebanese Hezbollah made ground around Salma. The hilltop of “Katf al-Ghader” was retaken by the Syrian army on Thursday and a multipronged attack on Salma is underway. This operation will be absolutely essential in the long awaited offensive onto Jish al-Shughur, a first step towards advancing into Idlib province.
- Further South, the rebels of “Ahrar al-Sham” launchted a counter-attack in Hama province, managing to retake two villages from the SAA. While their territorial gains are marginal, this operation could threaten the Salamiyya to Khanasser road, the only supply line of the R+5 into Aleppo. Therefore, any development in this area needs to be followed closely as well.
- Another attack onto the same supply line took place further North, in a coordinated “Jabhat al-Nusra” and ISIS offensive on Khanasser. There had already been rumours about both groups joining forces earlier this week, but this unsuccessful operation is definite proof that there is at least some kind of operational coordination between both Jihadi franchises on the ground. So much for the narrative about the “Jabhat al-Nusra” reconcilables …
- A last development has been observed around Deir ez-Zor, in Eastern Syria, an SAA outpost and airbase besieged by ISIS militants. In this area, the Russian airstrikes that took place recently point to a new tactical shift in the overall R+5 strategy.
Up until now, what could be seen on the ground was an attempt at opening various fronts, probing defenses, fixing rebel troops and trying to close them in, probably in order to destroy them through overwhelming artillery and MRLS fire and clear these areas of any remaining rebels with traditional infantry units sweeping through villages and countryside. This tactic may very well be the expected endgoal still, but given the unknowns regarding both sides’ resources and manpower, it is difficult to assess the time and place where such “cauldron” operations (in the Russian military lingo) would take place.
Currently, Aleppo seems the most likely area for such an encirclement, although heavy artillery shelling would not be the major option taken due to the number of civilians still living in the city. Rastan enclave is second on the list, as it is already cut off from rebel lines. Time will tell, patience is probably the most underrated military virtue, and no conclusions should be drawn from what some observers consider “slow” advances or even “stalling” R+5 offensives.
An expanding R+5 operation ?
In addition to this attritional dimension, it looks now as if the Russians were serious about their intended increase in airstrikes. The number they aim for is 300 a day (up from around 50 to 80 now). However, in order to achieve this goal, the R+5 will need more airbases, as close as possible to areas they target and covering more Syrian territory. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Kuweires airbase is the not the only airbase the Russians have set their eyes on.
In the East of Syria, they might be tempted to extend the territory under government control in Deir ez-Zor, as this enclave has an operational airbase that could also be used. Furthermore, far away from most journalists’ attention, another government area in Kurdish held territory has been the focus of interesting news: Qamishli airport, on the Northern edge of the Hasakah area, was closed to civilian traffic earlier this week and is rumoured to be built-up as a military airbase.
Given the location of these airbases, it is safe to assume that any resumption of operation will be taken charge of by the Syrian Air Force, and not the Russian. The RuAF would then use available space on airbases located in areas under firm government control, thus avoiding the risk of having Russian troops overrun and taken prisoner by ISIS in particular.
Russia's "58th Army" operating in Syria
More basically, the battle plan that seems to be implemented clearly bears the signature of the Russian army, and not the Iranians. Qassem Suleimani, often rumoured to have been in charge of the whole operation, is certainly a major player on the tactical level, but operationally and strategically, it is the Russian forces that are in the lead. While there is no official confirmation of this assumption so far, several clues point into this direction. In recent days, Russian soldiers in Latakia were overheard saying they were not Naval Infantry used for force protection in the area, but part of the “58th Combined Arms Army”, a large formation of the Russian forces stationed in the North Caucasus.
Why this anecdotal information is interesting and potentially useful in order to analyse Russian doctrine in Syria, is because the 58th Army was in charge of the Russian push into South Ossetia in 2008 (Russian-Georgian War) and has often been spotted close to Ukrainian territory during the hybrid warfare operations in Eastern Ukraine, in 2014. Therefore, it is highly likely that operational and tactical moves in Syria will be strongly influenced by lessons that senior Russian officers have taken from Ukraine, and South Ossetia to a lesser degree. Having a closer look at the way Eastern Ukrainian militias, backed directly or indirectly by Russian military, took apart the Ukrainian forces in 2014 is probably a good idea right now.
