The Pakistani stance on Yemen … and its implications for Saudi–Arabia

 

By Patrick Bahzad

The Pakistani Parliament has spoken – or maybe it was the Chiefs of Staff in Rawalpindi. Pakistan will not commit ground troops to a land-based operation against the Yemeni "Houthi" rebels. The news arrived on Friday and have stunned several Arab States, mostly Saudi-Arabia, but also the United Arab Emirates. In the US as well, a sense of disbelief seemed to prevail among the usual proponents of the anti-Iran faction.

Pakistan's decision has drawn sharp criticism from these players, yet it is based on an instinct of self-preservation and national interest that should not come as a surprise, even to those advocating for a more aggressive approach in Yemen. What is at stake for Pakistan is not just its alliances with countries in the Gulf, but its standing in the future geopolitical landscape at the intersection of the Middle-East and South-Asia.

A decision made in defiance of military and economic ties

The violence of the reaction to Pakistan's declared "neutrality" with regard to the Saudi led coalition can only be interpreted as an indicator of the upset this decision has caused. In very undiplomatic terms, Anwar Gargash – the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – has hinted at the serious consequences the Pakistani reluctance might have and openly declared, Pakistan could pay a heavy price for its "unexpected" position. The Saudi reaction has not been as vocal, but it goes without saying that Riyadh can't have been thrilled either.

Both Gulf countries, Saudi-Arabia and the UAE, are pumping massive amounts of money into Pakistan, year in year out. The Emiratis have built-up substantial trade relations in recent years, while the Saudis have always provided relief funding to bolster the faltering Pakistani budget. Last year alone, Saudi-Arabia has injected 1.5 billion US dollars into the bottomless pit that is the Pakistani Treasury. Riyadh has also been there in times of need for current Pakistani Prime-minister, Nawaz Sharif, for example when he needed shelter at the end of 1999, after the Pakistani army under General Musharraf had organised a coup and ousted the legitimate government.

With regard to operation "Decisive Storm", Riyadh and Abu Dabi expected – or rather demanded – Pakistan to repay its debt, as it had always done in the past. Up until now, Islamabad had never bulked at the finger snapping from the Gulf. After the seizure on the Great Mosque of Mecca by Saudi fundamentalists in 1979, which had been organized in part by a brother of Osama Bin Laden, as many as 20 000 Pakistani troops were dispatched to the Kingdom, in an effort to strengthen its defences against any challenge from within. That is also the reason why the "Saudi Arabian National Guard" recruited a number of ex-Pakistani military over the years, to fill its ranks with troops more apt at fighting local insurgents and – even more importantly – more loyal to orders coming from the House of Saud.

Misconceptions and wrong assumptions

While the Gulf States consider Pakistan's "obedience" as a given, Islamabad tends to see itself more as the "shield" of Sunni Islam and its Holy places against any threat directed at it. Whenever the "territorial integrity" of the Saudi Kingdom was at stake, Pakistan was there to provide the foot-soldiers that Riyadh was so direly lacking. This time however, despite early announcements made by the Saudis, according to which the Pakistani air force was already part of the coalition, Islamabad resisted the PR pressure and made a decision that is astounding in more than just one sense.

Seen from Pakistan, operation "Decisive Storm" looks very different from what the spin doctors in the Gulf and their Western off springs are trying to sell. Neither the Saudi borders nor the Saudi State are seen as threatened by the Houthis, well at least not until the Saudi coalition started its bombing campaign. While a fraction of Pakistani public opinion would undoubtedly support the sending of ground troops, there is a growing scepticism among the majority of the population that is reflected in the second thoughts of the military and civilian leadership.

The Pakistan of today – according to the dominant political discourse – wants to be a power that promotes unity and reconciliation within the (Sunni) Muslim world, as an expression of Islamabad's claim to being the champion of "Islamic Internationalism". One could contend of course that these are only official rhetorics and narratives, but there are also other reasons for the position the country has taken.

Pakistan's internal problems

As it is, Islamabad has enough to deal with on its own territory. The military has been fighting a guerrilla war against its home-made Islamic fundamentalists and Pashtun rebels for almost a year in the "North-West Frontier Province" and the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas", both of which border Afghanistan. It's been a long and costly campaign, with the military having committed large number of troops and having suffered serious casualties.

