FOCUS: modus operandi of ISIS on the tactical level

By Patrick Bahzad

 
With discussions having recently taken place about the best course of action in the fight against the Islamic State, a short overview of the modus operandi of IS troops on the tactical level seems helpful to understand how their military capabilities can be targeted, and to what effect. The following assessment is based on IS operations undertaken mostly in Iraq in the period since early June 2014.

As a preliminary observation, it has to be pointed out that ISIS' operations in Syria, although they have been been taken into account for comparative purposes, are dependent on other contingencies and are only mentioned in case of notable discrepancies with Iraq. It also needs to be mentioned that, as an adaptive organisation, the Islamic State would probably be able to change its tactics if there was a significant overhaul of the Coalition's strategy.

For all these reasons, the following assessment should only be seen as indicative of IS' tactics so far and shouldn't be considered a projection of any course of action they might take over the months to come, in particular during Ramadan which is about to start.

A "Survivalist" Organisation

One of the most important things to stress about ISIS is that this is an organisation that has learnt to fight and survive – despite heavy losses – in an environment where they were totally outmatched technologically and under the constant threat of US air-power. The other decisive aspect to their military capabilities is the input of former military and intelligence personnel from the Saddam era.

In its early days, "Al Qaeda in Iraq" lacked the military, logistical and organisational skills of the former Iraqi military and it had a hard time surviving the US led "Surge". However, what was left of AQI in 2009 had merged with the ex-Baathist element and had gradually morphed into a structure that had learnt its lessons the hard way. Renamed "Islamic State in Iraq", it was led by a group of people skilled enough to seize any chance to expand and consolidate their organisation.

The very nature of the terrain that this war is being fought on, i.e. the presence of ISIS on both sides of the international border between Iraq and Syria, makes for a third element with huge implications for the Coalition. Iraq was always seen as the top priority of ISIS leadership, but their expansion into Eastern Syria - both as a logistical base and a sanctuary - has changed the equation. The scope of this change however will not be analysed further in detail in this piece. Instead we will focus primarily on the characteristics of the Islamic State as a hybrid organisation mixing terror, insurgency and urban warfare tactics.

A Decentralized Chain of Command

One thing ISIS has learnt from the fight against the US Armed Forces in Iraq, as well as from Al Qaeda's experience in Afghanistan, is that "hard" structure in terms of command and control is a recipe for disaster. On the operational level, the Islamic State has thus opted for a very decentralized chain of command and for a low tech approach to all forms of communication.

The "Caliph" himself is a man very rarely seen. Whether operational decisions are taken by him or by a "Shura" council of leaders including Abubakr al-Baghdadi is not always easy to say. The Caliph's messages may often be interpreted very broadly and don't give away much in terms of what ISIS is up to. What is known however, is that actionable decisions are sent to units in the field through a sophisticated network of couriers.

The man in charge of the Islamic State's "Courier Service" is Abu Hajar al-Hassafi, who was recruited by the Caliph himself in 2010 only. This late joiner managed to build an extensive network of relays all over the North and West of Iraq. Ever since 2012, he's been doing the same in Syria, starting with ISIS centres of gravity in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. No phone or other electronic device is ever used for these kinds of messages. Without human resources on the ground to identify the couriers, tracking them through SIGINT/GEOINT will remain a difficult task.

The Caliph and his top aides are just as cautious when it comes to moving around. A "light footprint" is key to survival and avoidance of suspicion. Key ISIS personnel moves in pick-up trucks, old vans or used cars, with never more than 2 or 3 bodyguards, and they have access to probably dozens of safe houses, both in Iraq and Syria. Again, the lack of human assets and intelligence on the ground is being felt here as well.

Various grades of asymmetric warfare

Cultivating a sense of paranoia that was typical of the Saddam era, al-Baghdadi for example can decide to meet with an associate in one place, only to change his mind deliberately and turn up somewhere else, 300 miles away at the exact same time. "These men are paranoid to the bone", as one former low level ISIS fighter puts it.

Perfectly aware that they are the weaker of the warring parties involved, ISIS has developed an sense of operational thinking that certainly qualifies as asymmetric warfare, but incorporates various levels of engagement, depending on the balance of power in the theatre of operation. In areas with a low density of IS' personnel or areas with relatively recent affiliation to the group, terror attacks in the traditional sense – meaning car bombs, suicide bombers or mass casualty attacks – are most prevalent.

