The Middle East almost always has been near the top of the American foreign policy agenda. Balancing commitment to Israel’s welfare with the high value placed on support for oil-rich Arab states has been one challenge. Reconciling rhetorical dedication to democracy promotion and human rights with a pragmatic recognition of friendly despotisms has been another. Hostile relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran added one more stressful element. Then the rise of radical jihadist movements and the phenomenon of transnational terrorism came to the fore. That turbulent mix has been stirred into a maelstrom by dramatic events – some initiated by the United States itself. Occupation of Afghanistan in response to 9/11, invasion and occupation of Iraq, the region-wide Global War on Terror, the Arab Spring, and capped by the unprecedented menace of ISIL.
Consequently, Washington officials face a uniquely complex policy field that places extraordinary demands of a strategic and diplomatic nature.
Surveying the present state of affairs, the observer is struck by the elements of contradiction in objective conditions and in the American policies intended to address them. Indeed, contradiction is the outstanding feature of the United States’ engagements in the Middle East. The swift Russian intervention into Syria exacerbates every one of the contradictory elements in Washington’s various, unintegrated Middle East policies. That is one reason for the unexpected moves by Putin are deeply unsettling. They not only add a major variable, but that factor also involves a self-willed player ready and able to take initiatives which are not predictable or easy to counter. An already fluid field of action, thereby, is rendered even more turbulent by orders of magnitude.
Another, related reason is that since the United States has no comprehensive strategy, the repercussions of the Russian actions, military and political, are generating a piecemeal reaction that finds it difficult to gain any intellectual or diplomatic traction in each policy sphere. Theoretically, these developments should highlight the need for such an overarching strategy by underscoring the costs of not having one. There is no evidence, though, of that happening within the Obama administration – or within the American foreign policy community generally. Why? In addition to the manifest lack of aptitude for such an undertaking, the kinds of conceptual adjustments indicated by the Russian intervention touch on highly sensitive questions of America’s status and mission in the world which its political elite is unprepared to engage.
The swift Russian intervention into Syria exacerbates every one of the contradictory elements in Washington’s various, unintegrated Middle East policies. That is one reason for the unexpected moves by Putin are deeply unsettling. They not only add a major variable, but that factor also involves a self-willed player ready and able to take initiatives which are not predictable or easy to counter. An already fluid field of action, thereby, is rendered even more turbulent by orders of magnitude. Another, related reason is that since the United States has no comprehensive strategy, the repercussions of the Russian actions, military and political, are generating a piecemeal reaction that finds it difficult to gain any intellectual or diplomatic traction in each policy sphere. Theoretically, these developments should highlight the need for such an overarching strategy by underscoring the costs of not having one. There is no evidence, though, of that happening within the Obama administration – or within the American foreign policy community generally. Why? In addition to the manifest lack of aptitude for such an undertaking, the kinds of conceptual adjustments indicated by the Russian intervention touch on highly sensitive questions of America’s status and mission in the world which its political elite is unprepared to engage.
Let us look first at the specific, practical effects on those problems with which Washington already is struggling. In Syria itself, the ambiguous Obama approach of “patience and persistence” is now fully exposed as the empty slogan that it always has been. Its basic flaws lie in the elementary failure to identify your enemy (ies), your allies, the nature of the threat and your objectives. No one has been able to say – from the President on down. Very early in the multi-party civil war, there was a recognition of their being two enemies: 1) the Assad government which President Obama vocally proclaimed “must go;” and 2) the diverse jihadist movements, declared foes of the West and their friends in the Islamic world, who rapidly became the dominant opposition force. The latter have subordinated “moderate” groups – both secular and Islamic – to a secondary status, with their very existence now being at the sufferance of al-Nusra (primarily) and ISIL. The former, in turn, is at war with ISIL for leadership of the Islamist cause – a conflict that creates incentives for it to tolerate tacit forms of cooperation with the “moderates’ so as to facilitate the continued flow of assistance from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf statelets, Turkey and the United States itself (via the “moderate’ intermediaries” who “reverse launder” them).