Moving a substantial number of ground troops to Saudi-Arabia for an operation the duration of which cannot be foreseen would be a serious bet, one the army's Chief of Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif, didn't want to make. It would have meant less troop rotations in the current campaign against the domestic rebellion, or less troops on the border with India, which remains a highly sensitive area, despite a recent "rapprochement" between both countries.

Another facet of the internal dimension to Pakistan's decision is the presence of a large Shia minority within its borders. Shias make up about 25 % of Pakistan's population, which could amount to as many as 35-40 million people. In recent years, sectarian violence has cost many lives, particularly among the Shia minorities in areas most prone to Sunni fundamentalism.

The involvement of Pakistan's army in a ground campaign directed at another Shia minority in Yemen could inflame that situation further, adding to the destabilisation of Pakistan from within  and possibly prompting a reaction from Iranian proxies, which could find sanctuary on the other side of the common border between both countries.

First knock-on effect of the agreement with Iran

However, avoiding tensions with Iran is also guided by other considerations still. In the interim phase that has now started since the signing of the new agreement with Iran, Pakistan cannot afford to be seen – particularly not by the US – as one more regional power that threatens to derail the whole process. There is enough opposition to any form of agreement with Iran among closer allies to the US, thus anything Islamabad might do to worsen that trend would not go down well with the current administration.

Besides, Pakistan has a national interest of its own in preventing Iran from getting the bomb, as it would then be exposed to two potentially hostile nuclear powers, one in the south – India – and one in the West – Iran. The whole strategic concept of the Pakistani army would be thrown totally off balance, even though, admittedly, it's not very convincing already.

In addition to abstaining from any military friction, the Pakistani leadership had something else in mind when it announced its refusal to commit ground troops to operation "Decisive Storm". Almost simultaneously to Islamabad's declaration of neutrality, China announced it would build a natural gas pipeline linking Iran to Pakistan, and possibly continuing further into China once the first part between Asalyuyeh (Iran) and Nawabshah (Pakistan) was finished. This project had long been delayed but US opposition to it, but after the signing of the interim agreement with Tehran, China seems eager to move ahead quickly.

China and the geopolitics of energy

What lies behind that decision is not just Beijing's interest in developing an economic corridor going from the Gulf (Iran), through Pakistan and South-West China. The fact that such a corridor would encompass the supply of huge quantities of oil and gas points to the global strategy Beijing is pursuing with regard to natural resources. The geopolitics of energy, and the attempts made by Beijing to break the US ability to block the supply of the Chinese market, play a significant role in the events unfolding in Yemen.

Of course, it is in Pakistan's interests to overcome the energy shortages it has been experiencing for years and the Chinese "Pipeline of Peace" is going to help in that regard. Sending troops into Saudi-Arabia or even Yemen might have threatened the viability of that project, not just because the Iranians might have been unhappy, but first and foremost because China is turning into a major player in that part of the world. The Chinese presence in South Asia and East Africa has been increasing for years, even though Beijing is trying to be as discrete as possible about the take-off of its economic and political relations.

Whether in Pakistan, Kenya or Sudan, China's influence has been on the rise. Were it not for the black hole that Somalia has become, chances are, China would be present there as well. This increase in Chinese visibility around the Horn of Africa in particular is related to various reasons, but one of the most interesting ones in the context of the Yemen crisis, is the Strait of Mandeb. Roughly 5 % of all oil exports worldwide and 40 % of maritime goods transit through there, which makes this route a strategic asset for a number of countries. For the Chinese, it's not just the oil flow that is of importance, but also the trade route to Europe, which has been importing large quantities of Chinese manufactured goods for years.

With Japan planning to establish a permanent military base in Djibouti – in addition to the already existing French and US bases there – the challenge to Beijing is evident. The underground chess-game that is being played between the US and its allies, on the one side, and the emerging Chinese giant and its friends, on the other, has chosen Yemen as one of the pawns. To the US, it seems preferable to restrain the "Houthis" and their alleged Iranian sponsors, even though Washington could probably live with former President Saleh and his associates controlling the coastal areas along the strait, as long as Iran – or China – doesn't appear as gaining a substantial advantage through such a development.

