ISIS - a Black Hole in the Heart of the Middle East: the Kurdish Factor (1/2)

By Patrick Bahzad


In a recent turn of events, Turkey has stepped up its military operations against the "Islamic State", but also against Kurdish PKK fighters and their logistical bases in Northern Syria. The development that triggered the Turks springing into action was a suicide bombing that occurred last week in Suruç, on the Turkish side of the border to Syria, near the town of Kobane.

While many observers expected Ankara to step up its efforts and rein in ISIS' freedom of action on Turkish territory, secretly hoping for stronger measures to be taken against the Jihadi militants on Syrian territory as well, the Turkish airstrikes against Kurdish groups have come as a surprize and a shock. This dual strategy however is perfectly explainable and should remind all those interested in fighting the "Islamic State" that national interests in the region are very diverse and that the US-inspired anti-ISIS coalition has to deal with a number of national agendas, making the implementation of any common plan all the more difficult. To Ankara in particular, it looks very much like the Kurds and their militant groups are just as much a part of the problem as is the "Islamic State".

Kobane, the Kurdish border-town close to where last week's bombing took place, did rise to fame last year when Kurdish "Peshmerga" fighters managed to contain and roll back an IS offensive. However, the success of the Kurdish irregulars, whose name literally means "those facing death", was largely conditioned by massive US and Coalition airstrikes. During the four month siege of Kobane, nearly 80 % off all anti-ISIS strikes in Iraq and Syria took place around Kobane. This alone should help put the Kurdish performance into context and help understand that the aura of courage and resilience of the Kurds is also an image that was carefully crafted by PR-agencies in the West.

Kurdish History Repeating Itself

In truth, the Kurds have a reputation as fearsome mountain fighters. Early converts to Islam, they have always lived in their current areas of population, but rarely – actually never – formed an independent political entity. The 19th century in particular was crucial to their dispersion and lack of unity. Confronted with an increasing political and administrative centralisation by the Ottoman State, the Kurds started an insurgency, but – just as today – their lack of internal cohesion brought their downfall and what was left of earlier semi-autonomous Kurdish emirates gradually disappeared, as Ottoman armies put an end to local leadership.

However, the "Sheikhs" that the Ottoman Sultans designated to replace earlier feudal leaders would prove almost as difficult to manage as their predecessors and insurgency practically became the normal state of play in Kurdish populated areas of the Empire. While these insurgencies played a crucial role in shaping the feeling of a Kurdish identity and fed the Kurds' longing for autonomy and independence, they also fostered a fractured political landscape, with clans and families – often the offspring of the "Sheikhs" who had been put in place by the Sublime Porte – fighting for legitimacy as representatives of the Kurdish people.

With the end of World War I and the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, hopes ran high in Kurdish areas. The peace Treaty of Sèvres (1920) even suggested the establishment of an independent Kurdish State in Eastern Anatolia and in the province of Mosul, in today's Iraq. However, the new Turkish State under Kemal Ataturk refused those terms and a three year war against foreign occupying powers put an end to any expectation of Kurdish autonomy. Starting in 1923, the "Turkification" of the whole territory, including the Kurdish areas, systematically denied any specific rights to the Kurdish minority.

This repressive policy, again, caused a series of uprisings that were all put down militarily in the 1920s and 1930s. Worse for the Kurds, in 1937, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan signed an agreement for the coordination of efforts against Kurdish separatism. Back then already, the Kurdish question was a transnational issue and would remain so until the present day. The fact that Kurdish population groups were spread over several countries was not the only obstacle to the Kurds' efforts at increased autonomy though. Internal factors also didn't play in their favour.

The Problem of Kurdish Identity

According to credible estimates, the Kurds represent some 35 million people today, with around half of them living in Turkey, the other countries of Kurdish population being mainly Northern Syria, North-Eastern Iraq and North-western Iran. These 35 million people however don't constitute a homogenous group: tribal allegiances are very strong and internal feuds have been common for centuries. This may also explain why there never was a real attempt at unifying those groups under a single banner. Rather, the various groups tried to gain more rights within the countries and States on whose territory they were living.

Not even the language is unified. Several variants of Kurdish exist and understanding each other may not always be easy, depending on which regions are concerned. Writing too is based on different alphabets. As for religion, the Kurds are predominantly Sunni Muslims, but some tribes (particularly in Eastern Iraq and in Iran) are Shia. All this makes it difficult to consider the Kurds as a nation in the same way the French, the Brits or the Americans are. And of course, tribal rivalries and sectarian differences have been exploited by regional powers to try and prevent the rise of a real sense of national Kurdish identity.

