THE BEST DEFENCE IS A GOOD OFFENSE

ISIS launching operations towards Kobane and Hasakah ? 

By Patrick Bahzad

A couple of days have passed since Kurdish YPG militias achieved an important victory against ISIS in Syria, where they took the city of Tal Abyad, a large border-crossing into Turkey. With the support of US airstrikes, the combined forces of the YPG and a number of Syrian rebel groups also advanced South towards Raqqa, the capital of the "Caliphate", apparently managing to take control of Ain Issa, a strategic traffic junction between the road from Tal Abyad to Raqqa and  the"Syrian Road" going all the way from Mosul to Aleppo. While these advances are quite significant as such, they will only have a lasting effect in the fight against ISIS if they can be consolidated and maintained.

The Islamic State however seems to have opted for its favoured method of defence, which is to avoid large scale engagements and instead redeploy and counter-attack in the enemy's hinterland. The success or failure of such moves will have a strong bearing on what is now a battle for control over the Turkish-Syrian border.

Up until a few weeks ago, ISIS was controlling a much larger part of the border area, including vital border-crossings that the organisation used as smuggling and resupply routes. The fall of Tal Abyad has dealt a severe blow to the Jihadis' stream of trucks carrying oil, cotton, grain and other goods over the Turkish border, as they now have to take a longer route to reach a border-crossing still under their control.

Kurdish Advance and Victories

In this context, the Kurdish YPG advances further South onto Ain Issa can clearly be seen as an operation aimed at cutting of the smuggling route used by ISIS - i.e. the famous M4 known as the "Syrian Road" - which provided ISIS with a major East to West traffic connection, all the way from North-Eastern Iraq to North-Western Syria. Several border crossings North of the M4 have been used over time to maintain a steady flow of goods getting back and forth over the Turkish border.

From that perspective, the recent Kurdish victories could potentially have serious consequences for the Islamic State. For one thing, these gains could enable the anti-ISIS coalition to seriously disrupt ISIS logistical and financial operations. The Kurdish expansion into areas along the Turkish border might also be used as a means to stop or reduce the arrival of new ISIS recruits, and serve as a launch-pad towards major offensive actions against the Caliphate's territory in Syria, especially its capital Raqqa, which is located just about 40 miles South of Ain Issa, the furthest point of YPG advance so far.

ISIS' reaction

Up until now, the Islamic State has not attempted to engage the militias that have advanced onto its territory in large conventional battles. Such a move would have been very surprising anyway, as it is not the usual defensive MO of the Organisation. US airstrikes have been very instrumental in recent Kurdish victories, but they have focused on a rather small area, along the main offensive objectives of the YPG. The Islamic State knows it can't cope with the combined forces of US airpower and a reasonably equipped and trained ground-force. They might try to sustain such an onslaught in specific circumstances, but such a defence would come at a very high cost on open ground.

Rather than risking heavy losses, ISIS has instead opted for a tactical redeployment towards defensive lines closer to the urban area of Raqqa, where US airstrikes won't be called in as easily. The other advantage of such a move is that YPG lines risk being overstretched as the militias are advancing further away from their logistical bases and into areas that have never been Kurdish. In other words, now that the YPG are going South, they're heading deeper into Arab Sunni areas, where they can't count on the support and cooperation of the civilians, especially given recent news about alleged ethnic cleansing of Arabs by the Kurdish fighters further North.

In typical IS fashion, the Caliphate's troops are implementing a Maoist insurgency tactic, vanishing into the depth of the land and making use of their mobility and "stealth" ability to reappear behind enemy lines. Since early this morning, it seems they have started an operation West of the disputed area, against the Kurdish town of Kobane, which had already been the scene of a months' long siege by ISIS late in 2014.

A counter-attack on Kobane and Hasakah ?

Although the scale of this counter-attack remains to be confirmed, it seems ISIS has started its operation with the usual suicide attacks, followed by an assault by light infantry that was able to take a foothold inside Kobane. The logic of such a move would be quite straight forward: given that the Kurdish YPG militias mobilized a large fraction of their fighting force for the offence on Tal Abyad and Ain Issa, probabilities are high that other areas along the border lost manpower and were less protected than before.

ISIS, still in control of the area West of Kobane, would thus be in a position to launch a counter-attack against the Kurdish city, which holds as much importance as a border-crossing as recently lost Tal Abyad. Another reason for the sudden ISIS operation against Kobane is that US air force can only fly a certain number of "sorties", meaning that if most of the airstrikes target the front-line North of Raqqa, the Kurdish defensive positions elsewhere will be left to deal with an attack mostly on their own, unless there's a tactical decision by Coalition commanders to divert part of their air-assets towards defending other areas.