Saudi-Arabia in charge … but not on the up

The little support the US have granted Saudi-Arabia, in terms of logistics and intelligence, seems directed mostly as not letting cracks appear in the alliance between Washington and the Riyadh. But the Saudis are now in the driving seat, which constitutes a novelty for a country more used to interfering and meddling through easy to manipulate proxies.

Leading complex military operations isn't something the Saudis have ever excelled at. The fact that they took this road now has to be seen as a telling sign. For one thing, it is probable that the new political leadership in Riyadh wants to put down and marker and demonstrate a new sense of confidence and power.

The chinks in the Saudi armour are numerous however. First of all, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are not fully on board. Oman in particular has declined the invitation to take part in operation "Decisive Storm". Iraq and Syria aren't there, for obvious reasons, but neither is Algeria, the major Arab power in North-West Africa. Libya is divided on this topic, as much as it is on any topic these days ! But the real blow to the Saudi operation came from the two heavy weights that could provide some real substance to this toothless military coalition.

Egypt – once bitten, twice shy – is limiting its participation to airstrikes and maritime patrols. No Egyptian "boots on the ground" this time … One Yemeni "Vietnam" is probably enough, that must be the undertone of Cairo's message to the Saudis. This left Riyadh with only the Pakistanis as a credible army to back-up their threat of a ground campaign. That bubble has now burst as well.

Local proxies as the only plan B

All that is left, other than the airstrikes, is the traditional Saudi reliance on Islamist proxies, in this case Al Qaeda's franchise in Yemen (AQAP) and the tribal militias sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood's party in the country "Al-Islah". The military capabilities of both these groups remains a mystery, especially their ability to repel a combined Houthi and Yemeni army offensive on the South. Any circumstantial alliance between the Saudis and both AQAP and "Al-Islah" would also lead to major objections from more important allies of the Saudis.

Egypt's President Sisi is determined to break the "Ikhwan" and would not appreciate the Saudis re-establishing links, particularly not after they had broken up with them under Egyptian pressure. As for AQAP, the US have been flying drone missions against them from the al-Anad airbase for a number of years. American approval of the Saudis now backing the same AQAP would be bordering on the schizophrenic … The Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia is now left alone to deal with this mess, and the token States or the "Gulf Cooperation Council" are not going to change this.  

Of course, the Saudis probably knew most of this. They were aware of Egyptian and US doubts and were not relying on them for substantial support. Their bets were on Pakistan to back them up, as always. Now, they face a very tricky situation. The Kingdom's credibility is on the line. Up until now, King Salman had proven that he could take tough decisions, contrary to his predecessor. But the risks involved in the Yemeni adventure are even higher, now that Pakistan has opted out of it.

Alea Jacta Est …

Behind the scenes, it is not just the regional struggle for Saudi dominance over the Iranian rival that is taking place (and being lost). There is also a fight for influence within the Saudi royal family that is going in. King Salman, a member of the "Sudairi clan" (a group of seven brothers former King Abdul-Aziz had with his third wife), seemed intent on settling old scores when he came into power. He may be suffering from an early form of Alzheimer's, but he didn't waste any time putting his family branch back in business.

Powerful men have lost their jobs or have been overlooked, in particular "Prince of Darkness" Bandar bin Sultan (ex-Chief of Saudi Intelligence). More importantly though, the King awarded key positions to two grandsons of the founder of the modern Saud dynasty: Mohamed bin Nayef (55) and Mohamed bin Salman (34 and the King's own son) are now in charge of key portfolios in the Saudi government. While the first one has already proven his capabilities in matters related to national security, his younger cousin's nomination as Minister of Defence appears to place him as a serious contender in the line of succession.

The King may have picked his inexperienced son for such a high responsibility precisely to bolster his position as a potential challenger for the crown, but young Mohamed bin Salman is definitely going to need some serious credentials … like a successful foreign military campaign in Yemen. The die is now cast anyway and there is no way back, short of a diplomatic solution which would be tantamount to a debacle for the Saudi State and its leadership.

