The Pakistani stance on Yemen … and its implications for Saudi–Arabia

 

By Patrick Bahzad

The Pakistani Parliament has spoken – or maybe it was the Chiefs of Staff in Rawalpindi. Pakistan will not commit ground troops to a land-based operation against the Yemeni "Houthi" rebels. The news arrived on Friday and have stunned several Arab States, mostly Saudi-Arabia, but also the United Arab Emirates. In the US as well, a sense of disbelief seemed to prevail among the usual proponents of the anti-Iran faction.

Pakistan's decision has drawn sharp criticism from these players, yet it is based on an instinct of self-preservation and national interest that should not come as a surprise, even to those advocating for a more aggressive approach in Yemen. What is at stake for Pakistan is not just its alliances with countries in the Gulf, but its standing in the future geopolitical landscape at the intersection of the Middle-East and South-Asia.

A decision made in defiance of military and economic ties

The violence of the reaction to Pakistan's declared "neutrality" with regard to the Saudi led coalition can only be interpreted as an indicator of the upset this decision has caused. In very undiplomatic terms, Anwar Gargash – the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – has hinted at the serious consequences the Pakistani reluctance might have and openly declared, Pakistan could pay a heavy price for its "unexpected" position. The Saudi reaction has not been as vocal, but it goes without saying that Riyadh can't have been thrilled either.

Both Gulf countries, Saudi-Arabia and the UAE, are pumping massive amounts of money into Pakistan, year in year out. The Emiratis have built-up substantial trade relations in recent years, while the Saudis have always provided relief funding to bolster the faltering Pakistani budget. Last year alone, Saudi-Arabia has injected 1.5 billion US dollars into the bottomless pit that is the Pakistani Treasury. Riyadh has also been there in times of need for current Pakistani Prime-minister, Nawaz Sharif, for example when he needed shelter at the end of 1999, after the Pakistani army under General Musharraf had organised a coup and ousted the legitimate government.

With regard to operation "Decisive Storm", Riyadh and Abu Dabi expected – or rather demanded – Pakistan to repay its debt, as it had always done in the past. Up until now, Islamabad had never bulked at the finger snapping from the Gulf. After the seizure on the Great Mosque of Mecca by Saudi fundamentalists in 1979, which had been organized in part by a brother of Osama Bin Laden, as many as 20 000 Pakistani troops were dispatched to the Kingdom, in an effort to strengthen its defences against any challenge from within. That is also the reason why the "Saudi Arabian National Guard" recruited a number of ex-Pakistani military over the years, to fill its ranks with troops more apt at fighting local insurgents and – even more importantly – more loyal to orders coming from the House of Saud.

Misconceptions and wrong assumptions

While the Gulf States consider Pakistan's "obedience" as a given, Islamabad tends to see itself more as the "shield" of Sunni Islam and its Holy places against any threat directed at it. Whenever the "territorial integrity" of the Saudi Kingdom was at stake, Pakistan was there to provide the foot-soldiers that Riyadh was so direly lacking. This time however, despite early announcements made by the Saudis, according to which the Pakistani air force was already part of the coalition, Islamabad resisted the PR pressure and made a decision that is astounding in more than just one sense.

Seen from Pakistan, operation "Decisive Storm" looks very different from what the spin doctors in the Gulf and their Western off springs are trying to sell. Neither the Saudi borders nor the Saudi State are seen as threatened by the Houthis, well at least not until the Saudi coalition started its bombing campaign. While a fraction of Pakistani public opinion would undoubtedly support the sending of ground troops, there is a growing scepticism among the majority of the population that is reflected in the second thoughts of the military and civilian leadership.

The Pakistan of today – according to the dominant political discourse – wants to be a power that promotes unity and reconciliation within the (Sunni) Muslim world, as an expression of Islamabad's claim to being the champion of "Islamic Internationalism". One could contend of course that these are only official rhetorics and narratives, but there are also other reasons for the position the country has taken.

Pakistan's internal problems

As it is, Islamabad has enough to deal with on its own territory. The military has been fighting a guerrilla war against its home-made Islamic fundamentalists and Pashtun rebels for almost a year in the "North-West Frontier Province" and the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas", both of which border Afghanistan. It's been a long and costly campaign, with the military having committed large number of troops and having suffered serious casualties.