It's worth remembering that in the fall of 2014, Kobane was held against an ISIS onslaught only through heavy US air support (80% of Coalition airstrikes in Iraq and Syria during that period took place around Kobane). If the situation in Kobane further escalates, there will be a dilemma both for the YPG (possibly having to cancel further operations towards Raqqa in order to send reinforcements to Kobane) and for US commanders (having to choose between concentrating their strikes onto the Caliphate's capital or giving more support to Kurdish troops elsewhere).

In addition to the raid against Kobane, ISIS also launched an attack further East, on Hasakah, a town which is being held both by Syrian government troops and Kurdish militias. Again, it has to be underlined that ISIS offensive action is being launched directly against an urban area, where US airstrikes will be much less in number (especially because Hasakah is being held in part by pro-Assad government units).

Preventing the fall of Raqqa

The significance of ISIS operations both East and West of the main Kurdish troop concentration will depend on how much progress is made in what is now the centre of the ongoing "campaign". If the Kurds and their allies manage to push further towards Raqqa, possibly getting into the city and maybe taking parts thereof, they will have dealt a severe blow to the Islamic State, achieving a victory of high symbolic value.

However, the ability of the YPG to conduct such an operation of combined arms and urban warfare has never been tested yet. Considering ISIS capabilities in the latter area, it looks rather unlikely the Kurds will attempt, let alone succeed in such an operation. Quite possibly, they're looking to consolidate the territorial gains they have recently achieved and deprive ISIS of an important part of the border area with Turkey.

The downside to the latest offensive against ISIS is that the Kurdish flanks have most probably been left "unattended" and that cities and towns on the Turkish border or with access to that border would now be easier targets for the motorized "light infantry" units of the Islamic State. If the centre part of the Caliphate's defensive line around Raqqa manages to repel or contain a continuing assault by the YPG, the momentum in the current battle may very well change sides, and what looks like ISIS flanking moves in the West (against Kobane) and in the East (against Hasakah) might force the Kurds in particular to deploy reinforcements to those areas, thus weakening their own centre and reducing their chances of success.

Double or Quits

For the Islamic State on the other hand, the seriousness of the current threat on Raqqa could either bring about a disastrous defeat or be turned into a tactical victory with important implications for control over border-crossings with Turkey. The fact ISIS is also waging ferocious fights against opposing Salafi groups that control such border-crossings in north-western Syria shows how much they are aware of the importance of those areas. Kobane however will probably not be taken by ISIS, as the Coalition won't let such a high value target fall into the hands of the Jihadis, especially not after last fall's defence of the city, but in the East of Syria, Qamishli and Ras al-Ayn would both be within ISIS reach, if Hasakah was to fall.

Additionally, any further push of ISIS towards the North and the Turkish border would threaten and possibly cut off the continuity of the Kurdish enclave in Syria, which is another risk the Coalition won't be willing to take. The outcome of the current operations in northern Syria, combined with the still ongoing siege of the Baji refinery in Iraq, will most likely dictate the military course of action for the weeks to come.

 

 

 

 

Comments

[William R. Cumming]

Thanks for this post! The Turks are a proud nation-state but IMO nation-states that do not control their borders are disqualified.

Why are the Turks so cavalier about their borders?

[turcopolier]

WRC

There are "nations" and then there are "nation-states." "Nation-state" implies a state the boundaries of which are co-extensive with an ethno-linguistic "nation." There are not many of these. pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

They probably have their own reasons ...

A question though, does the US control its Southern border well enough to prevent a steady inflow of illegal immigrants ? No it doesn't.
Does it disqualify the US as a nation, a State or a nation-State ? According to your logic, it should ;-)

[turcopolier]

All

I am told that on the SW Syria front the Israelis intend to try to transform the Syrian Druze into a buffer against IS. The Izzies are not concerned with all the other menagerie beasts among the Syrian rebels but they fear IS and wish to be freed of the threat by constructing something like their SLA strategy in south Lebanon long ago. There are many Druze in the IDF and Israeli police. These may be an asset in this effort or maybe not. The main Israeli local concern remains Hizbullah and they have no idea how to deal with that threat. pl

[Matthew]

Col: I read an idiotic comment yesterday on another tread where someone said the Kurds "were beating ISIS" just with AK-47's. Not to diminish the bravery of Kurds, but American airpower helps. A lot.