American policy-makers have sought to avoid the painful choice of selecting a “preferred enemy” by concentrating their rhetorical fire on ISIl while, at the same time, trying to square the circle by building a “third force” of politically congenial elements who would fight, and defeat, both ISIL and the Damascus regime. That latter initiative has failed ignominiously and was officially suspended on October 9 by the Pentagon.1 Unofficially, it never was viewed as the panacea. I was told by a State Department official who works on Syria, a year ago, that it was generally understand that the training project was just political window dressing. No one in the administration (except for a few incurable innocents) believed in it or thought that it could have any practical results. Oddly, Obama himself stated as much in an interview with Thomas Friedman last summer.2 That's $50 million worth of window dressing. It seems that the other $450 million was spent mainly by the CIA to continue supplying their tacit allies up North, i.e. remnants of the Free Syrian Army and their associates which include parts of the al-Nusra apparatus. It has become public knowledge that that program dates from 2011, allowing for a slowdown, if not complete break, in 2012 when Obama rejected a formal proposal from CIA Director David Petraeus to expand it. In practice, much of the sophisticated equipment simply passed through the administrative hands of validated “good guys” directly into the hands of the “bad guys.”
The logical contradiction between the White House’s lack of conviction in successive programs in support of “moderate” elements of the Syrian opposition, on the one hand, and the persistence in pursuing one ill-fated venture after another became publicly manifest when Obama’s Press Secretary Josh Earnest told reporters that the President had backed the now discarded training program only because he had been pressed to do so by critics in Congress and the media. Hence, he did not judge its termination as a failure of his administration’s judgment. This is a first.
Never before has a sitting President admitted that he had taken a risky foreign policy course without conviction in its value but strictly as an expedient gesture to domestic forces whom he was not prepared to confront. To disown so cavalierly what was rolled out with fanfare, and cited routinely as the foundation stone of American strategy in Syria, is high-level fecklessness without precedent.
That politically circuitous route has been supplemented by direct supply routes from the Gulf and Turkey into the inventories of al-Nusra and its affiliates. By implication, but not in declaration, Washington therefore has been drawing a clear line of differentiation, for some time, between ISIl and al-Nusra – despite the latter’s being an acknowledged affiliate of al-Qaeda. A great anomaly of the situation, of course, is that al-Qaeda has been figures as the “Great Satan” against which America has been fighting a global war since 2001. Yet, there is no political reaction to this extraordinary policy turn – whether by politicians, the media or the unofficial foreign policy community.
There is more than a touch of absurdity in this. Just this week, the White House justified its policy reversal in regard to the maintenance of a substantial troop presence in Afghanistan to counter a persistent al-Qaeda and ISIL threat. (Where the Taliban fit into the picture is conveniently left obscure). Yet far more formidable units of the latter, which are operating close to American strategic interests in the region of Syria and Iraq, are being treated as tacit allies of the United States. In addition to indirect arms supplies via other members of the Army of Victory, they are immune to American airstrikes. Even ISIL gets less attention from the United States Air Force than do the Taliban around Kunduz. Over the past month, it has flown fewer missions in Iraq and Syria combined than the Russians have flown in one day.
As far as the Obama people are concerned, this oddity owes in part to the premiums placed on maintaining close relations with traditional allies in the Gulf and with Turkey who view all Islamist forces in Syria as the key to toppling Assad. He bulks largest in their strategic thinking due to his Iranian ties at a time when, for them, the Sunni-Shia civil war within Islam eclipses all else. It also owes in part to the administration’s independent judgment that Iran is the region’s greatest menace insofar as American interests are concerned. In part, it further reflects Israeli strategic thinking that parallels that of Riyadh and the GCC minnows, with political resonance domestically. In part, there is the simple inability of the White House and associates to devise a strategy of a subtlety that matches the complexity of the situation – or to make the tough decision to scale back objectives in recognition of the severe limits on American influence.
This last has been underscored by the Russian intervention. Official Washington was caught by surprise – once again. Intelligence failed in terms of foreseeing the scale of the operation, of properly estimating Putin’s will and nerve, of appraising Russian military capabilities for swift action, and of readying a set of possible responses. Consequently, a pre-existing state of intellectual and diplomatic disarray has now degenerated into general disorientation and confusion.
