By Patrick BahzadThe Saudi led intervention in Yemen has only just started, but it is already difficult to predict any positive outcome to it, such are the risks and unknowns involved in it. Seen largely – through Western eyes – as another chapter in the ongoing regional war between Shia and Sunni, there is actually more to this conflict than a mere sectarian divide. The events unfolding right now could be the endgame to developments going as far back as 1990, with the failed unification of Yemen gradually turning into a fragmentation process that became more apparent after 2004 and has been fast-tracked in 2011 by the "Arab Spring".
The name of the ongoing operation – "Decisive Storm" – sounds like the title of a bad Hollywood thriller, and it probably doesn’t deserve any better. Presented as the joint effort of 10 nations led by Saudi-Arabia, the announcement of this coalition wasn't made by the Saudi King or his son (the minister of Defence), but by the Saudi Ambassador to the US, which is quite telling already. The official reason for launching air-strikes against the Houthi "rebels", who control the capital and most of North and West Yemen, was the ousting of the supposedly legitimate President, Abd Rabbuh Masur Hadi, who had taken refuge in his home town of Aden and was forced to flee to Saudi-Arabia, as Houthi forces were closing in on the former capital of the South.
This trigger event though is only the latest development in a series of wars, sectarian struggles and political feuds in a country that has not really been at peace ever since it was united, in 1990. In fact, the misguided process of unification and its end-product, the Yemeni version of the "Arab Spring", have brought back all those elements of dissent and outside meddling that had been the trademark of politics in this corner of the Arabian Peninsula.
A failed State from the outset ?
In its current borders, Yemen is the product of a now failed attempt at gluing together two countries, with different historic, religious and political backgrounds. Indeed, up until 1990, North and South Yemen were separate entities.
The North had been a Shia Zaydi Kingdom, until a coup fomented with the help of Nasser's Egypt turned it into the "Yemen Arab Republic", in 1962. For several years, a civil war tore the country apart, with the monarchist rebels inflicting very painful losses to the Egyptian expeditionary force, up to the point where some in Egypt considered Yemen to be their "Vietnam", just as Afghanistan should be to the Soviets some 20 years later.
Oddly enough, it didn't seem awkward at the time that the Zaydi (Shia) rebels were being funded, supported and armed by the Saudi Wahhabi monarchy, which is now launching airstrikes against the sons and grand-sons of their former allies. This is also the same Saudis who had been at war with the Zaydi Emirate in the 1930s, annexing three provinces (Assir, Najran and Jizan), a loss the Yemenis have never completely forgotten nor forgiven. But Yemeni politics and history are no strangers to reversals of alliances, as recent events also have shown.
The South on the other hand became the pro-soviet "People's Democratic Republic of Yemen" in 1967 and was formed mainly out of two areas, around the former British colony of Aden and the Hadhramaut region, home to the bin Laden dynasty. Civil war was no stranger to the history of that State either, so it shouldn't come as a surprise that the unification of both entities didn't go exactly smoothly.
Internal dissent and outside interference
As has been noted more often than not, the population of the North and South are quite different in certain regards. There is definitely a sectarian divide, but up until a few years ago it has never been a key element to the infighting and power struggle going on within Yemen. The situation could be described more accurately as a sectarian divide coinciding with differences in power structures and clan or tribal allegiances.
In addition to internal dissent, the Saudis also did their best to stir things up, always playing a game of divide and conquer – or divide and weaken – directed at a potentially dangerous and more populated neighbour in the South. With the Yemeni central government never managing to bridge the gap between the various factions, tribes, and religious groups that were the driving forces in the country's political landscape, this was enough to make sure things got sufficiently out of hand for Yemen not being able to overcome the difficulties inherent to any unification process.
