Musings on Turkey (by CP)

 

I have been pondering about Turkey for a while, and this post is part one of a small series of posts on the subject. What struck me is frankly how agressive Turkey has acted in pursuit of their policies vis a vis Syria. Erdoğan repeatedly tried to force, co-opt and when that failed, to actively sabotage US policy in Syria. He tried to force the hand of the Europeans as well.

♦ Fool me once [Ghouta chemical weapons incident]

The first attempt was apparently when they tried to coax the US into intervening in Syria, by making sure that Obama's foolishly uttered red line - non-use of chemical weapons would be met. In business, they call it rainmaking. It is very probable, as reporting by Seymour Hersh suggests, that the Ghouta incident happened with a Turkish helping hand.

„An American foreign policy expert who speaks regularly with officials in Washington and Ankara told me about a working dinner Obama held for Erdoğan during his May visit. The meal was dominated by the Turks’ insistence that Syria had crossed the red line and their complaints that Obama was reluctant to do anything about it. Obama was accompanied by John Kerry and Tom Donilon, the national security adviser who would soon leave the job. Erdoğan was joined by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s foreign minister, and Hakan Fidan, the head of the MIT. Fidan is known to be fiercely loyal to Erdoğan, and has been seen as a consistent backer of the radical rebel opposition in Syria.

The foreign policy expert told me that the account he heard originated with Donilon. (It was later corroborated by a former US official, who learned of it from a senior Turkish diplomat.) According to the expert, Erdoğan had sought the meeting to demonstrate to Obama that the red line had been crossed, and had brought Fidan along to state the case. When Erdoğan tried to draw Fidan into the conversation, and Fidan began speaking, Obama cut him off and said: ‘We know.’ Erdoğan tried to bring Fidan in a second time, and Obama again cut him off and said: ‘We know.’ At that point, an exasperated Erdoğan said, ‘But your red line has been crossed!’ and, the expert told me, ‘Donilon said Erdoğan “fucking waved his finger at the president inside the White House”.’ Obama then pointed at Fidan and said: ‘We know what you’re doing with the radicals in Syria.’“

The idea apparently was to force the US hand. The incident was apparently designed to compel the US into acting on Obama's 'red line' and the incident, with the accompanying PR blitz, were designed to make sure that that would be the case. Thankfully, reason prevailed and Obama did not intervene.

♦ Fool me twice [or the great Unicorn massacre]

The Turks let Jabhat al-Nusra  ambush Division 30 in order to make the US more dependent and to shape US Syria policy by destroying their alternate choices.

„... the US plan to create ... a moderate force [in Syria] was humiliatingly knocked on the head when Jabhat al-Nusra attacked and kidnapped many of this US-trained force as they entered Syria from Turkey. It now seems certain that Nusra had been tipped off by Turkish intelligence about the movements of the US-backed unit known as “Division 30”. Turkey apparently did this because it does not want the US to have its own surrogate in Syria … leav(ing) the US with no alternative but to train Turkish-sponsored rebel groups whose primary aim is to topple Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad“

After that stab in the back, the Pentagon's US rebel training program closed shop.

♦ Fool me once more [screw the Kurds, and the US]

Last but not least they sold the US on the idea that they could have Incirlic air base for use against ISIS. Turkey used it as a pretext to go after the Kurds while being demonstrably unconcerned about ISIS.

„In return for the use of Incirlik Air Base just north of the Syrian border, the US betrayed the Syrian Kurds who have so far been its most effective ally against Islamic State(Isis, also known as Daesh). In return for this deal signed on 22 July, the US got greater military cooperation from Turkey, but it swiftly emerged that Ankara’s real target was the Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Action against Isis was almost an afterthought, and it was hit by only three Turkish airstrikes, compared to 300 against the bases of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).“

That added insult to injury for the US and the Kurds, since the Kurds have been America's one successful ally in fighting ISIS. In going after the Kurds Turkey again crippled a US ally, while facilitating the very Jihadis that the US opposed.

♦ And then some [the refugee crisis]

Throughout this summer, Turkey was making the rounds, trying to get the Europeans and the US on board with their plan for a Safe Zone in northern Syria to resettle refugees in Syria. Europe was reluctant to get on board, apparently suspecting Turkey’s good faith and motives.

