The Pakistani stance on Yemen … and its implications for Saudi–Arabia

 

By Patrick Bahzad

The Pakistani Parliament has spoken – or maybe it was the Chiefs of Staff in Rawalpindi. Pakistan will not commit ground troops to a land-based operation against the Yemeni "Houthi" rebels. The news arrived on Friday and have stunned several Arab States, mostly Saudi-Arabia, but also the United Arab Emirates. In the US as well, a sense of disbelief seemed to prevail among the usual proponents of the anti-Iran faction.

Pakistan's decision has drawn sharp criticism from these players, yet it is based on an instinct of self-preservation and national interest that should not come as a surprise, even to those advocating for a more aggressive approach in Yemen. What is at stake for Pakistan is not just its alliances with countries in the Gulf, but its standing in the future geopolitical landscape at the intersection of the Middle-East and South-Asia.

A decision made in defiance of military and economic ties

The violence of the reaction to Pakistan's declared "neutrality" with regard to the Saudi led coalition can only be interpreted as an indicator of the upset this decision has caused. In very undiplomatic terms, Anwar Gargash – the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – has hinted at the serious consequences the Pakistani reluctance might have and openly declared, Pakistan could pay a heavy price for its "unexpected" position. The Saudi reaction has not been as vocal, but it goes without saying that Riyadh can't have been thrilled either.

Both Gulf countries, Saudi-Arabia and the UAE, are pumping massive amounts of money into Pakistan, year in year out. The Emiratis have built-up substantial trade relations in recent years, while the Saudis have always provided relief funding to bolster the faltering Pakistani budget. Last year alone, Saudi-Arabia has injected 1.5 billion US dollars into the bottomless pit that is the Pakistani Treasury. Riyadh has also been there in times of need for current Pakistani Prime-minister, Nawaz Sharif, for example when he needed shelter at the end of 1999, after the Pakistani army under General Musharraf had organised a coup and ousted the legitimate government.

With regard to operation "Decisive Storm", Riyadh and Abu Dabi expected – or rather demanded – Pakistan to repay its debt, as it had always done in the past. Up until now, Islamabad had never bulked at the finger snapping from the Gulf. After the seizure on the Great Mosque of Mecca by Saudi fundamentalists in 1979, which had been organized in part by a brother of Osama Bin Laden, as many as 20 000 Pakistani troops were dispatched to the Kingdom, in an effort to strengthen its defences against any challenge from within. That is also the reason why the "Saudi Arabian National Guard" recruited a number of ex-Pakistani military over the years, to fill its ranks with troops more apt at fighting local insurgents and – even more importantly – more loyal to orders coming from the House of Saud.

Misconceptions and wrong assumptions

While the Gulf States consider Pakistan's "obedience" as a given, Islamabad tends to see itself more as the "shield" of Sunni Islam and its Holy places against any threat directed at it. Whenever the "territorial integrity" of the Saudi Kingdom was at stake, Pakistan was there to provide the foot-soldiers that Riyadh was so direly lacking. This time however, despite early announcements made by the Saudis, according to which the Pakistani air force was already part of the coalition, Islamabad resisted the PR pressure and made a decision that is astounding in more than just one sense.

Seen from Pakistan, operation "Decisive Storm" looks very different from what the spin doctors in the Gulf and their Western off springs are trying to sell. Neither the Saudi borders nor the Saudi State are seen as threatened by the Houthis, well at least not until the Saudi coalition started its bombing campaign. While a fraction of Pakistani public opinion would undoubtedly support the sending of ground troops, there is a growing scepticism among the majority of the population that is reflected in the second thoughts of the military and civilian leadership.

The Pakistan of today – according to the dominant political discourse – wants to be a power that promotes unity and reconciliation within the (Sunni) Muslim world, as an expression of Islamabad's claim to being the champion of "Islamic Internationalism". One could contend of course that these are only official rhetorics and narratives, but there are also other reasons for the position the country has taken.

Pakistan's internal problems

As it is, Islamabad has enough to deal with on its own territory. The military has been fighting a guerrilla war against its home-made Islamic fundamentalists and Pashtun rebels for almost a year in the "North-West Frontier Province" and the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas", both of which border Afghanistan. It's been a long and costly campaign, with the military having committed large number of troops and having suffered serious casualties.

