Straws in the Middle East wind (FB Ali)

Having performed the modern equivalent of the ancient practice of predicting the future based on examining the entrails of a sacrificial animal, I'd like to share my findings with this Committee.

The young Saudi Prince Muhammad, having sown his wild oats in Yemen, seems to have now been taken in hand by the elders of the clan. In the process, of course, he perpetrated the most notable war crime of the post-WW2 era. Having drawn in the US as a (probably reluctant) aider and abettor, he has also ruled out any valid grounds for the US media and sundry 'keepers of the world's conscience' to expostulate in horror every time Rami Abdelrahman announces from his London basement that the vile Assad's forces had killed a dozen or two civilians. Not that this will stop them, of course. 

The clan elders steered Prince Muhammad (still the face of the regime, being the apple of his father the King's eye) to Cairo, where he was lectured on the facts of life by President el-Sisi (and then signed a pact between Egypt and Saudi Arabia). In the 'world according to Sisi', the villains are Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the various jihadi groups, while anyone fighting them, such as Assad of Syria, are good guys. Turkey is up to no good; it backed the MB and now supports the jihadis; it aims to re-establish its rule over the Arabs. Iran and Hizbullah are undoubtedly suspect as Shia, but have their hearts in the right place as they also fight jihadis. And, of course, all this needs lots of money, so thank you in advance for your generous assistance.

Field Marshal el-Sisi himself is currently on a roll, but his future is anything but certain. Having been let out from the penalty box where he'd been put for a while by the US, he has been compensated by a shower of F-16s, money, high-level visits, etc. With the blood he has already shed, and his continuing tough ways, he may have a suicide bomber get close enough some day. Or, if things start to go downhill in the country, another general or a junta may remove him.

The Saudis are going to end their Yemen misadventure; however, the young Prince is having one last fling to save face. With the Emiratis, he has launched a ground attack on the Houthis (presumably planned by American advisers). The hope is that when it succeeds in driving them from Sanaa, Yemeni 'President' Hadi and his ministers will be transported there, the Prince will declare "Mission Accomplished", and end the war. However, as he should have already learned, in war things often don't go according to plan; instead of saving face he may find himself with more muck on it. Meanwhile, AQAP, the local al Qaeda franchise, much strengthened by the war, will become a major threat to the Saudis and the Gulfies, while IS establishes itself there.

Saudi and Gulfie support for the jihadis (the al Qaeda 'front' (the JaF or Army of Conquest) and the IS) is going to dry up, except from Qatar, which likes to live dangerously, relying perhaps on its vast wealth and the military facilities it provides the US. Jordan will fall obediently in line, but whether its CIA-run 'operations room' will stop arming and funding any more JaF disguised as 'good guys' is an open question (the CIA is known to sometimes conduct its own foreign policy).

Another possible development is for the price of oil to go up. The Saudis and Gulfies have been pumping like mad, but now, with the sanctions being lifted, Iranian oil is going to flood back into the market, which could cause the price to collapse even further. The Arabs have already been feeling the pinch: with their exorbitant expenses to keep their 'royalty' in the style they're accustomed to, and to bribe their citizenry, most of them have been running short of money (and some rumoured to be running short of oil reserves as well!). They may well decide it's time to recall OPEC and turn down the spigots.

The US military is surprised at the results (or lack thereof) of its air campaign against IS. After a year of bombing, and claiming about 10,000 IS fighters killed, it finds IS's strength apparently unimpaired, enabling it to capture fresh territory while holding on to what it had already seized. This puzzlement has led to denial and some rather weak explanations. Perhaps they will twig to the obvious. Even though CENTCOM claims that its bombing has caused all of 2 civilian casualties, other reports speak of hundreds (in just the 52 incidents investigated). If the US military realises that it is the families, friends and neighbours of those killed that are bolstering IS's ranks, they may ease up on their air strikes (at least in Iraq).