There is plenty of “open source” information available about Ukraine, but just as a reminder, let’s emphasize that military operations there took several months to build up and turn into decisive battles and military victories on the ground. Whether there will be a similar development in Syria remains to be seen, as many factors play a role in this equation. However, there should be no doubt as to the Russians’ determination to obtain a genuine, conventional military victory, rather than lead a COIN-like campaign, which would not yield any decisive results.
Tenth Day of Muharram
Now of course, a military victory of that nature would not put an end to the civil war, but it would send a strong signal to the rebels’ backers in the region and in the West, and would put Russia and Vladimir Putin back on the map as the central figure to any political settlement. Negotiating from a position of strength, backed by decisive victories on the ground, could be a summary of current Russian thinking.
To achieve such a victory though, the R+5 will need to step up the tempo of their operations and launch a large scale offensive in the weeks to come. In this regard, it should be remembered that the Day of “Ashura” – a major Shia celebration – is today and could be the perfect timing for such a major operation by the Syrians’ Shia allies, whose troops are said to be stationed in large numbers in Latakia province. Tomorrow could be an interesting day, or not …
Addendum: as already announced in a previous piece, the largest Islamist rebel coalition "Jaish al-Fatah" (combining "Jabhat al-Nusra", "Ahrar al-Sham" and other Jihadi or radical Salafi groups) has now officially split, with one of the most radical and combative groups ("Jund al-Aqsa") having made a statement to this effect, earlier today. According to various sources, the PR attempt at mainstreaming "Jaish al-Fatah" and making them look like a reasonable enough player has caused deep displeasure among the Jihadis of "Jund al Aqsa" who resented any indication that this coalition might be willing to confront ISIS, which "Jund al-Aqsa" categorically refused. There goes another "Jabhat al-Nusra" reconcilable ...
Thank you very much. That's very interesting. I am sure you are right about the desire for a conventional military victory.
Posted by: Laguerre | 24 October 2015 at 10:09 AM
How do you explain the fact that the various rebel groups are not "cutting and running" even though they are being pounded by Russian airstrikes and advancing SAA and Iranian units?
It seems to me their leadership must be professional military.
Like many Americans, I figured these guys would vamoose at the first sign of a determined adversary with more firepower, but, instead, they're acting like real soldiers in a real army.
Can you explain this for me?
Posted by: plantman | 24 October 2015 at 10:26 AM
Tomorrow night's TV show 60 Minutes [previewed on Charlie Rose last night] has pictures of US COMMAND CENTER in Quatar and also spends time favorably contrasting US current airstrike efforts against ISIS with Russian efforts. Propaganda?
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 24 October 2015 at 10:35 AM
plantman,
I don't think anyone is expecting large scale revolts at this stage, but there are the reports of IS militants fleeing by shaving their beards, leaving their positions, etc. The kind of rout you're talking about is something you'll see when Raqqa falls.
There's also a psychology to consider as well in being bombed. Yes it sucks but if you're dug in you can take it a lot easier than ground troops rolling into your position and killing all your dudes.
Let us not forget that the situation now is vastly different than what we saw as little as two months ago.
Posted by: Tyler | 24 October 2015 at 11:41 AM
WRC,
I assume that question is rhetorical.
Posted by: Tyler | 24 October 2015 at 11:41 AM
plantman
PB answered your question but may wish to comment further. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 24 October 2015 at 11:41 AM
WRC,
Yes. Sadly, more evidence that the television "news" has descended into obvious propaganda, almost a caricature of propaganda, for the militaristic foreign and authoritarian domestic policies, and the financial racket that has been built since the early 1980's.