The ad hoc response is characterized by these elements. One is a definition of the crisis mainly in terms of a Russo-American contest. Hence, the talk is of a second “Cold War”, of a “test for NATO” that includes beefing up Nordic defense3; rejecting if not ignoring out-of-hand Putin’s proposals for cooperation in finding a formula for stabilizing Syria; edging even closer to Turkey and the Saudis; and envisaging an entirely fresh approach to creating another version of a “third force” that would join the Syrian Kurds of the YPG with disparate splinter groups, who have given themselves the acquired surreal name of The Euphrates Volcano. They, in fact, are the flotsam and jetsam of the four year civil war: displaced locals, brigands, Turcomen recruited by Ankara from Syria, Iraq, the Caucasus or Central Asia. This last is strictly a public relations gesture whose accompanying rhetoric betrays the undercurrent of desperation in Washington. The Kurds of the Kobane region (Rojani) will not fight for anything more than their homes and fields – most certainly not for some abstract Sunni cause or to satisfy the ambitions of outside powers to unseat Assad with whom they long had reached a modus vivendi. As for the Euphrates Volcano, their loyalty as well as capacity for sustained military action is viewed as a very dubious commodity everywhere but in Langley, Virginia. They are no more the solution than have been the petty warlords and bandit militias in Afghanistan – another CIA and Special Forces creation.
Another sign pointing in the same direction is provided by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, among others, referring hopefully to the Russians experiencing another Afghanistan-like quagmire in Syria, of heavy casualties eroding Putin’s popularity and maybe even leading to his unseating (a la Kiev). Frustration over being outmaneuvered, of its less than serious campaign against being exposed for the pretentious failure it has been, of muscular Russian military performance – all are irritating that nerve of insecurity that runs through America’s body politic these days.
The most radical move, one with far-reaching complications, is to solidify what has been the tacit and partial understanding between the United States (pressed by Turkey and the KSA) and the al-Nusra dominated alliance renamed the Army of Victory (al-Burkan Furat) which also includes the radical Islamist group Ahrar – al-Shams. The implicit sanitizing of al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise entails the following steps: insistence on using the innocuous term “rebels” to refer in aggregate to all non-ISIL opponents of the Assad government – terminology that has been universally adopted by the media under administration pressure; denunciation of the Russians for striking al-Nusra and associates as well as ISIL; continued abstention from any American air strikes against even unmistakable al-Nusra sites; a pledge to bolster material support to groups operating under the Army of Victory umbrella without noting its essentially jihadist identity; and keeping up the drumfire of virulent criticism of the Iranian campaign to destabilize the Middle East – Syria nominated as the central front.
More serious is the ramping up of the CIA’s program to provide sophisticated armaments likely to strengthen the al-Nusra inventory. They include TOWs to counter the government’s armor and rockets that could threaten Russian bases. Director John Brennan visited the region early in October to forge a pact with the Saudi government to expedite the TOW shipments. The possibility exists that this step represents a desire on the part of the Obama administration, or at least certain elements of it, to exploit its links with the recently constituted, al-Nusra led Army of Victory that could transpose the second “Cold War’ onto the Middle East in response to the dramatic Putin initiative.
In short, insofar as Syria is concerned, we are observing Washington’s progressive adoption of the Israeli cum Saudi perspective. There is no indication that the Obama White House recognizes that the Russia factor has made that perspective academic and the chances of realizing its objectives nil. The potential implications are profound.
Cossetting the royal family and passive tolerance for all their weeks; ignoring the KAS as the source and abettor of radical Wahhabi movements; all-out backing for the assault on the Houthis in Yemen; refusing to cooperate on a tactical basis with Tehran despite manifest convergent interests - an attitude expressed with vehemence even after the nuclear accord; failure to confront Erdogan for his support to ISIL and al-Nusra; and fostering the Israeli-Saudi de facto diplomatic alliance. At no time have we heard an explanation of why we have taken these missteps or a recognition of their net effect. The Russian intervention in Syria (and Iraq) has highlighted the full geo-strategic implications of that strategic blindness. Our alignment with a self-conscious Sunni bloc (anti not just Shia but any non-Sunni Muslims, e.g. Alawite, Zaidi) is an enormous burden in an already flawed campaign against ISIL and AQAP. That is becoming evident in Baghdad as well as elsewhere.
*****
The errors of American policy in the Middle East over the past fourteen years are legion - as anyone paying attention knows. Those errors are conceptual, analytical and operational - at both the diplomatic and military plane. To this sorry record now has been added the macro error of choosing sides in Islam's sectarian civil war. It should have been obvious to even the novice that any contribution to its exacerbation was detrimental to the United States' interests and to those of the region as a whole. Instead, we have jumped in like fools where angels dare not tread. It is apparent that the implications of incremental decisions made disjointedly over time never were thought through - if thought about at all.