In the eyes of the Saudis in particular, the existence of a Republic at their Southern border, even though not a model democracy, was deeply resented as a risk to the foundations of their own monarchy, given the intense exchanges that existed between both countries, in particular through the numerous Yemenis who made up a substantial part of the immigrant work-force in Saudi-Arabia. The formerly Shia Emirate and Kingdom that had existed in Northern Yemen added to that resentment, as it had been an intolerable challenge to the Wahhabi fundamentalists in Riyadh.
Against all these odds, a single man managed however to stay in power from 1990 until the "Arab Spring" of 2011. Ali Abdallah Saleh, already president of North Yemen since 1978, avoided assassination by rival tribal leaders, but he mainly accomplished this performance by letting the country slip out of control, leaving fundamentalist Sunni forces in the South and East slowly build-up their influence, with the help of the Saudis. He remained basically one among a number of regional leaders, whose power base extended from the capital Sanaa to most of the Zaydi North.
His eviction from the Presidency however, in the aftermath of the mass protests that took place in Sanaa in the Spring of 2011, should not be construed as a victory for pro-democracy forces. Rather, it was the fundamentalists and their Saudi sponsors who took over, while being careful enough not to be too visible in Western media. These Sunni tribal leaders, all of them Salafis and some of them open supporters of Al Qaeda, had advocated for a fairer share of the State (and its benefits) for as long as Saleh was in power. What they couldn't get through negotiation, they finally took through a pseudo-revolution ...
Saleh was ousted, but he hadn't given up on reclaiming power either for himself or his clan and family. In one of those reversal of alliances that Yemen is familiar with, Saleh and part of the army chose to get into some form of agreement – some might call it an implicit alliance – with the Zaydi Houthis of the North. For years, Saleh had been a staunch adversary of the rebels and had waged several campaigns against them, starting in 2004. After 2011 however, he realized that the Houthis were the only force left with a chance to turn the tide.
The Houthi take-over
In September 2014, the Houthis were finally able to take hold of the capital, Sanaa. Although they are a Shia group, who did never hide their sympathies for the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as their opposition to Israel or the US war on terror, one shouldn't consider their victory as that of a sectarian group only.
Of course, there's no denying that the sectarian rift has deepened again in the last ten years, through an combination of elements, not least President Saleh's wars against the Houthis from 2004 on. Having accused them of being religious fundamentalists with strong ties to Iran, Saleh contributed to raising the antagonism between the Northern Zaydis and the Salafi groups and Al Qaeda franchise which established bases in the South and East around the same time.
This rationale of sectarian violence should not be overstated though. The Houthis in particular have always been very vocal in making demands that include a wide array of social, economic and political matters, thus diversifying their following far beyond the Zaydi tribes only.
In that regard, it is interesting to observe that the Houthi offensive which led to the taking of Sanaa in September of last year actually started because of an end of the State subsidizing oil prices. The doubling of fuel costs and the loss in purchasing power among ordinary Yemenis of various creeds and political "couleur" gave the Houthis a much wider support, one that could help explain their spectacular military success.
A broken country
On the other hand, the Houthi leadership also made use of the popular support they had gained in order to get even with some of their oldest and fiercest enemies, in particular Ali Muhsin, the former head of the army's 1st armour division, who had been so relentless in his war against the Houthis. Other political adversaries were also victim of intimidation tactics. The closing of various religious schools, in particular the Al-Iman mosque of Sanaa, which had been run by a former associate of Ossama bin Laden, bears testimony to the sectarian dimension of this war.
Overall however, the fault lines in Yemeni politics have been blurred by years of nepotism and outside meddling, and the latest cycle of violence should be seen more as the confrontation between various confederations of interests rather than two sides entrenched in clear-cut and opposing views. The ancient and long established tribal structures are being reshaped not only by the new alliances that have been formed, but also by the social and political demands of ordinary Yemenis, in the urban areas in particular.