Moving a substantial number of ground troops to Saudi-Arabia for an operation the duration of which cannot be foreseen would be a serious bet, one the army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif, didn't want to make. It would have meant less troop rotations in the current campaign against the domestic rebellion, or less troops on the border with India, which remains a highly sensitive area, despite a recent "rapprochement" between both countries.

Another facet of the internal dimension to Pakistan's decision is the presence of a large Shia minority within its borders. Shias make up about 25 % of Pakistan's population, which could amount to as many as 35-40 million people. In recent years, sectarian violence has cost many lives, particularly among the Shia minorities in areas most prone to Sunni fundamentalism.

The involvement of Pakistan's army in a ground campaign directed at another Shia minority in Yemen could inflame that situation further, adding to the destabilisation of Pakistan from within  and possibly prompting a reaction from Iranian proxies, which could find sanctuary on the other side of the common border between both countries.

First knock-on effect of the agreement with Iran

However, avoiding tensions with Iran is also guided by other considerations still. In the interim phase that has now started since the signing of the new agreement with Iran, Pakistan cannot afford to be seen – particularly not by the US – as one more regional power that threatens to derail the whole process. There is enough opposition to any form of agreement with Iran among closer allies to the US, thus anything Islamabad might do to worsen that trend would not go down well with the current administration.

Besides, Pakistan has a national interest of its own in preventing Iran from getting the bomb, as it would then be exposed to two potentially hostile nuclear powers, one in the south – India – and one in the West – Iran. The whole strategic concept of the Pakistani army would be thrown totally off balance, even though, admittedly, it's not very convincing already.

In addition to abstaining from any military friction, the Pakistani leadership had something else in mind when it announced its refusal to commit ground troops to operation "Decisive Storm". Almost simultaneously to Islamabad's declaration of neutrality, China announced it would build a natural gas pipeline linking Iran to Pakistan, and possibly continuing further into China once the first part between Asalyuyeh (Iran) and Nawabshah (Pakistan) was finished. This project had long been delayed but US opposition to it, but after the signing of the interim agreement with Tehran, China seems eager to move ahead quickly.

China and the geopolitics of energy

What lies behind that decision is not just Beijing's interest in developing an economic corridor going from the Gulf (Iran), through Pakistan and South-West China. The fact that such a corridor would encompass the supply of huge quantities of oil and gas points to the global strategy Beijing is pursuing with regard to natural resources. The geopolitics of energy, and the attempts made by Beijing to break the US ability to block the supply of the Chinese market, play a significant role in the events unfolding in Yemen.

Of course, it is in Pakistan's interests to overcome the energy shortages it has been experiencing for years and the Chinese "Pipeline of Peace" is going to help in that regard. Sending troops into Saudi-Arabia or even Yemen might have threatened the viability of that project, not just because the Iranians might have been unhappy, but first and foremost because China is turning into a major player in that part of the world. The Chinese presence in South Asia and East Africa has been increasing for years, even though Beijing is trying to be as discrete as possible about the take-off of its economic and political relations.

Whether in Pakistan, Kenya or Sudan, China's influence has been on the rise. Were it not for the black hole that Somalia has become, chances are, China would be present there as well. This increase in Chinese visibility around the Horn of Africa in particular is related to various reasons, but one of the most interesting ones in the context of the Yemen crisis, is the Strait of Mandeb. Roughly 5 % of all oil exports worldwide and 40 % of maritime goods transit through there, which makes this route a strategic asset for a number of countries. For the Chinese, it's not just the oil flow that is of importance, but also the trade route to Europe, which has been importing large quantities of Chinese manufactured goods for years.

With Japan planning to establish a permanent military base in Djibouti – in addition to the already existing French and US bases there – the challenge to Beijing is evident. The underground chess-game that is being played between the US and its allies, on the one side, and the emerging Chinese giant and its friends, on the other, has chosen Yemen as one of the pawns. To the US, it seems preferable to restrain the "Houthis" and their alleged Iranian sponsors, even though Washington could probably live with former President Saleh and his associates controlling the coastal areas along the strait, as long as Iran – or China – doesn't appear as gaining a substantial advantage through such a development.

Saudi-Arabia in charge … but not on the up

The little support the US have granted Saudi-Arabia, in terms of logistics and intelligence, seems directed mostly as not letting cracks appear in the alliance between Washington and the Riyadh. But the Saudis are now in the driving seat, which constitutes a novelty for a country more used to interfering and meddling through easy to manipulate proxies.