All too often, the countries with Kurdish minorities have been ruthless in their oppression of their own Kurdish minority, while at the same time encouraging uprisings among the Kurds in neighbouring and rival States. The result for the Kurds has been a disaster. Since the 1960s, some 250 000 Kurds have been killed all over the Middle-East in various counter-insurgency campaigns, millions have been displaced and thousands of villages destroyed.

Kurdish Minorities in Syria, Iraq and Iran

In Syria for example, Kurds are estimated to be around one million, living mostly along the border to Turkey in the North and North-East. The attitude of the Syrian State has been quite fluctuating with regard to their minority. In the 1960s and 1970s, the "Arabisation" process promoted by the Syrian Baath party led to some 300 000 Kurds being stripped of their Syrian citizenship. At the same time though, Kurds were encouraged to join the army and some even made it into the "Presidential Guard" that spearheaded the attack against the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold of Hama, in 1982. Until 1998, the Assad regime even tacitly supported the PKK, i.e. the Kurdish terrorist and insurgent group that fought for autonomy and independence against Turkey.

In Iran, the 6 to 8 million Kurds also harboured various militant groups. Things went so far that at one point, Ayatollah Khomeini declared a "Jihad" against them. Repression in the Kurdish mountains of North Western Iran was no less bloody than in Turkey, and some of the exiled Kurdish-Iranian leaders were even assassinated by Iranian intelligence. The Iran-Iraq war perfectly exemplified the cynical policy of the established States, giving support and training to the Kurds in the neighbouring country, while brutally oppressing their own Kurdish population.

A collateral damage of these policies has been the widening gap between the various Kurdish groups, which made it more and more difficult for any potential party or leader to achieve unity among clans and tribes. This strategy of "divide and conquer" or "divide and reign" had already started way before the Iran-Iraq war, but it reached its climax during the early 1980s, culminating in Saddam Hussein's massacre of the Kurds at Halabja. In that sense though, the war crime of Halabja – which didn't give rise to calls for UN or international intervention, unlike the still disputed chemical attack of Eastern Damascus in 2012 – only differed from similar operations by the number of casualties and the use of chemical WMDs.

For the Kurds of Iraq, Halabja will forever remain as one of the darkest chapters in their history. Ironically, their relation with Iraqi authorities and in particular with Saddam Hussein had taken a rather good start in 1970. That year, the Iraqi dictator signed an agreement with legendary Kurdish DPK leader Mustafa Barzani. Baghdad granted a number of local and cultural rights to their Kurds and Kurdish representatives even made it as cabinet ministers into the Iraqi government.

The Terrible Fate of the Iraqi Kurds

One issue remained though that would prove a real poison in the long run: the oil rich city of Kirkuk. After a few years of relative calm, uprisings broke out again. That time however, Barzani made a fatal mistake. Rather than sticking to his previous deal with Saddam, he entered into an alliance with the Iranians, who had promised weapons, money and training. But in 1975 already, the Iraqis and Iranians worked out a provisional deal and the Kurdish DPK of Barzani paid a heavy price for its "treason". Scores of DPK fighters had to flee to Iran and the party itself was split. A new leadership and a new party emerged: the PUK, led by another influential clan leader, Jalal Talabani.

But worse was still to come for the Iraqi Kurds. In the aftermath of the 1988 ceasefire between Iraq and Iran, Saddam Hussein again exerted a terrible vengeance for the open support both the PDK and the UPK had received from Tehran. The whole North of Iraq was reconquered militarily and some 150 000 Kurds were killed during the "Anfal" campaign. The only positive outcome from a Kurdish point of view was that rival PUK and DPK had to unite their forces against the Iraqi onslaught.

Three years later, PUK and DPK "Pershmerga" – encouraged by US intelligence – tried their luck again, while Saddam's armies were given a hiding by the US during "Operation Desert Storm". The circumstances in which the Iraqi Republican Guard was finally allowed to put down this insurrection too are still being debated, but the end-result was similar to that of previous campaigns: the Kurds were defeated once again, thousands died, and millions fled into the mountainous North, or even into Turkey and Iran.

