By Patrick BAHZAD
Yesterday, the Iraqi government announced its coming offensive not just on Ramadi, but on the entire Anbar province. To be more precise, it was a Shia militias spokesman who made that announcement even prior to the government. One can only wonder at the ambition of such an enterprise and the disaster that would be a ground operation spearheaded by sectarian troops with a bad reputation and a number of alleged war crimes under their belt. Launching Shia militias into the heartland of Sunni Iraq, under a codename ("Labayka ya Hussein") that can only be resented by many Sunnis in Ramadi, Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar, doesn't bear the hallmarks of a sound strategy.
Is it a sign of desperation within the Iraqi government, an impulse reaction against harsh American criticism or the realization that of all government troops available, the Shia militias are the only ones with the will and the "guts" to take the fight to the enemy ? Time will tell, but if this is more than a PR-stunt and if there is indeed an actual military effort at taking back large areas under ISIS control, the most likely scenario is one of massive bloodshed, destruction and chaos.
The question that also needs to be asked is how the "Islamic State" is going to react to the government’s preparations. It can probably stomach a defensive fight in Ramadi, even a tactical retreat out of the city, but it can't let the Shia groups take away the initiative and drive back the Caliphate's armies into Iraq's Western desert. Basically, all bets are on as to what might happen next. First reports are already trickling in about a number of suicide attacks by ISIS "Martyrs" against the pro-government forces preparing for battle in the North and East of Ramadi. The writing is on the wall: ISIS won't probably give up Ramadi the way it did Tikrit and the Shia militias have to brace themselves for a tough fight in the days to come.
Be that as it may, the purpose of this piece is not to analyze tactical scenarios for possible developments on the ground, but rather to study a few cases of ISIS operations that are not strictly military, and focus instead on another of the organization’s tactics, as a follow-up to last week's piece about the Caliphate's ground troops. The aim is to give the reader an insight into one of ISIS most potent weapons, one that has a direct bearing on the outcome of a battle, but one that remains mostly in the shadows, only to be seen by its results and effects.
In fact, ISIS' strategy for winning over cities like Ramadi earlier this month, or Mosul last year, is based a lot on what happens in the weeks and months before the actual military attack. This "intelligence war" that ISIS has mastered much more than combined arms in the conventional sense is interesting as so far as it could give a few pointers regarding how the organization might try to react to the government’s offensive that is supposed to start soon.
The use of "sleeper cells" in Ramadi
Infiltration of potential target areas by ISIS members has proven a very powerful tool in the organization’s arsenal. In the conquest of Ramadi in particular, "sleeper cells" have been blamed by Iraqi officials for the chaos and confusion they created among government troops, through disseminating false information and spreading fear. While not entirely false, the role of so called "sleeper cells"doesn’t explain the rout of Iraqi troops by a force much smaller in numbers.
ISIS can't mobilize and built-up large ground forces prior to an offensive: any suspicious gathering of vehicles or troops outside of a major city would immediately be detected and endanger the whole operation, as the attacking force would likely be targeted by coalition airstrikes. The Caliphate doesn't have the manpower to sustain a campaign of that nature, even though the casualty rate suffered from air attacks doesn't seem to have harmed IS' overall capabilities so far.
What many describe as "sleeper cells" is actually a modular system, combining various types of agents who are being infiltrated into an area of interest. Whether these operatives start collecting information and intelligence in advance, or whether they are activated in the last days or hours before an attack, depends on the situation. They may remain "dormant" for longer periods, like in Baghdad for example, which could hold as many as 2 000 ISIS operatives already.
Part of these cells however carry out their mission as soon as they are in place. Once infiltrated into neighborhoods where they can easily hide, possibly among family or tribe members, in exclusively Sunni neighborhoods, they start collecting intelligence, stage suicide attacks or organize targeted assassinations.
A tough nut to crack
Members of the Caliphate's "Special Forces", lead by the now famous Abu Omar al-Shishani, may also be called upon to take-over strategic buildings and locations as part of first military action prior to a main offensive, as has been the case in Mosul last year as well as in Ramadi. These troops however are already part of the military aspect of an offensive. They don't do any intelligence work and only qualify as "sleeper cells" because they get called into action in the last hours prior to the attack.
However, with regard to Ramadi in particular, it wouldn't be surprising that either members of Shishani's troops, suicide bombers or snipers have taken up positions in the urban environment of the city, waiting for the right time to strike and inflict severe casualties to any approaching government force.