Another surprise for the US military was the fate of the 60 Syrian fighters it had trained (with considerable fanfare) and then sent back into Syria, only to have them promptly mopped up by al-Nusra. There was some grumbling back home at the million dollar plus cost per lost fighter, but what these skinflints don't realise is that most of that went into the pockets of US contractors, which is all good for the US economy. The chances are the US will now accept the inevitable conclusion that the Free Syrian Army plan is a mirage, and the real choice is between the Assad government and the jihadis, even though it is unlikely to publicly acknowledge it. Especially after the Saudi switch.

That will leave Turkey alone in its anti-Assad policy (except, of course, for the jihadis). Recent moves leave Erdogan well placed to cope with this changed situation. Finding himself hemmed in by the Kurds, through their election success at home, and their progress in creating a Kurdish enclave in Syria (on Turkey's border), he switched gears, declared a campaign against IS, and promptly bombed the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. He also appears to have gotten the US to abandon the Syrian Kurds in return for being allowed to use the Incerlik airbase, with some murky agreement in the mix about establishing a 'safe haven' in Syria across the border.

Erdogan knows something that the US and the West haven't realised yet: there is no basic difference between al-Nusra, IS and other jihadi factions. The differences are all about leadership, not ideology or ultimate aims. If any one of them becomes too powerful somewhere, the others will ally with it, or see their followers switch allegiance. That is why Erdogan can afford to have his military carry out some token attacks against IS to please the US, while continuing support for al-Nusra. All of them are targetting Assad, and if he falls it will be the jihadis who will take over Syria. That would be fully in line with Erdogan's game plan of establishing a large Sunni 'base' in the ME under his control or influence.

So, the game goes on in the Middle East, as it has for the last hundred years.

But there is a bigger and more lasting change heading its way.

In the next couple of decades, this area will also be significantly affected by the profound changes occurring in the Eurasian "Heartland" as China implements its grand design of the One Belt One Road project.

Comments

[Old Gun Pilot]

Seamus Padraig
See also: " A Man Called Intrepid" Lyons Press 1976
OGP

[Valissa]

FB Ali, you are a wonderful geopolitical storyteller! Entertaining and informative.

Looking forward to the next update on the exploits of Prince Mohammed ;)

Since the political games in the ME are so complex and entangled, I often find old maps very helpful. Today I came across an interesting article on the 1920 Treaty Of Sèvres whose 95th anniversary was on 8/10. Though I originally read it at Foreign Policy, that triggered me to read it at author Nick Danforth's own blog, which focuses on Ottoman/Turkish/Middle Eastern/Balkan cartography .

The Sevres Anniversary http://www.midafternoonmap.com/2015/08/the-sevres-anniversary.html
Ninety-five years ago today, European diplomats gathered at a porcelain factory in the Paris suburb of Sèvres and signed a treaty to remake the Middle East from the ashes of the Ottoman empire. The plan collapsed so quickly we barely remember it anymore, but the short-lived Treaty of Sèvres, no less than the endlessly discussed Sykes-Picot agreement, had consequences that can still be seen today. We might do well to consider a few of them as the anniversary of this forgotten treaty quietly passes by. ...

There’s no doubt that Europeans were happy to create borders that conformed to their own interests whenever they could get away with it. But the failure of Sèvres proves that that sometimes they couldn’t. When European statesmen tried to redraw the map of Anatolia, their efforts were forcefully defeated. In the Middle East, by contrast, Europeans succeeded in imposing borders because they had the military power to prevail over the people resisting them. Had the Syrian nationalist Yusuf al-‘Azma, another mustachioed Ottoman army officer, replicated Ataturk’s military success and defeated the French at the Battle of Maysalun, European plans for the Levant would have gone the way of Sèvres.

Would different borders have made the Middle East more stable, or perhaps less prone to sectarian violence? Not necessarily. But looking at history through the lens of the Sèvres treaty suggests a deeper point about the cause-and-effect relationship between European-drawn borders and Middle Eastern instability: the regions that ended up with borders imposed by Europe tended to be those already too weak or disorganized to successfully resist colonial occupation. Turkey didn’t become wealthier and more democratic than Syria or Iraq because it had the good fortune to get the right borders. Rather, the factors that enabled Turkey to defy European plans and draw its own borders — including an army and economic infrastructure inherited from the Ottoman empire — were some of the same ones that enabled Turkey to build a strong, centralized, European-style nation-state.

