Abu Deera, the “Shia Zarqawi" – by Patrick Bahzad
In June 2014, Mosul was conquered literally overnight by the “Islamic State”. The very next day, the US finally woke up to the fact that the war in Iraq wasn’t over yet. In a state of shock and disbelief, Average Joe “politico” began to realize – very much like in Faulkner’s quote – that the past was never dead, not even past. What most pundits and analysts in DC have been doing since is underlining the barbaric nature of ISIS, describing it as a modern day death cult, insisting – quite rightfully – on its many crimes and atrocities, but without contributing in any way to solving the actual problem.
What has gone unnoticed in this debate, is that the “Islamic State” is in fact just one side of the coin, the Sunnis of Iraq being now stuck between pledging allegiance to the new "Caliph" or contemplating life as second class citizens in a State that has been confiscated by a faction of Shia politicians and their “enforcers”, a hydra of militias and death squads who have been implementing a sectarian agenda ever since the start of “Operation Iraqi Freedom”.
These groups, a Shia mirror image to the Sunni Jihadis, are as much in the way of solving Iraq as ISIS. They are the Islamic State’s nemesis, just as the Islamic State is theirs. Here is the story of one of their most fearsome leaders. The Shia militias’ contribution to taking back Tikrit, earlier this year, already shed some light on the increasing role of these groups in the fight against ISIS.
The fall of Ramadi and the head scratching that has been going on since illustrates the dilemma the Shia paramilitaries pose for the Iraqi government and the US administration. What is at stake is their place in the overall strategy that needs to be implemented in order to defeat Abubakr al-Baghdadi’s stormtroopers and suicide bombers.
Between a Rock and a Hard Place
The alternative that the Obama administration is confronted with is simple: continue relying on the Iraqi government and its armed forces, helping them with airstrikes and logistical support, but keeping away the Shia militias, or take in the more combative paramilitaries from the South, perfectly knowing they are to most Sunnis what ISIS is to the Shia, and for good reason.
Based on those terms, the equation is hard to solve and every scenario that is being played through invariably ends up in disaster. Either the non-existent Iraqi army is going to implode, leaving Baghdad wide open to the Jihadi throat-cutters, or the Shia death squads are going to spread mayhem in predominantly Sunni areas, thus bolstering ISIS’ claim as their sole legitimate representative and protector.
This sad state of affairs however is only the end-result of years of mistakes, short sighted policies, misconceptions and duplicity from all sides involved. With their invasion of 2003, the US broke a country that was barely functional, but functional still. Instead of fixing it, Viceroy Paul Bremer and his cronies took decisions with catastrophic consequences, that are being felt to the present day, and then tried to find a way out of that conundrum, always keen to go for the quick fix as the only way to salvage a doomed counter-insurgency and the legacy of a President who nonetheless will go down in history books as one of the most incompetent US leaders ever.
April 9th 2003
The day Saddam was toppled by US military power will forever remain in the collective memory of all Iraqis. Yet, it has a fundamentally different meaning, depending on which group – ethnic or religious – an individual belongs to.
For the Shia, who make up about 60 % of the population and have long been oppressed in Saddam’s “Republic of Fear”, pay-back time had come. Time to get even with the henchmen of the Iraqi dictator, time also to take control of a State that had never been theirs.
In the weeks and even months that followed the end of the Baathist regime, chaos and anarchy ruled the cities and streets of Iraq. To the US administrators living in the bubble of the Green Zone, but also to the American military command, restoring law and order did not seem to be a priority. Getting rid of Baathist remnants, restructuring the economy, finding ever more elusive WMDs and going after a gradually expanding insurgency were on top of their agenda.
And while US forces went after the ex-Baathist leadership with an often clumsy and sometimes disrespectful attitude towards the laws of the land, knocking down doors, humiliating ordinary Iraqis in front of their wifes and kids, or patting down women for weapons or documents, the Shia political parties started to get organised and involved in the new Iraqi politics.
Countdown to take-over
The “Dawa” party and the “Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq” (SCIRI) were the main players in the Shia camp. Relying on American goodwill towards these former enemies of Saddam Hussein, their members gradually penetrated the still to be built Iraqi State. The “Badr Brigades” in particular, the armed wing of the SCIRI, slowly took over the entire Ministry of the Interior and waged their own gruesome war against the Jihadi and Baathist insurgents.
In Baghdad, in particular in the huge suburb of Sadr City, another political and militant movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr was about to take roots. Son to murdered opposition figure Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, Muqtada was nothing like his father. An ex-criminal and probable murderer, Muqtada was nonetheless going to create the most popular of the Shia militias, the “Al-Mahdi Army”.