Obviously, these ISIS assets won't be able to halt a determined assault, but they can potentially delay operations and demoralize the attacking troops, while in the meantime ISIS may very well prepare for another operation in the back of the Iraqi army, launching a major suicide campaign in Baghdad, which could force the government to regroup around the capital and thus weaken its ground force in Ramadi. One might even conjecture as to the possibility of simultaneous terror attacks in major Shia cities in the South, like Karbala, which could be ISIS' way of deepening the sectarian rift, at a time when Shia groups are potentially about to enter Sunni heartland.
The Caliphate's black, white and red "lists"
However, the actual intelligence work of IS "cells" operating in areas under government control is not directly related to military operations as such. One example of the job they do is the so-called black, white and red lists that they compile in potential target areas. This was the case in particular in Mosul, in early 2014, where dozens of informants, some of them local and regional government officials, gave crucial information to IS intelligence operatives, in exchange for mercy once the city was taken.
The "know-how" the Islamic State is exhibiting in matters related to such type of intelligence work is actually much more impressive than its military prowess. No doubt, it bears the signature of Saddam Hussein's intelligence officers, who have joined ISIS in numbers since the mid-2000s. Thanks to these men, the Islamic State sometimes just had to reactivate intelligence networks that used to work for Saddam and had been lying dormant for months, sometimes even years. In Mosul, local politicians, police officers, and sometimes average citizens provided the raw material for IS agents to gather the information they needed.
The lists that were compiled are divided by colors: black, white and red. The one that calls for immediate action is the “black list”, which features names and details of individuals earmarked for "targeted assassination" by ISIS. This list might include Sunni leaders likely to oppose any take-over by the Islamic State, or a competent military commander who could be an obstacle to easy conquest.
The "white list" is being completed over a longer period of time, as it comprises people that have been won over by ISIS agents or who can provide information. Once ground operations begin, the assets from the "white list" can also be called upon to participate in certain actions, like sabotage, or – in the case of Mosul – very simply spread messages over the loudspeakers of the city's mosques, calling for the take-over of Mosul by the Islamic State's troops.
The Baathist handbook of terror
The "red list" finally is the trickiest one to manage, as it involves a good read of the situation on the ground. This list, also referred to as "chaos list", aims at triggering a cycle of sectarian violence, reprisals and counter-violence, likely to foster a climate more favorable to ISIS action. Names on the red list include individuals of all kinds. A Shia cleric for example might be killed by a car bomb in his mosque, which would then cause for the local Shia militants to avenge his death by taking lives among the Sunnis. Thus, the “red list” increases and reinforces the sectarian divide.
In cities where Sunnis are a minority, they are more likely to turn to ISIS for protection, if they appear to be targeted by a violent Shia mob. That wasn't the case in Mosul, but it may very well be the case in Baghdad, where a "red list" operation might be implemented on a large scale by the Islamic State. The "red list" is usually the last of the three lists to be implemented. It is the sign of something major in the making: assassination numbers go up, car bombs and suicide bombers hit crowded places, enemies and rivals are being killed and a climate of fear and sectarian violence is being spread.
These tactics are no invention of the Islamic State, they're more an adaptation of the intelligence "handbook" of Saddam Hussein's services, which has been fully taken onboard, as exemplified by the US raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden", in July 2014. Information about what happened during that raid, the first one of its kind on Syrian territory, is still sketchy. However, certain information obtained on the ground, as well as the lack of clarification by US officials, make the scenario of an ISIS "intelligence" operation a very plausible possibility.
US raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden"
If you read the few articles that have been published about the US raid that took place early in July 2014, outside of Raqqa in Eastern Syria, you get the impression that this was nothing more than a failed hostage rescue attempt. And in a sense, it was, only that it didn't fail because of "bad luck" or because the hostages involved (James Foley and Steven Sotloff) had been moved to a different location, but quite possibly because this had been an operation designed by ISIS' intelligence to lure the US into an ambush.
According to official and Western media sources, it all started in June 2014, when the FBI sent several agents to Europe, in order to interview European hostages who had been released by ISIS. The idea was to establish whether US citizens taken by ISIS were still alive, gather as much information as possible about their whereabouts and finally report back and see if a hostage rescue operation was feasible. Unknown to the FBI however, ISIS agents had anticipated that possibility and were planning to ambush any US rescue party.