Confronted with a humanitarian disaster, the Allies – and in particular the US – finally established a "no fly zone" in the North of Iraq. Thousands of Western soldiers were sent in, letting the Kurdish irregulars take actual control of those areas. The rivalry between PUK and DPK, and between their leaders Talabani and Barzani, started off again, with the DPK controlling most of Northern Kurdistan, while the UPK became stronger in the South.

Tacit Powersharing

This geographical distribution of each party's powerbase gave rise to serious tensions, as control over the North meant control over trading and smuggling routes with Turkey. The financially richer DPK a wasn't willing to share its benefits with rival PUK though and tensions escalated into a genuine civil war, with thousands of casualties on both sides.

In 1995, Talabani's PUK seemed to gain the upper hand. At this point however, his rival Barzani called in arch-enemy Saddam Hussein, another sign of how deep the gap had become within the Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi government troops entered Kurdistan and helped Barzani to victory, while previously more successful Talabani fled to Iran. Barzani now became the only ruler of the Kurdish enclave. After extensive US mediation though, he finally agreed to let in rival PUK into the lucrative oil deals.

The situation and peace remained fragile though, due to the ever existent dissent within the Kurds. Many small parties coexisted in addition to the main DPK and PUK. And each of these groups has its own militia. There was also a small but growing Islamist movement in remote areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, "Ansar al-Islam", which would rise to fame in the years following the US invasion of 2003. Add into the mix the presence of a Turkmen minority with strong ties to Turkey, and neighbouring Iran with its own Kurdish party (the MIK), and the picture that emerges is one of a totally fractured and truly shaky autonomy.

This system of alliances and allegiances remained largely in place even after US "Operation Iraqi Freedom", the only difference being institutional, with the main Kurdish parties – PUK and DPK – gaining official recognition and positions of influence within the new Iraqi State. In broad terms tough, the period between 1991 and 2011 was one of growing cultural and economic autonomy for Iraqi Kurds, but the real development that got everything rolling again was the start of the Syrian civil war, and the gradual rise of the "Islamic State".

Öcalan, Turkey and the PKK

In that regard, one last player has to be mentioned again: Turkey, and the Turkish Kurds. In fact, Turkey is both home to the largest Kurdish population group and the main actor in the repression of Kurdish autonomy efforts. While the situation of Kurds in countries such as Iraq, Syria or Iran has not necessarily been worse – economically speaking – than that of the majority of the population, there has always been a deep divide between Turks and Kurds living in Turkey. The income, the education level, the economic perspectives of Turkish Kurds have always been far worse than those of the average national, making the Kurds de facto second class citizens.

Thus, it shouldn't come as a surprise that Kurdish separatist movements have always been strongest and most active in Turkey. In 1974 for example, the big man of the Kurds in Turkey made his debut on the political stage: Abdullah Öcalan, aka "Apo" (for "uncle") created his first militant group, "Apocus". Following internal dissent however, Öcalan founded a splinter group that was to become one of the major players in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict: the PKK, the "Kurdish Workers Party", a openly Marxist group, calling for an independent Kurdistan, the establishment of a communist society, the destruction of the "bourgeois" social class and the alliance of farmers and workers of Kurdistan.

Altogether, this programme made for a very conventional Marxist agenda, but the PKK's actions aimed first at destroying rival Kurdish groups, which were accused of being Turkish collaborators. Once again, as in other Kurdish areas across the Middle-East, Kurdish militants engaged in self-destructive feuds, that have become the trademark of all the Kurdish insurgency movements. These internal divisions and rifts are probably just as much a reason for the failure of the Kurds to fulfil their dream of an independent State as the repressive policies of the countries where Kurdish populations live.

Violence and Counter-violence

Having assassinated some of his rivals, Öcalan stepped up the actions of the PKK, engaging first in a campaign of terrorism against the Turkish State, with an open insurgency phase being implemented as a second stage, in a classic revolutionary warfare style. Taxing local businesses, engaging in drug and weapons smuggling, but also relying on outside help (from the Syrian government in particular), Öcalan's PKK rapidly expanded its operations and Öcalan himself established his headquarters on Syrian territory.

After the military coup of 1980, the Turkish army reacted with utmost brutality to the terror tactics of the PKK. In 1983, following the assassination of three Turkish officers, the use of the Kurdish language was even prohibited on Turkish soil. One year later, Öcalan decided to launch a full-scale guerrilla warfare against the Turkish army. Violence and counter-violence spiralled almost out of control and casualty figures ran high, especially among the Kurdish civilians. Villages were raided and destroyed. Turkish death squads (the famous "Grey Wolves", recruited out of Turkish intelligence and local organised crime) roamed the Kurdish countryside, killing and raping on a large scale. In total, almost 40 000 people died, and two million Kurds fled their homeland.