In 2004, Sadr’s militia got entangled in a series of pitched battles against US forces in Najaf. Although soundly beaten militarily, Muqtada al-Sadr came out a political winner, positioning himself cleverly between Prime-Minister and ex-CIA asset Iyad Allawi and moderate Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, thus appearing as a major Shia figure in the political – and military – fight against the American occupiers.
At the time a rising political star, he fled the country in 2007, but other players have taken his place at the bargaining table. Sadr has come back since, but officially retired from politics in 2014, in a move that surprised many of those who couldn’t see through the smoke-screen of Shia groups, parties and militias that have been set-up to mask the “grand game” being played by one of the main regional powers having a stake in this fight.
Al Qaeda’s early days in Iraq
Meanwhile, the disgruntled Baathist officers and the Sunni fundamentalists started their own insurgency, with the Jihadis focusing more and more on an anti-Shia agenda. Massive bombings, suicide attacks and car bombs took place daily, targeting US forces, the rising Shia political establishment or ordinary Shia citizens.
Countless victims were blown to bits by cars packed with explosives. In the rubble, amongst the dismembered bodies, security forces sometimes found the hands of the suicide bomber still taped to the steering wheel. A gloomy image, but only a glimpse of the mostly untold horrors that were still to come.
Hundreds of young Sunnis and foreign fighters having come for the Jihad against the American unbelievers volunteered for “martyr operations”. Those days were the formative years that led to the level of sophistication of today’s VBIED attacks by the Islamic State. However, back then too, professional planners were already behind the fanatics – or schmucks – who blew themselves up attacking American military convoys or peaceful Shia worshippers.
Quite often, the suicide bombers operated in pairs, thus making sure that at least one of them would detonate the bomb in case the other had a last minute change of mind. Some of them didn’t even know their cars were rigged with explosives when they were sent to their death.
Enter the Shia death squads
To stem the tide of an insurgency they hadn’t see coming, US forces resorted to heavy-handed tactics that they were ill prepared for. Abu Ghraib epitomises that fiasco: clumsy, ineffective and with disastrous consequences for the image of the United States, as well as additional “free” publicity for Al Qaeda.
This is the context in which Shia death squads and “Special Police Commandos” entered the fray, employing methods just as barbaric as Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi’s troops. Tit-for-tat killings were on the menu in most mixed Sunni/Shia areas of Baghdad. Up until the US invasion, both sides of the Tigris river – which separates Baghdad into a Western part ("Karkh") and an Eastern one ("Rusafa") – featured Sunni, Shia and mixed neighbourhoods.
The Shia militias now embarked not just on the suppression of the Jihadi and Baathist cells in the capital, but also implemented a campaign of ethnic cleansing that saw thousands of Sunnis killed and dumped onto the streets of Baghdad in the years 2004 to 2007. The area of Sadaa, better known as the “Happiness Hotel”, a patch of wasteland on the outskirts of Eastern Baghdad, rose to questionable fame, as one of the most suited places to dump the bodies of tortured and mutilated victims.
By 2007, the once diverse and bustling Baghdad had turned into a mostly Shia capital, the Sunni enclaves having almost totally disappeared from Rusafa and their inhabitants having fled to Karkh, or even further, to the refugee camps of Eastern Anbar.
Abu Deera
This was the environment in which a number of Shia militants made a name for themselves and wrote a history carved in the blood of their victims. Looking at some of these characters, a number of potential candidates come to mind as representative enough of what the Shia militant scene stood for. None of them though is as iconic – or as feared – as the man commonly referred to as the “Shia Zarqawi".
Named after the notorious Jordanian terrorist who led "Al Qaeda in Iraq" until he was killed by US forces in 2006, this man goes by the nom de guerre Abu Deera. Born Ismail al-Lami, an Internet search doesn’t come up with much about him. Revered by some as the “Shield” of the Shia, or hated as the “Reaper of Rusafa” by his Sunni foes, Abu Deera was the perfect nemesis to the Jordanian terrorist, thug and mass-murderer.
As a UPI dispatch quite eloquently put it in August 2010, "most of the Sunni victims of Abu Deraa's group were tortured before they were killed. Bodies were found dumped in the streets, pierced by nails and bolts or bored by hand-held electric drills. Many of the victims were shot but some were found with their heads crushed by cement blocks. Many were decapitated". This may sound gruesome, but it was still a good stretch away from the worst torture methods that were employed in those years.