What the European hostages described to the FBI was a building that was later determined to be part of an oil refinery on the outskirts of Raqqa, in Eastern Syria. It took the NSA a while to identify the building through satellite imagery, as US Intel wasn't flying any surveillance drones over that area at the time.
A Delta Force detachment was dispatched to Jordan in anticipation of a possible rescue attempt, which finally got the "go ahead" in the night of July 2nd 2014. Helicopters flew the Delta Force over to Raqqa, the building was stormed, a fire-fight ensued, but the hostages couldn't be found. About a month later, ISIS released a video showing the beheading of one of the US hostages.
ISIS' most successful intelligence operation ?
That's about everything you'll find in the media about the operation, give or take a couple of minor details. There's another side to that story however, and the fact that until recently the US hadn't staged any other raid of that sort over Syrian or ISIS controlled territory certainly gives credence to this version of events.
If you’re to believe these alternative sources, the raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden" was a set-up from the start, an operation led by a close associate and longtime acquaintance of Abubakr al-Baghdadi. After the European hostages were released in the spring of 2014, this man and his lieutenants had no doubt Western intelligence would debrief his ex-captives, who would possibly give away the place they had been held together with Foley and Sotloff.
Soon after, ISIS decided to relocate the US hostages in another IS hideout and " camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden", basically an empty shell at that point, was gradually prepared for a US airborne operation. Additionally, ISIS informants in the border area to Turkey began feeding Turkish intelligence with reports about a camp near Raqqa where foreign hostages were allegedly being held.
This human intelligence was in line with the statements made by the European hostages and was later confirmed by satellite imagery, making for a picture in which the base appeared as a prime target for a US raid. As early as June 2014, i.e. one month before Delta Force attacked, ISIS started beefing up its defenses and brought in small groups of experienced fighters, who were going to wait there for a whole month, until the night of July 2nd. Several dozen fighters were dispatched over the perimeter, and a larger number did hide in small farms and villages around the camp.
Casualties and lessons to be learnt
When Delta Force arrived on site, they became quickly aware that the enemy had been waiting for them. Nonetheless, they managed to enter and search the building, or parts thereof, but couldn’t find the hostages and were taking heavy fire from ISIS' fortified positions within the compound.
Officially, according to US estimates, five ISIS fighters were killed in the exchange, while one US serviceman was wounded. Sources in the area however claim to have seen at least two bodies wearing “SOCOM” type uniforms, without it being clear whether it was Delta Force operatives or Jordanian Special Forces accompanying them.
Be that as it may, the casualties are not the main point to take away from this. However, if indeed this was an operation directed by ISIS and aimed at manipulating the US into a trap, it would certainly explain US reluctance to launch any similar raid until the "Abu Sayyaf" operation which took place a few weeks ago, and which certainly wasn’t based on information gathered from unreliable local informants.
From a purely intelligence point of view, the message to take away from the failed raid on camp "Sheikh Osama Bin Laden" is also a cause for concern, as it would prove that no HUMINT coming out of Syria or from the Turkish border areas is credible enough for Western analysts to base a reliable assessment on. In that regard, the weakness of Western – and even Turkish – human intelligence is an obvious shortcoming that has potentially long term consequences.
The problem is, all the CIA and other Western agencies have to offer their local informants is money. ISIS on the other hand can also offer money, combined with the threat of a slow and painful death in case you don't play ball. Weighing in both propositions, there's not really much of a choice for the locals.
NGO-traps: the true story of the fake “Sons of the Levant”
A last example of the tactics of spreading fear and fostering paranoia among local populations under ISIS control also took place in the border area to Turkey in the spring of 2014. In early March of that year, ISIS set up a fake Syrian opposition group in a Turkish border town. “The sons of the Levant” was an NGO allegedly sponsored by the Free Syrian Army (FSA), whose goal was to draw the international community’s and the media’s attention towards war crimes and atrocities committed by the Islamic State.
The NGO of course was nothing but a cover. Its militants, young Syrian opposition members willing to engage with Western media and any friendly local, called for the unification of the various FSA branches. For several months the activists tried to build-up networks, gathered information and identified witnesses of ISIS atrocities.