[Valissa]

More educational historical maps here...

Treaty of Sèvres https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres

[Babak Makkinejad]

The Young Turks ethnically cleansed Anatolia of the Christians; first the Armenians and then Pontic Greeks. In this they followed the splendid example of European states; ein volk, ein reich etc.

Ottomans had the virtue of being cosmopolitans; per the elements of the Seljuk Synthesis.

Syria and Iraq were weak since both bestrode the Seljuk fault lines; analogous to the way Czechoslovakia bestrode the old Diocletian Line - in spite of the commonality of language (but not culture).

I think a more natural division is what we are seeing with the emergence of ISIS and the coming together of the rump Syria and Lebanon.

But the creators of Syria and Iraq did not have the benefit of having me around to advise them on the subtleties of the application of the Makkinejad Thesis to the creation of new states.

[FB Ali]

Glad you enjoyed it, Valissa.

Sevres and Sykes-Picot were attempts by the European powers, still in imperial mode, to divide up the Ottoman empire that they had just defeated in WW1. They were able to get away with it as far as the Arab lands were concerned, but Turkey proper was another matter.

The Arabs were a tribal society, accustomed to owing allegiance to their chiefs, who left them largely alone to pursue their simple lives. The chiefs, in turn, were used to being ruled by a stronger power. The Turks, on the other hand, were a proud and homogenous people who had never been ruled by outsiders, and weren't going to let it happen now.

These personal and societal traits are still manifesting themselves in current developments.

[gnv233]

Agree with your comment, but I guess you meant Yugoslavia, not Czechoslovakia

[Amir]

From first hand info, all along during the sanctions period, Chinese developers, businessmen and in engineers were having a free hand in establishing cooperation with local partners.

[different clue]

Several years ago I noted that for me trying to predict price movements of oil was like trying to play checkers when the squares are moving around as well as the checkers. I still find it that way. Yet I try to think about it. I try to think . . . something.

I believed the "exterminate unconventional oil production" theory of Saudi downpricing till I read an article which offered a simpler yet deeper theory. The article theorised ( and claimed to base this on some of Saudi oil minister al Naimi's own statements of desire and intent) that the KSA-gov is afraid that the industrialized world is slowly taking itself off the oil standard, and will leave Saudi Arabia with bunches of oil and no one to sell it to. Therefor, al Naimi has decided that KSA must downprice oil deep enough and long enough to disincentivise efforts to use oil more efficiently and displace oil wherever feasible, in order to keep selling large amounts of oil to an inefficient world. Here is the link.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-12/saudi-arabia-s-plan-to-extend-the-age-of-oil

If this is al Naimi's plan, one wonders if a screaming budget deficit will abort the plan.

About Ambassador Freeman's description and prediction of China's plans . . . it sounds like China seeks to organize and lead a Great Eurasia Co-Prosperity Sphere. People predicting the failure of China's plans may well be trying to comfort and reassure themselves out of Fear of a Chinese Planet. If the ChinaGov can weather and suppress or solve certain problems long enough to set Plan China into irreversible motion, they could achieve everything that Ambassador Freeman predicts.
But that will create problems which the Freeman Analysis does not discuss. It will involve the Eurasia-wide rollout of the natural resource sack-and-pillage currently under way against Tibet. I recently skimmed a book about that called Meltdown In Tibet. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-meltdown-in-tibet-on-chinas-eco-destruction-by-michael-buckley/2015/01/02/0a240d02-690a-11e4-b053-65cea7903f2e_story.html I myself envision a Chinese plan to shut down and relocate as much European industry as possible and relocate it to thousands of maquiladoras all along the New Silk Road back to China. I don't see the Chinese reef-expanding in the China Seas as a frivolous non-concern. I see it as bespeaking the same kind of nasty aquisitiveness for resources against all the China Sea nations as is displayed by Israel's West Bank and Golan Heights settlements for resource aquisitiveness against West Bank Palestine and Syria.