Whatever the outcome of operation "Decisive Storm", it is likely to be a key element in the balance of power between the new strongmen in the House of Saud, as well as a crucial factor in the political survival of the family itself. In that regard, Yemen could be decisive for the future of the Kingdom.

Comments

[confusedponderer]

Obliquely related thought:

Is it just me or have the Obamaites changed the "leadership from behind" approach in the Middle East of late and had local states run against a wall to have them see how far they get without US help - and then offer help in order to drive home to them their dependency.

I mean that is what they appear to have been telling the Iraqis and Iranians in Iraq (That siege of Tikrit didn't work out so well until we intervened, did you notice? Need a hand?), the Saudis (It appears that offensive of yours in Yemen didn't work so well? Need help?) and the Israelis (Oh, you dislike the Iran deal? Too bad. Now, how was that about you handling Iran on your own?) lately.

Obama's approach appears to be more effective in shaping the behaviour of the various actors than the neocon idea of the US using power directly.

To the neocons, having power, and not using it is, for all practivcal purposes, not having power. That's why they are so compulsively assertive.

[William R. Cumming]

Hoping CP has correct analytic framework. Mine is different. The USA has worn out its BOOTS ON THE GROUND forces and they will not be rebuilt anytime soon. Like the doctrine of MASSIVE RETALIATION the real deficiencies of US conventional forces will cause the US HARD POWER to continue to wither for the next several decades IMO.

If you consider the Armed Forces as an investment then like the Hampton Mansions of the Hedge Fund managers its under investment will allow the Chinese Condominium to expand and thrive.

But like most of the rest of the world's oligarchs, the Saudi Royal Family and the Chinese oligarchs will continue to see the USA as a SAFE HARBOR for their personal wealth.

The 5,000 key US oligarchs will continue to exploit the US political class to try and avoid the aphorism--three generations shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves.

IMO of course.

[BabelFish]

WRC, I think we are one massacre inside the CONUS for 'make radioactive glass beads'. Have a Charlie Hebdo in the US and there will be blood.

Also, as a wise SST member reminded me, when we build these 'investments', our leaders seem to find reasons to use them. As Patrick observed, Neocons can't seem to go to bed at night without planning some military intervention, somewhere.

It must really suck to have your rent-a-army and chattel tell you to go bleep yourself, as the Pakis did to everyone who wanted them to be slaughtered in a fight they have no dog in.

[William R. Cumming]

Mostly in agreement. A NUDET anywhere in USA could collapse US government.

[The Twisted Genius]

Another clear, concise analysis. Thanks Patrick. The Pakistani refusal to send troops to Yemen at the behest of the Saudis certainly raised my eyebrows. It strikes me as a "What are you gonna do now, Ranger?" moment for the house of Saud. I'm sure there are quite a few in Pakistan who are regretting the largesse of the madrassas and longing for the influence of sufism.

[FB Ali]

A few comments on PB's wide-ranging post:

Security policy, especially covering external security, is firmly in the hands of the Pakistan army (not military). The main foreign power that Pakistan depends on for its external security is China. The Chinese indicated they do not want Pakistan to get involved in Yemen and spoil their plans for establishing the economic land corridor that PB has mentioned. That was decisive in determining Pakistan's stance.

The leaders of the ruling political party, the Muslim League, and of the main opposition, the People's Party, are thoroughly corrupt, and would 'sell' Pakistan to the Saudis and the GCC without hesitation. However, public opinion was strongly against getting involved in Yemen.

The "shield of Sunni Islam" stuff that PB refers to is mostly political and media rhetoric, and plays little or no role in determining policy.

No one who matters in Pakistan is concerned about (or believes in) an "Iranian nuclear bomb". This is mainly a fantasy of the US, encouraged by Israel and the Saudis.

My guess is that the Saudi military campaign against Yemen was sponsored by the King's son, Prince Salman, to bolster his prospects in the succession stakes. As Patrick says, its failure would deal a serious blow to his chances. Thus one can foresee its prolongation beyond any worthwhile limits.

A small correction on the historical side: The "coup" that removed Nawaz Sharif and installed Musharraf was in fact a counter-coup. The coup that failed was Sharif's attempt to remove Musharraf.