Moving a substantial number of ground troops to Saudi-Arabia for an operation the duration of which cannot be foreseen would be a serious bet, one the army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif, didn't want to make. It would have meant less troop rotations in the current campaign against the domestic rebellion, or less troops on the border with India, which remains a highly sensitive area, despite a recent "rapprochement" between both countries.

Another facet of the internal dimension to Pakistan's decision is the presence of a large Shia minority within its borders. Shias make up about 25 % of Pakistan's population, which could amount to as many as 35-40 million people. In recent years, sectarian violence has cost many lives, particularly among the Shia minorities in areas most prone to Sunni fundamentalism.

The involvement of Pakistan's army in a ground campaign directed at another Shia minority in Yemen could inflame that situation further, adding to the destabilisation of Pakistan from within  and possibly prompting a reaction from Iranian proxies, which could find sanctuary on the other side of the common border between both countries.

First knock-on effect of the agreement with Iran

However, avoiding tensions with Iran is also guided by other considerations still. In the interim phase that has now started since the signing of the new agreement with Iran, Pakistan cannot afford to be seen – particularly not by the US – as one more regional power that threatens to derail the whole process. There is enough opposition to any form of agreement with Iran among closer allies to the US, thus anything Islamabad might do to worsen that trend would not go down well with the current administration.

Besides, Pakistan has a national interest of its own in preventing Iran from getting the bomb, as it would then be exposed to two potentially hostile nuclear powers, one in the south – India – and one in the West – Iran. The whole strategic concept of the Pakistani army would be thrown totally off balance, even though, admittedly, it's not very convincing already.

In addition to abstaining from any military friction, the Pakistani leadership had something else in mind when it announced its refusal to commit ground troops to operation "Decisive Storm". Almost simultaneously to Islamabad's declaration of neutrality, China announced it would build a natural gas pipeline linking Iran to Pakistan, and possibly continuing further into China once the first part between Asalyuyeh (Iran) and Nawabshah (Pakistan) was finished. This project had long been delayed but US opposition to it, but after the signing of the interim agreement with Tehran, China seems eager to move ahead quickly.

China and the geopolitics of energy

What lies behind that decision is not just Beijing's interest in developing an economic corridor going from the Gulf (Iran), through Pakistan and South-West China. The fact that such a corridor would encompass the supply of huge quantities of oil and gas points to the global strategy Beijing is pursuing with regard to natural resources. The geopolitics of energy, and the attempts made by Beijing to break the US ability to block the supply of the Chinese market, play a significant role in the events unfolding in Yemen.

Of course, it is in Pakistan's interests to overcome the energy shortages it has been experiencing for years and the Chinese "Pipeline of Peace" is going to help in that regard. Sending troops into Saudi-Arabia or even Yemen might have threatened the viability of that project, not just because the Iranians might have been unhappy, but first and foremost because China is turning into a major player in that part of the world. The Chinese presence in South Asia and East Africa has been increasing for years, even though Beijing is trying to be as discrete as possible about the take-off of its economic and political relations.

Whether in Pakistan, Kenya or Sudan, China's influence has been on the rise. Were it not for the black hole that Somalia has become, chances are, China would be present there as well. This increase in Chinese visibility around the Horn of Africa in particular is related to various reasons, but one of the most interesting ones in the context of the Yemen crisis, is the Strait of Mandeb. Roughly 5 % of all oil exports worldwide and 40 % of maritime goods transit through there, which makes this route a strategic asset for a number of countries. For the Chinese, it's not just the oil flow that is of importance, but also the trade route to Europe, which has been importing large quantities of Chinese manufactured goods for years.

With Japan planning to establish a permanent military base in Djibouti – in addition to the already existing French and US bases there – the challenge to Beijing is evident. The underground chess-game that is being played between the US and its allies, on the one side, and the emerging Chinese giant and its friends, on the other, has chosen Yemen as one of the pawns. To the US, it seems preferable to restrain the "Houthis" and their alleged Iranian sponsors, even though Washington could probably live with former President Saleh and his associates controlling the coastal areas along the strait, as long as Iran – or China – doesn't appear as gaining a substantial advantage through such a development.