In terms of creativity as a torturer, Abu Deera remained rather average. Other Shia militia leaders displayed much more ferocity in that department. However, as far as efficiency goes, his record is quite outstanding. Hundreds of Sunnis were killed by him and his men and he took a major role in the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad at that time. A significant number of the bodies found at the “Happiness Hotel” in Saada are considered to be his work.
Media Coverage
In the few pieces published about him in late 2006, Abu Deera was described mostly as a ruthless warlord and murderer, which he undoubtedly is. To his defence – everybody has the right to a lawyer, right ? – it has to be said that in his twisted logic, he only tortured, maimed and killed people he suspected of being former Baathists with blood on their hands or Al Qaeda operatives. But family members of his enemies were just as much a "go" sometimes, which is stretching the "self-defence" case a bit ... Can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, as they say in France.
When it comes to Abu Deera's background however, information about him gets very murky. If you believe the few journalists who wrote about him, not much is known about his upbringing and early involvement in the militias. More probably though, witnesses who knew were too afraid to talk to foreigners, especially the kind wearing a flack jacket, a Kevlar helmet and a large "Press" badge around their neck.
More probably also, US intelligence didn't have enough personnel with a good command of local language and culture to find out more about him. It's hard enough to get a mole inside the New York mob when you haven't grown up in one of the five boroughs, so imagine what it's like to infiltrate the “Mahdi Army” if your name is Chuck and you're from Wisconsin.
Long story short, the Western media didn't know sh*t about Abu Deera and Western intelligence seemingly didn't know much more for quite a while. Abu Deera however was not a mystery man. He didn’t hide in his neighbourhood and was considered a hero by many Shias who saw him as their lord protector. Of course, that is not to say that he was a public figure, but when it comes to how he became the “Shia Zarqawi”, a couple of interesting things can be said.
A mass-murderer’s youth
If one had to sum up his resume, the most compelling description to give would be "small time thug from poor family turned Iranian agent and gone on an ego power-trip and killing-spree in the warlike environment of Baghdad".
Born in 1968 into a modest Southern Shia family, Abu Deera was six years old when his parents fled the Marshlands. Like other Shia, they took refuge in Area 75 of "Revolution City", a huge housing project built in the late 1950s to accommodate the needs of Baghdad's growing population of urban poor. The neighbourhood was renamed a first time in 1982, when it became "Saddam City" and finally took its current name – “Sadr City” – after the fall of the Iraqi dictator.
Abu Deera grew up there, with one brother and three sisters, under the watchful eye and brutal repression of Saddam's secret police, the “Mukhabarat”. His family earned a living as fishmongers on the local Mraidi market and Abu Deera, at the time only known as Ismail al-Lami, a short overweight teenager, made a few extra Dinars thieving and stealing whatever he could lay his hands on.
According to a local tribal leader, the young Abu Deera was neither respected nor appreciated. Sentenced a first time at the age of 18 for a burglary he committed in his own neighbourhood, his family avoided a heavy sentence through paying the victims a large financial compensation.
Recruited by the “Badr Brigade”
Soon after however, he raped a young man and was sentenced to four years in jail. Around the same time, his sister killed one of his cousins over a dispute for the location of her market stand. Things were seriously starting to get out of hand.
Having served his time, Abu Deera was sent to the army, during the war against Iran. After a few months basic training however, he deserted and ran over to the Iranians. The year was 1988 and Abu Deera was about to embark on his career as an Iranian proxy with the “Badr Brigade”, the anti-baathist group of militants who fought with the Iranians.
Created in 1983 as the “Badr Organisation” by the powerful al-Hakim family, all of them exiles living in Iran, its military wing grouped most of the Iraqi Shia deserters and exiles in Iran. The “Badr Brigade” had about 10 000 men in arms at the time of the war – equipped, trained and paid by the Iranians – and its operatives were used mostly for “unconventional warfare” behind Iraqi lines. This Iranian financing and control of the organisation would later open the door to Iranian infiltration of the new Shia dominated power structures in post-Saddam Iraq.
Luckily for Abu Deera, he joined the Iranians just ahead of the ceasefire that was brokered in 1988. He nevertheless stayed in Iran for another five years, now a member of a paramilitary force doing Iran’s bidding in the underground struggle against Saddam. In 1993, he was sent back to his home-country. His job was not just to collect information or organise networks of informants and potential activists. Abu Deera’s mission was to assassinate high value “Baathist” targets.