In May 2014, the “Sons of the Levant” had already about one hundred regular members. What these people didn't know, was that they had actually given away their identities to operatives of the Islamic State. After May 20th, they were arrested by ISIS border troops, together with their families. Some of them were publicly crucified, the others haven’t been seen since …
What the Islamic State is trying to achieve through operations such as this is not only to round-up possible opponents and shut them up. By publicizing its operations, it is pursuing the permanent goal of spreading fear and paranoia among the population, very much like Saddam’s security apparatus did in Baathist Iraq. Raising suspicion, even among family members and especially towards foreigners and strangers, turns out to be a very efficient way to control any attempt at passing on information potentially damaging to the Caliphate.
Foreign Intelligence Recruiters
Finally, operations such as the “Sons of the Levant” also serve yet another purpose, which is to discourage anybody willing to cooperate with Western intelligence in exchange for money, the only leverage our agencies have in that area.
To make that point clear, IS agents even posed as CIA recruiters early into their involvement in the Syrian civil war. Having "tapped" a local source, they paid the man tens of thousands of US dollars and promised a similar amount every month in return for intelligence about ISIS and the names of his informants. The operation, which was run out of Turkish Kurdistan, lasted several months, and each time the would-be CIA source cashed in his money.
When his ISIS handlers finally decided they knew enough, he was arrested – again with his family – and so were about 15 of his informants, whose identity he had given to the supposed CIA agents. None has been seen since and chances are, they ended up in a shallow grave somewhere in the border region.
What to take away from this
These few examples of successful intelligence operations led by ISIS are not intended to give the impression of an all powerful enemy that can’t be defeated. ISIS is just playing the cards it has been dealt, and it is playing them well, feeding as much on its own strengths as on the Iraqi government’s weaknesses.
As a conventional force, ISIS is rather small, considering the size of its territory and the number of inhabitants. Its means of conquest are not the one’s of a large Western army and that is a fact that the organization has understood well. To succeed, it needs to prepare its actions long in advance, divide potential adversaries and strike fear into the hearts of its enemies.
The intelligence aspect of that strategy has been perfectly mastered by the armies of the Caliphate and regardless of the outcome of the Iraqi government’s offensive on Ramadi, defeating the Islamic State will also require taking them on in the field of military and wartime intelligence.
Patrick Bahzad. In my opinion, your writing is of the same tradition but potentially surpasses that of Bernard Fall – the American Francophile who gave us Street Without Joy. And you do so in English no less, which presumably isn’t your first language.
It would seem that Fall’s chapter on Revolutionary Warfare is in dire need of an update, for the reasons that Col. Lang has already propounded.
Since you, apparently, come from the tradition of Galula and Trinquier, you certainly appear “apropos” (which I can pronounce) for the task at hand, and your contributions are much appreciated.
Posted by: “Reims”, which is difficult to pronounce, | 27 May 2015 at 04:05 PM
Thx for the high praise regarding Fall, might be a bit overstated but thx nonetheless ! I try and keep up with the standards others have set, colonel Lang being one of them.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 May 2015 at 04:31 PM
PB,
Thanks again. You highlight the complete lack of information in the West on the Islamic State. All we get is propaganda and Aston Carter’s gaffe. These are hard nose true believers. They were members of Al Qaeda in Iraq or the Baathist Party who survived American targeted bombing and sweep-ups. Naturally, they will use the techniques aimed at them and add the fervor of a people fighting against foreign invaders and heretics. The Americans already ethnic cleansed Iraq. ISIS will seize and hold the Sunni areas. My concern is that this a grand plan to entice the Shiite militia to attack Anbar Province and deplete the Shiite enclaves’ defenses and weaken Iran; much like the Maiden Coup in Kiev was intended to destabilize Russia. Are the borders of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia secure? Will the Gulf State’s internal security police will be able to prevent the building of cells of Sunni true believers who are intent on purifying Mecca? Wars started due to delusions of grandeur and ignorance do not turn out well.
Posted by: VietnamVet | 27 May 2015 at 05:36 PM
Colonel,
A good piece by former ambassador Dan Simpson....common sense with regrd to our options
http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/2015/05/27/Dan-Simpson-The-U-S-has-few-options-in-the-Middle-East/stories/201505230036
Posted by: oofda | 27 May 2015 at 10:41 PM
You, Sir, need to write a book!
But in the meantime, if you could just translate some of your posts back into French and submit them to a couple of French journals, that would do a lot to elevate the level of public discourse about these matters in the Republic.