As for the PKK, they were not much better than their Turkish foes: anybody suspected of collusion with the Turkish State was assassinated, and that also included town elders in villages that were too "neutral" or "hostile" to the PKK. Women and children were not exempt either from the wrath of the Kurdish fighters. Finally, it has to be noted that in the struggle against the Turkish State, part of the PKK - especially its cells present on mainland Europe - drifted gradually towards organised crime, in their effort to collect "revolutionary tax" from Kurdish exiles and in their management of drug smuggling rings that were very lucrative sources of income for Öcalan's movement.

The Turkish Fear of a "Domino Effect"

Confronted with mounting European pressure though, Turkey gradually shifted its stance on the Kurdish question, especially as part of the process of EU-membership that Ankara was very favourable to in the  early 2000s. However, the Turkish government always remained very cautious and wary of Kurdish autonomy, even just cultural or linguistic.

What gives Turkish rulers nightmares is the prospect of a "domino effect" spreading from a possibly autonomous Kurdish region in Eastern Anatolia to other Kurdish areas in Syria, Iraq and possibly Iran. If the call for autonomy ­– or, worse, independence – was to spread like a wildfire to the approximately 35 million Kurds living in the Middle-East, a political shift might start that could have very serious implications for Turkey's territorial integrity and geopolitical standing in the region.

This fundamental fear is the basic reason for Turkish political decisions regarding ongoing developments since the early 2000s. This is also where the "Islamic State" comes into play now, as a new actor on the regional political stage, and – again – Turkish politics vis-à-vis ISIS are dictated by a schizophrenic impulse to rein in Kurdish efforts North and South of the border, while at the same time maintaining a reasonably good relationship with the Kurdish enclaves of Iraq, from where Turkey gets cheap oil thanks to the smuggling routes established by the "Islamic State". Additionally, ISIS also acts as a de facto proxy for Turkish interests in Syria and Iraq, limiting Kurdish expansion and ambitions in the area.

It is these cynical "realpolitiks" that will be the subject of a separate second account, focusing specifically on the triangular conflict between the various Kurdish militias, the "Islamic State" and other Jihadi groups in the Middle-East, and the State sponsors of both these set of actors.

Comments

[William R. Cumming]

First, disclosure! I am pro-the -Turkish Nation-State and formal US ally through NATO! Many complicated reasons but as background read Paul Kennedy's work on the key 21st Century nation-states, which also include China and India.

Second, apparently no first principles guide US FP including adhering to the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution as the Pole Star.

Third, US FP is undermining the nation-state system.

Both the Kurds and the Ukraine made a play for nation-state status AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE after the WWI Armistice. The Great Powers were unanimous in turning down this bids.

After much thought I believe border control policies and immigration policies are key to preservation of nation-states and that an international order based on the nation-state system can only be maintained of all nation-states agree on that conclusion. As Tyler aptly stated areas with a song and a flag are NOT Nation-states however else defined.

And guess what neither the KURDs nor any portion of the Ukraine is capable of self-governance but prefer pot-stirring instead of the very very hard work of governance.

And the Turkish government has largely decided on remaining an intact nation-state.

NO SURPRISE TO ME!

[Patrick Bahzad]

WRC,

I agree on principle with your statement regarding the importance of preserving the Nation State and establishing a difference between nations (whether they have a State or not) and countries which are by no means a nation, let alone a nation-State.

For the record though, let me state that the "Paris Peace Conference" is just the generic term for the various peace treaties that were negotiated as a result of WWI, with one specific treaty being signed with each losing belligerent ("Versailles Treaty" for Germany, "Saint-Germain-en-Laye" for Austria, "Trianon" for Hungary, "Neuilly" for Bulgaria and finally "Sèvres" for Turkey).

[Babak Makkinejad]

Turkey, in the sense of European states West of the Diocletian Line, is a multi-national state but it is legally defined as a state of a single nation - the Turkish Nation. That was so because like every other non-Western state, the Turks modeled themselves on the Western European models. The constitutional structures of Turkey do not fit its reality; in my opinion.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Thank you Patrick Bahzad for articulating very well that Kurds neither deserve nor can form a state of their own.