Back home
To avoid detection, he used the identity of an Iraqi POW who had died during captivity in Iran. Saddam’s secret police however kept an eye on him for a while, suspecting the man with the fake identity could be a “Badr” mole. In time though, they let go and never suspected his real identity.
However, fearing that his cover was potentially compromised, Abu Deera’s Iranian handlers choose to play it safe. He remained a dormant agent for another nine years and was only activated in 2002, when he shot and killed an Iraqi military officer. Apparently, nine years as a sleeper wasn’t enough though to evade the watchful eye of the “Mukhabarat” and Abu Deera was arrested, incarcerated and comprehensively tortured.
He was a tough man though and never gave away his true identity, or his affiliation to the “Badr Brigade”. Fed up with a prisoner who kept claiming his innocence, despite all the energy they put into making him confess, his jailers kept him locked up, until further notice.
A second time lucky, Abu Deera only had to wait for another few months before the US launched “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. Ironically, it was the Americans who provided him with a “get out of jail free” card. In April 2003, Saddam was finished and Abu Deera returned home to his old neighbourhood of Sadr City.
A star is born
In the streets of Baghdad, it was a free for all, despite the many US military vehicles roaming the streets. Many old and new scores got settled in those days. The nights were often as lit up as during the US airstrikes, but this time, it was Iraqi on Iraqi tracer bullets that provided for fireworks to the US servicemen watching the show without even grasping what was going on in the city they had freed from its evil dictator.
Very quickly, Abu Deera and a few associates realized Baghdad was like a huge candy store with nobody paying attention. Determined to give it a go, they robbed the Rafidain bank in the Shorja neighbourhood and killed their local “competitors”, just for good measure. A few days later, they were at it again: the al-Rashid military base had become a sort of no man’s land. No more Iraqi guards, and the Americans looked like they couldn’t care less.
The candy store syndrome set in again. Abu Deera and Co. went in the base like into a supermarket. They didn’t fire a single shot and got away with 3 000 AK-47s that were loaded onto several trucks that simply drove in and out of the base, as if they were picking up a delivery.
Joining the “Mahdi Army”
At this point, Abu Deera realized there was a “market” to take in Baghdad. The old order had dissolved and the new one was non-existent yet. One day after the heist at the al-Rashid military base, the gang joined in the looting of the Baghdad “Duty Free Shopping Centre”. They took everything that wasn’t nailed to the floor, including a large batch of “Gamble” whisky bottles, a highly valuable good, easy to sell on Baghdad’s black market.
When the big party was finally over, after days and days of pillaging, Abu Deera had made up his mind. He already had gathered a group of accomplices around him, petty thieves, rapists and murderers from Sadr City, eager for easy money, and willing to follow orders from a man they looked up to. For a time, they specialized in stolen cars and spare parts. In his community, Abu Deera became a respected man but also a feared gang leader.
Unsurprisingly, the newly formed “Al-Mahdi Army” made contact with him and asked him to join their ranks. In his trade, Abu Deera could provide them with a much needed logistical support as well as the necessary “muscle” for intimidation, extortion and more. To sweeten the deal, the leaders of the “Mahdi Army” offered Abu Deera a command post at the head of around 40 fighters. Needless to say, the former fishmonger accepted right away.
Who’s in charge ?
His old buddies from the “Badr Brigade” however had not forgotten about him and had followed his steep rise to fame in Sadr City with a certain interest. In June 2003, they touched base again. Slightly embarrassed by the dilemma he thought he was going to face, Abu Deera modestly stated his preference for working for his country and faith. The people he talked to – “Badr” officials or maybe some of their Iranian handlers – didn’t seem to be bothered.
“Don’t you worry, my friend. You’re going to stay with the Mahdi Army, working for your country, your faith … and for us”, was the baseline of the reply he got. Abu Deera knew this was the kind of offer one couldn’t refuse. Once again, he chose the Iranian card, relying on their protection and networks to further his personal goals as well as his commitment to defend his countrymen threatened by the Baathist and Jihadi backlash.
Looking at these events from a larger perspective, it was clear already back then that the Iranians and their proxies, the “Badr Brigade”, were trying to get a foothold not just in the new Iraqi State but also in a number of newly created militias and groups, especially one as popular and large as the “Mahdi Army”.
While officially competing organisations, the “Mahdi Army” and the “Badr Brigade” – or the “Special Police Commandos” and the “Wolf Brigade” that would be placed under their command within the Ministry of the Interior – were all part of a wider network, secretly guided by Iranian “Al Quds” agents, some of whom stayed in Iraq on a more or less permanent basis.