Posted by: robt willmann | 24 October 2015 at 11:50 AM
All
The Russians are playing a masterful political game in Syria and potentially in Iraq. The arrangement with Jorda effectively neuters the "Southern Front." Cut off from Jordan based supply, the jihadi/unicorns there will probably wither on the vine. In Vienna Lavrov's offer to broker multi-sided peace talks among the various Syrian parties will expose the Jihadi nature of many of the factions backed by the Borg. the Russian offer to provide air support to non jihadi elements of the FSA unicorn army has been met with rejection by the Borgists in Washington because they want to regain control dominance of the struggle in Syria. It appears that the Russians are playing chess while the US is struggling to catch up in its thinking. The mythology of the evolution of warfare between "generations" of methodology is being exposed for the BS it always was. Various forms of warfare have always existed simultaneously and still do. This mythology was successfully "sold" to ignorant political generals at the beginning of the GWOT. The myth of 4th generation warfare is a central doctrine of the Borg and they will have a hard time giving it up since so many of the Borgists are as ignorant as many generals who rose through political skills within the armed services. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 24 October 2015 at 11:56 AM
Sir,
Also lots of money to be made by contractors selling the newest gee whiz "anti IED" toy, but that's warfare in the US for you so nothing new.
Posted by: Tyler | 24 October 2015 at 12:11 PM
Does a bear shit in the woods ;)
http://bit.ly/1Wb9wdV
http://bit.ly/1MKX4wu
http://bit.ly/1KwSgJh
Posted by: Valissa | 24 October 2015 at 12:11 PM
PB, thank you very much for your enlightening reports on the war in Syria. There is almost nothing comparable available.
Col Lang, you are right about the superior game the Russians are playing, combining military and political/diplomatic moves. They appear to fully understand that military force is only successful when it leads to a better political outcome - something that Western leaders seem to have forgotten. The Russians also realise that unlimited political aims require the use of unlimited force (in scope and duration), something that most often proves both impractical and harmful.
In Ukraine, Russia could easily have engineered the secession of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but chose not to do so (even though many of the regions' leaders strongly wanted it). That is how Putin managed to bring Merkel and Hollande onside, despite strong US displeasure.
I think in the ME, too, Putin's political moves will bear fruit. Jordan and Egypt have already broken ranks with the Borg-Saudi alliance; France and Germany are probably wavering (I suspect the UAE is, too).
Posted by: FB Ali | 24 October 2015 at 12:37 PM
All,
The Colonel writes:
'In Vienna Lavrov's offer to broker multi-sided peace talks among the various Syrian parties will expose the Jihadi nature of many of the factions backed by the Borg. the Russian offer to provide air support to non jihadi elements of the FSA unicorn army has been met with rejection by the Borgists in Washington because they want to regain control dominance of the struggle in Syria.'
There is also a 'political game' going on about public opinion in the West. I cannot comment on the situation in continental Europe or the United States, but in Britain the 'Borgists' (or should one say 'Borgistas'?) are in very serious trouble.
As on other matters, Michael Oren blurts out truths which it would be more prudent for him to obfuscate. So, in a conversation with Jeffrey Goldberg last year, he explained that: 'From Israel's perspective, if there's got to be an evil that's got to prevail, let the Sunni evil prevail.'
(See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EgBsTT0h_SA&feature=youtu.be .)
That situation – where the only effective opposition to the jihadists they themselves have empowered is the 'R + 5' – an alliance of all their traditional enemies – is one that most of the 'Borgistas' – unlike Oren – are not prepared candidly to face, even in their own minds.
Accordingly, they have to believe in the existence of a 'third force' of 'moderate insurgents'.
As a result, however, they have handed the Russians a golden propaganda opportunity. In his speech at the Valdai Conference, Putin remarked:
'We do not need wordplay here; we should not break down the terrorists into moderate and immoderate ones. It would be good to know the difference. Probably, in the opinion of certain experts, it is that the so-called moderate militants behead people in limited numbers or in some delicate fashion.'
The argument Putin is making is very clearly cogent to a very large swathe of public opinion here in Britain, across the political spectrum – although disproportionately concentrated on a traditionally conservative, and generally anti-Russian, end of that spectrum.
Probably one should not use a cricketing analogy to a largely American and European audience.
However, to some of us, Putin's remarks look like one of those gentle-looking balls which the great Pakistani leg spinner Abdul Qadir used to bowl. There is no way the 'Borgistas' can play it – their only choice is which way they prefer to get out.
Posted by: David Habakkuk | 24 October 2015 at 01:05 PM
turcopolier says, "The mythology of the evolution of warfare between "generations" of methodology is being exposed for the BS it always was....This mythology was successfully "sold" to ignorant political generals at the beginning of the GWOT
This strikes me as a very critical point.