"Turkey is calling on us to support the establishment of a safe zone in northern Syria, whereas Russia - increasingly engaged in Syria - is openly rejecting this idea. There is no doubt that our strengthened cooperation with the region is indispensable, but it will be a long march," EU Council President Donald Tusk has warned ahead of the meeting.

There is also a reluctance to give Turkey too much as it continues to pursue its war against Kurdish militias in the region who are allied to the US and the west."

When Turkey didn’t get ahead with their Safe Zone plans in Bruxelles they used the refugees as leverage. They simply let them loose in a game of bait and switch: Your choice is either the refugee crisis or our Safe Zone (to keep the refugees in Syria). That is, they created for Europe a problem to sell them their solution – the Safe Zone.

That one came also with a PR blitz, which found its icon in the sad photo of the drowned toddler, ironically a Kurdish child from Kobane who had fled ISIS with his parents. While ISIS was hammering the Kurds in Kobane, the Turks had stood by idly, sealing off the border. In terms of cynicism, hard to beat.

The Russian intervention spelt an end to Turkish ideas about a Safe Zone to resettle refugees (under Turkish administration?) in northern Syria. In the meanwhile, the refugees remain Europe's problem.

♦ In closing

Turkey's pattern of behaviour has been quite extraordinary. With allies like that, who needs enemies? This repeated Turkish betrayal, or put in more neutral terms, their agressive pursuit of policies that are fundamentally at odds with US and European interests, goes a long way to explain a possible tacit agreement in the US (and Europe) with Putin's intervention in Syria that Anatol Lieven alludes to.

It also makes clear the grand dilemma the US have maneuvered themselves into. As Cockburn points out:

„… there is a deeper reason for America’s inability to confront Isis successfully. Ever since 9/11, the US has wanted to combat al-Qaeda-type movements, but without disturbing its close relations with Sunni states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Gulf monarchies. But it is these same allies that have fostered, tolerated or failed to act against the al-Qaeda clones, which explains their continuing success."

Chas Freeman elaborates in greater detail:

"The ... U.S. invasion and destruction of Iraq’s power and independence from Iran ensured that there was no way to sustain a stable balance of power in the Gulf that did not require the continuation of a huge, expensive, and locally burdensome American military presence there...

No one openly questions this situation but no one is comfortable with it.  And with good reason.  It is politically awkward for all concerned.  It presupposes a degree of congruity in U.S. and Arab views that no longer exists.  And, notwithstanding the Obama administration’s considerable efforts to allay Gulf Arab concerns, they suspect that the logic of events in the region could yet drive America toward rapprochement with Iran and strategic cooperation with it against Sunni Islamism.

In assessing American reliability, our partners in the Gulf cannot forget what happened to Hosni Mubarak.  Not surprisingly, they want to reduce dependence on America for their protection as much as they can.  This is leading to a lot of arms purchases and outreach by Saudi Arabia and other GCC members to countries in Europe as well as China, India, and Russia.  It has also stimulated assertively independent foreign policies on their part. ...

Meanwhile, however, the apparent contradictions between U.S. interests and policies and those of our GCC partners are widening.  The United States now asserts objectives in the region that do not coincide with those of most GCC members.  These include support of the Shi`ite-dominated Iraqi government against its Sunni opposition and assigning priority in Syria to the defeat of Da’esh over the ouster of President Asad.  U.S. support for the Kurds disturbs our Arab friends as well as our Turkish ally.  America supports the GCC’s military operations in Yemen less out of conviction than the perceived need to sustain solidarity with Saudi Arabia.

The United States and Gulf Arab governments have in effect agreed to disagree about the sources of instability in Bahrain and Egypt and how to cure them.  Where a common ideology of anti-communism once united us or caused us to downplay our disagreements, passionate differences between Americans and Arabs over Salafism, Zionism, feminism, religious tolerance, sexual mores, and democratic vs. autocratic systems of governance now openly divide us.  Neither side harbors the sympathy and affection for the other that it once did.  Islamophobia in the United States is matched by disillusionment with America in the Gulf.  But the ultimate sources of mutual discomfort are the strategic conundrums of what to do about Syria and how to deal with Iran."

... to be continued

by confusedponderer

Comments

[b]

A small correction to the valuable piece: "While ISIS was hammering the Kurds in Kobane, the Kurds had stood by idly, ..." The second "the Kurds" should be "the Turks".