An ancillary error, as highlighted in this discussion, is the elementary mistake of having "chosen" the "wrong" side. By this I mean that it is a basic principle of realpolitik that an outside power that seeks (for sound reason or other) to intervene in such a situation to its advantage should associate itself with the weaker side, as a matter of principle. The reasons are too obvious to cite. It is hardly surprising that the maladroit Obama crowd should add this misjudgment its long list of tragic mistakes.
Elsewhere in the region, the reverberations from the Russian intervention are also being felt. The most immediate effects are to diminish Israeli and Turkey hopes for using the civil war to advance their own ends. The Saudi royal family, enmeshed in a succession crisis and stressed by its imperial war in Yemen, is unprepared to change course and instead will persevere in its self-defined mortal combat with Iran and its Syrian ally. As to Iraq, the equivocations and incompetence of the United States over the past year have made the al-Abadi government sympathetic to the arrival of Russia on the scene. It strengthens their hand in playing off Washington, Teheran and now Moscow while adding a powerful military ally in the fight against ISIL. That is why they have gone so far as to join the Russian sponsored alliance and welcomed establishment of an intelligence and planning cell in Baghdad. This ‘4 + 1’ unit registered its first success on October 11 when it prompted an Iraqi airstrike that killed a number of Daesh leaders on a road near Ramadi and injured al-Baghdadi himself.
A paradoxical twist is the opening of a divide in the Sunni bloc. Egypt and Jordan within days expressed their backing for the Russian military campaign. Al-Sisi in Cairo made it clear that the Islamists of all stripes (including the offshoots and residue of the Mother Brotherhood who play a minor role in the ranks of the opposition) are politically haram. He sees them as a menace to his rule which, as such, must be crushed. That takes precedence over removing Assad or curtailing the Shi’ite bloc. So strong is this conviction that al-Sisi saw fit to break with the Saudis on this issue despite Egypt’s critical dependence on the KAS’ financial largesse. As far as the American view is concerned, he continues to discount it in the aftermath of what he views as Washington’s betrayal in its acceptance of the Mursi government.
A similar line of thinking prevails in Amman where King Abdullah is well aware that both al-Nusra and ISIL have his monarchy in their sights. Moreover, he is more vulnerable in terms of geography and the fragility of Jordanian national identity. Defection of Egypt and Jordan jeopardizes the informal coalition of status quo powers that the United States has sought to reconstitute in the wake of the Iraq and Arab Spring upheavals. That odd-fellow grouping brought together the KSA, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and, implicitly, the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority. Their common enemies were radical Islam, Iran and its allies, and popular democracy.
It remains to be seen whether the fissures created by the Russian intervention will endure. One consequence is that it provides a further incentive for the U.S. to tighten its embrace of the Saudis and the Gulfies as staunch allies. That conclusion does mean overlooking their financial and material backing for Islamist extremists and their reckless assault in Yemen. Obama’s overriding concern to placate them in the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear deal, which they ardently opposed, is cited as the principal motivation behind this policy of concession and deference.
Another factor is the high value that Washington places on the military bases they make available. The Pentagon has pressured the White House hard to avoid doing anything that might call into question current arrangements. So long as some possible hot war with Iran is contemplated, they retain significant value for both the defense establishment and the President. Indeed, so long as the American military strategy aims at maintenance of “full spectrum dominance” in that part of the world, basing rights will trump other considerations no matter what path relations with the IRI take.
Taken together, these developments associated with the sudden entry of Russia into Syria, reestablishing itself as a Middle East power, have the net effect of weakening the American position. Since its loosely drawn goals remain maximalist and constant, the discrepancy will bedevil Washington policy-makers who already manifestly lack the adequate talents to manage the maelstrom of forces at work in the region.
In the broader perspective, Russia’s move into Syria has overturned some central pillars of the American worldview. As Alistair Crooke has written, since the Cold war’s end “NATO effectively has made all the decisions about war and peace. It faced no opposition and no rival. Matters of war were effectively a solely internal debate within NATO -- about whether to proceed or not, and in what way. That was it. It didn't matter much about what others thought or did. Those on the receiving end simply had to endure it.”3 That manifestly is no longer the case – whether in Europe or in the Middle East.