To put it simply, and based on events on the ground, the Houthis and the supporters of the Saleh clan, many of them in the military and among Sunni tribes opposed to Saleh's successor, are facing a coalition of three forces: the Salafi inspired tribes in the South and East, the local Al Qaeda franchise in Yemen (AQAP), and the Islamic party "Al-Islah", sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Saudi encirclement syndrome
While the conquest of the capital Sanaa didn't cause any foreign reaction – that is no action either from the US or the Saudis – recent territorial gains by the Houthis and their allies seem to have changed the nature of the game. Two simultaneous developments have contributed to this change.
The Houthis and their allies among the military have pushed forward in two directions that must have set off alarm bells all over the region, as well as in Washington. On the one hand, they have consistently advanced towards the Southern port of Aden, which they control now at least in part, despite the Saudi airstrikes that have been launched for over a week now. A stronghold of Saleh's and the Houthis' enemies, some of whom had to be evacuated to Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, Aden is vital for its access to the sea and its control over part of the South.
In another even more important move, the Houthis have also been trying to get to the port of Mocha, on the Red Sea. This is truly a development of strategic significance, as any success in claiming the port would enable the Houthis to take hold of the coastal area close to the Bab el Mandeb – the Mandeb Strait – which commands entry to the Red Sea. The Mandeb Strait is just as vital to navigation through the Red Sea (and Suez Canal) as the Strait of Hormuz is to the Arabian/Persian Gulf. It is a crucial artery not just for Yemen and Saudi-Arabia, but also to countries such as Egypt, Sudan and others.
Seeing the Mandeb Strait fall into the hands of a force supposedly – and probably – helped by Iran was the "red flag" that called for the Saudi led coalition jump into action. For the Saudis in particular, entrenched as they are in their sectarian war against Iran and the "Shia Crescent", the Houthi take-over of Yemen and the Mandeb Strait would feel like one more piece in their encirclement by the Iranians.
According to the Saudis' logic, they already consider Iraq – in its Shia parts – as well as Bashar al-Assad's Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah areas to be part of an arch of encirclement on their Northern flank. But this Saudi syndrome of seeing the invisible hand of Tehran everywhere, including in places where it wasn't present sometimes, goes further still. The Eastern oil rich provinces of the Kingdom also have a Shia majority. So has Bahrain, despite being ruled by a Sunni family. Seeing another piece of the puzzle fall "into Shia hands", this time in the South, must have pushed the new Saudi leadership over the edge.
A fictional coalition
A careful study of the "coalition" that was put together sheds an interesting light on its nature. Officially, the air, land and sea components that have been assembled under the operational leadership of Saudi-Arabia look impressive. In fact, they are all but impressive. The airstrikes will certainly do some damage to Houthi infrastructure and will impede their ability to deploy much further than they already have. However, it remains to be seen whether these airstrikes will prevent the Houthis and their allies from taking control of Aden and, more importantly maybe, Mocha and the Red Sea coastal areas around the Mandeb Strait.
Ten nations have joined in the common effort of pushing back the Houthis, but only two or three of them do really matter militarily. This almost looks like the local equivalent to George W. Bush's "Coalition of the Willing". The token armies of the Gulf States are not going to put fear into the heart of the Houthi mountain warriors or the Special Forces of the Yemeni army who remained loyal to Saleh. With even a country like Sudan in the coalition, you might wonder why the Saudis haven't also thrown Somalia into the mix !
An under-strength military force
The only heavy weights in this rag-tag confederation are Egypt and Pakistan. Both countries however have trouble in their own backyard and are unlikely to be to looking for another fight.
In truth, the Egyptians have a strategic interest in keeping open the access to and from the Red Sea. Their naval presence there and in the Gulf of Aden could point to some willingness on their part to also organise limited operations along the coast, in order to prevent any take-over of these areas by forces too friendly to Iran. But Egypt has already gotten a bloody nose the last time they fought a ground war in Yemen and they are certainly not going to commit troops to a lengthy campaign.
