Afghan Buzkashi (FB Ali)

Buzkashi is an ancient Central Asian game in which two teams on horseback seek to drag a goat carcass (often headless) across a field to a marked circle or goal line. A very rough game, it is also played in Afghanistan.

Something like Buzkashi is currently going on in Afghanistan, with not one but several teams pitted against each other. Instead of the carcass of a goat, the teams are fighting over the country, and its future within the broader regional context.

The game started in 1979 with the Soviet invasion, and has continued ever since, with the 'goat' in the possession of one team or the other. After the US-supported Mujahideen forced a Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the regime they left behind lasted for about 3 years, to be followed by a vicious civil war, centred on Kabul, between the various Mujahideen commanders and warlords. This was ended by the Taliban in 1996 when, with clandestine Pakistani support, they established control over most of the country (taking over the rest in the next two years).

The US invasion in 2001 (after the 9/11 attacks) involved a massive aerial assault under which the forces of the Northern Alliance moved on Kabul and the South. This shattered the Taliban's forces and administration, and within a few days they were completely defeated. Their troops and cadres scattered, most of them seeking refuge in their villages and homes, with a few escaping to Pakistan.

Strangely, out of this total victory, the US managed, in a short time, to stir up a Pashtun-Taliban insurgency. According to a remarkable book by Anand Gopal (which describes the occupation as seen through Afghan eyes) this was mainly due to an almost complete lack of knowledge of the country and its people, as well as the propensity, especially of US Special Forces, to undertake 'kinetic action'. (Later on, even Gen Stanley McChrystal, not known to be shy about undertaking such action himself, once said, “We have shot an amazing number of people, but to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be a threat”; he was referring primarily to shootings at checkpoints and from convoys).

In spite of a couple of troop 'surges', the US and its allies could not defeat the Taliban insurgency, especially in the Pashtun areas. In 2011, they began to drawdown their troops, handing over the lead in operations to the Afghan Army in 2013, with a planned total withdrawal by the end of 2016.

Ashraf Ghani, who became President in 2014, initially thought that the Afghan Army, with the support and military backing of the US, would succeed in defeating the insurgency. However, he was soon forced to the conclusion that this was not going to happen. So, with American blessing, he sought to negotiate peace with them. But the Taliban obviously believed that they could wear down the Americans and their protégés in Kabul, and spurned Ghani's overtures. Until the Chinese stepped in, both directly and through Pakistan. This combined pressure was sufficient to bring the Taliban leadership to the negotiating table.

China's actions on Afghanistan need to be seen in the context of other developments affecting it. US actions in spurning Russia's attempts to move towards the West, thus forcing it to turn to China instead, plus other aggressive US moves directed at China, appear to have hastened its longer-term plans. Part of these are its moves in Central Asia and (what I like to term) Middle Asia (Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, and, in some contexts, the 4 'stans' to their North).

The most recent of these actions is its commitment of $46 billion to develop an Economic Corridor (comprising road, rail and pipeline links) between Kashgar (in its Xinjiang province) and the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea (the still-incomplete Iran-Pakistan pipeline will also run through Gwadar). Longer term, it is also interested in Afghanistan's untapped mineral resources (currently it has the rights to mine a huge copper deposit).

It is these plans that make it important for China to ensure peace in this region, and explain its actions in pushing the Afghan peace talks. Another concern is indigenous terrorism feeding off turmoil in neighbouring regions. These Chinese actions are also the cause of a significant change in Pakistan's attitudes. From secretly helping the Taliban in their insurgency, and evading Afghan and US requests to arrange peace talks, it has moved to twisting the arms of the Taliban hard enough to get them to the table. Because now China wants it. (The BRICS and SCO have also called for a settlement in Afghanistan, but, for Pakistan, it is China that matters).

The opening of the talks is already creating ripples.

President Ghani is well aware how fragile his support is in the country. His survival depends on continuing American involvement and assistance, including, where necessary, military support. President Obama wants to pull US troops out by the end of 2016, but the US military lobby (the military, the defence industry, their Congressional backers, various thinktanks, the neocons, etc) wants to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan. The Taliban's basic demand, however, is for all foreign troops to leave the country. This is where the Islamic State (IS) has come in handy.