Many of our foreign friends have lately come to see America as a bad hegemon. Perhaps they think China may be a better hegemon. They may be correct. The experiment will be run. We will all get to find out. As bad as our blundering approach to China ( and things in general) has been so far, I can think of an even bigger blunder which will be suggested in due course. And that would be to permit the building of an undersea road and railroad from Siberia to Alaska under the Bering Strait. I hope it never happens.

[Poul]

Simply put yes. But as is the case with the US dollar other nations can fix their exchange rates so low that they have a more or less permanent trade surplus with the USA. That could happen to China.

On a small scale a reserve currency status is not necessarily a bad thing for the USA but as America's share of the global economy becomes smaller the negative side effects of been a reserve currency starts to be seen. Part of the reason for the flat real income of most US households is the wage pressures from abroad. Made possible by currency pegging. Another part is that Americans have not shared the profits of increased global trade more equally with the lion's share going to the riches top 10% households.

[charly]

So if they are without PLA and CCP parents you know that they are spies? PLA/CCP membership is to high to be useful.

[charly]

Did the US run a trade deficit in the 40's & 50's when the dollar became THE reserve currency. I seriously doubt it but am to lazy to look it up.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I have tried to be honest with myself and others in regards to Diocletian Line as well as the Makkinejad Theses.

I took the Diocletian Line to be at 10 degrees of longitude; in which case most of Slovakia lies to its East.

If I set it at 19 degrees of longitude, then still more than half of Slovakia would be to its East.

Yes, I agree, Yugoslavia is another case.

It is more complicated there because in Bosnia-Hercegovina the Diocletian Line is bisected by the Muslim Civilization boundary.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Correction :

"I took the Diocletian Line to be at 18 degrees of longitude; in which case most of Slovakia lies to its East."

[Poul]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system

Bretton Woods was tied into gold and the US dollar as the key currencies. But the US balance of payment deficits also cause the system to end.

[Charles I]

Who do the Chinese borrow from?

[Charles I]

Columbia is not quite dead yet

[Charles I]

Reserve currencies not backed by gold require vast amounts of credit beneath them. Who do the Chinese borrow from nowadays?

[Charles I]

Thanks for sharing your wisdom with us FB.

Chinese are in for the long haul. We built global supply chains TO them; why be surprised if they now build them FROM China to everywhere? Presumably they need to get all the food they are buying up everywhere home as well.

[Fred]

Charles,

As an added bonus when their people get really hungry they can traverse all those roads to new and more fertile lands. Who, after all, is going to stop them?

[Matthew]

Charles: They mostly borrow and speculate from their own savings.

[different clue]

Fred,

That is why we must block every attempt to get such a road built under the Bering Straits from Siberia to Alaska.

[Babak Makkinejad]

different clue:

The first post that I made on this forum more than a decade ago was a statement to the effect that Iran was not an enemy of the United Sates but she opposed US strategies.

And a decade ago, a colleague was bitterly complaining to me: "Why are not we treating those who want to work with us better? Why are we not concentrating on giving them things that they want which we can?"

Many countries in the world want to work with the United States but many also seem to have come to the conclusion that US is unable, unwilling, or incapable of positively engaging with them.

That a communist dictatorship has become more attractive than the United State in many ways is not the fault of the foreigners; in my opinion.

[charly]

I would find that to be a very longitudinal answer as it never been Orthodox Christian or even ruled by them (excluding the USSR) and being Orthodox or Catholic/Protestant is what i understand to be the reason for the Diocletian line

[Babak Makkinejad]

I do not know why & how, I only state it as an empirical observation.

[Poul]

Professor Pettis have another post about the Chinese currency adjustment and possible policy goals involved.

http://blog.mpettis.com/2015/08/do-markets-determine-the-value-of-the-rmb/