What irritates Washington more than anything else is the display of Russian military prowess thought relegated to history. Moreover, it has been done with impressive speed and efficiency. The unipolar moment that lasted for a quarter of a century is gone. America resists accepting that new reality. Hence, the denigration of Russia simultaneously with steps to impede its efforts in Syria rather than to form a tacit partnership.
These compounded frustrations lie behind the incandescent outrage at Russia’s temerity by American officials and the entire commentariat. The latter category includes highly regarded veteran “Sovietologists” like Strobe Talbott (former high official and now head of the Brookings Institution) and David Remnick (author of excellent books on the break-up of the Soviet Union and now editor of The New Yorker) whose supposed intimate knowledge of Russia is belied by the tenor of their emotional anti-Putin diatribes at once simplistic and at variance with the facts. Americans are reacting erratically to omens of the country’s mortality as global hegemon.
One never should underestimate the extent to which belief in American exceptionalism/superiority sustains collective and individual self-esteem.
` NOTES
- “NATO, Tested By Russia In Syria, Raises Its Guard and Its Tone” Helene Kantor The New York Times Oct 9 2015
2 “Pentagon Plans Major Shift In Effort to Counter Islamic State In Syria” WP Oct 10 Karen DeYoung Washington Post October 10 2015
3. Patrick Cockburn Counterpunch October 9, 2015
b,
As a Shia supremacist ruler of Iraq, how would Maliki have ever gotten the Sunni insurgency put down? Especially since he oppressed and betrayed the Sunnis ( Sons of Iraq and others) into reviving it?
Maliki drove the Sunni tribes into re-supporting al quaeda and then ISIS all over again to begin with.
I begin to wonder if a Shia supremacist government in Baghdad will ever bring itself to offer a Fair Deal to the Sunni Arab areas?
Probably not on its own. Perhaps under enough Iranian torture and pressure . . . if the Iranians decide a Fair Deal for the Sunni Iraqi Arabs is the only thing that will drain their support away from ISIS.
Posted by: different clue | 17 October 2015 at 05:11 PM
This passage confuses me in what otherwise is a compelling and comprehensive analysis. The Sunnis (certainly the jihadist wing) are the moral and numerical underdogs in the region.
"An ancillary error, as highlighted in this discussion, is the elementary mistake of having "chosen" the "wrong" side. By this I mean that it is a basic principle of realpolitik that an outside power that seeks (for sound reason or other) to intervene in such a situation to its advantage should associate itself with the weaker side, as a matter of principle. The reasons are too obvious to cite."
Posted by: sammy mcnight | 17 October 2015 at 05:24 PM
EU will follow where US leads - without a doubt.-The Syrian nat gas line that will feed EU says otherwise.Its amazing how msm keeps Syrian nat gas line out of the US,NATO propaganda.Winter is coming!
Posted by: One eyed Jack | 17 October 2015 at 06:10 PM
b
you are a good and useful military analyst but your evident desire to blame the US for the world's ills is just sad. US failure to deal effectively with IS does not mean the US "sponsored" IS, but you want to believe that and will do so as will many here. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 17 October 2015 at 06:23 PM
Babak,
"[T]he absence of independent (from the United States) analytical capability" could suggest the problem is one of actual capacity. I suspect it's more the sheer weight of the prevailing paradigm steering most analytical efforts into well-established streams.
Those who do sense the shifting tectonics probably keep most of their thoughts to themselves. Going against deeply rooted establishment views from within takes a peculiar kind of rash courage. Still, the plates are moving and if the US persists in pursuing often inexplicable policies, that shift will accelerate.
Posted by: Ingolf | 17 October 2015 at 06:42 PM
Sir
In my business travel overseas I have noticed a general perception particularly in Asia and Latin America of US government omnipotence. Anything that happens there is a conspiracy theory that US black operations in support of some nefarious economic advantage is behind it.
People in those parts of the world have a hard time believing the gross incompetence of our government by and large as well as the delusional hubris of our political elites and the apparatchiks that climb to power in the bureaucracy.
I have found in Europe however a certain type of person that have had a historical bias as a "red" sympathizer and has always been against the ideals of our system as well as the success and strength of the US. I think that is a congenital trait.
