Erdoğan's legacy and the Kurds (by CP)

Commentators often refer to Turkey‘s neo-Ottoman policies domestically or vis a vis its neighbours, notably Syria. What "neo-Ottoman" exactly means is disputed. The term is being used equally as an epithet or descriptive. I will sidestep that here, since, while what I am interested in may be neo-Ottoman, or not, whether that label applies or not is IMO not particularly meaningful.

♦ Building a legacy

I think that the key to understanding at least one important aspect about Erdogan’s Turkey ist he simple fact that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is an unabashed Islamist, an Islamist in a business suit, but an Islamist no less. He is also a man intent on building a legacy - nothing less than remaking Turkey, and he is beginning with the role of presidency, and if the sheer size his new palace is any indication he has grand designs.Erdoğan's biggest legacy project domestically is to rewrite the constitution and turn Turkey into a more presidential, and - Erdogan is an Islamist after all - more Islamic country, shedding the laizist constraints that Attatürk and successive Turkish generals had enshrined in the current constitution.

By all appearances, Erdogan and his supporters seem convinced that Turkey needs a firm hand ...

"seen against the background of his recent behaviour, Mr Erdogan’s plans for a strong presidency are troubling. He has dismantled checks on his power. His approach is majoritarian and divisive: so long as his party wins elections, it can trample any critics. Critical newspaper groups have been subjected to capricious tax fines. Columnists have been fired. Turkey had more journalists in jail than any other country until the middle of last year, when a clutch of 40 were let out. Reporters Without Borders, a Paris-based group, ranks it 149th of 180 countries for press freedom, above Russia but below Venezuela.

The authorities have often tried to close off access to critical websites and social media. In the second half of 2014, Turkey filed 477 requests to Twitter to remove content, five times more than any other country. And since Mr Erdogan became president, 105 people have been indicted for insulting the head of state."

... or a heavy foot: Speaking ill of Erdoğan in the presence of his advisors appears to be unwise.

The pictured man, Mr. Yusef Yerkel, aide to Erdoğan, apparently fiercly loyal, hurt his foot while dealing out swift justice and had to be given a week of sick leave to recover from his injury. He explained later that he had been provoked.

♦ The dissolution of the solution process

Apart from drafting a new constitution, Erdoğan promised to move forward the so-called solution process, the Kurdish–Turkish peace process. This was central to Erdoğan's policy program for Turkey. A part of his outreach to the Kurds has been, unsurprisingly, emphacising Muslim unity.

It is, after this, somewhat surprising that this policy found its abrupt and violent end.

For their part, the situation of the Turkish Kurds had been by and large improving, culminating in their participation in the recent elections. The Iraqi Kurds had carved out their de-facto autonomous region in North Iraq, stopping short of independence. The Syrian Kurds had been granted autonomy by the Syrian government early on in the civil war. The expansion of ISIS at Kurdish expense alarmed Kurds, especially the capture of Mosul and the climatic battle of Kobane, during which Turkey tacitly supported ISIS.

The Turks were uneasy in light of Kurdish enclaves gaining increasing amounts of autonomy bordering to statehood as a consequence of the instability in Syria and Iraq. The rising level of Kurdish activity certainly must have alarmed the nationalists and the military. But Kurdish autonomy in North Iraq had been going on for several years, and yet the 'solution process' proceeded, albeit slowly.

What changed?

♦ Overriding priorities

For one, Turkish policy empowering and facilitating Jihadis in Syria worked to undermine the credibility of the solution process. Turkish facilitation was most visible during the Battle of Kobane. That is to say that it was his own foreign policy which ruined Erdoğan's domestic attempt to come to terms with the Kurds.

Beyond that, I propose that domestic imperatives were probably more important: Erdoğan requires for his constitutional change a two third majority so that his AKP can change the constitution without a referendum.  Here's the neo-liberal take on the state of affairs in Turkey:

"To change the system, the AKP needs a two-thirds, or 367-seat, majority enabling it to rewrite the constitution. Failing that – and it looks highly improbable – it needs a three-fifths, or 330-seat, majority, which would allow it to call a plebiscite on constitutional revision. That, too, is unlikely, according to the opinion polls. But there is general agreement that the party is the slickest, most organised political machine Turkey has ever seen. All bets are off. The AKP owns the bureaucracy, controls the media, has returned the army to barracks and marginalised the military, traditional arbiters of Turkish politics. Erdoğan used his final term as prime minister to curb the independence of the key institutions of state – the constitutional court, the parliament, the central bank, the prosecution and judiciary services."