The situation is not all too different for Pakistan, which has insisted that its participation is about protecting the integrity of Saudi Arabia, meaning implicitly they might agree to some cross-border operations, in case the Yemenis should have the stupid idea of trying to take back the provinces they lost in 1934, but Pakistan certainly isn't keen on any confrontation with a locally backed insurgency. They already have one at home and that is plenty enough for them to take care off.
The military ties between Saudi-Arabia and Pakistan are probably the strongest and closest within this coalition and they actually reach quite far back: Pakistani military and volunteers have always figured prominently among the Saudi National Guard. The latest example of this is the crack-down on the Bahraini Shia revolt in 2014, which was done mostly with Pakistani "mercenaries" under Saudi command.
But however well equipped, the "Saudi Arabian National Guard" is a force intended first and foremost for domestic purposes, like quelling unrest or violence that might erupt among the Shias in the oil-rich Eastern province. There is a big question mark about the ability of this force to conduct a ground campaign against a much more potent enemy.
The fact that Saudi-Arabia is the first weapons importer in the world, and is literally armed to the teeth, shouldn't count for much in that regard. When Saddam's army invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the "bluff" that is the Saudi army was called right away and the King himself turned to the US to shield him against the Iraqis. This inherent military weakness of the Saudi State, despite all the high-tech gear they've been buying in the West, is going to turn into a real problem, once they realize that airstrikes alone are not going to be enough to reign in the Houthis.
"Decisive Storm" as a sign of Saudi weakness
For too long, the Saudis have been seen as sitting idly by as the Houthis and their allies were growing in strength and finally taking the upper hand. This hesitancy points to some structural issue with the traditional tools of Saudi "power projection". The Saudis have chosen to get involved themselves, which they very rarely do. Usually, they rely on their proxies to do their bidding, but it seems this hasn't been possible in Yemen.
Riyadh's influence among the anti-Houthi forces has vastly diminished over the past months and years. On the one hand, the clan most loyal to them, the Al-Ahmar clan, has lost ground with domestic reform in Yemen not going well. On the other hand, Al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen could not be used either as the spearhead of a pro-Saudi counter-offensive, for various reasons.
Thus, the Saudis were left with no other option than going in themselves, with the help of a regional coalition built along instructions that were probably discussed with Washington. The most interesting about this coalition is actually not so much who is in it, but more who isn't.
Oman in particular, Yemen's neighbour to the East, has declined to join. This rebuttal of a major Saudi initiative follows another big step taken by Oman in refusing Saudi-Arabia's project of creating a "Union of the Gulf States". In the large Shia-Sunni confrontation that is going on, this appears like a serious crack in the Saudi armour.
But other States usually more aligned with Riyadh have also voiced their dissent or concerns in regard to the position to adopt vis-à-vis Iran. In fact, with the notable exception of Saudi-Arabia and Bahrain, all other members of the "Gulf Cooperation Council" had approved the draft agreement between the US and Iran, back in 2013. And Kuwait went as far as refusing to sign the "Internal Security Pact" elaborated by Riyadh, another piece of legislation aimed at countering Iranian influence in the region.
The Saudi move against Yemen must be seen as what it is: a desperate attempt to turn the tide, made by a regional power that is feeling more and more cornered.
The signing of a US-Iran agreement and the American position
It's no coincidence the Saudi led expedition comes at a time when things are shaping up regarding a final agreement between the US and Iran. Of course, it doesn't mean that the US will abandon their traditional alliance with the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia, but Riyadh would lose some of its strategic importance and this might force the Saudis to work-out some compromise of their own with the mullahs in Tehran, a thought that must be unbearable to contemplate for some people in the Kingdom !
Saudi-Arabia needs the US, just as the US need Saudi-Arabia, but for altogether different reasons. This is probably why the Saudis got the blessing from Washington when they announced – through their ambassador – the establishment of a coalition and the launch of operation "Decisive Storm". As long as a deal has not been finalized with Iran, Washington wants to keep all options on the table, even if it means backing a military campaign on a peripheral theatre of operation with very limited chances of success.