[confusedponderer]

I stand corrected, thanks.

[OIFVet]

I think that Erdogan and Davutoglu are still trying to peddle their no-fly zone. They turned up their nose at the EU's money and visa bribe, and poured salt in old wounds by saying that Turkey won't be a "concentration camp." It's possible that they are holding out for more concessions on EU membership negotiations, but that's obviously a no-go and everybody knows it. I think Erdogan and Davutoglu are clowns enough to think that their no-fly zone is still possible, though. Or know that the ship has sailed and will spite the Euros for not acting on the no-fly zone while it was still possible. Either way, these clowns need to go, and soon.

[Babak Makkinejad]

CP:

France just concluded a $ 10 billion deal with Saudi Arabia.

Last year UK also concluded a major deal with them and UAE.

The air operations room in UAE flags of France and UK and Canada are hung together with those of the Arabs.

This is an alliance that encompasses NATO Alliance.

I mean, France can quit the Persian Gulf, where she has been waiting to attack Iran, and go home.

But she won't now, will she?

And what are those Dutch boats doing in the Gulfo de Persicos; defending Freedom of Navigation?

[Ryan]

"The ... U.S. invasion and destruction of Iraq’s power and independence from Iran ensured that there was no way to sustain a stable balance of power in the Gulf that did not require the continuation of a huge, expensive, and locally burdensome American military presence there...

An unspoken objective of the neocons, to create such a mess to be able to insist that the US must permanently garrison the region. Of course, being neocons another unspoken objective is that they believe this will benefit Israel in the long run. It won't.

A good and very useful piece, CP. You have tied up everything nicely.

[Babak Makkinejad]

All:

UK & Saudi Arabia

http://myinforms.com/en/a/17886637-pillars-of-wisdom-britain8217s-saudi-arabia-problem/

Germany & Saudi Arabia

http://saudiarabien.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_saudi_arabien/GSBM/GSBM_October_2011.pdf

[confusedponderer]

Well, thank you for the kind words, but the credit for the quote has to go to Chas Freeman.

[Linda Lau]

I very much appreciate your bringing all this together. I, also, have been trying to make sense of Turkey's actions.

[paub]

lets not give credit where none is due,

the neo cons believed their own bs, invading iraq was not meant to just result in pure chaos but was meant to install a client state.

they failed totally, and plan b happens to be in their favor as well, but this is not their intent.

[Ishmael Zechariah]

CP,
First and foremost, Turks living in Turkey are responsible for the (sorry) state of their state. However, understanding the last 15 years in Turkey requires separating Turkey from the various flocks of turkeys running around the place and understanding who feeds these gobbler packs.
1-You might remember that tayyip and AKP had significant support, materiel and propaganda, from the West in the beginning. It was actually an EU ideal to "reduce the influence of the Turkish Army" on the "civil" government. Their high commissioner to Turkey was actually recorded on tape discussing this. Why?
2-Fethullah and Co. which used lies, innuendo and blackmail to attack the secular state have their HQ in Pennsylvania, of all places. Why?
3-Separatist Kurds have had significant logistic and material help from the intelligence services of various governments. This costs a lot of money. Why?

It seems that the Turkish Republic built by Ataturk is a sore point for lots of nations. One recent example is the ethnicity question directed to the Turkish Nobel Laureate of this year by a BBC hack.
I have been trying to tease out the threads of this tapestry for a while. If I get any unique insights I will try to post here.
Ishmael Zechariah

[Seamus Padraig]

Erdogan is out of control. He's so far managed to alienate both the Russians and the Americans, and now, for good measure, he's working on the Europeans too. His little gambit in neighboring Syria is failing miserably, so what does he do? He rolls out a whole new war against the Kurds! Tell me: at this point, how many friends does Turkey have left? Qatar and Saudi Arabia? I don't care what anybody thinks about the hejav or drinking alcohol. This has gone far beyond the usual culture-war issues that color people's opinions of the AKP. This is now about the very survival of modern Turkey in some recognizable form.

If I were an enterprising young Kemalist general, I would be plotting a coup right now.

[Will]

the ghosts of Qaddafi or abdul Nasser would say a Col. would work just fine.

[Will]

It probably started when they insisted on hanging a president that had been in office for ten or so years. This was despite a personal appeal by European heads of state. They could have just as easily put him on a boat like the Egyptian's put King Farouk.