This MO changes gradually the more ISIS gains the upper hand. Harassment and guerilla war are the next step up, with attacks on small military, paramilitary and police detachments or buildings, the third and final step being the ability to conduct larger conventional engagements resulting in important territorial gains or conquest of cities (Mosul and Ramadi for example). What is particularly striking in this regard is how fast ISIS went up the ladder from grade 1 (terror attacks) to grade 3 (conventional warfare), bearing in mind they have no air force and – obviously – no navy.

Their success rate has thus to be traced back to their intelligence capabilities, which are one of the main drivers for their territorial expansion. This aspect of the "Caliphate" has already been described in a previous piece though and will not be analysed any further here.

Small is beautiful …

Regarding deployment and engagement of conventional units, ISIS has been careful not to use large troop contingents, in order to avoid detection through satellite or other imagery. Up until the start of the Coalition air strikes, in the summer of 2014, the basic unit that was deployed on the ground was roughly battalion sized: 400 to 500 men in around 50 pick-up trucks (three companies, each three platoons strong, and a small command and support group).

The increased surveillance and ensuing air strikes however forced ISIS to downsize its units. The basic units (katiba) now feature around 40-50 men, no more, under a single commander who takes decentralized and autonomous decisions in the area that has been assigned to him. His course of action obviously follows a larger framework established centrally, but he's quite free to operate the way he likes within this framework.

If necessary, katibas can be regrouped for larger operations. In that case, the manoeuvring prior to action is done autonomously again, over a longer period of time, in an effort to avoid detection or raise suspicions.

As far as equipment is concerned, the most apt description of a katiba would be a large motorized light infantry platoon, armed with standard infantry weapons and usually a few RPKs and RPGs. Transport again is supposed to be as discreet as possible: pick-up truck, cars and small vans are being used to carry the group to its destination.

In case suppressive or support fire is needed, ISIS "artillery" can provide for indirect fire with mortar and a limited number of heavy artillery. Anti-tank missile teams and MBTs as direct fire support have also been used in some instances.

Offensive action

The specifics of ISIS' offensive action can be summed up as follows:

-        collection of detailed intelligence prior to engagement, through sleeper cells, informants and infiltrated agents or members of their "special forces";

-        deception and disinformation. Examples of this MO have already been given in a previous piece. Regarding battlefield deception, it's worth mentioning in particular the use of radio communication as a way to saturate and confuse the enemy prior to an operation. Harassment tactics all over the frontline are also a frequently used means to prevent the identification of the precise point of attack;

-        VBIEDs and SVBIEDS have become a distinctive feature of imminent ISIS attacks. As has been described time and again on SST, these vehicles packed with explosives are the Islamic State's battering rams, opening holes and gaps into the frontline, which are then exploited by ISIS infantry. Indirect mortar fire is often launched prior or simultaneously with infantry assault;

-        systemic use of sniper teams all over the frontline wears the enemy down and is used to take out specific personnel (COs, AT-missile crews, machine-gunners, etc.). Furthermore, in case an attack fails, sniper teams often provide for cover fire while infantry units regroup.

Defensive action and exit strategies

From a defensive point of view, a few details probably stand out as representative, even though they are in no way an invention or prerogative of IS units:

-        sniper teams slow down enemy progression from fortified and camouflaged positions. These units sometimes use extraction routes like underground tunnels to exit the battlefield;

-        booby-traps, IEDS and EFPs are routinely placed all along IS extraction routes. Larger explosive charges may also be dug in before any retreat, in anticipation of enemy movement into a specific area;

-        decoys are used more and more, sometimes through very simple means. ISIS flags might be flying on top of buildings with no military significance in order to attract attention. These decoys not only create confusion but slow down enemy progression, as air strikes are often being called in to take-out what may look like a military target, thus further delaying infantry advance in areas from which IS fighters are exiting.

Keeping the initiative

Vastly inferior in numbers and firepower, ISIS tries to keep the tactical initiative by attacking in places they're not expected and evacuating areas where the balance of power is too unequal. Although it has been announced that coalition air strikes have killed around 10 000 IS fighters in one year, there is no independent way to verify those kills. Considering how few casualties could be confirmed in areas taken back from the Islamic State, serious doubts can be raised over those figures.