Saudi-Arabia in charge … but not on the up

The little support the US have granted Saudi-Arabia, in terms of logistics and intelligence, seems directed mostly as not letting cracks appear in the alliance between Washington and the Riyadh. But the Saudis are now in the driving seat, which constitutes a novelty for a country more used to interfering and meddling through easy to manipulate proxies.

Leading complex military operations isn't something the Saudis have ever excelled at. The fact that they took this road now has to be seen as a telling sign. For one thing, it is probable that the new political leadership in Riyadh wants to put down and marker and demonstrate a new sense of confidence and power.

The chinks in the Saudi armour are numerous however. First of all, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are not fully on board. Oman in particular has declined the invitation to take part in operation "Decisive Storm". Iraq and Syria aren't there, for obvious reasons, but neither is Algeria, the major Arab power in North-West Africa. Libya is divided on this topic, as much as it is on any topic these days ! But the real blow to the Saudi operation came from the two heavy weights that could provide some real substance to this toothless military coalition.

Egypt – once bitten, twice shy – is limiting its participation to airstrikes and maritime patrols. No Egyptian "boots on the ground" this time … One Yemeni "Vietnam" is probably enough, that must be the undertone of Cairo's message to the Saudis. This left Riyadh with only the Pakistanis as a credible army to back-up their threat of a ground campaign. That bubble has now burst as well.

Local proxies as the only plan B

All that is left, other than the airstrikes, is the traditional Saudi reliance on Islamist proxies, in this case Al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen (AQAP) and the tribal militias sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood's party in the country "Al-Islah". The military capabilities of both these groups remains a mystery, especially their ability to repel a combined Houthi and Yemeni army offensive on the South. Any circumstantial alliance between the Saudis and both AQAP and "Al-Islah" would also lead to major objections from more important allies of the Saudis.

Egypt's President Sisi is determined to break the "Ikhwan" and would not appreciate the Saudis re-establishing links, particularly not after they had broken up with them under Egyptian pressure. As for AQAP, the US have been flying drone missions against them from the al-Anad airbase for a number of years. American approval of the Saudis now backing the same AQAP would be bordering on the schizophrenic … The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia is now left alone to deal with this mess, and the token States or the "Gulf Cooperation Council" are not going to change this.  

Of course, the Saudis probably knew most of this. They were aware of Egyptian and US doubts and were not relying on them for substantial support. Their bets were on Pakistan to back them up, as always. Now, they face a very tricky situation. The Kingdom's credibility is on the line. Up until now, King Salman had proven that he could take tough decisions, contrary to his predecessor. But the risks involved in the Yemeni adventure are even higher, now that Pakistan has opted out of it.

Alea Jacta Est …

Behind the scenes, it is not just the regional struggle for Saudi dominance over the Iranian rival that is taking place (and being lost). There is also a fight for influence within the Saudi royal family that is going in. King Salman, a member of the "Sudairi clan" (a group of seven brothers former King Abdul-Aziz had with his third wife), seemed intent on settling old scores when he came into power. He may be suffering from an early form of Alzheimer's, but he didn't waste any time putting his family branch back in business.

Powerful men have lost their jobs or have been overlooked, in particular "Prince of Darkness" Bandar bin Sultan (ex-Chief of Saudi Intelligence). More importantly though, the King awarded key positions to two grandsons of the founder of the modern Saud dynasty: Mohamed bin Nayef (55) and Mohamed bin Salman (34 and the King's own son) are now in charge of key portfolios in the Saudi government. While the first one has already proven his capabilities in matters related to national security, his younger cousin's nomination as Minister of Defence appears to place him as a serious contender in the line of succession.

The King may have picked his inexperienced son for such a high responsibility precisely to bolster his position as a potential challenger for the crown, but young Mohamed bin Salman is definitely going to need some serious credentials … like a successful foreign military campaign in Yemen. The die is now cast anyway and there is no way back, short of a diplomatic solution which would be tantamount to a debacle for the Saudi State and its leadership.

Whatever the outcome of operation "Decisive Storm", it is likely to be a key element in the balance of power between the new strongmen in the House of Saud, as well as a crucial factor in the political survival of the family itself. In that regard, Yemen could be decisive for the future of the Kingdom.