[VietnamVet]

CP

Thanks for helping to clarify Turkey’s role. It is muddled on purpose in corporate media.

I still am very much afraid that if the supply line is cut in Northern Syria; Turkey’s armed forces will intervene to save fellow Sunnis from “Iranian Aggression” and to solve the “Kurd Problem”. Then every state from Turkey to Yemen will be active participants in the Sunni Shiite Jihad. World War III is one mistake away.

Like airplane accidents, this catastrophe has been caused by a chain of events starting when the USA went to war with Iraq in 1990. Some of these events aren’t mentioned in corporate media. There may well be a tacit agreement between Russia and the West. The closest American Carrier is in the Indian Ocean. Safe from attack but unable to provide air support for a no fly zone over Syria demanded by six Presidential candidates including Democratic front runner Hillary Clinton which would start a war with Russia. The refugee crisis is also caused by austerity forced by the Eurozone on Greece which stopped enforcing its borders allowing the refugees to stream to the Balkan states and on to Germany. The USA is now in the schizophrenic position of supporting the same people it is bombing. The 10,000 or so U.S. troops and contractors on the ground in the Levant are in an untenable position of relying on the kindness of Kurds and Shiite Iraq while Shiite militias from Iraq are dying from TOW weapons supplied by the USA to Sunnis. Kurds are being bombed by Turkey a NATO member state and American ally.

Henry Kissinger says that the USA must join with Russia in the coalition to defeat the Caliphate and end the non-state Islamic threat. The basic flaw is that Western rulers are intent on lowering taxes, deregulation, weakening borders, fighting wars for profit, and transferring power from sovereign states to corporate controlled transnational institutions. These are what caused of the Sunni Shiite Holy War and the refugee crisis in the first place. The only way mankind is to survive is to return to the geopolitics of sovereign states, strong borders and regulated capitalism.

[different clue]

OIFVet,

I have heard the Erdogists are also demanding visa-free travel for Turkish citizens throughout the European Union area. Including Turkish citizen members of IS, one supposes.

[different clue]

Seamus Padraig,

Didn't the Erdogists purge an awful lot of enterprising young Kemalist generals and colonels and others out of the Turkish Army with the so-called "Ergenekon" trials?

[gemini33]

All of this makes sense but there's one thing that I don't understand. Who was able to orchestrate the PR blitz? I don't think Turkey could pull that off.

[gemini33]

Last week it was Robert Gates calling for the NFZ under a milder sounding name "safe haven" and this week it's Hillary with McCain at her side. The usual warmongering neocons though I was surprised to hear it from Gates.

Who are they most influenced by? Saudis? Israelis?

NFZ is crazy talk at this point, in my view. It was always a terrible idea but now it's a trigger point and from what I've been reading from the experts here, it's not even realistic from a technical standpoint because of the systems the Russians have set up. Are they just flapping (knowing about the systems set up by the Russians) or do they really want to attempt to implement a NFZ?

[A.I.Schmelzer]

Concerning Ghouta:

What about the following theory/speculation concerning Ghouta:

Theory:
IS did Ghouta, and was agnostic about what would happen after it, because both US inaction and US strikes against Assad would have hugely benefited them.

Means:
Let me lay out while I think they had the means:
Precursors to the IS existed from around 2007, considerable parts of them were disgruntled Baathist officers, with no future in Iraq. They engaged in a pretty sophisticated campaign of confidence shattering, social engineering etc. which eventually included in the open rise of the IS. These groupings generally regarded the Iraqi-Syrian border as a strategic asset, since both Baghdad and Damascus were very keen on "passing the buck" to the other side of the border.
As a part of these efforts, they had conducted a considerable degree of infiltration of various grouping in Syria. This I think is pretty much undeniable. Secondly, Iraqi Baath officers orginally deployed in Saddams pre US Golf War 1 chemical weapons programm likely sought ways to maintain a chemical and/or biological weapon capability in the inter-gulf-war period, with or without actually crossing the boundary. The methods to maintain chemical weapon capability in sanctioned Iraq are very applicable to the operational problem of manufactoring some dozens litres of Sarin.
If such weapons existed, they were not used in 2003 because chemical weapons are political weapons, and the political and diplomatic damage from "no WMDs in Iraq" was far greater then the damage some minor Sarin or VX hits could have delivered to the American military.
Suffice to say that Iraqi chemical weapons specialists were nearly definitly Baath members, had nearly definitly no future in Shia Iraq, and would thus present high value members for Isis.