[Matthew]

Col: Well, the Israelis could stop preventing Lebanon from developing a real air force and taking control of its own airspace. That might dim Hezbollah's appeal.

[Tyler]

PB,

As someone on the front lines there, trust me - there are those who would happily see the US as little more than a bazaar with a song and flag.

[confusedponderer]

Matthew,
Lebanon doesn't have a real air force and doesn't control its own airspace and the Israelis like and want to keep it that way.

AFAIK the IDF is making sonic booms over Beirut every odd day or so just to remind the locals they're there. Needless to say, the same conduct by Russia over the Baltics or Kiev would have the US screaming bloody murder.

http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/lebanon-army-says-iaf-jets-violated-country-s-airspace-1.333366

http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/UN-protests-Israels-violation-of-Lebanon-airspace-312397

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13931203001146

The US is thowing used F16 at everybody who doesn't get up his tree fast enough. Lebanon doesn't get any, nor will they get a decent air defence.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Regarding Druze and Israel, the talk is about turning the mainly Druze areas in the Golan Heights into some sort of militarized buffer zone, preferably patrolled by local Druze police and the IDF's Druze 'Herev' Infantry Battalion.

However, the Druze on the Golan Heights (occupied by Israel in 1967 and annexed in 1981) still have very strong ties to the Syrian Druze and are not particularly pro-Israel, unlike the Druze in Israel's Northern region.

Hizbollah in South Lebanon is indeed seen as the more potent threat by the political establishment and part of the military, mainly because of their balistic capabilities (something the Jihadis in SW Syria don't have). This idea of a buffer zone can thus be traced back to several reasons.

However, there is growing concern in Israel about an emerging threat in Gaza, and to a lesser degree in East Jerusalem, where ISIS cells and groups are trying to establish a permanent presence.

In Gaza in particular, they're trying to get more popular among the locals, attempting to infiltrate and dislodge Hamas and linking up with IS affiliated groups in the Sinai, which would also increase the threat on Israeli Red Sea area around Eilat.

[FB Ali]

An interesting and useful post, PB.

However, it makes no reference to a couple of other important ingredients of the situation. One is the West's assistance to the YPG in terms of weapons, training, planning and, more than likely, battlefield assistance by SF (especially in directing air attacks).

The second is the role of Turkey, which is opposed to the YPG, and is believed to unofficially assist the IS. It is quite likely that the West has planned and directed this YPG attack to cut the access links between Turkey and the IS areas. The latest IS attacks appear to be a counter to such a cut-off, and probably have Turkish blessing.

Beneath this IS-YPG confrontation a deeper conflict is ongoing between the West and Turkey.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Do you know more precisely what country is actually helping YPG?

I cannot credit Europeans doing so, my guess would be the United States.

But I defer to you if you can shed any more light on this.

[Patrick Bahzad]

General,

Your additionnal information is very welcome. I wanted to keep this post short and sharp and stick to operational aspects of what is going on at the moment.

Turkey's role in the ongoing fight against ISIS would probably deserve a long piece in it own right, that is why I avoided referring explicitly to it.

Reactions in Ankara to further advance of YPG groups have been quite negative already. The deeper conflict between Turkish and Western interests is one thing you're right, but for the Turks it is just as important to ascertain their neo-Ottoman role in the ME as to avoid the establishment of a large semi-autonomous Kurdish enclave south of their border, in addition to autonomous Kurdistan in Iraq.

From that point of view, there is probably a very cynical balancing act going on in Turkey, where they want to make sure neither the YPG nor the IS gets too much of an upper hand.

At the moment, they're probably trying to come up with new "creative" ways of containing the YPG gains and allowing IS to take back some of the lost territory, especially along the border, as IS acts as a good buffer between Kurds North and South of the border between Turkey and Syria.

That the Kurdish YPG offensive has been coordinated with the West, possiby having enjoyed help from a number of "advisers", is very likely, considering how much coordination there has been between ground operations and air strikes during the advance towards Ain Issa.

[mbrenner]

An innocent question. It touches on the question of manpower. For a year now, we have been treated to a barrage of reports about the rapidly expanding ISIL army. The two sources are: a wave of foreign fighters; conscription from among the population they control. The numbers floating around have been upwards of 100,000. Yet, somehow, wherever they are confronted by a reasonably coherent opposition force (acting with or without US airpower - march to Tikrit is latter instance)ISIL is defeated or retreats. In most instances, they are said to be outmanned rather than outgunned. Their counter maneuvers, e.g. Ramadi, are tactically brilliant but involve only hundreds of troops.