To the US, the whole thing is more about "containment" than actual "roll-back" of the Houthis. The Americans were also made to look bad by the rebels, when they evacuated their embassy – in a bit of a hurry – and lost the Al-Anad airfield, which had been used up until then for drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere. It didn't look good at all, particularly not when the US President had claimed six months earlier that the anti-terror cooperation with Yemen was getting better and would keep getting better in the years ahead.
Rumour even has it that the Houthis managed to get hold of sensitive documents detailing secret CIA operations in the region, as well as the identities of the – few – human intelligence sources the US had in Yemen, possibly even among AQAP personnel. Looking at things from that angle, there is certainly a desire in Washington for some damage limitation and face saving, but the American support for the Saudis will remain marginal.
The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia at risk
This leaves the Saudis very much in charge of the whole operation. Soon, they will come to understand that their airstrikes won't be enough to provoke a decisive push-back of the Houthi rebels and their allies. Logic would call for a compromise at that point, which is always a possibility. With players like the Saudis at the table, they might however chose to go "all in" instead, a gamble with huge risks involved for the monarchy itself.
If they succeed militarily, the Saudis will only have created more instability on their southern border, with no central power in control in Yemen, and various groups and factions taking their piece of the territory, including Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and possibly other Salafi/Takfiri groups. What these organisations will be able to do with the newly gained operational freedom is up for debate …
If on the other hand, the Saudis fail to achieve any decisive success, the House of Saud itself will see its foundations weakened, at a time when it needs to look as strong and stable as possible. After having broken up to some degree with the Muslim Brotherhood, being confronted on its Northern border with a hostile Islamic State and having probably failed to prevent the "rapprochement" between the US and Iran, the Saudi royal family will probably look an easier target to all the Salafi, Wahhabi and Takfiri groups of any denomination that have always considered it an abomination against Islam.
Nobody will be able to say the Saudis haven't been warned. The last time they got involved in Yemen, back in 2009, they lost several planes, had hundreds of soldiers taken prisoners and even saw the Houthis raid Saudi border areas. With an operation on a much larger scale going on, the stakes would be exponentially higher, not just for the Houthis, but maybe and more so for the House of Saud.
Getting involved too heavily in Yemen might be like looking into the abyss without even noticing …
Patrick Bahzad:
The strategic implication, in my opinion, is that a rented nuclear-armed state within whose territories Shia are murdered everyday, which is supporting enemies of the Shia in Afghanistan, is now fighting the "Shia" in Yemen directly and possibly tomorrow in Iran.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 02 April 2015 at 10:50 AM
Pakistani-American Tarek Fateh on how Saudi Arabia has fooled the West, again.
http://www.torontosun.com/2015/03/31/saudi-arabia-fools-the-west-again
Quote: The lie that has been floated and gobbled up by western analysts and politicians is that the Yemeni Houthis are a product of Iranian intervention in Yemen and thus pose a threat to western interests as well as the security of Israel.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
End quote.
Posted by: Macgupta123 | 02 April 2015 at 11:48 AM
Nice piece. I like what Nasrallah termed the operation in a speech recently, "Decisive Breeze".
Posted by: Abu Sinan | 02 April 2015 at 12:12 PM
who is that "rented nuclear-armed state"?
I may well have my synapses twisted up. I could try to figure out from the rest of course, but it would be guesswork.
Posted by: LeaNder | 02 April 2015 at 12:35 PM
This war has been prepared for by both sides for several months, from before the Houthi take over of Sanaa in September. The Saleh/Houthi forces were initially shocked by the Saudi response but in fact the aerial campaign has damaged very little, either in Sanaa or on the battlefronts of Aden or Shabwa.
The Saudis will have planned for a second stage to accompany the bombardment. They are, for all their shortcomings, not so naive to believe that bombing from the air will achieve anything beyond angering a large portion of dangerous Northern Yemenis.
They will not commit ground troops to directly fight the Houthis. They will take strategic areas in the northern border areas with which to supply and support their tribal proxies.