[elev8]

Yes, Patrick's contributions are great.
One point: those 1.5 billion dollars are not exactly a Marshall plan. A pittance, in fact. Don't think it took the Pakis more than a minute to get over it. Perhaps they were asking for a major increase which the Saudis were not willing to grant.

[mbrenner]

It is natural to seek strategic design and systematic logic in the behavior of states - especially when major interests are at stake and military action impends. I suggest that in this instance it may profit our attempt at understanding the Yemen imbroglio to consider an alternative: i.e. that the decisions taken are the outcome of a more diffuse, perhaps disjointed process dominated by emotion, impulse and parochial internal or personality concerns than it is by strategic calculation.

Patrick Bahzad's excellent, well-informed analysis does refer to those latter elements in Saudi thinking. Perhaps even more emphasis should be placed on them. The Saudis may well have aimed at laying down a marker indicating that they are now a power to be reckoned with beyond their borders which is prepared to do more than write checks - in addition to preventing a disagreeable turn in Yemenese politics. If so, they sure picked a lousy way to do that. Their appraisal seems to have been based on a combination of wishful thinking (e.g. Pakistan and Egypt), visceral hatred of Shi'ite Iran, and a gross underestimation of the opposition. The only assumption they got right was that the ever pliable and timid Barack Obama could be drawn into this harebrained scheme by offering to remain silent on the Iran nuclear deal (while joining the Israelis behind the scenes in an all-out campaign against it)and by playing on the "hard-nosed" Washington consensus that the KSA as currently constituted is absolutely critical to American aims in the region (whatever those aims are this week).

As for Obama et al, if there is rational design behind our war on the Houthis it is so subtle as to be invisible to all but those who are privileged to have access to the magic lemon juice that can reveal it.

I think we had better get used to the uncomfortable fact that post-modern foreign policy-making will bear only a faint resemblance to what we all studied and thought we knew about how the world works. Frankly, the only people who seem to know what they are doing and are able to think clearly are the "mad" mullahs in Tehran.

[Judy]

Robert Parry introduces another dynamic in the Saudi/Yemen humanitarian crisis in the making: https://consortiumnews.com/2015/04/15/did-money-seal-israeli-saudi-alliance/

[FB Ali]

Michael,

"...who seem to know what they are doing and are able to think clearly are the "mad" mullahs in Tehran".

I would add to them Putin and the Chinese leaders. The latter are slowly but surely creating a bipolar world, while engaging and trading normally with the US so as to avoid creating hostility.

The key element will be an alternative financial system to the one the US now controls.

[anna-marina]

It seems that the Saudis have been trying to buy the US upper management through an expensive mediator, Mr. Netanyahu of Israel: https://consortiumnews.com/2015/04/15/did-money-seal-israeli-saudi-alliance/

[Patrick Bahzad]

FB Ali, Correct about sequence of events regarding coup and counter coup. Tried to keep things simple on complicated issues, I admit to cutting a bit of a corner there. But thx for putting the records straight, as I believe details do matter :-)

[Patrick Bahzad]

In all fairness, one has to admit that countries like Russia China and Iran have an advantage over democracies when thinking in terms of long term strategy and goals: they don't need to worry as much about the next election, but that doesn't excuse everything of course !

[William R. Cumming]

P.L. and ALL: Will the supplicant status of Pakistan to KSA help either in the long run of next few decades?

I assume there is NO FDI [foreign direct investment] in the KSA but who invests the most in Pakistan?

IMO FDI is the most effective financial indicator of relations between nation-state.

Could be wrong!

[The Beaver]

According to the Iranian FNA:
http://irdiplomacy.ir/en/page/1946521/Saudi+Major+General+Killed+in+Yemen.html

Major General Fahd bin Turki bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, a senior commander of the General Staff of Saudi Arabia's Armed Forces, was killed during a mission in Northwestern Yemen, sources disclosed on Tuesday.

{The Saudi major general was killed, while he was on a mission in Al Majda village in Quatabir district of the Sadah governorate in Northwestern Yemen on Saturday, a member of his entourage during the visit to Majda, who asked to remain unnamed, told an FNA correspondent in Riyadh on Tuesday.