However, even if the numbers did add up, these metrics don't give an indication about the "quality" of the fighters who have been taken out. In all likelihood, ISIS is very aware about its short supply of experienced fighters and would extract them as a top priority from an area under siege or attack. Newer recruits used as "cannon fodder" probably make up for a significant proportion of IS' personnel hit by Coalition air strikes.

Again, the lack of means to assess damage done to the organisation's military personnel is seriously hampering the Coalition efforts to get a clear picture of the effects of its air strikes. However, without such assets in place, it is difficult to ascertain and possibly adapt any efficient strategy aimed at degrading the frontline troops or the command and control structures of the Islamic State.

Comments

[The Twisted Genius]

Thanks for this Patrick. I've been looking at some videos of tactics and weaponry used by the YPG recently around Tal Abyad. I see a lot of similarities with ISIS tactics, except for the coalition air strikes of course.

This style of warfare should not be unfamiliar to the U.S. military. Here is a series of short articles describing the American experience of warfare in old New England. The entire website is interesting if you enjoy that kind of thing... which I do.

http://www.snowshoemen.com/node/26
http://www.snowshoemen.com/node/27
http://www.snowshoemen.com/node/28

[William R. Cumming]

Thanks as always P.B. for you insights. ISIS seems to be a LEARNING ORGANIZATION but can the same be said for the COALITION?

[The Twisted Genius]

The ISIS reliance on a courier network is admirable. I wonder if this is supplemented by field wire networks, especially on the defense. In the 25th Division, we practiced battalion level offensive and defensive operations in complete radio silence using field wire.

[Patrick Bahzad]

TTG,

Other main difference with YPG would be SVBIEDs ... And Intel capabilities !

Gonna have a look at those links, thx ;-)

[Patrick Bahzad]

WRC,

Yes coalition is learning of course. But sometimes knowng where the problem is doesn't mean you can fix it ...

[Patrick Bahzad]

TTG,

Given some of the people in charge in IS are soviet trained, I wouldn't be surprised if they used field wire.

[The Twisted Genius]

Ah yes, the SVBIEDs (or car bombs as we once called them). Saw a good video of YPG using a 12.7 anti-material rifle of Kurdish manufacture and a 23mm cannon firing aimed single shots to take out distant ISIS vehicular traffic. Not sure if they were approaching SVBIEDs or not.

[Medicine Man]

A quick question, TTG: What does "YPG" mean?

[Tyler]

PB,

Excellent article, as is your par. As much of a "how to" manual for how one fields a guerilla organization against a high tech enemy as it is a description of an effective fighting force.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Knowing your enemy is the first step towards defeating him ... Implementation is often the more tricky part though !

[The Beaver]

MM

YPG : Syrian Kurds

[Cee]

Patrick

Identifying all of your adversaries is key. I'm on the move and can't post but Robert Fisk wrote about who they are in The Guardian.

[Fred]

TTG,

Interesting read. When was the last time ISAF raided into ISIS territory?

[turcopolier]

PB et al

Very contributory and useful work. I am struck by the resemblances between the IS way of war and that of the Polisario Front in the '80s and '90s against the Moroccans. The Polisario were/are a guerrilla army and political movement of the Arabized Berber tribesmen who revolted against morocco after it occupied the former Spanish territory of Rio de Oro south of the original Morocco. In refugee camps in Algeria the Sahrawis (Polisario)organized themselves into a desert army. In doing this they had a lot of help from the Algerian government. The army that they formed was equipped with a wide variety of armored and motorized vehicles (old tanks, APCs, trucks, Land Rovers, etc.) These vehicles were all armed and carrying fighters. With this force the Sahrawis could maneuver for hundreds of miles across the Sahara Desert in widely dispersed small columns communicating by low wattage hand held radios that could not be intercepted by ground level Moroccan intercept stations. The Moroccans did not have airborne intercept and the "ground lobe" of Sahrawi signals were not audible to them. The Moroccans eventually built a long earthen berm to seal off the border against the Sahara Desert but the Sahrawis would mass just short of a section of the berm, assault it (usually at night) capture the Moroccan garrisions nearby, execute them and then withdraw across the desert at high speed dispersing into their many small units as they went. The Moroccans had an excellent army but they never learned to deal with this method. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polisario_Front pl

[mbrenner]

Knowing your enemy is the first step towards defeating him....