The article gets it right when it says that reduction to sectarian issues is incorrect. This is about a dangerous neighbour becoming more dangerous through Iranian encouragement. Through empowering the tribes to fight the Saudis will retain a far larger (potential) proxy force. If they were to choose only Sunni tribes then they would achieve little. Better to have the Houthi's close enemies, also Zaydi, do the fighting.
Posted by: MartinJ | 02 April 2015 at 12:45 PM
After reading this Patrick, I wondered why SA does not reconsider it's relations to Iran at least for the time being, ideally with long term perspective.
On the other hand Babak's (Makkinejad thesis) thesis and the idea, at least my temptative interpretation so far, of some type of more reliable (Western?) relations to people once living within the Seljuk empire doesn't seem a big help at the moment.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Saudi_Arabia_relations
Posted by: LeaNder | 02 April 2015 at 12:45 PM
Babak meant Pakistan ... Hope he won't mind me replying for him :-)
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 02 April 2015 at 12:51 PM
You wrote:
"...dangerous through Iranian encouragement..."
So you do have a dog in this fight?
Last I looked, ISIS was being supported by Turkey - a NATO member - and Saudi Arabia.
I suppose the invasion of Bahrain also was to counter these "..."...dangerous through Iranian encouragement..."?
I agree that this was long in preparation; when that German fellow showed up in Tehran in 2014 threatening Iran with the Thirty-Year War.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 02 April 2015 at 01:00 PM
Agree with you Martin about next phase in the making. However I get the feeling the Saudis are running out of options regarding local proxies that have the ability and will to confront the houthis head on. If they had them, they might have wanted to start with such a "war by proxies" rather than launching a massive campaign of air strikes that looks like a last ditch effort to prevent what had been coming for months.
I think the push for the Red Sea coast made by the houthis was definitely something that had all the chairborne strategists from Riyadh to Washington jump from their seats ...
We will see about the turn of events, with various factions being forced to re enter around their power base, including the houthis, but nothing is certain. In any case, more chaos and destruction is a distinct possibility and I know there's only one type of group that would benefit from it, one that isn't friendly neither to the Saudis nor to the Iranians.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 02 April 2015 at 01:02 PM
Thought you might ask that question, therefore didn't ask myself !
Personally I have trouble following this obsession with the Iranian peril at a time when its other state and non state actors that are setting the Middle East on fire ... But maybe I have a wrong read on this.
I remember a period in the 1980s where destabilization through Iranian proxies was a concern for us, right now I can see only two countries having those complaints. And I'm not counting in the U.S.
Maybe Martin has a better take on things. Would be looking forward to his analysis. No pun intended !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 02 April 2015 at 01:13 PM
Babak,
Im trying to understand Saudi actions from a Saudi point of view in order to see what they will do next. This war forms part of a wider Saudi-Iranian struggle. I have no dogs in either fight. If Saudi intervention in Syria is despicable then so too is Iranian militia building in Yemen.
I happen to be attached to Yemen as a country and as a people. It has occupied my life for the past several years. My "dog" is Yemen. Unfortunately they seem all too willing to fight each other with the minimal prodding from either Saudi or Iran.
If American intervention in Ukraine is to be condemned then, by extension, Iranian intervention in the inherently unstable state of Yemen must also be condemned.
Posted by: MartinJ | 02 April 2015 at 01:42 PM
Patrick,
This push for the Red Sea and for Aden is a bit of a chimera. Saleh controlled Aden, the Red Sea coast and the rest of Yemen. There was no withdrawal of any of the many brigades around Yemen (about 10 estimating from the top of my head) instead there was a relentless "push" by the Houthis through infiltration and through movement from Sanaa.
I believe that this is not about physical control of these geographic areas but about the need of Saleh/Huthis to quash the idea of separation of the South. They knew there would be resistance due to the occupation since 1990 and the steady stream of murders of opposition leaders. This is about re-establishing psychological control over the civilian population to cow them into submission.
