Right to the Source: Fall's Theory of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Adam L. Silverman

Earlier COL Lang referenced Bernard Fall's COIN equation. Fall was very prolific - writing both books and articles, as well as lecturing right up until the time of his death while on patrol with the marines in Vietnam on the Street Without Joy. In his "Theory of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency", originally presented as a lecture and then transcribed and published in Naval War College Review, Fall posited his equation for Revolutionary Warfare and presents in the narrative the basis for the equation that Col Lang referenced and which he would present in equation form elsewhere. For everyone's convenience, I'm attaching the pdf of the article below the post. Its not long, but its well worth taking the time to read it. One of the most prescient portions is just before Fall's conclusion:

Civic action is not the construction of privies or the distribution of antimalaria sprays. One can't fight an ideology; one can't fight a militant doctrine with better privies. Yet this is done constantly. One side says, "land reform," and the other side says, "better culverts." One side says, "We are going to kill all those nasty village chiefs and landlords." The other side says, "Yes, but look, we want to give you prize pigs to improve your strain." These arguments just do not match. Simple but adequate appeals will have to be found sooner or later.

It was Col Lang who advised me to read Dr. Fall's works as part of my preparation for the work I do for the military. In reality he told everyone in that classroom back in December 2007 to do so and it was excellent advice. Sadly I have found too few have read Fall and to many overly rely on more modern/recent scholars and practitioners of COIN. In many ways I find that Fall is like Sun Tzu. If you read him carefully and take his lessons to heart, you will never try to conduct counterinsurgency.** Just as the careful reader of Sun Tzu learns that the only real Taoist way of war is to never fight one.

I recently had reason, about two weeks ago, to go back and reread Fall's article and among the things that stuck out at me was the block quote I pulled out above. In that one quote Fall encapsulates the key point that too many seem to miss when they try to develop a strategy to defeat revolutionary movements - the tactical solutions that seem to work and are easily counted cannot and will not get you to victory.* Another key point that jumped out at me two weeks ago is Fall's remarks about the spreading oil slick, now called the spreading ink spot, concept. I've read and reread this piece at least ten times in the past eight years, but its always jarring to see Fall explain that this could only work in the Sahara as the center of the slick was to be the oases. If you could clear and hold the water supply, and then connect your points of control from oasis to oasis, eventually everyone would have to come to you or die of thirst. There were no oases in Vietnam. There are no oases in Anbar Province...

* I think it was three or four months ago that Tyler was deriding the idea of the need to create jobs in Iraq and Syria to remove an economic driver of support for DAESH. From a strategic perspective Tyler was spot on - tactical level economic development is not going to solve/resolve this conflict. And while we would probably see some success if the economies in Syria and Iraq improved, the lack of jobs and opportunity is a symptom, not the actual problem. And as Fall indicates that problem can't be fixed by building roads or sewer systems or toilets, etc.

** This, as he has made clear many times here at SST, and Col Lang's very informed view of COIN as well.

Download Fall_Theory_&_Practice_of_Insurgency_&_Counterinsurgency

Comments

[mike]

Colonel Lang -

I am not a fan of General Petraeus. I agree with both you and Bernard Fall about the failure of COIN, except in very limited cases – i.e. the Huk Rebellion, and perhaps even earlier the Philippine-American War at the end of the 19th century, and as you mentioned Cyprus.

[MartinJ]

All

this is an interesting potted look at the history of COIN using BBC archives on Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq. I found the footage fascinating.

What is hinted at but never examined by the author is the issue of time. The foreign occupier does not have time on their side.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/entries/93073500-9459-3bbb-a3e5-cde7a1cc2559

[Patrick Bahzad]

Who in France calls them Freedom Fighters ? Probably you and your leftists "Front de gauche" buddies !
I don't mind you having a personal opinion, but don't pretend you speak in the name of a whole country. Who TF you think you are ?
Word on the street in France is certainly not "freedom fighters", that's your horse manure ideology speaking.

[Jonathan House]

Below is a very short excerpt from Pope Francis' speech on July 9th which I think is not off topic but no doubt rather more abstract and general than most of the comments on this thread. I expect that many on this list will agree with the view it expresses.
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The whole speech is striking in many ways. I am not a Catholic - indeed not affiliated with any religion - but I have been circulating this speech to friends and I am proud to associate myself with its author if only in the small way of passing on what he writes.
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Here's the excerpt - the first paragraph of the second section of the third part. The whole speech can be found at
http://www.news.va/en/news/pope-francis-speech-at-world-meeting-of-popular-mo
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The world’s peoples want to be artisans of their own destiny. They want to advance peacefully towards justice. They do not want forms of tutelage or interference by which those with greater power subordinate those with less. They want their culture, their language, their social processes and their religious traditions to be respected. No actual or established power has the right to deprive peoples of the full exercise of their sovereignty. Whenever they do so, we see the rise of new forms of colonialism which seriously prejudice the possibility of peace and justice. For “peace is founded not only on respect for human rights but also on respect for the rights of peoples, in particular the right to independence”.[3]

[Patrick Bahzad]

How one can see the UK as winner in an "emergency" that saw them loose a whole Crown Colony is a mystery to me ... But never mind. The Cyprus case is inept as comparison to large scale counter-insurgency situations for one reason already: it was a very small theatre of engagement, which did not have the same effects on the British ability in terms of draining resources and manpower.
As for winner/looser, Cyprus is British no more, makes for a pretty clear win/loss picture to me. Based on your rationale, you might as well say the UK was winner in the Irish War of 1920 ! Takes some real jingoistic nonsense attitude to make such BS statements.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I thought they would have been translated in English ... bizarre, but then also explains the insistence on Fall, who got published in the US while the others apparently not even got translated.
You're right about Trinquier in the sense that his involvement in military combat action in WW2 was very limited.