Leading complex military operations isn't something the Saudis have ever excelled at. The fact that they took this road now has to be seen as a telling sign. For one thing, it is probable that the new political leadership in Riyadh wants to put down and marker and demonstrate a new sense of confidence and power.

The chinks in the Saudi armour are numerous however. First of all, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are not fully on board. Oman in particular has declined the invitation to take part in operation "Decisive Storm". Iraq and Syria aren't there, for obvious reasons, but neither is Algeria, the major Arab power in North-West Africa. Libya is divided on this topic, as much as it is on any topic these days ! But the real blow to the Saudi operation came from the two heavy weights that could provide some real substance to this toothless military coalition.

Egypt – once bitten, twice shy – is limiting its participation to airstrikes and maritime patrols. No Egyptian "boots on the ground" this time … One Yemeni "Vietnam" is probably enough, that must be the undertone of Cairo's message to the Saudis. This left Riyadh with only the Pakistanis as a credible army to back-up their threat of a ground campaign. That bubble has now burst as well.

Local proxies as the only plan B

All that is left, other than the airstrikes, is the traditional Saudi reliance on Islamist proxies, in this case Al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen (AQAP) and the tribal militias sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood's party in the country "Al-Islah". The military capabilities of both these groups remains a mystery, especially their ability to repel a combined Houthi and Yemeni army offensive on the South. Any circumstantial alliance between the Saudis and both AQAP and "Al-Islah" would also lead to major objections from more important allies of the Saudis.

Egypt's President Sisi is determined to break the "Ikhwan" and would not appreciate the Saudis re-establishing links, particularly not after they had broken up with them under Egyptian pressure. As for AQAP, the US have been flying drone missions against them from the al-Anad airbase for a number of years. American approval of the Saudis now backing the same AQAP would be bordering on the schizophrenic … The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia is now left alone to deal with this mess, and the token States or the "Gulf Cooperation Council" are not going to change this.  

Of course, the Saudis probably knew most of this. They were aware of Egyptian and US doubts and were not relying on them for substantial support. Their bets were on Pakistan to back them up, as always. Now, they face a very tricky situation. The Kingdom's credibility is on the line. Up until now, King Salman had proven that he could take tough decisions, contrary to his predecessor. But the risks involved in the Yemeni adventure are even higher, now that Pakistan has opted out of it.

Alea Jacta Est …

Behind the scenes, it is not just the regional struggle for Saudi dominance over the Iranian rival that is taking place (and being lost). There is also a fight for influence within the Saudi royal family that is going in. King Salman, a member of the "Sudairi clan" (a group of seven brothers former King Abdul-Aziz had with his third wife), seemed intent on settling old scores when he came into power. He may be suffering from an early form of Alzheimer's, but he didn't waste any time putting his family branch back in business.

Powerful men have lost their jobs or have been overlooked, in particular "Prince of Darkness" Bandar bin Sultan (ex-Chief of Saudi Intelligence). More importantly though, the King awarded key positions to two grandsons of the founder of the modern Saud dynasty: Mohamed bin Nayef (55) and Mohamed bin Salman (34 and the King's own son) are now in charge of key portfolios in the Saudi government. While the first one has already proven his capabilities in matters related to national security, his younger cousin's nomination as Minister of Defence appears to place him as a serious contender in the line of succession.

The King may have picked his inexperienced son for such a high responsibility precisely to bolster his position as a potential challenger for the crown, but young Mohamed bin Salman is definitely going to need some serious credentials … like a successful foreign military campaign in Yemen. The die is now cast anyway and there is no way back, short of a diplomatic solution which would be tantamount to a debacle for the Saudi State and its leadership.

Whatever the outcome of operation "Decisive Storm", it is likely to be a key element in the balance of power between the new strongmen in the House of Saud, as well as a crucial factor in the political survival of the family itself. In that regard, Yemen could be decisive for the future of the Kingdom.

Comments

[confusedponderer]

Be careful what you wish for.

The Saudis suck, granted, but there is worse.

[The Beaver]

Brig Ali,

Isn't the Sindh province mainly Shi'a?
And the Bhutto family (at least the mother) is Shi'a also ( I don't know about Mr 10%)

Don't know whether you've seen this article:
http://www.opednews.com/articles/Why-Pakistan-declines-Saud-by-Abdus-Sattar-Ghaza-Arab-League_Conflict_Crisis_Iran-150412-122.html

"The Shia Factor: Perhaps an important factor for Pakistan to decline to join the anti-Yemen coalition is the Shia factor. Saudi Arabia had reportedly asked Pakistan to send only Sunni soldiers and not Shia solders. Pakistan's army is comprised of roughly 70% Sunni soldiers and 30% Shia soldiers. The Saudi request was considered as creating a rift in the Pakistan army ranks which doesn't have any sectarian division."