A few more days of this and they will have achieved their objective. They have already started to target the known resistance elements - who are not AQ/ISIS as the Houthis/Saleh have been trying to paint them. In fact AQ is markedly absent from this conflict. They released 150 fellow AQ prisoners in Mukalla last night but these are Saleh AQ and are being fought in the streets by local Southern resistance.
If the Saudis don't intervene to stop the takeover of Aden then I fail to understand why they launched an air campaign at all. Humiliation beckons I feel...
Posted by: MartinJ | 02 April 2015 at 01:49 PM
I have no trouble with you having a different view on things, however I fail to recognize the consistency of your input: on the one hand warning against the danger of Iranian influence in Yemen but on the other hand dismissing the risk such influence might have, from a Saudi point of view, on the safety of maritime traffic in the Red Sea.
When/if houthis turn up in mocha, I'm sure we'll hear the same old stories about pasdarans setting up silkworm missiles there as well ...
As for resistance to houthis and saleh, you're right they're not all AQ and certainly not ISIS but they're all more or less inspired either by Salafi creed or sponsored by the muslim brotherhood ... East of Aden at least there's no doubt about that in my mind !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 02 April 2015 at 01:59 PM
You cannot be serious about "...trying to understand Saudi actions from a Saudi point of view .."
It is quite simple: Wahhabis have visceral hatred of the Shias and in addition to the general Arab dislike of Iran out of envy.
And as to making an analogy to US intervention in Ukraine:
Who is the Iranian counter-part of Ms. Nuland?
And the "Foundation for the Defense of Democracies"?
And where are the training camps - in analogous manner to those in Poland and Lithuania - in which proxy forces have been trained by Iran or her agents?
I am puzzled by your statements - making statements as though Saudis have a case.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 02 April 2015 at 02:00 PM
More on Yemen:
http://pando.com/2015/03/28/the-war-nerd-a-brief-history-of-the-yemen-clusterfck/
Quote:
The Saudis, with sleazy friends in Langley and unlimited cash to throw around, have incredible control over world media. They do such a good job of suppressing news about their long war with the Shia of Yemen that, until I lived there and got the story first hand, I didn’t even know that the Shia of Najran had actually risen up in armed rebellion in 2000. And it was an incredible story of a glorious, though doomed, rebellion.
In 2000, the Shia of Najran got sick of being told by their Saudi Provincial Governor (a Saudi princeling, naturally) that they were rafidii (“nay-sayers”) and takfiri (“apostates”). The Najrani grabbed their guns, scared off the Saudi national police and drove Prince Mishaal into hiding in the Najran Holiday Inn. You can still see the Holiday Inn; it’s as good as a Gettysburg monument to the locals, though the bullet holes have, unfortunately, been covered over.
That unknown rebellion ended with massive Saudi secret-police reprisals—more holes in the desert than a Joe Pesci golf tour. Once they’d killed off the ringleaders, the Saudi authorities went back to slower, less bloody methods.
End quote.
Posted by: Macgupta123 | 02 April 2015 at 02:08 PM
Damn, this was a good read. Thanks much.
Posted by: Tyler | 02 April 2015 at 02:08 PM
There was an old joke:
The ambassador of a Third World country walk into US State Department and asks to see the Secretary of State.
When audience is granted, he asks for how to apply for US aide to alleviate crushing poverty.
The Secretary of State asks: "Do you have any communists?"
The Ambassador, puzzled, says "No. But why do you ask?"
The Secretary of State says: "Because if you did, we can give you money to fight them."
The Ambassador then asks: "Where can I get some communists?"
To which the Secretary of State replies: "Oh, do not worry, poverty usually produces them."
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 02 April 2015 at 02:10 PM
Honestly, Iran seems much more reasonable to deal with over Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf satrapies. "Dangerous Iranian influence" is what is keeping ISIS contained in Syria and in other points across the MENA sphere.