Last Sunday, when Ghani met Gen Dempsey, the US CJCSC, he said he wanted US troops to remain in order to counter the IS threat in Afghanistan; in fact, he suggested, the US could use Afghanistan as a regional hub to counter IS in the whole area. Dempsey was very receptive. Gen Campbell, the US commander in Afghanistan, supported the idea, and obligingly upgraded the IS's presence in the country from "nascent" to "operationally emergent"!

This IS 'herring' raises some interesting questions: Is the IS threat real? Will the Taliban buy into it, and agree to US troops staying on?

The IS 'presence' in Afghanistan has to do with the fact that the Taliban movement is fracturing. The protracted insurgency has brought many tribal and personal loyalties into play. Some (younger) insurgent commanders within the country are weakening or breaking off their ties with the old leadership in Pakistan. Some of the latter have adopted the IS brand (a purely nominal gesture). Many of them may well refuse to accept an agreement negotiated by the leadership, and lay down arms.

This is a major concern as far as the Haqqanis are concerned. One of the most deadly insurgent groups in Afghanistan, they have so far remained a part of the Taliban; they even had a representative in the Taliban delegation at the first round of the peace talks. They are likely to adopt a hard line in the negotiations, and may refuse to accept any agreement arrived at if it is not to their liking. Drawing their strength from the predominant tribe in the region around Kabul, and now much less amenable to Pakistani persuasion and pressure, they are critical to an effective ceasefire and a peaceful outcome.

If parts of the Taliban movement refuse to accept any negotiated agreement, they may well adopt the IS designation as a declaration of independence. That is likely to be the future "IS threat" in Afghanistan.

The chances of a peace agreement being arrived at between the Taliban leadership and the Afghan government are dependent on the package on offer. It is a distinct possibility if the deal offers the Taliban the potential of dominating the Pashtun South and East, with reasonable representation in the Kabul government. Will the Taliban accept an agreement containing a continued US military presence? The answer depends on many factors.

Principal among them is China's attitude. It is just possible that it may agree to it. If China believes that an insurgency is likely to continue in parts of the country, and that the Afghan military will not be able to suppress it, it may well let the US military stay on and deal with it ‒ provided its freedom of action is limited, as is the duration of its presence. Pakistan would certainly go along (it wouldn't mind a US presence in the neighbourhood to balance somewhat its dependence on China).

The Taliban leadership would face a conundrum. Acceptance of such a clause would almost certainly lead to parts of the movement refusing to accept the agreement. This is likely in any case, but this would lead to many more refuseniks. If the leadership felt that it couldn't deal with them itself later on, it may also want to let the US do it. However, if China was ambivalent, and the Taliban were adamantly against it, they would not agree to any such presence.

If China was against such a US presence, that would be the end of the matter. Then Ashraf Ghani would have to do his sums again.

All these goings-on have caused India to feel left out. So it whispered into the ear of someone else also feeling left out ‒ former Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Karzai promptly headed off to Moscow, where he proposed to President Putin that Russia, China and India should replace the US and NATO in dealing with "terrorism" in Afghanistan. With China already involved in its Afghan venture, this Karzai-India move is not likely to lead to anything. Like the US, they are left looking on from the outside while the party goes on inside.

Meanwhile, the peace negotiations are about to resume. It is being said that the second round will take place in China. Of much greater significance, the reports say that China and Pakistan are prepared to act as guarantors of the peace agreement!

This Buzkashi game in Afghanistan is coming to an end. It was yet another manifestation of the geo-strategic imperatives so presciently discerned a century ago by Halford Mackinder.

Comments

[Babak Makkinejad]

FB Ali:

China will not actively intervene in Afghanistan to any degree worth a damn.

She has nothing to gain and the security threat from Afghanistan could be handled more efficiently outside of Afghanistan, in Central Asia, working with Russia.

Chinese do not understand religion - any religion - an their knowledge of Afghanistan and indeed Islam is only that which can be gleaned from books. They are at a distinct disadvantage, even compared to Euro-Americans.