[Babak Makkinejad]

Iran also is a religious state - purely based on Shia religion; without which it could not exist in its present form.

For both the Monarchy and the Islamic Republic Twelve-Imami Shia has been the state religion.

[Babak Makkinejad]

What is the distinction between a confessional state and a religious state?

Could you please elaborate?

[Babak Makkinejad]

I do not think that Sindh is Twelver - Binazir's mother was - I think.

[Babak Makkinejad]

The sitting President of Pakistan was the only foreign leader - Muslim or not - who attended the funeral and burial of Ayatollah Khomeini.

During Iran-Iraq War, Iranian helicopter pilots were being trained in Pakistan.

And Pakistan sold nuclear technology to Iran.

[Bandolero]

Patrick
Thank you for the detailed analysis.

However, I think, you failed to mention the most important point which I believe was conceiled behind the scenes:

Pakistan's army simply thinks the Saudis are going to lose that war in Yemen, with or without Pakistani help, and that badly.

Pakistanis are well aware, and some discreet Chinese, Iranian and even some US interlocators may have reinforced that message recently, that participating in a war and losing the war may have dire consequences, what any money hardly could compensate, especially when the major opposition (Imran Khan) is categorically against Pakistan fighting in Yemen, and the major reason the Saudis need Pakistan in their coalition is that they want Pakistan to take the casualties of a ground operation.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Which of the four schools is the most dominant in the state; among the fundamentalist generals, for example?

Do you know?

[Swami Bhut Jolokia]

I can understand the paranoia the Pakistani Army has about India, what with the long history, East Pakistan/Bangladesh, Kashmir, India on good terms with Afghanistan and Iran etc.

However, the country as a whole would be so much better off if the Army would grow up and make nice with India. India is too busy trying to grow its economy to have any territorial ambitions. Tight trade relationships have a way of putting war on the back burner.

[FB Ali]

No, Sind is mainly Sunni (though these designations don't mean much, except formally). Except for overtly religious people, they are mainly cultural labels. The Bhuttos are Shia, including Mr 10%.

I hadn't read this article, but I have referred above to the Shia angle (see my comment at 4:31 PM above).

[Pirouz]

Larry, if that B747 you saw was white fuselage and blue stripe along cabin windows, it was an Iran Air Force jet.

If it was white with a large blue emblem on the tail, it was Iran Air.

I don't think you meant Iran Navy- but the color navy.

And yes, Iran Air was active with commercial flights during the war, as the tragic downing of IR655 demonstrated.

[b]

Patrick writes:

"Any circumstantial alliance between the Saudis and both AQAP and "Al-Islah" would also lead to major objections from more important allies of the Saudis.
...
American approval of the Saudis now backing the same AQAP would be bordering on the schizophrenic …"

But that is exactly what is happening in Syria. The Saudis finance Jabhat al-Nusra and Israel is supporting it while the U.S. is bombing Nusra leaders.

I have seen Saudi bragging about that in the NYT but zero U.S. objection.

I believe that is the way they will go. Use AlQaeda to turn Yemen into a second big Gaza.

BTW: Yesterday 16 gas stations in Yemen with long rows of cars waiting for gas were bombed by the Saudi coalition. In one case over 40 people died. At least 20 U.S. officers in Riyadh are vetting the target lists.

Sanaa has had no electricity for 60+ hours now. There is no fuel for water pumps, gas canisters for cooking are running out. The harbors are completely blocked and no food is coming into the country. There is little to no news coming out of the country as telecommunication means were attacked earlier and have also run out of fuel. The UN envoy resigned in protest. Starvation started but little will be learned about it in the outside world.

[Patrick Bahzad]

b,
Thx for sharing this info - I don't think anybody is surprised at the turn of events. Supply of Yemen with food, goods of first necessity and fuel has collapsed, that is beyond doubt.
We'll see what happens about it. I think it will rather inflame the conflict further, at least in the short run. But the blocade as a means to force a decision is nothing new ... It's basically like laying siege to a castle in the middle-ages. We'll see who blinks first, but casualties are guaranteed anyway.
As for the comparison with Syria, the main difference is that in Yemen, you might see a Saudi government involvement in arming the anti-Saleh and anti-houthi forces. That is not the case in Syria, at least not anymore.
From 2011to 2013, that comparison would have been valid to a point, but several things have changed since. However, I agree with the totally schizophrenic nature of the US and Western policy in general, i.e. supporting and tolerating in one place the people we fight in others ...