Comments

[William Fitzgerald]

P.B.

Your analysis of players and motives is well written, apt and the conversation following is terrific. However, on the subject of Chinese influence, when I read "The chinks in the Saudi armour are numerous....", I almost spit a mouthful of coffee on my computer keyboard.

WPFIII

[Patrick Bahzad]

WF,

I hadn't even noticed the potential non-political correctness of that statement ... As I'm not the US Army however, I won't delete it ;-)
Thx for pointing it out though, might come in handy some day to avoid uncomfortable silence when making a presentation to a US audience ! I think the correct slang in US Special Forces is now to have an "Asian in one's armour", but I only checked Duffelblog as a reference.
On a need to know basis, I can confirm the following phrases will no longer be tweeted by the US military: "to have chinks in one's armour", "to hit the slopes", "colder than a witch’s tit in a brass bra", "Bang for the buck", "slit trench" and "shoot the closest alligator to the boat".
For more detail, please check the following link (if you got proper security clearance, as this is highly sensitive material) ... ;-)
http://www.duffelblog.com/2015/02/army-phrases-twitter/

[Matthew]

CP: Actually, no. If you replace House of Saud with a Takfiri regime, then the new regime will lose its Western protectors.

[jonst]

gotta add this BF, R2P'ers have a hard time sleeping as well, without thinking about some 'humanitarian military intervention'.

[Margaret Steinfels]

In Thursday's NYTimes a fascinating interchange between reporters and visiting Iraqi PM Haider al Abadi, "'There is no logic to the operation at all in the first place,” Mr. Abadi said. “Mainly, the problem of Yemen is within Yemen.'
Mr. Abadi, who is in Washington seeking American military help in the fight against the Islamic State as well as billions of dollars to shore up his sagging economy, then suggested that the Obama administration agreed with him in his concerns about the Saudi campaign."

That the administration shares al Abadi's concern is likey true through it subsequently denied his assertion.

Story here: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/world/middleeast/iraqi-prime-minister-criticizes-saudi-intervention-in-yemen.html?ref=world&_r=0

[confusedponderer]

I think I read that Al Qaeda, Yemen branch, attacked a Saudi border post and killed three or so Saudi officers just a couple days ago. Some months back, ISIS attacked a Saudi borderpost up north, killing a few soldiers.

I think that they are probing the Saudis and waiting for opportunities.

As for Israel not being able to defend themselves, I disagree.

My impression is that they are fully capable of defending themselves, due to their reserves and technological advantage, in particular in the air force. A protracted or all-out war would cost them dearly economically (those resevists can't work when they fight). Still, they probably should be quite capable repel any attack by any potential enemy, and then some.

They are for instance quite capable to devastate neighbouring countries from the air as when they went after Lebanese civilian infrastructure targets. In that regard their capabilities rival that of the US. What they don't have is legs. They can only reach so far, and for so long, and that falls short of Iran in both cases.

What they are not so good at is attacking resilient and deeply entrenched enemies as Hezbollah. That said, they arguably could defeat Hezbollah if they would go for it all-in.

That, however would likely so expensive that it isn't worth it (which is why Bibi probably thinks the US should do it instead (or, while at it, ISIS), not that it'd be cheaper then, but someone else pays and bleeds).

In Gaza the IDF had to resort to indiscriminate use of heavy fires to limit losses, inflicting 'with recklessness', to use the appropriate legal term, a large number of civilian casualties.

I write that because I think that losses appear to be Israel's achilles heel: In a war of choice Israel is quite sensitive to losses, but far more likely to accept them in an all-out defensive war.

A little crude and amateurish numbers game:

In their blackest disaster since the war of independence, the 1973 war, Israel lost 2,521 to 2,800 kia, 7,250 to 8,800 wounded, 293 Israelis were captured. Against that, on the Syrian and Egyptian sides 8,000 to 18,500 dead, 18,000 to 35,000 wounded and 8,783 POW. For kia hat compares roughly as between 1:4 to 1:10, depending on what numbers you trust in what was in essence an existential conflict for Israel, even though envisaged as a limited war by Syria and Egypt.