On the American Radar
The sometimes bloody street battles fought by the footsoldiers of both groups fooled some Western reporters and part of the Coalition military, but most of the top leaders in both organisations perfectly knew who was calling the shots … as well as sending in their monthly paychecks.
To Abu Deera, it didn’t make any difference. His job in this vast chess-game was to keep the Shia areas of Baghdad safe and get them rid of the Baathist and Al Qaeda cells that were causing mayhem in the streets. Anti-US attacks had been assigned to other operatives within his organisation.
For two years his growing army was busy kidnapping, torturing and killing. He probably overplayed his hand though, because he managed to pop up on the US radar. Quite a performance at a time when most American intelligence resources were devoted to tracking down Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq.
To be fair, one should point out that Abu Deera and his “colleagues” were kept pretty busy by the Jihadis, who had gone absolutely nuts in their attacks on the Shia. They didn’t just target political or militia leaders anymore, they went after everyone.
Tit-for-tat
It had all started in August 2003, when an Al Qaeda suicide bomber killed the political leader of the “Badr Brigade” in a car bomb attack on the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, killing at least one hundred people. Young men waiting to enlist in the new Iraqi police were targeted time and again, as were Shia day labourers waiting for their bus after a hard day’s work.
Among the worst attacks, the one that occurred on August 31st 2005 still leaves some questions open. According to the official version, a stampede occurred during a Shia pilgrimage following attempted suicide attacks. Around 950 Shia died, most of whom fell off the al-Aima bridge and drowned in the Tigris river.
After yet another attack, on the Golden Dome of the Askaryia Shrine in Samarra, on February 22nd 2006, the whole country descended into chaos for several days. Although denied at the time by Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, who managed to keep a straight face despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, it is now admitted that more than 1 500 people – mostly Sunnis – died in revenge killings in the days after the bombing.
The year 2006 was by far the worst one in that regard. The death toll, again never officially confirmed at the time, reached 3 000 a month on average. It is against this background that Abu Deera went about his work. And it is probably no coincidence that the number of Sunnis killed always increased dramatically after Al Qaeda operations like those described above.
Public enemy number one
Once the US finally got rid of the Al Qaeda butcher, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, in June 2006, they finally focused more on his Shia nemesis. Before the chase really started, Abu Deera however managed to stage one of his most famous killings, one that still earns him a lot of respect and approval among Shia residents all over Iraq.
On June 21st 2006, armed men dressed as Iraqi police abducted Khamis al-Obeidi from his home in the Adhamiya district and drove him to Sadr City. Obeidi was acting as Saddam Hussein’s lawyer, who was standing trial at that time. Having being severely beaten in front of an applauding crowd, Obeidi was finally shot in the head three times by Abu Deera and his body was dumped onto the street.
Obeidi was one of ten people involved in Saddam’s trial who was killed. Two other lawyers as well as seven officers of the court were also assassinated in sometimes similar circumstances. No arrest was ever made. This time the US had enough. Although Abu Deera never featured on the list of the 41 most wanted terrorists in Iraq, the Americans were now after him.
They tried to arrest or kill him at least twice, in July and October 2006, and twice they failed. In the second attempt however, Abu Deera’s son and an associate were killed. The noose was undoubtedly tightening. Sensing that the tide was turning, Abu Deera – or his handlers – decided it was probably healthier to retreat to an even more remote area of Sadr City and to cut of ties, at least officially, wit the “Mahdi Army” and its leader Muqtada al-Sadr.
Gone Rogue
Whether there ever was anything genuine about his break-away remains highly doubtful. Most likely, the puppet masters in that shadow war thought it would be wiser to do some damage limitation and not further tarnish the image of al-Sadr, who was then an important political figure in the Iraqi parliament.
Officially, Abu Deera had gone rogue, just like some 20 other leaders from various Shia militias around the same period. To Western intelligence agencies, it looked like he had totally turned into a free-lance warlord, ruling over his local fiefdom.
In hindsight, one is almost taken aback by some of the intelligence reports that came out of Baghdad in late 2006, assessing the “Abu Deera” case: “Whether he’s killed or captured, which will happen sooner or later, he will have served his purpose”.
But Abu Deera was neither killed nor captured. He had powerful friends, not just among the militias and their Iranian backers, but also in the Iraqi government. Prime-Minister al-Maliki, or people close to him, were definitely not keen to see the “Shield” of the Shia of Sadr City fall into American hands.