One only needs to read Anabasis to see this 2500-year old pattern and its persistence to this day.

One quibble: "Peesh Marge" - just means: "Death Facing".

[Babak Makkinejad]

I think France went through a long process of assimilating non-French during the 19-the century; millions did not speak standard French.

Italy still has all those Tyrolean Germans and Sicilians...

And Germany had the Swabians...

[Patrick Bahzad]

You're right about the translation of "Peshmerga" ... Guess I let myself be contaminated by the pro-Kurdish spin-doctoring that has been going on.
My Persian is not as good as it used to be. So I stand corrected: "Peshmerga" from "pis az merga", meaning "facing death" as you rightly said.
In a derivative sense however, they mean to say that these are fighters who supposedly will fight to the death, thus indirectly "looking death in the eye". But it's a bit of a stretch I agree.
I will edit that part of the text, just to put the record straight. Thx for pointing out this mistake.

[Farooq]

Patrick,

Do you agree with Babak's following assessment?
"Kurds neither deserve nor can form a state of their own."

[BabelFish]

The education from reading SST goes on and thank you, Patrick.

Reading this, the thought that came to me regarding the Kurds was from the famous American cartoon. 'We have met the enemy and he is us!'

[Marcy]

M. Bahzad,

About the Suruc bombing: Do you personally have any doubts about the story?
I don't want to believe in government conspiracies but the bombing was a very convenient excuse for the Erdogan government to spring into action against ISIS and the Kurds, well, actually the Kurds mainly because the Turks are just too cosy with ISIS.

[William R. Cumming]

Thanks PB!

[William R. Cumming]

Which multi-national organizations support the nation-state system and which undermine it, in whole or in part?

And which Treaties support the nation-state system and which undermine it?

[Ishmael Zechariah]

Patrick Bahzad,

Thanks for this comprehensive description. Most of it fits w/ my experience on the ground. A few minor points:
1-The Grey Wolves started as the youth arm of the Nationalist Action Party and evolved into the street enforcement organization of this party. They were and are distinct from the JITEM Special Operation Groups ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C4%B0TEM ) which fought the PKK using PKKs own tactics. The Ccommander of JITEM was an ethnic Kurd...

2-Grey Wolves were mostly engaged in armed urban action against left wing partisans 50s-to 90s. At the time the left wing also included the Kurdish nationalists. I never heard of Grey Wolves raping anyone per policy.

3-Seperatist "Kurds" in Turkey can only get 5-6% of the vote. In the last election they were loaned votes by the CHP so that they could exceed the 10% limit. Quoting population numbers which include those who are ethnically Kurdish but want no part of the PKK might not be helpful.

Reading the posts in this little bastion of sanity, I wonder if many of the SST committee members truly appreciate the size and coverage of the drug, extortion and prostitution rings controlled by the PKK, or what the Kurdish Mafia entails. I also do not think they really understand what we mean by terrorism; it is not driving bombs into barracks or attacking enlistment centers. In the beginning the actions undertaken by PKK were mostly against the "state": elementary schools-they killed the teachers, ostensibly to stop the subversion of the Kurdish children; health clinics-they killed the nurses, the midwives, fresh MDs sent on national service to Kurdish regions to improve health; road works-they killed the engineers and burnt the machines which were being used to improve roads. They slaughtered entire villages, men women and children. The PKK reality is quite different than the delusional spin peddled today.

The poverty of the east/southeast of Turkey has historical roots and can be traced to the Ottomans. Entire Anatolia was taxed for the comfort of Istanbul. These areas have consistently received more in services than the taxes they paid out. Even today the "Kurdish" regions pride themselves in not paying their utility bills. The tayyip regime had to tack on a surcharge on those areas which do pay to cover the losses of the (privatized) utility companies.

I regard the Kurdish gambit in the Middle East as part of the great game. The Kurds may rue their choices if the wheels do not turn their way.

Ishmael Zechariah

[charly]

Swiss German is only in name German as i don't understand it. In fact the whole Kurdish history sounds German to me (not really one language, different religions, countless internal wars)

[Babak Makkinejad]

"The PKK reality is quite different than the delusional spin peddled today. ".

I have seen this story before.

What you do is that you take a few comely young women and dress them in military fatigues and issue them Kalashnikov rifles. Next you show case them to gullible Americans and Europeans - who, in their perennial search for the legendary Amazons - will bite on this hook, line and slinkier - "Alas! At last we have found a group of Muslims who have gotten their hyper-male ethos under control and are well on their way to a Anglo-Saxon Feminist Utopia."