Conflating Iran's raising of militias with Saudi/Turkish/Sunni support for cannibal jihadis ain't exactly apples to apples at best, and is purposeful disinformation at worst.
Posted by: Tyler | 02 April 2015 at 02:12 PM
"when that German fellow showed up in Tehran in 2014 threatening Iran with the Thirty-Year War."
Interesting, Babak.
I am always interested in both Iranian-German news as in rumors. The Neocon-network-rumormill spread a rumor about Kohl, interestingly enough...parading as holocaust denier in Iran.
But I assume this wasn't a "holocaust denier" but then who was "the felloow" and what did he threaten?
Posted by: LeaNder | 02 April 2015 at 02:38 PM
Nitwitty of course: "Salafi creed or sponsored by the muslim brotherhood"
"or?"
state/institutional sponsorship versus ideological triggers?
If I may make an associative mental step, admitting that I may not have paid attention to details, what hard facts do we have that the Saudis do financially support ISIS. "Saudis" versus some type of "fourth line inheritors of Saudi power" or other Saudi elites that is?
Never mind the ideological continuities that can be traced between Saudi Wahhabism and Salafism. ... I am in the process of trying to get a slight 'reading basis' for that.
Posted by: LeaNder | 02 April 2015 at 03:09 PM
“Officially, the air, land and sea components that have been assembled under the operational leadership of Saudi-Arabia look impressive. In fact, they are all but impressive. “
Is this another way of saying, Lead from behind??? not saying who, it is a secret. Also, is it not likely that some of the pilots are mercenaries and likely US pilots? And US designated targets, etc??
“The closing of various religious schools, in particular the Al-Iman mosque of Sanaa, which had been run by a former associate of Ossama bin Laden, bears testimony to the sectarian dimension of this war “
So if US attacks OBL and his clan, it is called terrorist operation, but if the locals try to rid themselves of terrorists, you call it sectarian dimension! That divide is more a reflection of US policy in the region than the reality on the ground. Is it not? Is that region not based on various tribals who have been at odds and alliance with one another and against one another in one time or another?
Posted by: Rd. | 02 April 2015 at 03:39 PM
I'm not sure I understand your questions but from what I gathered here's my answer:
- no U.S. military involvement other than Intel and logistics.
- an associate of OBL is not nessecarily a terrorist especially as I said a former associate. Unless you consider any associate of OBL is a terrorist in which case a number of US citizens and government officials would fall under the same category.
- I'm not sure what you mean by OBL clan
- I don't get what you mean by the U.S. being branded as terrorists for going after OBL ? Who said that ?
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 02 April 2015 at 03:55 PM
Rd.
"... is it not likely that some of the pilots are mercenaries and likely US pilots?" It is not likely. SA spent many decades and a great deal of money having pilots trained by the US. They are not bad pilots. In the end they are good "stick and rudder men." The SA rulers are trying to demonstrate that they are serious people. They would not want US pilots to fly these missions. The unimpressive loss of two aircraft in the Gulf of Aden does not sound like USAF to me. "Mercenaries?" You must be a European. USAF or US Navy officers detailed to fly these missions would not be "mercenaries." Logistics The RSAF has a lot of contract logistical capability. They would not need US government support until they started to run out of parts and ordnance. If you think the US is "designating" places like mosques as targets you are a fool and probably yet another anti-American German. A ground offensive would be another matter. The SAers would quickly fall on their asses in that. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 02 April 2015 at 04:27 PM
LeAnder
""or?" state/institutional sponsorship versus ideological triggers?" Keep working on it and you will find some tortured way to blame this on the US. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 02 April 2015 at 04:31 PM
Macgupta123
"with sleazy friends in Langley" They don't need help from Langley. The PR is industry in Washington, New York and London is gigantic and filled with heartless, intelligent and experienced men and women who are for rent for enough Saudi money. All you have to do is give them the money and they will take care of the "bidness." pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 02 April 2015 at 04:50 PM