Regarding English versions: there's Trinquier's "Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency" ... Seems that's about it indeed. What a shame. Maybe you can find papers analysing their theories.

[Patrick Bahzad]

In addition to Martin's link and embedded video, another very interesting documentary on youtube: "Death Squads - The French School" from Vietnam to South America ... It's in French, but interesting also if you just want to have a look at what the French COINISTAS looked like and what their actions were:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8IaA8rTeQRY

[Patrick Bahzad]

The Phoenix program was based on Trinquier's theories as expressed in "La guerre moderne" ... it's basically a "copy & paste" of the French counter-revolutionary theory applied in Algeria.

[fasteddiez]

Not to mention that it was an island.

[mbrenner]

Two simple questions:

1. Where exactly in the world are we likely to find a situation in which the US national interest is great enough, and local insurgent circumstances directed at the established government threatening enough, for us to even consider engaging in a major counter-insurgency campaign?

2. Where did such circumstances exist post-Vietnam until today? Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Honduras, Congo. Mali, Bosnia, Ukraine, the halls of the Pentagon? (Vietnam exempted only so as to avoid getting bogged down in an intellectual quagmire).

[Johnny Reims]

PB
Col. Hackworth was a devotee of Trinquier in VN. If memory serves me, he wrote about T in the book, "About Face".

[fasteddiez]

I put forth in El Salvador, where it was done by their army, with US adviser input, weapons only. El Sal, being a violent country, sported an army that was both cruel and competent enough to expunge the insurgents. This information, point of view was given to me by two people who were such advisers.

They would come to a village in insurgent controlled territory and tell the people that if they had to come back because the locals still supported the rebels, they would kill everyone in that locale.

This information is second hand, as is addressed above, so I welcome input from Colonel Lang, if this Information is false, or incomplete.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Wasnt aware he had ! Thx for the info. I'll try and find out what he said about Trinquier. Have to admit though that Trinquier's very direct and confrontational approach towards winning back insurgent controlled territory make him less "usable" in modern day asymmetric campaigns (I'm avoiding the term COIN on purpose, as many people here in France don't believe in it, even though they are flattered Galula was named a "Clausewitz of COIN" by Petreaus, which is BS, despite all the respect I have for Galula academic achievements).

[William R. Cumming]

MEXICO?

[mbrenner]

Why was it in the US interest to do what it did? Look at the current state of the country - and neighboring Honduras where we backed a coup a few years ago only to see the country descend into violence and chaos?

[mbrenner]

Yes - with 60,000 dead, the drug cartels going full tilt and el-Chapo buying his way out of jail.

[Johnny Reims]

PB
Your last comment is why I think you are perfect to write a 2015 version of Street Without Joy based upon your considerable experiences.

A few years ago, I read Petreaus' work. At the time, I thought it was written as if he were an associate in a Wall Street law firm and was trying to make partner. It was extremely well-written, but nothing innovative, nothing new.

[mike]

In addition to being a devotee of Trinqier's book, Hackworth was also an admirer of Fall whom he had actually met and had conversations with regarding Fall's experiences.

During a tour of duty at the Pentagon, Hackworth haunted the library there and read the After-Action-Report of every battle and operation of the French IndoChina War. He claimed that it was obvious from the unsigned library checkout tag at the front of each document that no-one else in the Pentagon had attempted to read them. They had mouldered away in the stacks for years.

[fasteddiez]

Mr Brenner, as to your question:

1- They were enforcing the Monroe Doctrine (against Marxist enemies)
2- In those days the NCAs were matching The Soviets' SOBs for our Own.
3- The killing of Nuns, (some American), Cardinals, American USAID/or NGO types by their forces was of no concern to the US government This however, would be useful to the El Salvadoran government in order to encourage outrage in the American populace, should they believe the Commie insurgents could be blamed for these crimes.
4- The US NCA could not anticipate the violence created by hopeless conditions in the country, far into the future, nor would they care.
5- El Salvador was already a violent place since they had a war with one of their neighbors over a soccer game. Honduras has recently surpassed them, and US advisers are in place nowadays. Perhaps to turn their armed forces into a success story that is the present Iraqi army, many billions of dollars later.
6- Add all of the above, in my 'Umble opinion, that there is no price to pay for US leaders for failure. Furthermore Us Interests and the spreading of goodness and justice, and improvement of life of the peasantry, can be addressed by propaganda, which in a way is superfluous, since no one gives a damn.