Next you start getting aide from them.

That is what happened in Eretria which has become an open-air prison for its inhabitants.

I expect nothing less in this case.

[Patrick Bahzad]

The written form of Swiss german however is standard german. Any German could read the "neue zuercher zeitung" without any trouble whatsoever. Just one difference to point out your comparison doesn't add up.

Furthermore german regions have a history and a sense of a national feeling and destiny going back hundreds of years, even though there wasn't a German state. There never has been anything comparable for the Kurds. Which historical figure of international stature did boast about his Kurdishness ? Not even Salahadin did ... I could name a dozen of historic German figures out of the top of my head, same for state entities that could be seen as proto-German states. Nothing comparable with Kurds either.
Basically the point you're making could be valid for a number of European nations. Doesn't mean Kurds qualify as a nation too.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Personally I have no doubts about what happened but I wasn't there and I'm not privy to any of the investigation results. The sheer notion of a conspiracy however is so suspicious to me that I don't believe in it.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I don't think it is about deserving something or not. It's just that the long term history and trends in Kurdish culture have not been favorable to the establishment of a nation state. They failed so far and I'm afraid they will again in the future. What I think about it being deserved or not isn't relevant, but again I don't think that is the issue.

[Patrick Bahzad]

IZ,

Agree with all the factual points you made. Thing is with a piece as short as this one, you have to summarize some pieces of info and can't get to the level of detail you might want to. Thx for the added value of your comments to which I subscribe. The JITEM, Grey Wolves, Turkish deep state and Ergenekon affair are a case in its own right. I might report more about it at some point. Your input would be welcome.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Only difference being that Eritrea is 50 % Christian

[Ishmael Zechariah]

Typo alert: "50s-to 90s" in point 2 should be "60s to 90s". Sorry.
Ishmael Zechariah

[elkern]

Thanks again, PB, for more of the depth that makes this site so great.

My only quibble would be the implication (under the "Problem of Kurdish Identity") that the Kurds lack aspects of common identity which (US) Americans have. The US is NOT a "nation" in the tribal sense at all, despite the efforts of some to pretend that (Anglophonic) "White Christians" constitute a Nation, and the only "Real" Americans.

I regularly hear three languages spoken in the factory where I work; it used to be four, but most of the old Rhode Italians have retired. There are people here whose names, skin-tone, and facial structure bespeak heritage from every continent on this planet but Antarctica, and religious backgrounds to match. (BTW, by federal regulation, we can only hire US Citizens)

The only factor of shared identity you mention the Kurds lacking which we have (sorta) is an Alphabet! (...I'm amused by this, but still, I do appreciate the data-point, and it DOES bolster your point about the fractures within "Kurdish" identity).

Frankly, I've been rooting for the Kurds, especially recently against IS. My historical respect for Turkey has been severely strained by their treatment of the Kurds, and worse, by their barely covert support for IS.

My hypothesis is that Erdogan has been bought by the KSA - perhaps personally, but more likely (based on how things work here in USA) by monetary support for his political party. But this doesn't even qualify as a Theory, becuase I don't have any evidence.

Can't wait for Part 2!

[Ishmael Zechariah]

PB,
Thanks. Always happy to help.
Ishmael Zechariah

[Patrick Bahzad]

Well I'll try not to disappoint with part 2 then !

Regarding your point about kurdish identity, I didn't say there wasn't one, I merely stated the obvious which is that Kurdish identity cannot be compared to the national identity of nations such as the UK, US and France. Tribalism and ethnics have nothing to do with this as nations are not merely cultural but also political constructs, whether they have a State or not. The Kurds have neither. It's not a criticism, it's a fact.
I try not to let my personal sympathies cloud my judgement, especially not based on events going back a few months or years. I'm merely trying to describe what I observe. What you read is the result of this analysis.

[Babak Makkinejad]

One of the fundamental differences that has obtained for centuries between areas West of the Diocletian Line and areas outside of it has been this:

Self-governing cities - in Spain, in Italy, in Gaul, in Germania etc.

Nothing like that has existed, to my knowledge, in the Middle East - the famous proverb "The air of city makes you free." has no counterpart in the Near East - as far as I know.

[Fred]

Babak,

The US in still in the process of assimilating non-Americans with much resistance from both Americans and non-Americans.