Could someone more knowledgeable than I please explain this New Math

[FkDahl]

ISIS is not exactly a Cat A Soviet Motorized Division where the logistics requirements have been estimated and the number of supply trucks per day required is known within reasonable limits (dreamy flashback to younger years).
My question is: what is the logistics footprint of ISIS? How much fuel, jihadists and ammo are they burning through?
Would cutting the border with Turkey have any significant impact? (cough... NATO allies .. cough cough) or do they have enough ammo on hand from booty, and since pickups don't burn that much fuel (compared to a tank!) their consumption is insignifcant compared to the civilian population in the area?
Talking about pickups, since there seems to an active trade in used pickups (e.g. a plumber in Texas), has anyone tracked this trade or started equipping them with hidden transponders?

[Fred]

cp,

as you know weapons don't fight soldiers do. Just how unified is the social structure of Lebanon that would allow the time to actual develop a capable air force?

[Claud_Alexander]

To add a small footnote about Turkey, I'd note that, independently of the election results, the Turkish economy seems distinctly vulnerable.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11660864/Turkey-becomes-first-domino-for-emerging-market-debtors-as-politics-split-country.html

It could be that, having grown up in South America in the closing decades of the last century, I'm over-sensitive to lines such as,

"Turkish companies were left heavily exposed as they grapple with record levels of hard currency debt left from an unchecked credit boom." ,

, but I've seen how these have the potential to become breaker of nations, or at least of said nations' foreign policy forward-policies.

[FB Ali]

I'm afraid I do not know. The Germans and Canadians are helping the Iraqi Kurds (PM).

It may well be the US that is doing it in the case of the YPG. The Canadian SF have become, in effect, a junior partner of the US SF. So some of them may well have been 'sub-contracted' out to the YPG.

[mbrenner]

A feature of references to Turkey's role in supporting both al-Nusra and ISIL is the only fleeting mention of Washington. We hear virtually nothing as to American efforts to alter Turkish behavior. Any insight as to what - if anything - we are doing, and why it seems unavailing would be helpful to the discussion.

The Obama people seem congenitally incapable of resisting any strong-willed party with access to Washington's antechambers of power - Israel. KSA, Turkey among others. By contrast we are awfully good at attacking Huthis and trying to humiliate the Iranians.

[VietnamVet]

MB

Washington DC has a fundamental problem in that it doesn’t have the American people in the fight. The Middle East and Ukraine wars are strictly professional efforts to void the sequestration of DOD funds. Russia was chosen as the perfect villain in this play. But, the USA is dependent on proxies on the ground. YPG is similar Donbass rebels. An inclusive secular movement among an ethnic group; while the Jihadists and the Ukraine neo-fascists are at root insular fanatics. The Islamic State was born because the Sunnis did not want to be ruled by Shiites. Northern Iraq fell into their lap when the ISIL and Baathists partnered together. Ukraine was seized by a Western coup.

The problem for wars for profit is that they never end and the participants are uncontrollable. The American bombing is to perpetuate the fighting not end it.

[William R. Cumming]

YUP!

[William R. Cumming]

Agree!

[Patrick Bahzad]

Was just using WRC's image to show it could be used to describe what's going on in "el Norte" ... No doubt the revolving saloon door policy has its opponents there too :-)

[William R. Cumming]

Agree!

[Patrick Bahzad]

MB,

I'm afraid there isn't that much the US can do to push turkey into a corner. Remember how Turkish parliament opposed any invasion of Iraq from Turkish territory in 2003 ? They're a sovereign country and a big player in the ME. They got their own interests to defend.
The only reasonable thing to do is try and get them fully onboard a comprehensive blockade policy of their border, to sqeeze the life out of ISIS, but that calls for returning the favour with regard to the Kurds for example, which is problematic because the US needs the Kurds in their anti ISIS startegy as well.
Not an easy equation !

[mike]

Kurdish news reports are claiming that the attck in Kobani was three-pronged.

1] Two VBIED trucks crossing from Turkey with drivers plus Daesh fighters in FSA uniforms.
2] Multiple Daesh vehicles with YPG flags coming from the east this time dressed in YPG uniforms and shouting Kurdish slogans and singing Kurdish nationalist songs at checkpoints.(my thought is there had to be some Kurd Islamists in this group and not all foreign fighters)
3] A third prong from the south taking the village of Berikh Batan where reportedly a massacre of civilians took place.