The use of jihadi proxies can distance the perpetrators from accountability (to some extent) It also allows the proxies to do things that conventional forces might not be able to do.
But are proxies really capable of clearing and holding territory against a superior army backed by a modern airforce?
It looks to me like there are real limits to this type of oddball warfare, but I don't claim to be an expert.
Posted by: plantman | 24 October 2015 at 01:13 PM
As the Colonel explained on another thread, where would they run? They are not Syrian's, in territory hostile to them, and if they run, its not clear that if they could get to turkey, they would be welcome. Remember, also, many of them desired a martyr's death.
Posted by: ISL | 24 October 2015 at 01:18 PM
Tyler
Its unfortunate that Charlie Rose has become such an IO tool for the neocons writ large .
Posted by: alba etie | 24 October 2015 at 01:21 PM
PB/Colonel:
Do you think US war strategy is dictated in part (or a lot) by political pressure (the desire of generals to advance to elected high office), to conform to media news cycle?
PS Thanks for the summary!
Posted by: ISL | 24 October 2015 at 01:21 PM
It's like a leak in a dam or seawall. First a trickle, then a bigger hole, then it suddenly breaks under the stress. It"ll be interesting to see if there's a little Dutch boy foolish enough to stick his hole in the leak.
The Goddess only knows what Kerry & co. are up to. False flags, bombing the Syrian Arab Army? Who knows, but rest assured they are burning the midnight oil working on a counter-move.
Things to watch: Trump and Rand Paul are the only presidential candidates talking sense about Syria. (sigh). Next Wednesday will be interesting as Trump gets attacked by the "borg" at the debate. Sunday Nov 1 (?), Turkish election, will also be an eye opener. I think it was Ishmael Zaccariah (sp?) that said there was a tradeoff b/n the Turkish progressives that enabled the Kurds to overcome the 10% minimum result barrier to having seats in the parliament. Will it happen again? Will the Sultan do another false flag? will he cancel the election.
Oh, and those million or so Syrian refugees in Lebanon, will they start coming back and fulfill their obligation to defend their country? The Army has a duty to protect the country but fit men (and women) have a reciprocal duty to serve.
Posted by: Will | 24 October 2015 at 01:24 PM
Another excellent SITREP, with helpful analysis and explanation. Thanks.
Posted by: red brick | 24 October 2015 at 01:32 PM
ditto.. thanks..
Posted by: bell | 24 October 2015 at 01:33 PM
David Habakkuk
I will use "Borgistas." pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 24 October 2015 at 01:33 PM
Col, I can see your argument that Russia can defeat the ISIL/Unicorn main forces. However after the US beat the Iraqi army easily but then faced a long-term insurgency.
Why would the Russians fair any differently?
Posted by: James Doleman | 24 October 2015 at 01:45 PM
Doleman
The situations are not comparable. Iraq had large national armed forces that, contrary to Borgista propaganda, had resisted the US a lot and never surrendered. See the US Army's history of the campaign, "On Point." It would IMO have been fairly easy to pacify Iraq if the Borg and its minions under the CPA had not abolished the still existing Iraqi security forces. This was contrary to the advice of the US division commanders on the ground who were sure they could stand the Iraqi forces back up to stabilize their own country. The abolition of the Iraqi forces provided the manpower for the long, long insurgency against US occupation. The jihadis only came in AFTER this fateful decision by Bremer and the other Borgistas. The Russians have no intention of abolishing the Syrian state, a state that enjoys the support of many, many Syrians, including many Sunni Arabs, including the Syrian Armed Forces chief Freij. If there is an insurgency against a restored and unified Syrian state it will be a minor thing no matter what the Borg and the Saudis want
Posted by: turcopolier | 24 October 2015 at 02:02 PM
Of course!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 24 October 2015 at 02:12 PM
An insightful comment with which I agree. Thanks General Ali!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 24 October 2015 at 02:15 PM
P.L.! Would you agree that HRC is the leading "Borgista" candidate so far for 2016? IMO she is in fact that!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 24 October 2015 at 02:17 PM