SITREP: Summary of Recent Developments in Syria

By Patrick BAHZAD

The situation is developing as could be expected. The R+5 launched offensives in several strategic areas since early last week, most of them in the NW of Syria. More recently, serious fighting and minor government advances were also registered in the Damascus area (Eastern Ghouta).

The attritional character of the current ground offensives against entrenched rebel positions, some of whom have been fortified for months and years, is obvious. The unknown factor is the current depletion rate of rebel manpower, ammunition and weaponry, which makes a forecast regarding the length of the current campaign difficult.

However, it looks like the idea of stretching rebel forces thin, forcing them to organise/reorganise defensive lines in areas located wide apart, notably through starting an operation in Aleppo, behind major rebel lines, will take its toll on the logistics and CC capabilites of the rebels.

While news has been publicized about senior Iranian IRGC deaths, it should be noted that the rebels have lost a very significant number of front-line commanders ("Jaish al-Islam" in Damascus, "Jabhat al-Nusra" and "Ahrar al-Sham" in the NW) and that an undetermined number of foreign fighters were killed around Idlib. These kills bear the hallmark of the RuAF strategy, aimed at:

1. logistical depots and bases of the rebels,
2. rebel frontline positions (CAS) and
3. CC facilities and individual commanders.

In this regard, the absence of a unified command structure among the rebel factions might cost them dearly in a not so distant future, as the R+5 seems intent on keeping the momentum and intensifying the operational pace. The number of airstrikes has significantly increased in the last two days and correlating the targets of these strikes with imminence of renewed ground operations suggests that the major axis of R+5 offensives will focus again on the Rastan enclave and a further push into SW Aleppo. The outcome of the relief operation to Kuweires airbase, located East of Aleppo, will also be interesting to follow.

Previously to the push around Aleppo, major combat operations were taking place North of Hama and in Ghab plain. In that regard, there is a big question mark regarding the whereabouts of the several thousand strong Iranian force, most of which has not been seen in large numbers on the battlefield so far.

Quite possibly, there is an ongoing troops buid-up in Latakia province, with the recent attacks on Salma being only a probing a testing phase for a larger engagement which would target the border areas to Turkey and the Jabal al-Akrad in particular.

Unconfirmed info regarding the state of the rebel factions makes for a picture that is consistent with the intended goals of the R+5:

• TOW teams deployed in Ghab plain were sent back to SW Aleppo to counter advancing government troops. If the rebels have to send already committed forces to hot spots of R+5 offensives, this might be considered a rather ominous sign;

• internal feuds could have erupted within Jaish al-Fath, as one of its most radical components - the Jihadi "Jund al-Aqsa" - stated it was not willing to confront ISIS if called upon to do so. According to unverified sources, the predominantly Moroccan and North African "Jund al-Aqsa" got into firefights with "Ahrar al-Sham" groups in at least one location under their control.

While short term developments (T + 7 days) are difficult to assess, it is already apparent that the Syrian regime and its allies are intend not just on some minor border corrections but on achieving a large scale military victory in NW Syria.

Comments

[Valissa]

Babak, the comments are pretty derisive. The author is Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution.

IMO this test balloon isn't going to fly very far before it deflates. The trend of supporting the rebel opposition seems be on the downswing in the Borg collective overall. I've been seeing an uptick in articles in Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy (the journals) decrying this strategy, and more support for working with the Russians and Iranians against ISIS/Daesh, at least for now. Henry Kissinger's recent interview at the WSJ advocates working with Russia to combat ISIS, though he's still an Iranophobe and thinks moderate Sunnis are the key to success in the ME.

Going directly to the WSJ link I was not able to read the article as I'm not a subscriber, but by going here first I was able to get to it http://www.realclearpolitics.com/2015/10/17/a_path_out_of_the_middle_east_collapse_367799.html

WSJ URL, via above link... http://www.wsj.com/article_email/a-path-out-of-the-middle-east-collapse-1445037513-lMyQjAxMTI1MjE2NzIxMDcwWj

[J Villain]

It appears the Russia and Assad are fine with the Kurds.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/kurdish-leader-pyd-russia-support-syria.html

[J Villain]

If that was the Russians that would be quite ominous for the US's short term UAV plans. They would need to kick up the next autonomous part to counter it. It would be good news for innocent civilians though.

[David Habakkuk]

Patrick Bahzad,

Everything he produces under his own name has a highly distinctive style. The follow-up he has just produced to the 'rant' to which Bill Herschel linked being a case in point.

(See http://thesaker.is/dreams-of-a-sleeping-alligator-dream-three-a-surrender-a-meeting-and-a-rating/ .)

However, that does not mean that the operation as a whole is a 'one man' venture. Actually, 'the Saker' portrays himself as having plenty of helpers. Whether this is simply a voluntary effort – the product of spontaneous enthusiasm – seems to me a moot point. I am somewhat sceptical, just as the 'dreams of a sleeping alligator' idea, although ingenious, reinforces my doubts as to whether he is actually currently in Florida.

Actually I do not think 'the Saker' said he worked for Nitze. He did say that he had had 'the pleasure and honour to study with Paul Nitze'. According to his account, he did a MA at the SAIS at Johns Hopkins.

(See http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/crosstalk-containment-20-ft-stephen.html .)

[Patrick Bahzad]

That's not my point.

My point is that there are several "Saker" versions going in various languages. To me that suggests a little more than just a couple of helpers ... Ask PL how difficult it is to maintain something like SST in just one language. Imagine multiplying this effort by 3 or 4 and you get an idea of the effort/manpower potentially necessary. But be that as it may, I'm not particularly interested in Saker-ology. As I said, it was a side-note.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Thank you for your comments.

I have read the article.

My impression has been that Iranians asked for something from US (may be on Yemen) and US declined. At which point Ayatollah Khamenei banned further negotiations with the United States.

Kissinger wants Iran to act as Westphalian state - I suppose that means Iranians take the lead and dismantle the Shia Crescent & her other alliances and relationships.

In other words, act just the way she did in 1980 on the eve of Iraq's war on Iran.

I do not think Kissinger can convince very many people in Iran.

Significantly, when mentioning all the countries aligned against the Shia Crescent, he had not included Turkey - "...a Sunni bloc consisting of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States".

Per the Makkinejad Theses, the muddle in the Middle East is not across sectarian lines - it is a intra-civilizational one between Seljuk Islam and non-Seljuk Islam.

The best strategy is to superimpose a map of the Seljuk Empire on the contemporary Middle East and strengthen the state and governing structures of those within it.

Outside of it, I do not expect much.

[Valissa]

Ah, the Westphalian state... but what is that really? Is this "creature" real or mythic or merely a convenient description for a certain IR mindset?

A cartoon explanation... http://www.toondoo.com/public/b/o/r/bordasz627/toons/cool-cartoon-2073434.png

An interesting student essay on the topic...
How ‘Westphalian’ is the Westphalian Model? http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/03/how-westphalian-is-the-westphalian-model/

From your comment:
"My impression has been that Iranians asked for something from US (may be on Yemen) and US declined. At which point Ayatollah Khamenei banned further negotiations with the United States."

Interesting clue, thanks... I was wondering what the Ayatollah's latest frustration with the US was based on.

[Ryan]

Bill,

I've always been curious when I hear that the US aircraft that were flying the airstrikes in northern Iraq had to fly from the gulf on why the US couldn't use the airfields in Israel. After all, the US paid for a number of them. I note as well the US has munitions stores located there, too. So much for Israel being "our strategic partner".