After several successive electoal victories, Erdoğan’s AKP lost its absolute majority the first time since 2002 in the last elections, with the Kurds scoring a surprising 13% of the vote. Their electoral success thus threatens Erdoğan's constitutional transformation.

In a sense, by merely participating in Turkey's electoral and parliamentary process, successfully, the Kurds threaten Erdoğan’s constitutional transformation more than as if they abstained or seceded. It is my impression that their participation and success in the elections was the last straw.

♦ The fix

Erdoğan's approach to this knotty problem appears to me to have thus far been rather Macchiavellian:

After a series of suicide bomb attacks against Kurdish activists in Suruc (met with a media blackout), and only recently in Ankara (met with a media blackout),Turkish authorities are suspecting publicly bi-polar extremes - IS and the PKK.

I find that doubtful. The PKK has done suicide bombings in the past, in fact rather recently even, but to the best of my knowledge not directed at fellow Kurds.

The Suruc and Ankara blasts apparently deliberately targeted Kurds and political opposition activity. The Suruc blast was specifically directed at secular, socialist Kurds who supported the defenders of Kobane, and it came in the aftermath of the Battle of Kobane.

In a recent PKK suicide attack a Kurd tried to drive a tractor with two tons of explosives into a Turkish army checkpoint. Different sort of target and it doesn't parse with the Suruc and Ankara blasts. Blowing up crowds of apostates or heathen however is something that Jihadis do, do a lot in fact.

Alas, keeping IS and the PKK as official suspects would help enlisting potential US and European support in "fighting terror" and help split up the notoriously fracticidal Kurds. If the news blackouts are any indication, Turkish authorities like to keep it that ambiguous. It serves their purposes.

And speaking of purposes, it is by now obvious that between Jihadis  and Turkey there is a working relationship. Turkey colluded with Jabhad al Nusra to bring Division 30 to their doom. Generally, Turkey has supported various Islamist groups in Syria, notably Jabhat al Nusra. The Turks facilitated IS at Kobane. The Suruc bombing afterwards has apparently been comitted by IS. This list is incomplete.

Turkey clearly sees Islamist groups in Syria as useful and controllable tools to achieve its policy goals there. Why just there? Perhaps such groups had martyrs to spare in exchange for material support? I propose as a working theory that the Turks may be using Jihadis not only in Syria but also domestically. Jihadi involvement certainly would explain the odd, recent spike in suicide attacks against opposition groups in Turkey.

In face of this and an increasing number of Turkish air strikes against Kurdish targets, the Kurds are effectively drifting out of democratic participation back into sectarian and internecine strife and out of the electoral equation. True to form (perhaps nudged by MIT?) the Kurds apparently merrily oblige.

For Erdoğan's plans to remake the constitution, Kurdish abstention can only be of advantage.

Making the Kurds the foreign and domestic enemy again, may even give his reforms a sense of urgency to help hurry them along. By holding up the spectre of Kurdish terror and independence as an internal and external threat, the AKP may even succeed co-opting the nationalists and the military. If the choices are building a heritage by installing an Islamist presidential constitution or being at war with the Kurds again, the latter may just be a small price that Erdoğan is willing to pay.

... to be continued

by confusedponderer

Comments

[Babak Makkinejad]

confusedponderer:

That is the real issue; neither Kurd nor Turk can trust that the Turkish government agents have not been complicit in the suicide bombings against Kurds.

But very many Kurds are also to be blamed; 40 years of war - like ETA in Spain - and only dead bodies to show for all of that. All those young Kurdish Marxist-Leninist-Maoist living in the Lala Land and killing and dying for a cause that one may honestly describe as both unreachable as well as utterly and completely rubbish.