In the 2006 Lebanon war Israel suffered 121 kia and 1,244 wounded, Hezbollah 250-500, 600 in the Israeli estimation, with an unknown number of wounded. In terms of kia that's ~ 1:2 to 1:4,5, in a war of choice.

It suggests a number of things: For one, that defence is a strong form of war that benefits the defender. Then it suggests that Hezbollah fought pretty well and skillfully. They exacted from Israel a higher relative toll than the Syrians and Egyptians.

It also suggests that if the Israelis wanted to 'eradicate Hezbollah' mano-a-mano they'd pay for that dearly. That would be an existential conflict for Hezbollah. To kill a three thousand Hezbollah fighter - risk 1500 to 666 Israelis kia, or more? Apparently, Hezbollah is not threatening enough for Israel to consider to pay a such price.

Then, they'd rather go and kill Lebanese civilians instead - softer targets - as they did in 2006 when they got bogged down fighting Hezbollah's soldiers (iirc village militias and not the core force), and politely call carnage strategy.

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3605863,00.html

http://www.richardsilverstein.com/2014/11/29/netanyahu-promotes-dahiya-doctrine-author-to-idf-chief-of-staff/

In Israel, Douhet is alive and kicking. The apparent idea is that if only the IDF makes life miserable for enouugh Lebanes civilians and kills a good many, then they'll get mad at Hezbollah and bring them down. How sensible! That was what ended WW-II after all. The US and Brits rubbled German cities, killed innumerable civilians and in response the German people arose and toppled Hitler. Worked like charm! Wait ...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giulio_Douhet

Perhaps the basic flaw in this is a misconception of human nature. Apparently people who are being bombed blame the bombing party for thir mistery. That is only reasonable, after all they are the ones doing the bombing. After 9/11 the US also didn't rise up against Bush - they blamed Al Qaueda, incidentally the ones directly responsible for the destruction ...

An alternative and rather unpeasant explanation is that all that strategising is just make-up for racism and utter disregard for Lebanese and Palestinian lives. But such things are not o be spoken about in polite company.

[Swami Bhut Jolokia]

PB, I'm afraid you're right. The Pakistani Army is too invested in the 'threat of India' to give it up easily. And as you say, they have profited from it. At the expense of the ordinary citizen.

The lack of a democratic tradition in Pakistan means power is firmly in the hands of the Army, and there's no credible and powerful leader who can change the state of affairs in the foreseeable future.

Which is such a shame, as so many bright and capable humans are being denied opportunities and benefits increasingly available to the populations of emerging economies.

[FB Ali]

The 'school' is only significant for mullahs and scholars. It doesn't really matter to the vast majority of Muslims. That said, the generally prevalent school is the Hanafi (mostly in its Barelvi version). The Jihadis are, of course, Wahhabis.

There are no "fundamentalist" generals in the Pakistan army. Anyone showing such tendencies gets weeded out or blocked early on.

[William R. Cumming]

IMO a single well trained mechanized infantry division following an integrated strike on KSA ops would be all that is needed.

[William R. Cumming]

Yours is the majority opinion CP but I respectfully disagree.

[William R. Cumming]

KILLING MORE OF THE ENEMY THAN THEY KILL US NO LONGER THE MEASURE OF VICTORY IN THIS CENTURY IF IT EVER WAS!

And rating both mobilization and logistics capabilities mostly untested for almost all nation-states in 21st Century.

Was George C. Marshall the source of the alleged quote after PEARL HARBOR--"Yesterday we had time but no money--today money but no time."

I consider myself somewhat expert on mobilizing the nation's resources for national needs and the skill-set is very very scarce.

The 1995 OKC bombing, 9/11/2001, the Boston Marathon Bombing all highly limited geographic areas, Better tests reflected in Hurricane's Andrew and Katrina and Storm Sandy.

Try on Fukishima Da-Ici for size? Or the Haitian Earthquake?

[Babak Makkinejad]

I will make it more plain:

US is a country with a huge margin of error. Her leaders have endeavored to dedicate that margin of error - in part or in sum - to clearly hare-brained schema abroad.

A poorer country, lacking that enormous margin of error, would be more circumspect in wasting their more limited (in comparison to US) margin of error.

It is not democracy that is the culprit, in my opinion, rather Hubris of Wealth and Power.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I do not know any difference; to me it is a distinction without merit.