Posted by: Jack | 17 October 2015 at 07:04 PM
The numbers are elusive and I was aware of that. In the Islamic world as a whole, the Sunnis are several times more numerous. That holds for the Greater Middle East as well since it includes Turkey. Only if we limit the region to the Arab Middle East (and leave out North Africa) is there something closer to a balance - IF we make Iran an honorary Arab country.
But the numbers are only part of the story. Sunnis have traditionally dominated the region. Only the political "liberation" of Iraq's Sunnis after 500 years has Shi'ite Iran acquired a potentially significant partner.
In functional diplomatic terms, the United States over the past few years has had three choices re. the Sunni-Shia "civil war:" remain assiduously neutral, back the Sunni bloc (as we now are unwittingly doing), or aim at transcending the sectarian conflict in the interest of regional stability by trying to foster a set of understandings that give Iran a legitimate place in the affairs of the region - especially its security affairs.
As far as can be seen from the outside, the Obama people (and those who circulate in its orbit)have not recognized the saliency of the issue, have not realized that there were choices to be made, or made wise ones. What else is new; the foreign policy establishment, for the most part, has freeze-dried in minds since 9/11/2001.
Posted by: mbrenner | 17 October 2015 at 08:37 PM
Yes that is the bit that put a big smile on my face too. Great throughout and a pleasure to read. Kudos Dr. Brenner.
Posted by: JJackson | 17 October 2015 at 08:58 PM
One eyed Jack,
Try the Russian to Germany gas pipeline project that bypasses Ukraine.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/gazprom-signs-preliminary-deal-to-expand-gas-pipeline-to-germany-1434648924
Posted by: Fred | 17 October 2015 at 11:33 PM
walrus,
"I used to excuse infantile behaviour on the basis that the person would grow out of it. "
This is the ongoing conduct of the 60's generation that rebelled against their parents ideals. Now that the unipolar world has been proven to be at an end by the very effective conventional military actions in Syria by a nuclear armed Russian Federation and her allies they are going to turn inward. Just think of the damage they are going to inflict upon American society if they are not stopped by electoral action soon.
Posted by: Fred | 17 October 2015 at 11:45 PM
Fred and Walrus
My wife and I are happy to have lived in the great days of the Republic. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 18 October 2015 at 12:31 AM
Fred
Boomer presidents Slick Willy and Dubya brought about the disregard for international law and acting with impunity.
Gen Xer Obama has continued in that vein. One good thing is that the Boomers are slowly getting out of the picture. The question is how the Millenials are going to run things. They are an even larger cohort relative to the Boomers. I recently saw an interview of Neil Howe who does demographic research and he believes that while the Boomers were culture warriors the Millenials will be more like the GI generation. So there are some grounds for optimism. But...in their book The Fourth Turning they say there is an 80+ year cycle and we are now in a period of crisis. We'll need to get through that before an era of stability and the next generation of culture warriors arrive on stage.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strauss–Howe_generational_theory
Posted by: Jack | 18 October 2015 at 01:13 AM
Amazing how little coverage that deal got, even in the business pages. Hugely significant.
Posted by: LondonBob | 18 October 2015 at 05:29 AM
So life--and Europe, is a all wrapped up neat. A geographical area mapped out, and a chain of command. Yeah, sure. Nobody out there taking a train from "Lake Geneva to the Finland Station". Europe is an idea...as such, always in flux.
Posted by: jonst | 18 October 2015 at 06:23 AM
On paper, all EU decisions are supposed to be made unanimously.
In reality, EU is not a federal system of sovereign states of equal political weight.
In reality, the Earl of London, the Baroness of Berlin, and the Duke of Paris tell others what to do.
Or Else.
And they all fall into place.
If you do not know this, then you have not been paying attention to how EU operates.
Consider: "When and why Iran became the Enemy of Denmark?"
Consider: "Why a communication satellite of Iran has been impounded by Italy for 10 years?"
Consider: "Iran was supplying oil to Greece on credit when no one else would - the EU Troika ordered the Greeks to "cease and desist"."
And the EU Troika, in turn, are in cahoots with the Elector of Washington.