[Will]

yep, democracy is not all that it's cracked up to be. I love it when in Turtledove's ww2 alien invasion novel, the lizards call it "snout counting." The strongest argument that Charles II made to regain the monarchy was that the King was constitutionally restrained, but that a Protector like Cromwell had unlimited powers. Erdogan is another would be Cromwell. (leaving out Hitler, for now)

this is interesting:
"The political doctrine of anacyclosis (or anakyklosis from Greek: ἀνακύκλωσις) is a cyclical theory of political evolution. The theory of anacyclosis is based upon the Greek typology of constitutional forms of rule by the one, the few, and the many. Anacyclosis states that three basic forms of "benign" government (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) are inherently weak and unstable, tending to degenerate rapidly into the three basic forms of "malignant" government (tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy). Note that "ochlocracy" refers to mob rule, not the concept of democracy created in the late 18th century.
According to the doctrine, "benign" governments have the interests of all at heart, whereas "malignant" governments have the interests of a select few at heart. However, all six are considered unworkable because the first three rapidly transform into the latter three due to political corruption."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anacyclosis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyklos

[Ishmael Zechariah]

CP,
Re: "After several successive electoal victories, Erdoğan’s AKP lost its absolute majority the first time since 2002 in the last elections, with the Kurds scoring a surprising 13% of the vote." Do you know how this 13% was achieved?

Ishmael Zechariah

[confusedponderer]

IZ,
"Do you know how this 13% was achieved?"

I don't and I'd be grateful for insights.

[Ishmael Zechariah]

CP,
The current election code of Turkey is designed to marginalize all with less than 10% of the vote. HDP was "loaned" votes from CHP to put it over the 10% barrier in a number of important cities. The tayyiban are counting on this not happening again-and they may prove to be correct. The 60% in Turkey need to come together and kick these bastards out. A coup really is not the answer. An election followed by trials is.

BTW, the show Merkel performed with tayyip was surprising.
Ishmael Zechariah

[Will]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_general_election,_June_2015#Issues_and_developments

looking at the maps, it appears that Erdogan's strength is in the rural Anatolian hinterland. The other two major groupings are 1) urban center and 2) south east Kurdish Turkey.

The Kurds may not turn out in large numbers as before in this November election. The Urban centers will still vote. Erdogan may yet get his majority.

[confusedponderer]

Re: Merkel - desperation, IMO.

Erdoğan really is the one at fault for a good deal of the refugee crisis but also, however annoying that is, the one in the key position to do something about it, something he will try to leverage to the fullest, and milk for domestic PR.

Back in the summer he wanted not just the safe zone, but 3 billion Euro to boot. He got neither, and we got the refugees. And then he got a rematch.

Edit: Actually, here is in detail what he demands now:

"... around €3 billion ($3.4 billion) in aid, via an EU trust fund. Visa-free travel for Turks inside the EU’s Schengen zone, another big prize, may be granted next year, if Turkey agrees to readmit illegal third-country migrants who reach Europe via its territory. Perhaps most strikingly, the leaders agreed last night to “re-energise” Turkey’s long-stalled bid to join the EU."

I wanna retch. It continues:

"Many details remain to be filled in, and some governments are hostile. Austria and Cyprus remain sceptical about accelerating Turkey’s membership bid, for example. A further Turkish demand—to be placed on a list of “safe countries of origin”, meaning that the small number of Turkish nationals seeking asylum in the EU would struggle to obtain it—also faces opposition from some European governments"

And rightly so.

http://tinyurl.com/pkfoln9

[Babak Makkinejad]

My impression has been that at the start of campaign to destroy the Syrian Arab Republic, certain promises had been made to Turkey which were left unfulfilled.

Likely, Erdogan thought of himself as having been tricked.

Now, he is playing hardball with those whom he considers to have tricked him.

[Kunuri]

Will, If I know the Kurds, they are not cowed easily, in my furtive imagination they are like the Irish of Turkey. They are rebellious by nature, and not dumb. Expect an unusual turnout in southeast Turkey and a complete rout for AKP.

[Kunuri]

Yes BM, he expected Assad to let free the Muslim Brotherhood and Ihvan adherents within Syria. It was a no go for Assad, so RTE just got pissed off and decided to off him. Still sticks to it, see, its all personal, like the southern turn of Hitler from the suburbs of Moscow to deprive Stalin of the city of his namesake. That's how megalomaniacs behave.

[Kunuri]

Merkel was set up, when will they ever learn. Those tacky thrones and all, why give this despot a light of a the day? Don't they know they are encouraging him and enabling him to do even worse? Why would they even take him seriously as a head of state? HE HAS NO POWERS UNDER TURKISH CONSTITUTION TO NEGOTATE ANYTHING!