[DeWitt]

Excellent post, sir. I would say that Pepe Escobar adds the economic dimension to the military and political aspects of the regional Buzkashi game.

http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176026/

[Mark Logan]

FB,

Thank you. Your ability to pierce the chaff of the region and draw a clear and coherent picture is a wonder to behold. I am most grateful.

Thanks again.

[readerOfTeaLeavesq]

FB Ali and All --
Fascinating analysis.
FWIW, due to the miracle of YouTube, it is possible to locate archival films of Buzkashi.
Here is one to get interested readers started: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dkyuE_5zook

This link is an archival version from AP, with no commentary or interpretation.
The BBC has some great archival films of Buzkashi, back before the Soviet invasions.

The horsemanship is astonishing to watch; and how those tribesmen bred such sure-footed horses is a wonder. If they negotiate as well as they ride, they're formidable.

[elaine]

Afghan archaeologists with help from a few French are desperately
trying to excavate the ruins of Mes Aynak (near Pakistan border) before a
Chinese copper mining company blows the entire site to kingdom come.
Mes Aynak contains many Buddist shrines dating back 2,000 years or more
& since the site is on or near the Old Silk Road perhaps even more ancient
artifacts. It's sad. The Chinese did give a 1 year extension to the archaeolists however that extension is near its expiration. I think UNESCO
promised funds & expertise but didn't pull through. Info hard to come by.

[bth]

FB Ali, how would you overlay the Indians onto the Afghan situation at this point?

[Hussan Zia]

Brigadier Ali has reviewed the situation vis-a-vis Afghanistan is his usual comprehensive and incisive fashion. As aptly pointed out by him, Taliban leadership has only a limited influence over the Pashtoon population as whole.

Because NATO and the Americans have shed so much Pashtoon blood it will not be easy for Taliban leadership to accept continued western presence in Afghanistan even if they wanted to. It applies equally to the Russians which makes their involvement just as improbable. The Pashtoon never forgets and seldom forgives.

The main issue is one of reconciling the non-Pashtoon so-called Northern Alliance with the Pashtoons. Left to themselves, Afghanis are quite capable of reaching a settlement. What are preventing this from happening are vested external interests.

In this context, Pakistan and Afghanistan are inseparable and former's involvement may be unavoidable for a variety of reasons. Unless interference by the rest is somehow excluded, it is difficult to see a lasting solution emerging anytime soon. The Chinese have an outside chance because they have no past baggage and also because they have the monetary clout.

For what it is worth, IS or any other similar externally based outfit has no future in Afghanistan

[FB Ali]

I deal with that towards the end of my piece.

[Farooq]

Iran is part of Indian thrust. They have some making up to do after they abandoned them under US pressure, but the détente and machinations are already under way.

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/iran-offers-india-bigger-role-in-chabahar-port-reports/

"Iran offers India a bigger role in Chabahar port: Report

The port of Chabahar in southeast Iran is central to India's efforts to circumvent arch-rival Pakistan and open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan where it has developed close security ties and economic interests.
- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/iran-offers-india-bigger-role-in-chabahar-port-reports/#sthash.6eH5VHSe.dpuf"

[steve]

Thanks for this. I am still left unsure of the Indian response, besides making overtures to Karzai. If Modi really is the nationalist that is portrayed in some reporting, it is hard to believe he will not take more assertive measures for access to Iranian oil.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that Afghanistan state cannot be reconstituted into what it was under the Monarchy or even under the Communists.

Fundamentally, the Seljuk fault line runs through Afghanistan and the Pashtuns are in one side of that line and the non-Pashtuns on the other.

The Pashtuns in Pakistan are being assimilated linguistically into the Panjabi language and I imagine this would spread to areas North of the Duran Line.

Furthermore, the Seljuk part of Afghanistan was unified with the non-Seljuk part in the person of the King; once the Monarchy was gone the legal basis for a unitary Afghanistan was removed and thus any upstart - like Mullah Omar - could lay a claim to state power.

To wit, just like what happened in Somalia - it is best to accept the de facto partition of Afghanistan and help usher in two new countries; one within the Seljuk line and one without.