Cui Bono:
Concerning the motive, let us consider the 2 main possible outcomes of a Gas attack:

1: The USA intervenes, and either destroys Assad outright or greatly reduces his military capabilities. Since Assad is the strongest obstacle to Jihadi rule, this is a good outcome. Secondly, "non Jihadi opposition" is to a considerable degree united only by hatred of Assad/Alewites. With those unifying enemies gone, and non IS opposition would splinter even, and individual splinters would be easy pickings for the Islamic state.
Lastly, American will to intervene is not an infinite resource, if the Americans intervene once, and the result is complete anarchy with a growing Jihadist statelet, there may well be a sentiment that keeps them from intervening again.

2: The US does not intervene. In this case, any remaining "pro western opposition" would be weakened and devalued, something that suits the IS well. Secondly, the Assad goverment will conclude that the only way to ensure its survival is focus on utterly crushing or keeping tiny any possible group the USA could back, even if these groups are not even remotely military threatening on their own.

Let me expand on this a bit more: If the Americans, mistakenly, believe that "pro western groups" are militarily credible and go in to crush Assad, well, Assad will end up dead (and the Americans will end up with a desert), however, incredible post Assad troubles for the USA will be of scant consolation to either Assad or the Alawites. The Syrian goverment thus has a very very big incentive to comprehensively crush any potential pro western groups so completely that not even Washington could possibly deem them credible.
From the pov. of Isis, this distracts SAA resources from fighting them, and greatly minimizes the odds of a potential reconcilliation between the loyalist factions and their patrons (Russia, China, Iran) and the opposition groups and their backers. Again, this is a very beneficial effect for Isis.

One may also add that, if this speculative theory actually holds water, both the "opposition" and the "regime" will assume an enemy "false flag" since they would know that it wasnt them, which once more has the effect of lessening trust between different enemies of ISIS.

An interesting thing about this "theory" is that it is, as far as I know, not ruled out by any currently existing credible evidence, and that it offers the maximum number of fig leaves for the maximum number of actors involved in the Syrian tragedy.

Personally, I believe that any "reapproachment" between western and Russian factions (not neccessarily the USA) would need to start with mutually agreeable things, and I kind of hope that this theory is one such thing.

I am not making any claim about this being true, it could however prove to be usefull.

[Ulenspiegel]

"It's possible that they are holding out for more concessions on EU membership negotiations, but that's obviously a no-go and everybody knows it."

It is stupid to start EU membership negotiations with a blackmail, the negotiations will take many years and require 28 yes votes. As Turk president I would have avoided the coupling of EU membership and Syria at all price.

[Amir]

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940728001371 "The terrorist groups in Syria have received Sarin gas from Ankara," member of the Republican People's Party (CHP) Barish Arkadash said on Tuesday." I did not find any other confirmations nor can I read Turkish and verify the original source.

[confusedponderer]

"It is stupid to start EU membership negotiations with a blackmail"

True, and I concede that I certainly do bear a grudge for what they have done.

Although, if Erdogan sees the entry negotiations as a process for the sake of process (because the EU is psycholgically and politically incapable of saying no) after which the Turks aren't going to be admitted, what's the loss?

[confusedponderer]

Babak,
I take it you suggest that the Saudi business is about buying political favours from Germany? The Saudis may think so, and in reality there indeed is a considerable degree of incluence money can buy. It works in the US (read Robert Baer and weep) and probably works in Germany, too.

Still, what IMO dominates the political side, I'd wager is by and large opportunistic, seeing these deals as opportuinities to keep jobs in Germany's export driven economy, as long as the buyers aren't too odious.

But at the end of the day the Gulfies are still mostly just a bunch of obnoxious pricks with a lot of money to spend whom nobody likes (which they probably suspect). That, and their nutty desire to Wahhabise the Middle East, are what gives them power.

What German business are trying to do is get their money while the getting is good. That's what businesses do. IMO, if they could choose freely, they'd do the same in Iran, again.

[confusedponderer]

Well, somebody managed to orchestrate the Ghouta PR blitz just fine, don't you think?

[confusedponderer]

I read that too; couldn't find it elsewhere either.