[Kunuri]

Sorry IZ, but the loaned votes to HDP are no longer needed to keep them in the parliament. The Kurdish body public is energized to see HDP as their only hope to any kind of legitimate representation. They will sweep wide swaths of votes from AKP, the undecided and politically apathetic.

[confusedponderer]

"HE HAS NO POWERS UNDER TURKISH CONSTITUTION"

Yet.

Already, Davatoglu is just his placeholder. Everybody, not just Merkel, negotiating with Erdoğan only makes this clearer. In essence Erdoğan is already living the powers he imagines his future office to hold, after the referendum.

[confusedponderer]

Kunuri,
as they say in German: "Ihr Wort in Gottes Ohr ..."

I hope you're right.

[Stonevendor]

"...the Irish of Turkey." I thoroughly enjoy reading the featured pieces and comments on this site. Many are so well thought out, so informative, and thought provoking on my part. But, Kunuri, this has to be one of the most delightful comments I have encountered here. I conjure up images of Kurds tossing down an ale, and then dancing off to the polls accompanied by stings, whistles and drums. I wish you, and your Kurdish friends, the best of luck in the upcoming election and I am sure my distant relatives in County Cork would do so also.

[turcopolier]

Stonevender

"... this has to be one of the most delightful comments I have encountered here." Well, how condescending you are... pl

[Ryan]

This article from Bloomberg News is related to the ongoing mess today in an indirect manner. There is a small skirmish going on in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the southern Caucasus Mountains between Azerbaijan and Armenia that dates back to 1994. Nagorno-Karabakh is mostly Christian and doesn't wish to be a part of Azerbaijan. As a result, there has been off and on fighting for years between the two. Turkey supports Azerbaijan while Russia is attempting to mediate between the two combatants while selling weapons to both. Russia and Turkey are both watching this region closely.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-22/frozen-war-thaws-in-russian-backyard-as-nagorno-karabakh-flares?cmpid=yhoo.headline

At one point around ten years ago I read that Russia had a motor rifle division stationed in Armenia and a fighter wing. The divison has probably been replaced with a brigade as part of the Russian Army's reorganization.

[Ryan]

Good article, CP.

I like this gem you found:

"seen against the background of his recent behaviour, Mr Erdogan’s plans for a strong presidency are troubling. He has dismantled checks on his power."

Mr. Erdogan is a man after Dick Cheney and Bill Kristol hearts.

[Ishmael Zechariah]

Kunuri,
I posted the "vote loan" as a matter of historical record. It is important for the Committee to have the correct information behind the recent 13%. HDP had never exceeded 7% before, and the loaned votes were the main factor in their performance in the last election- quite a few tayyipist big wigs lost because of that. Maybe HDP's performance in the upcoming election will be better-we will see.
I am not as sanguine as you are about the future. HDP's unholy alliance with the illegal tayyiban government is one factor-quite a few ethnic Kurds who are loyal the Turkish Republic detest HDP and the PKK.
Be safe.
Ishmael Zechariah

[Babak Makkinejad]

Do you know or understand why Kurds are not attracted to Liberalism?

All those young and not-too-old people with Communist flags; why do they not support the principles of a Liberal Order?

Would that not be a more workable and beneficial political platform for them?

[LeaNder]

A threshold of 10% versus the 5% we have, surely has an impact on voters. I noticed it, he way wondering about its legal history. ;)

Electable parties, nutshell programs in the upcoming election?

[LeaNder]

"tossing down an ale"

dark ale, I avoid the brand, with exactly the right type of stiff foam you can write your initials on/in and they still show in the remnants of foam on the bottom of your glass, was the wisdom I was told. ;)

[LeaNder]

Ok, I didn't get it. Maybe?? I concentrated on the good luck. And strictly I wouldn't assume Kunuri has a Kurdish background. Should I?

[Kunuri]

Keine sorge, LeaNder, I am a mix of many genes, but product of several cultures and upbringing. My loyalties lie with humanity and those who are just.

[Stonevendor]

I'm sorry if you took offense. I meant what I said about this being a site with thought provoking content. But, let's face it, there is also a lot grim news. Kunurl's "furtive imagination" brought a smile.