The source added that two other senior officers accompanying General Fahd were also killed during the attack."

[Babak Makkinejad]

They are just no rich enough to think that they can afford to indulge in the same hare-brained policies that a richer country could indulge in.

UK, for example, has been very cautious.

Switzerland and Sweden are also counter-examples.

[Babak Makkinejad]

"The Shield of Sunni Islam" is not even a canard; those espousing it or seriously giving it any consideration need to have a visit by those men in white uniforms.

May be Bellevue Hospital could be induced to house them.

[Larry M.]

Relations between Iran and Pakistan may not be as close as in the time of the Shah, but they have been remarkably stable. Both have a common internal enemy in Baluchi separatism, and after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, both felt threatened by the Soviet Union to their north. With the U.S., even Pakistan's relations were problematic at best.

I think many of us had a tendency to overestimate governments and their ideology (Shia vs. Sunni), especially after 1979, and to underestimate geopolitics and permanent interests. When leaving Pakistan via Karachi Airport on 10 February 1981, I was surprised to see a navy-blue Boeing 747 cargo jet with the logo "Islamic Republic of Iran Navy" parked near a hangar.

This was a year into the Iraq-Iran war where both sides were desperately trying to maintain supply links to the outside world. The Iranian navy jumbo may just have been in transit, but nevertheless seemed to signal that a certain "business as usual" between Pakistan and Iran was still working, even after the fall of the Shah.

[FB Ali]

Pakistan (its government and the vast majority of its population) considers itself to be a Muslim nation, NOT a Sunni Muslim nation. Shias, Christians and others serve in government departments and the military. In the well-educated, well-off social strata they live as equal citizens. Discrimination probably exists, but it is covert and unacknowledged.

The only groups that flaunt their Sunni Islam are fringe religious parties and terrorists.

One of the reasons behind the army turning down the Saudi request was that it would raise the Shia/Sunni issue within its ranks, as well as among the people at large. There are reports that the Saudis wanted Pakistan to send a Sunni-only force; this was obviously a total NO-NO.

[FB Ali]

The Saudis announced that three of their officers were killed near the border by a Houthi mortar attack in Najran province on 10 April.

http://tinyurl.com/l9hospz

[Patrick Bahzad]

Pakistan is - with Israel - the only state that was built on purely confessional basis, ie either a Muslim or a Jewish state.
And you know what they say about PAkistan ? Every state has an army but in Pakistan it's the army that has a state ...

[FB Ali]

No, that is wrong. It was a political separation of the Muslim-majority provinces from the rest of India. It was based on a people with a shared identity not wanting to be subsumed within a much larger country whose majority ethos they did not share. Part of that shared identity was a common faith, but it was NOT the faith that motivated the Pakistan movement. In fact all the Muslim religious parties in British India bitterly opposed the Pakistan idea and movement.

It was clearly enunciated in the founding documents of the new state that all its inhabitants, irrespective of their religion, would be its citizens, with equal rights and privileges. This is still the law in Pakistan.

It is true that various politicians from time to time sought political advantage by advocating various Islamic trappings, but these were largely cosmetic. It was only when Gen Zia-ul-Haq ruled the country that the laws were tinkered with to introduce some religious elements; many of these remain on the books but are not implemented.

The only people in Pakistan advocating a religious state are the Jihadis, whom the government and military are fighting to eradicate.

[Matthew]

FB Ali: Every morning I awake expecting the Fall of the House of Saud. Every evening I go to bed disappointed.

[Matthew]

FB Ali: the Chinese are using our own hubris against us. See http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-04-15/china-takes-aim-dollar-reserve-status-promotes-yuan-new-bank

They really know how to boil a frog in an open pan. Slow, incremental movements, without much fanfare or bombast.

[Patrick Bahzad]

I think that is playing with words. Pakistan was established in the areas where muslim populations were clearly the majority and Islam became or was the defining feature that United its people. What did east Pakistan have in common with west Pakistan ? Different language, different culture, only thing in common was Islam ... In various versions I should add ! So Pakistan was and is a confessional state, I'm not saying it was meant as a religious state, there's a difference. Besides there are also Christians, Muslims and Druze who are citizens of Israel so the comparison is not that far fetched.