[FB Ali]

The "close security ties and economic interests" were with Karzai's Afghanistan. They are much weaker now.

India's "thrust" towards Iran is because of its intrinsic benefits, and is not just a means to gain access to Afghanistan.

[FB Ali]

India doesn't need to go through Afghanistan to access Iranian oil.

[Babak Makkinejad]

There is no "Iran Thrust" emanating from India.

That game has been over since 2006.

All and any interactions between Iran and India remain purely transactional.

[ked]

So, the US role is free military coverage for Chinese regional hegemony over resource & trade deals? Our Founding Fathers (& Eisenhower) would be so proud of what has become of our national security. Momentum, even empty of wisdom, is a powerful force.

[HankP]

FB Ali -

Very interesting, thanks for posting this.

Do you think this cooperation absent the US and EU is related to the recent financial moves by the BRICS nations to propose alternatives to the IMF, World Bank and general US/EU control of world financial arrangements? Here are some links -

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f59ed7d4-c90a-11e4-bc64-00144feab7de.html#axzz3gpuFquhf

http://thebricspost.com/eu-allies-defy-us-to-join-china-led-asian-bank/

http://emergingequity.org/2015/07/08/brics-launch-new-100-billion-development-bank-sign-agreement-on-100-billion-currency-reserve-pool/

[William R. Cumming]

Does China benefit from the Afghanistan opium trade? Who does?

[ex-PFC Chuck]

Thanks for the link. That was indeed an important post all the more because, as Escobar writes, because the Ufa summit was barely touched by western MSM.

[Simple Simon]

To Brigadier Ali:
We often see discussions of the US role in Pakistan; we sometimes see references, as here, to the role of China in Pakistan. It would be very useful to see an integrated discussion of how Pakistan balances its relationships to the US and China, and reciprocally, how the US and China each view the role of the other in Pakistan. Obviously, given Pakistan's, the US's and China's interests in Afghanistan the matter is relevant to this post--but the issue is far broader. I wonder if you could either here or elsewhere address this issue.

[jonst]

"where he proposed to President Putin that Russia, China and India should replace the US and NATO in dealing with "terrorism" in Afghanistan".

Get the space cadet, crook, up in front of Congress and give him our highest civilian award. And some money. And pills, to boot. Greatest service he ever performed for the US.

[FB Ali]

Escobar's is a useful article. One caution, though. I think he overestimates India's role in these developments and in the future.

India is a BRIC and SCO partner, and is entering into various economic and developmental arrangements in this region. But it is also hobnobbing with the US and entering into defence pacts with US allies (eg, Japan). Because of this, it is not fully trusted by Russia and China; with the latter it has an old rivalry.

As an example of Escobar's over-estimation: TAPI is not going anywhere in the foreseeable future. Mainly because it is US backed, and also because Pakistan would prefer the gas link to Iran.

[FB Ali]

The financial moves to ultimately have an alternative to the US dollar are one part of this general trend to consolidate the Russia-China-Asian region as a counter to US hegemony over the world.

[FB Ali]

China has nothing to do with this 'trade'. The opium goes out through the 'stans' to the North, and through Pakistan. Somewhere along the route it is processed and ends up in the West, where the consumers are.

[HankP]

FB Ali -

I agree. Do you think it will be successful, do you have any idea how receptive nations in the area will be to such proposals? If they manage to get the oil trade off the dollar to a significant degree this could really screw up the dollar as the global reserve currency.

[FB Ali]

I don't have any inside, or even direct, knowledge of the actual policies being pursued by Pakistan. As an outside observer, the best I can do is paint a broad picture based on what I see.

Pakistan has friendly relations with the US, but probably counts itself an ally of China. China has stood by the country through thick and thin. China is a major military hardware supplier. The two countries have jointly designed a fighter plane, which is now in production for both air forces. Pakistan has now contracted to buy 8 submarines from China. As I have narrated in my piece above, Pakistan is playing a prominent role in China's future plans for the region.

If Pakistan ever had to choose between the US and China, I have little doubt which one it would choose.