Posted by: toto | 27 May 2015 at 10:43 PM
Toto,
I'm not sure getting more accurate information to the MSM, whether in the US or in Europe, would actually be enough to change the "narrative" about the ME and ISIS.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 03:51 AM
VV,
I'm not sure there is actually a real plan behind this new offensive, let alone a grand plan !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 03:52 AM
oofda,
Thx for the link, I wasn't aware of this. Is it just a coincidence he's writing for the Pittsburgh Post and not the Washington Post ?
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 03:57 AM
Patrick! This is an impressive post. My almost total ignorance of MENA is only improved by reading and thinking about SST posts and comments. But that considered some may find my analysis of interest some may not. Outside MENA I have some limited expertise including the US Armed Forces, NATO, and US FP. My understanding is largely focused by my understanding of Washington thinking and politics and its validity is for others to judge. So here goes!
1. No one in Washington seems able to comprehend the Sunni/Shia rivalry including what drives it and likely outcomes. IMO if it did not exist then Islam might well be an existential threat to the USA and its allies.
2. The paucity of those knowledgeable of ARAB culture and language in Washington is astounding. IMO more people speak FARSI [Court Persian] PASHTO and URDU inside the Beltway than speak Arabic. Could be wrong as always. There are many fewer Ex-PATS in the USA from MENA then from the nation-states of Egypt, SA [if this is a nation-state?], Iran, and Turkey. But this Ex-PAT community seems to have no real effective role in USA FP but perhaps checkmated by Israel.
3. There seems to be almost no expert discussion in OPEN SOURCES of the ORDER OF BATTLE in Syria and Iraq. And no anlysis of UNIT COHESION and tactics and strategy.
4. The U.S IC [Intelligence Community] seems after the fact constantly surprised by MENA events and their impacts.
5. There is clearly a deep and dangerous disconnect in senior military circles of the US Armed Forces as to STRATEGY AND TACTICS with all four services having no clear understanding that employment of force may well result in Chalmers Johnson and Andrew Bachevich's BLOWBACK.
6. MILITARY/CIVIL RELATIONS IN USA LEADERSHIP CIRCLES HAVE LARGELY COLLAPSED WITH NONE WILLING TO LABEL FAILURES AS SUCH AND THUS NO LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED.
I would note that we do need a Bernard Fall to help US understand and Patrick whatever your self-effacement at the moment you fill my bill for that role.
7. The writings and speakings of the Presidential candidates avoid labeling any events in MENA significant to the USA and seem zombie like to me in their failure to articulate policies and strategies in MENA to work our way out of the deep hole we have dug for ourselves.
8. The US Military is about to suffer its most dangerous decline IMO since 1946-1947 and again it is because the fake shield of strategic bombing insulates the US polity from recognizing the SALAMI TACTICS [a slice at a time] that characterized the early post-WWII.
9. The almost total decline of the support of FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS by MSM means we [US] remain blinded to events and changes that impact US.
10. The anti-intellectualism prevailing in American leadership circles is directly related IMO of the decline of FREE SPEECH in Academia and elsewhere. P.L. ban from DoD servers seems to be complete evidence to me.
11. The recruitment to ISIS of MEN AND WOMEN from outside MENA is of major significance and I could not begin to document how significant that has become to future events.
12. The increasing evidence that behind a facade of friendship the puppet relationship of Israel to the USA or the converse is an existential threat to the USA.
Some thoughts in any event!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 28 May 2015 at 09:01 AM
PB, I suspect it's more a matter of the fact that the words and music are out of tune with the Company Song.
Posted by: ex-PFC Chuck | 28 May 2015 at 09:29 AM
I suspect you got it right !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 09:36 AM
Great brainstorming WC, I am very, very interested in responses. Notice my response is arbitrary and not to the points that drew most of my attention.
****
"P.L. ban from DoD servers seems to be complete evidence to me."
I keep wondering if we didn't have whatever kind of variation on that theme before. As always I may be completely misguided, but something about it felt vaguely like a déjá vu.
"anti-intellectualism prevailing in American leadership circles ..."
I noticed this a lot on the US web, without going if into details, whenever I discover it used politically I tend to be somewhat suspicious.
I think the larger topic would deserve studying, but basically I doubt "American leadership circles" can be reduced to being anti-Intellectuals.
Intellectuals are average citizen too in the end, and too succump to group-think occasionally or surrender to the "intellectual/creative icon of the day".