But I thought I give you the benefit of the doubt that I am missing something subtle.

Learning from Gen. Zia-ul-Haq?

That is like asking Henry the Eight about Annunciation.

[Babak Makkinejad]

A distinction with out merit in Muslims states.

The man responsible for Partition was Gandhi; Jinah was a respected member of Congress before Gandhi showed up on the scene and his fantasies won the day because he could get more people into the street.

He and together with Nehru and others who deified him....

[Patrick Bahzad]

I don't think your post is to be taken too seriously but we can wargame t quickly.
As with other countries in the big sandbox, conducting a successful military campaign would not be the issue.
But first of all you'd be facing 1.2 billion Muslims in the world as an attack on the holy places of Islam would justify a call for Jihad according to all creeds of that religion.
Second you'd have mayhem on the oil markets and the world economy if a couple of oil terminals and facilities go up in flames, particularly Abqaiq, Juaymah and Ras Tanura.
Third you'd have one division in a huge country ... They would look be totally lost and get nowhere, even if they get somewhere.
Third you'd have to deal with a local population a part of which would become very dangerous and relentless enemies, with an never ending influx of fighters coming from all directions.
Finally, one division of Marines is all the US thought they would need to beat the Viet Cong ...
Overall the odds for a successful Invasion whether with one or 100 divisions are rather glim, especially an army of "kufars" ... True vulnerability of KSA and real challenge to monarchy can only come from within its borders and/or within Islam.
Maybe PL is willing to organize some wargaking along these lines. I know there have been such scenarios played through by US ... They usually didn't end well !

[Patrick Bahzad]

That is just lazy Babak ! Doesn't sound like you ... Maybe Bhutto senior should have paid more careful attention to this general who learnt part of his trade in Jordan putting down the September 1970 uprise by the Palestinians! You can learn something from anybody without approving that they say ...

[Patrick Bahzad]

Think the partition issue is not that simple but that's another issue.
Regarding the merit or not of distinction between state religion and religion as defining element of a nation, You're self contradicting yourself or youre not consistent.
Either Pakistan is a confessional state created only for that reason or it isnt in which case there certainly is merit in distinction I made.
As a side note, lots of states with Muslim majority have been secular states for a long time ! Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt to name but a few ... Ring a bell ?

[Patrick Bahzad]

Hubris of power yes that's true, no doubt ! Combined with a sense of "manifest destiny" in the case of the U.S.
But we were talking more about existence or not of long term strategy. But valid point regarding extent of resources of course.
Regarding the U.S., Tocqueville in the 1840s and more recently Raumon Aaron had a pretty good idea about the way US foreign was going: an "Imperial Republic" ... Very good book by the way, you might want to read it, if you haven't yet !

[Patrick Bahzad]

Hadn't seen the mention of Mr 10 % ... You might also have said that he killed Benazir Bhutto's own brother, that's the kind of political elite this country is blessed with !
And then you have the country North or the border whose biggest drug dealer was the president's brother.

[Charles I]

too funny, thanks WF for starting the diversion.

[The Beaver]

I keep telling some of my friends that the saffran, that they buy in the Canadian stores, is not really Product of Spain but imported from Iran via a middle country and then labelled differently. We do get the real stuff , at a price , from the couple of Iranian stores in Montréal.

Same for Pistachio.

[Charles I]

Buck up man. Is it really that bad? If a country as big and fat as Golden Mountain can't take a hit like one you moot, however chaotically or incompetently, you guys should start the revolution now.

If an emp like in the TV show Revolution really could knock out all the electricity nationwide imho order would collapse within a month or so. No electricity, potable water & municipal sewers would do it in short order. As would a complete exchange of SIOP's.

Now when Yellowstone blows or The Big Asteroid comes again, what every 70 million years or so?, its back to Sumer for sure.

I think the U.S. has more capacity yet than we give it credit for. I hope.

[confusedponderer]

WRC,
"Yours is the majority opinion CP but I respectfully disagree."

On what specifically? Israel being (iN)capable of defending itself?

[confusedponderer]

Ok, and then?

[charly]

Those 1.2 billion is a problem for a non Muslim power but all regional powers, with the exclusion of Israel, are Muslim.