Exit to Tehran
By early 2007 however, it looked like he had no other way out than to return to Iran. The Americans had set their “gators” onto him. Abu Deera just vanished into thin air. Nobody could verify his whereabouts, not even the intelligence group from TF 145.
It took one and a half year of searching for leads, until finally, in November 2008, a photograph appeared showing Abu Deera in the Iranian city of Qom, with other members of the “Mahdi Army” who had gone strangely missing the previous year.
What he did in Iran is open to conjecture. The only thing that is established beyond doubt is that he remained there for almost 6 more years, until June 2014, when he made a public come-back during a parade of the successor militia to the “Mahdi Army”.
Part of Iran’s anti-ISIS plan
The event that triggered his sending back to Baghdad is pretty easy to make out though. A few days before the parade of the “Promised Day Brigade” in which Abu Deera took part, the “Islamic State” had conquered the city of Mosul.
Abubakr al-Baghdadi’s stormtroopers were also advancing on Baghdad and this move must have set of alarm bells all over Tehran. Probably not in panic mode yet, the Iranians and their “Quds” Force thought a little reassurance for the mainly Shia residents of Baghdad was necessary.
They were also sending a signal to their Takfiri foes, letting them know that they wouldn’t let go of the Iraqi capital without putting up a fight at least as brutal and merciless as ISIS was capable of. And who better than Abu Deera to personify this uncompromising ferocity ?
Although he hasn’t taken part in any of the offensive actions undertaken by the “Popular Mobilisation Units” and the various brigades under the command of Transport Minister Hadi al-Amiri, it would be surprising if Abu Deera just spent his time standing idly by.
The Cherry on top
Chances are, he’s organising the self-defence groups in the capital and getting ready to retaliate with overwhelming force in case the “Islamic State” tries to pull off a real attack on the capital.
Sleeper cells of the Caliphate are already present in significant numbers and they make their presence felt by the number of bodies they leave week in week out on Baghdad’s streets. This is maybe a difference to the situation in 2005-2006, when the level of sophistication and organisation of the Sunni insurgents in and around the city left much more to be desired.
The current ISIS leaders and the core of their member are survivors. They have learnt their lessons the hard way and will probably be much more difficult to get rid off than the previous generation.
As for Abu Deera, he probably is just as safe in Baghdad as in Tehran. Although a terrorist wanted by the US, a mass-murderer and torturer, nobody in the Iraqi government is even contemplating his arrest. Not only is he protected by the Iranians, but more prosaically, he’s married to the sister of Hadi al-Amiri, the same al-Amiri who is also Minister for Transport, leader of the “Badr Brigade”, commander in chief of the “Popular Mobilisation Units”, long time friend to Qasim Suleimani (Major General of the IRGC) and a former guest to the Oval Office … Go figure !
Mr Bazhad,
Thank you for a comprehensive review of the Shia militias. Would it be naive to ask is there any way at this point in the carnage that the "Clean Break Cohort " left us - to quietly walk away from this hellhole of ancient religious strife ?
How might we leave this behind us without having it follow us home ? It feels like the neocons have placed us squarely in the quagmire of the ME with no safe way home .
Posted by: alba etie | 06 June 2015 at 08:15 PM
PB,
Very interesting piece. Thank you.
You say: ".... now stuck between pledging allegiance to a terrorist organisation...."
May I suggest that labelling the IS as a terrorist organization (a pejorative term), while perfectly valid as an expression of one's opinion, detracts from understanding its full dimension. It needs to be treated and understood as a serious player in the ME cauldron, not dismissed with one of those labels.
Posted by: FB Ali | 06 June 2015 at 09:00 PM
General,
You're absolutely right. I edited the passage accordingly.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 06 June 2015 at 09:06 PM
"the dilemma the Shia paramilitaries pose for the Iraqi government "
It has to be conceded that a majority of MPs in the Iraqi parliament support PMF. PMF is also supported by at least one VP and at least one minister.
The IRGC, which to varying levels, offers guidance and logistical support to the Shia militias, is also accepted by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Just last month a slew of IRGC generals was hosted at Iraqi MoD, including Iran's defense minister, an IRGC brigadier general.
The United States attempted to push away Shia militia and IRGC participation in the war against ISIL, by leveraging airstrikes during the concluding phase of Battle of Tikrit. What transpired was a command dispute that contributed towards ISIL subsequently regaining the initiative, and the fall of Ramadi. Another consequence of the command dispute is PMF has adopted the advanced defensive position for the protection of Baghdad and the holy cities, burdening Abadi and his far less effective ISF with the retaking of Ramadi. Really, without U.S. propping up, the Abadi government might have fallen following the loss of Ramadi. As it now stands, that government has been noticeably weakened.