When, in Greece, you have pensioners looking through the garbage for food and in Germany you have people driving BMWs - then - in my opinion - you are living in a feudal system.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 18 October 2015 at 01:37 PM
Iran's Mullahs make enemies. People in the 'West' are ready to hate them from the moment the Mullahs open their mouths. That is a reality. It is a--partly- irrational one. So it fits with the irrational nonsense (as I would read it, you won't agree) that comes out of the mouths of the Mullahs. Bush et al, had a certain element...the moment he opened his mouth he made enemies.
A digression, if you don't know why Italy is holding a "communication device" they impounded, I suggest it is YOU who has not be paying attention to how Italy has operated for centuries. Maybe they can trade it for one or another of those poor souls languishing some prison in Iran for kissing in public, or dancing, or some other 'bad behavior' the Mullahs frown on.
Posted by: jonst | 18 October 2015 at 03:35 PM
Again, the issue is not Iran per se.
The point I was hoping to make was that the Troika tells others what to do and they do it.
The Troika tells Greece to hurt herself and she dutifully does.
That is all.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 18 October 2015 at 08:12 PM
Too simplistic for my taste. Greece does not "dutifully" do anything. She does under protest. Germany and the Greek ruling class wins. Now. For the moment. But at what cost? Setting up future confrontations? Other nations draw lessons. Yours strikes me an Principal-Agency relationship in the which the Principal says "jump" the agent says, "how high?" That is not the way I see life, or diplomacy, or history. I. The Greeks, begrudgingly dragged into doing something, for all we know, may set the stage for entire southern tier of the EU withdrawing from the EU. These arrangements are not set in stone.
Posted by: jonst | 19 October 2015 at 09:00 AM
Col. sir, Jack, Dr. Brenner
RE: "gross incompetence of our government by and large as well as the delusional hubris of our political elites and the apparatchiks that climb to power in the bureaucracy"
From what I recently gleaned...
http://chuckspinney.blogspot.my/2015/09/why-is-us-foreign-policy-shambles.html
Posted by: YT | 19 October 2015 at 12:20 PM
Interesting, Babak. But over loads of sicsempertyrannis synapses, I am not really surprised, I may have been expecting it for longer now.
Full discovery: Yes, admittedly, I found Erdogan challening Peres in Davos, quite interesting. But I accept you tell me that Erdogan was indeed the wrong to listen to/?the devil? while Peres, with the little help he got from the female assistant, was the hero, I assume.
I forget how you used that event in your argument, but I did notice it.
Posted by: LeaNder | 19 October 2015 at 12:25 PM
This was a great article, with useful insights and really good arguments. I certainly appreciated it. However, I'm probably more ambivalent about Obama than most of those who comment here. A lot that has happened in the last few years could have been implemented a lot more intelligently. Who gets trained and who gets armed by us being an example. However, prior to the entry by the Russians Obama had no attractive choices. I have tried to think of which presidents have been faced with a similar situation and the only one that came readily to mind was FDR. In the late 30s and early 40s there was no mistaking the signs of what the Nazis wanted and, like IS, they were truly a bad lot. But he also had a country full of people who did not want to get involved in "that European war". Despite the ravings of McCain, Graham, and most Republicans (and some Dems under the thumb of AIPAC) most Americans are not keen on our sending ground troops into yet another Arab country. I know a quarry manager whose son was an infantryman in Iraq. Back in '06 & '07 I would ask about his son. We talked about the Iraqi debacle. One day he said, "Those people have been fighting each other for hundreds of years. We don't need to be in the middle of it."
I suspect that sentiment prevails in many quarters.
Posted by: Stonevendor | 19 October 2015 at 02:34 PM
Of course disagreement is only natural; may the truth be revealed through such disagreements.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 19 October 2015 at 02:35 PM
How could it ever be otherwise?
https://thinkpatriot.wordpress.com/2015/02/26/complex-systems-and-the-hubris-is-easy-also-profitable/
The report I have never seen is the heads-in-the-baskets rate for the intelligence directors vs all the other senior people in gov. It is the last possible brag they might make to defend their record of utter failure throughout history.
Posted by: lew | 19 October 2015 at 04:21 PM
LondonBob,
I'm sure the people in the gas and pipeline business are paying attention even if the press and think-tank crowd aren't.
Posted by: Fred | 19 October 2015 at 04:49 PM
Col.,
Your example is still the one to follow in these darkening days.
Posted by: Fred | 19 October 2015 at 04:52 PM