[Patrick Bahzad]

On the other hand, if Pakistan had been able to build a consistent education system over the years - something India managed to do - maybe there would be no need to Saudi funded madrassas ...
It's not that easy you know, when you're a poor family and the only option we have for your kids is to send at least one of your kids to a madrassa, being told he'll get a good education, and maybe 10 years on he turns into a radical.
But when you have no alternative, it's not that simple. Education in Pakistan, like the rest of the State and its civilian agencies, are totally dysfunctional.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Yes I could and should, but I'm pretty sure you already know the difference yourself. Besides, you can check Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's own words, he explains that quite eloquently.

[Patrick Bahzad]

there's a difference between State religion and religion being the defining element in the identity of a State. I thought that was pretty obvious. For Pakistan, at least until partition in 1971, religion was the only common identity feature of that State. Doesn't mean there were no minorities, although the 2 millions dead during partition of India made sure there wouldn't be too many of them, but as such, without Islam, there was no rationale justifying the creation of Pakistan as a State.
Maybe it was a reward of the Brits for the Muslim League supporting them during WWII, while the Congress party didn't. Or maybe it was the old British way of dividing to create chaos and weaken the post-colonial states they left. That's up for debate.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I didn't quite get what you meant by referring to Switzerland and Sweden, two small neutral countries, with a population about 0.05 % to 0.1 % that of China ... and neither the will, nor the ambition for a global foreign policy.
As for Sweden, i don't consider their unhealthy role in the anti-Russia cabbale as an example to follow.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Relations between Iran and a number of countries are or have been better than is usually stated mainly in the US media.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Thats is a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy: Saudi-Arabia is going to lose the war if Pakistan doesn't provide grounds troops, thus Pakistan doesn't provide ground-troops because it doesn't want to lose the war.
The probability of military success may have played a role but I don't think it is the decisive element in Pakistan's decision, which would only have provided troops for the defence of KSA, not for offensive missions in Yemen. The other elements in the equation, particularly in relation to China, public opinion in Pakistan and risk of inflaming the domestic situation, did weigh in much more.

[Patrick Bahzad]

The Pakistani army paranoia about India is just that ... paranoia, that served the purpose of making the army the only halfway functioning government body in the country and the Generals at its head becoming very wealthy individuals, let's put it that way ...

The idea of the "strategic Depth" that Pakistan needed in Afghanistan and the alleged Indian meddling in Afghanistan, which is an idea that prevailed for years in the Pakistani army (t least it was the official version), is just a pile of you know what.

How the mountains of Afghanistan could provide strategic depth for Pakistani armoured divisions manoeuvrering against an Indian invasion force has always remained a mystery to me.

As for growing up, I'm afraid it's gonna take a bit more than that. What's in it for the army, would be the first question you would hear.

[confusedponderer]

I don't know but have an informed hunch: Hanafi/Deobandi?

I have no idea as to whether, and if so to what extent, Saudi/Gulfie funding shifted religius views towards Hanbali/Wahhabi Islam. If so, that would be an inherent cause for conflict and fratricide since I assume that Wahhabis and Salfis likely find much to object to in Deobandi Islam.

[William R. Cumming]

Agree!

[William R. Cumming]

Your comment a distinction without a difference. I asked some time ago on this blog as to whether KSA could defend its borders? No answer that I remember. IMO the engagement of KSA in YEMEN the triumph of hope over experience and the KSA is unable to defend itself but continues to pretend it can do so. Just Israeli military for its analysis of KSA capabilities?

But hey I don't believe Israel is capable of self-defense either from conventional weapons or nuclear. This fact drives BIBI's concerns.

[confusedponderer]

Patrick Bahzad,
thanks for another brilliant post. Thanks!

[Patrick Bahzad]

I must have missed that post where you raised those points.
Answer to your question regarding KSA depends on the nature of the threat we're talking.
In general terms however, the ability of the SA army to conduct combined military operations on a large scale is quite limited.
Regarding Israel, I would have a rather different opinion ...