Posted by: Pirouz | 06 June 2015 at 10:53 PM
PB:
The political leader of the “Badr Brigade”, assassinated on 29 August 2003, by someone in Iraq was Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Hakim - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Baqir_al-Hakim.
I do not believe that Al Qaeda was present in Iraq prior to US attack on 05/12/2003 and I cannot believe that Al Qaeda was organized in 3 months and then assassinated Ayatollah Hakim.
Someone else killed Ayatollah Hakim and attributed that to Al Qaeda.
3 days of state mourning was declared in Iran by Ayatollah Khamenei on occasion of his assassination. His assassination was clearly seen as a direct attack on the Iranian state.
This was not a little minor matter.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 07 June 2015 at 12:32 AM
BM,
You're right, it was no little matter, it was big and that's why I mentioned it rather than other attacks that made even more victims.
Regarding the party that is responsible for it, your scenario is possible, it could have been someone else than al Qaeda in theory, but this is the kind of conspiracy theory I don't want to get suck into.
As far as al Qaeda presence in Iraq goes, key personnel was sent as early as March 2003, and they hit targets before ayatollah Hakim was killed. The Jordanian embassy bombing was in early August and the UN bombing in mid August. Both of them have clearly been established as AQ attacks. Therefore at least as far as timeline goes, your theory doesn't add up.
That being said, there still could have been another player involved in the attack of August 29th.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 07 June 2015 at 05:38 AM
as far as I can tell there is little the "Iranian State" sees that it does not interpret as a direct attack on it. And who knows, there may be a lot of 'fire in all that smoke'. Or may just mostly smoke.
Posted by: jonst | 07 June 2015 at 07:08 AM
Thanks for this post! So exactly who are America's allies in Iraq?
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 07 June 2015 at 09:49 AM
WRC,
Any question regarding local allies should be sent directly to 1600 Pennsylvania Ave, as nobody else exactly knows who these allies are. Over here we certainly didn't get the memo ... Basically we deciding on a daily basis, just to make sure we get it right at least some of the time ;-)
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 07 June 2015 at 09:58 AM
That is a trait it evidently shares with the Great Satan.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 07 June 2015 at 10:09 AM
Ayatollah Khoei was also murdered in Imam Ali Mosque by persons unknown on April 10, 2013.
I seriously doubt that the hand of Al Qaeda in there.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 07 June 2015 at 10:12 AM
Any idea who it might have been if not AQ or IS ?
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 07 June 2015 at 10:15 AM
A beginning of a war must be accompanied by formation of "government battalion" made exclusively of the close relatives of the legislative body and of ideologues from pro-war think-tanks. This battalion should be trained in combat. Perhaps when Cheneys, Kagans, and Bushies see they children and grandchildren coming limbless and brain-damaged from the wars, the country would have a more intelligent policies devised by the responsible experts and not by the war profiteers and career opportunists.
Posted by: anna-marina | 07 June 2015 at 10:24 AM
Patrick, many thanks for this insightful piece.
Babak,Patrick my understanding is he was trying to protect a Baathist who had sought sanctuary in the shrine. However, a group of people killed him and then the Baathist. Whether they were affiliated to anyone or merely enraged civvies is unknown.
Posted by: Lord Curzon | 07 June 2015 at 03:07 PM
Patrick Bahzad,
I remember reading semi-shortly after the Khoei murder, that Muqtada al-Sadr was theorized as having a role in it, to eliminate Khoei as some kind of rival. I remember having read that al Sadr was driven by the murder scene to watch Khoei dying, and then was driven away. I can't remember where I read that.
Posted by: different clue | 07 June 2015 at 03:26 PM
Dear Patrick Bahzad,
An excellent summary. I recall when the media trumpeted the "El Salvador" option, drawing all the wrong lessons from (If the US had a theocratic fundamentalist best buddy in Latin America, then useful analogies could have been drawn, but the history of Central America would have been very different). Instead, rather than stabilizing the situation, it destabilized towards worsening sectarian strife. Most annoyingly, the purveyors of this series of disastrous decisions are accorded honored discussion debates in village Potemkin. Perhaps they felt that no matter how much carnage was created the might of the US military could always sort it out. And if not, denial was the fallback plan.