Is this context, that truism seems to have a double meaning:1)ISIL's tactical adjustment to American air strikes; and 2) the so-called "coalitions" less adapative learning from experience and PB's acute analysis (presumably done as well by the US Army). To this amateur's mind, that still leaves the question of the kind of strategic and tactical interaction between the two sides which has occurred. One issue is that it appears hard to assess with full confidence how good ISIL is militarily given the pathetic weakness of the opposition. They win most of the time but when facing an enemy that will fight - as at Kobane and around Tikrit - they lose. However either fits in their overall scheme, they do not look unbeatable. The other issue is the erratic use of airpower. That remains a mystery - but I have yet to see an explanation for the erratic, ill-timed pattern that has been observed. Open country, clear skies, depopulated outskirts of Ramadi. mid-day parades through downtown Ramadi's central avenue, a seeming cessation of infrastructure targetting around Raqqah. Third, there is the US refusal to work with or even acknowledge the Shi'ite militias. ISIL is surely versatile and dedicated and resilient - but with opposition like this, the Ruritanians might look pretty good. In the vernacular: what the hell's going on? To use another Americianism" you can't beat something with nothing

[turcopolier]

mbrenner

We have been over a number of your points before. Military forces can only be judged for effectiveness in the context of the opponents they face. This is universally true. As several of us have tried to explain. air power is nothing like as effective as it has been sold to be. The airplanes themselves are only part of the formula for using the over-rated air power. A large and effective targeting mechanism is needed to target and re-target aircraft. There is an open question as to how many hundreds of American servicemen the administration should commit to this task and life in the desert surrounded by Islamic fanatics and unreliable allies. the inhibition against killing civilians in mis-directed air attacks is strong. A small mistske leads to permanently dead innocents. I think you would be critical if that occurred. IS and Nusra are not unbeatable. US ground forces would defeat them handily. Do you want that? pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

PL,

It's true that IS light mobile units bear resemblance with Polisario columns. The only difference I see is that Sahrawis fought desert warfare at some point, which IS isn't really doing for fear of being engaged by coalition air force. Recoil less cannons also seem to have been more in fashion against Moroccans.
But the light mobile pick up truck columns are definitely a feature of tribal desert fighters, whether in Sahara or Jazira.
the Chadian army who fought gaddafi in the 1980s also used these tactics against heavily armoured Libyan columns to great effect. But they had french (And US) air and ground support. That's actually how they captured libyan gen. Haftar Who was then a loyal gaddafist.
The chadian Toubou Warriors were feared by the Libyans And they still are very effective fighters with a death dodger reputation. I remember one of their methods for clearing mine fields was to drive through with their land rovers or toyotas driving at 90 miles an hour.

[Babak Makkinejad]

All:

Iranian Foreign Minister on how to fight Violent Extremism

http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/11547

[Babak Makkinejad]

Pakistanis are doing the same thing, arming the Sunni Jundullah and sending them across the border into Iran to kill and maim.

Another manifestation of what is usually called called Islamic Brotherhood; the other one being when suicide bombers attack Shia Mosques.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I fail to see anything else in this piece than political propaganda by the minister of a State which has been one of the main proponents of terrorism in the ME since the early 1980s. But maybe it takes (former) terrorists or terrorism sponsors to know how to fight terrorism, why not ... Anyway, payback is a bitch, maybe Iran should have thought about that before they got their consulate officers slaughtered by Taleban !

[turcopolier]

PB

I was involved on behalf of the US on the Moroccan side. The Sahrawis never engaged unless they were closed up and "embracing" Moroccan forces. that was wise because Moroccan air would reach the scene of action along the berm before anyone else could. the Moroccan Air force often attacked Sahrawi forces forward of the berm if they could find them. BTW, the mandarins of the US cryptologic community refused to become involved to help the Moroccans. pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

What's the connection between jundullah and Sahrawis ?! There isn't any !
You should compile a list of all the shit the Iranians pulled for long long years, would clear up your mind and you might stop whinging about poor mistreated Iran. What a joke !

[Medicine Man]

Thank you.

[steve]

Do you really think they would fight if we deployed a large ground force? Why not just melt away, wait until we leave again, then come back? Maintain a constant stream of various suicide attacks and bombings so that we have constant casualties, while never letting us have a direct confrontation and "victory".

[Tyler]

PB,

Just looking at potential applications of these tactics in the US southwest.

The Taliban is telling ISIS to stay out of Afghanistan. My money is on the Afghanis.