Posted by: LeaNder | 28 May 2015 at 10:37 AM
LeaNder,
I'm not sure this is anti-intellectualism, rather the opposite: it's anti-realism or anti-Realpolitik ... if you don't like reality as it is, change it for a "fourth dimension" that you can spin anyway you like.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 10:52 AM
"Launching Shia militias into the heartland of Sunni Iraq, under a codename ("Labayka ya Hussein") that can only be resented by many Sunnis in Ramadi, Fallujah and elsewhere in Anbar, doesn't bear the hallmarks of a sound strategy."
"Labayka ya Hussein" never was the name of the coming Anbar ops. It was used by some local militia leader and a Reuters reporter picked that up but it was never the official name. That was always "Labayka Ya Iraq"
see: https://twitter.com/SajadJiyad/status/603615544097566721
Besides that "Labayka ya Hussein" is not nearly as sectarian as it seems. Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the prophet, is revered by Sunni and Shia. His name in on one of the huge calligraphies in the (sunni) Hagia Sophia.
Posted by: b | 28 May 2015 at 11:03 AM
Thx for your insight, now you just have to convince ISIS and their supporters in Anbar of your well-founded argument, good luck with that pal ... Your kind of logic is gonna get you killed in those areas !
As for the name of the operation, it was as I stated, don't play cheap propaganda tricks here. The name has now been changed because of the shit-storm it caused.
What's going on is an incompetent government trying to do damage limitation, and no twitter tweet is gonna change that. I've been following events closely and I stand by what I wrote. "Labayka Ya Iraq" is a joke, would even be funny if it wasn't that sad a story.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 11:17 AM
b
What you say about the name of Hussein is only theoretically true. In Iraq, his name and that of Hassan his brother are Red Flag symbols of the aspirations of the Shia to run the country and the Sunnis. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 28 May 2015 at 11:22 AM
Patrick, I vaguely agree in this context. ... Vaguely means, I may not quite get your challenge. If that is what it is? Does it help if I acknowledge that in earlier phases of my life I may have supported more idealist/Utopian positions versus Realpolitik? Without ever being interested in politics and/or the military though. ... Not the sloganeering type of political speech though, ever.
My intention is not to spin anything: "if you don't like reality as it is". But 911 and/or especially its aftermath have turned my rather limited political positions upside down.
Question: "fourth dimension", could this forth dimension ever succeed without relying on earlier three-dimensional-positions taken for granted by one or the other?
And, don't ask me why: Sons of the Levant, or its NGO variety left an imprint on my mind, after I read your contribution. ...
Posted by: LeaNder | 28 May 2015 at 11:31 AM
I wasn't referring to you with that "fourth dimension" quote, but to the politicos of all kinds, in DC, Berlin, Paris and elsewhere. Has nothing to do with having an ideal, but seeing reality for what it is, not how you want it to be.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 11:36 AM
Wasn't there also a plaque with the name "Fatma" on it at Hagia Sofia?
It does not seem to be there any more.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 28 May 2015 at 11:45 AM
WRC,
I'm reading this on a DOD computer.
Mark
Posted by: Mark Gaughan | 28 May 2015 at 12:18 PM
Not quite on-thread and I forget if this has been recommended before, but Oryx Blog comes up with a lot of good pictures from the conflict:
http://spioenkop.blogspot.com/
Posted by: Allen Thomson | 28 May 2015 at 01:04 PM
Thanks LeaNder!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 28 May 2015 at 01:18 PM
Perhaps wrong PB but I unfortunately believe REALITY what the majority believe even when reason says otherwise.
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 28 May 2015 at 01:20 PM
Winston Churchill is reputed to have said something like IF YOU DON'T HAVE HEART WHEN YOUNG AND DON'T HAVE HEAD WHEN OLD YOU DID NOT LIVE!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 28 May 2015 at 01:22 PM
True and to be more complete it has to be said that the Ottoman Empire both had Sunni subjects but also a large minority of Shias under its rule, as well as Christians and other minorities. Giving ottoman Turks as example of the Sunnis benevolence towards Hussein seems seriously misguided ... Last time I checked it was Sunni arrows that killed him !
His father was caliph and as such he had a legitimacy among Sunnis too as he represented the entire Umma, even though he was opposed both by the Syrians and the kharidjites who finally killed him, but Hussein never was caliph and was never recognized by the Sunnis. He really is the first representative of the Shiat Ali as such ... Maybe b should go to kerbala and ask how many Sunnis are among the crowd during achoura !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 May 2015 at 01:35 PM