Posted by: ISL | 07 June 2015 at 03:27 PM
Sorry have not paid enough attention, this is the murder that took place in 2003. Indeed muqtada al-Sadr still is considered the main suspect in this case, you're right.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 07 June 2015 at 03:45 PM
The talk about Salvador option came up after it was first mentioned by then VP dick Cheney . Col. James Steele was sent in capacity as advisor to new police forces who were already being infiltrated by Badr brigades and other sectarian groups. This will be the subject of a separate piece.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 07 June 2015 at 03:51 PM
Thanks ISL,
Wikipedia has this quote from Newsweek.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salvador_Option
"An article published by Newsweek in January 2005 that explored the notion of the "Salvador Option" quoted anonymous military insiders but did not specify the precise origin of the phrase or explicitly say that those words were actually used by Pentagon sources.
According to Newsweek:
...one Pentagon proposal would send Special Forces teams to advise, support and possibly train Iraqi squads, most likely hand-picked Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and Shiite militiamen, to target Sunni insurgents and their sympathizers, even across the border into Syria, according to military insiders familiar with the discussions. It remains unclear, however, whether this would be a policy of assassination or so-called "snatch" operations, in which the targets are sent to secret facilities for interrogation. The current thinking is that while U.S. Special Forces would lead operations in, say, Syria, activities inside Iraq itself would be carried out by Iraqi paramilitaries."
Link to Newsweek article on Archive.Org
http://web.archive.org/web/20050110030928/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6802629/site/newsweek/">http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6802629/site/newsweek/">http://web.archive.org/web/20050110030928/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6802629/site/newsweek/
Posted by: LeaNder | 07 June 2015 at 07:00 PM
LeAnder
"It remains unclear, however, whether this would be a policy of assassination or so-called "snatch" operations, in which the targets are sent to secret facilities for interrogation' More sanctimonious BS, are you aware that there is a war to be fought on behalf of all the people in the ME who do not want to be taken back to the Middle Ages? pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 07 June 2015 at 07:19 PM
The Shiite militia is now armed, very heavily armed.
http://fortruss.blogspot.com/2015/06/meanwhile-in-iraq.html
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-lopKMPXToo4/VXSRGk4cmMI/AAAAAAAAFbM/4F-1oix8-rg/s1600/CGZ9p3kXIAA1oqn.jpg
Interesting that this heavy weaponry went to a militia and not to the Iraqi Army (which should decrease the likelyhood of ISIS getting their hands on them).
Posted by: FkDahl | 08 June 2015 at 06:09 PM
Eliot Abrams was among the NeoCons who made their bones in our Dirty War in Central America, getting cozy with the more traditional (waspy) Republican hawks like Cheney, Rumsfeld, etc.
This bright idea - pretending that what "worked" in El Salvador would be even better in Iraq - smells to me like the work of the NeoCons moles in the Pentagon.
Damn their eyes.
Posted by: elkern | 08 June 2015 at 07:48 PM
Pat, my intention wasn't to suggest that the article should be read as a clear/unclouded mirror of reality.
"are you aware that there is a war to be fought on behalf of all the people in the ME who do not want to be taken back to the Middle Ages?"
I wish I knew the ideology to the extend you do. I cannot help but see a bit of hypocrisy. The misuse of religion. Identity politics related to the-will-to-power. Not very different from extreme Western position: you have to live according to my dictate.
In other words, I deeply distrust the religious cover.
Posted by: LeaNder | 09 June 2015 at 09:19 AM
LeAnder
Your mind is contaminated by the secularism of Western culture. How many times must you be told that for the Islamists and for all Muslims to the extent that they are not contaminated by Western culture, there IS NO DIFFERENCE or distinction among the different aspects of life. Religion (as you understand it, a matter of lifecycle rituals)economics, war, politics, etc. for them these are all the sane thing and are aspects of a holistic view of life in which your idea that religion can be a screen is simply blasphemy. Islam is religion of the Middle Ages that has never been "reformed" successfully and that resists "reformation." IS and Nusra are merely the most recent evidence of that resistance. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 09 June 2015 at 09:58 AM
"Your mind is contaminated by the secularism of Western culture. "
It no doubt is. As European I am even more suspect of being a secularist then the average American.
"How many times must you be told ..."
Without any doubt I have a mystic core that for a very, very long time tried avoid political realities: "economics, war, politics, etc."
But there is also a skeptic a secularist:
"IS and Nusra are merely the most recent evidence of that resistance."
And this secularist wonders to what extend, admittedly without any knowledge, purely based on my very, very limited intellectual capacities, or knowledge on the issue at hand, how this resistance to the mills-of-time came about?
Posted by: LeaNder | 09 June 2015 at 10:43 AM