April 1961 versus April 2015 – David Petraeus and the demise of the "warrior" ethos

 

by Patrick Bahzad

 

"We are the men from the assault troops, soldiers of the old Legion.
Tomorrow we will be holding up our flags, as victors we will ravel.
Not only do we carry our weapons, but the devil is walking at our side."
Song of the French Foreign Legion

 

At first sight, April 1961 and April 2015 don’t have much in common. Fifty-four years separate both dates and a lot has happened in between. Were it not for the recent ruling of a federal court in Charlotte, N.C., one could probably be guessing until pigs can fly as to what the connection is between these dates. Yet there is a link, one that points to fundamentally opposed attitudes among military leaders and raises tough questions about the ethics as well as the standing of the military establishment in today's world. 

 

The "David Petraeus" case is shut. Done and dusted. Two years' probation and a hefty fine, that's what the leaking of classified information cost the four-star General, ex-CIA director and former poster-boy of the Bush administration. A sad and pitiful end to a sad and pitiful affair, in every sense of the word. Time to reflect briefly on the demise of the "face" that allegedly won the US a war and George W. a successful second term.

"King David"

We were spared no hyperbole when Petraeus was announced as the guy who would change the course of the war in Iraq. The administration seemed to look up to him, as if he were Jesus-Christ himself, having come back to save his (Neo-Con) flock from the wicked and wretched souls of the Iraqi insurgents. But let us be clear about this. The strategy of the "Surge" was born just as much out of military necessity as of political interest.

Things had to change, that was known to both the civilian and the military leadership. And the operational blue-print for that change also was no mystery. What was missing, was a "face" to embody this change. A hero had to rise ... A warrior figure, inspiring but sophisticated. That's where Petraeus came in. Described as a kind of modern day Alexander, he was a military man with brains and a PhD. A PR-engineered saviour who would implement the new policy and get America (and George W.) out of the Iraqi quagmire.

His counter-insurgency field manual, the famous FM 3/24, was hyped-up as a revolutionary masterpiece of military thinking. After the revolution in military affairs, came the new American Clausewitz of the early 21st century. For whoever has read the FM 3/24 though, the description sounds slightly out of touch with reality, but it fitted both the political and the media circus back home.

In fact, the new COIN doctrine was just a combination of Petraeus' personal experience in the Mosul area in 2003-2004 (and during a second tour in 2005) and classic counter-insurgency techniques and tactics, based largely on the writings of French and British strategists, from the time of the colonial wars in the 1950s and 1960s.

Petraeus' all too famous 14 "Observations from Soldiering in Iraq" would become to the US forces what the 10 commandments were to the Old Testament and it's no coincidence Petraeus became known as "King David" during and even after his time in Iraq. How much of a personal contribution he made to the temporary success of the US military campaign will be up for experts in military history to decide. Chances are, there won't ever be a consensus about it, because what is mostly known, publicized and quantifiable is only the "bright" side of the Petraeus strategy. But read between the lines of his recommendations and another picture will emerge, one much darker and less glamorous.

The Dark Side of Petraeus and his "Surge"

Before being appointed Commanding General of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq, Petraeus had a stint as the head of MNSTC-I, the "Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq". What he oversaw and maybe overlooked there – or on the contrary encouraged – is a much different type of counter-insurgency than the one that was sold to the American public two years later. It was not so much about nation building, engaging with the locals and building-up alliances.

It was about achieving "regional alignment" through means much less honourable. Pouring money into bottomless pits, buying out greedy and corrupt local leaders, thus gaining their support. Turning communities onto each other, inflaming tensions instead of contributing to settling things down. Letting local militias do the dirty work, and not getting involved when the "enemy of your enemy" proceeded to ethnically cleanse whole neighbourhoods and cities, when this served your own interests.

The horror stories are as countless as the bodies that were dumped onto the streets of Baghdad, sometimes with holes from electric drills in their crushed kneecaps, sometimes with just a bullet in their head. None of this, of course, was done under direct order from Petraeus, but it happened on his watch, and the "special police commandos" of the Iraqi government who were responsible for most of these crimes had been set-up by US experts, brought in by Petraeus.

Although the Shia "death squads" did a real good job at littering the streets of Iraq's capital with mutilated bodies, this wasn't enough to stem the tide of the rising Sunni and Jihadi insurgency that was sweeping across Iraq. What would make the difference, at least for a while, was one key element of Petraeus' strategy, one that is often overlooked.

On the one hand, he built alliances with tribal leaders in the North and West of the country, where the insurgents were strongest. The much celebrated and tactically clever move, i.e. putting the tribes in his pocket and turning them loose on the Al Qaeda groups that were roaming free in those areas is just one side of the COIN ...

True though, there were some slightly off the top aspects to the "Awakening" councils. Like when the al-Bufaraj tribe decided in 2007 to order the beheading of Abubakr al-Baghdadi's wife (a member of that tribe herself), as a sign of good faith and allegiance to the Americans. Quite effective in the short run, no doubt, but possibly not the best way to ensure durable success, as more recent events regarding the Islamic State have demonstrated.

The other real fundamental side of Petraeus' strategy was cordoning off Baghdad with an extra 20 000 men. Militarily, that was the key element that squeezed the life out of the insurgency in and around the capital. Cut-off from their logistical bases in the Sunni "hinterland", it was just a question of time before the combined forces of the US military and the Iraqi/Shia police and militias would crush the insurgents. By late 2007, the casualty figures among US troops had already significantly decreased, a trend that was confirmed in 2008.

The higher the rise, the steeper the fall

By that time, a new administration was in place in the White House. General Petraeus was at the height of his military glory, and was deemed worthy enough of another high risk assignment, that of doing in Afghanistan what he had allegedly achieved in Iraq. From then on however, it was all downhill for him. Most of the story is known, from his permanent obsession with striking Iran, which probably cost him dearly in the end, to his failed Afghan "Surge" and his very personal friendship with his biographer, Paula Broadwell. Even his nomination as CIA director in 2011, something almost equal to getting another chance after his Afghan setback, didn't yield the expected results. During his short tenure at Langley, he probably managed to make more enemies within the Agency than during 8 years of counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Let's not speculate about the hidden agenda behind his resignation. Leave it to the conspiracy theorists to come up with ideas linking the dismissal and fall of idolised Petraeus to some untold truth regarding the Benghazi attack in 2012, or the necessity to get rid of him, in order to go forward with the not so secret negotiations with Iran. There may or may not be some truth to this. More likely there isn't, but that is not the issue.

What caused Petraeus' downfall was ultimately Petraeus himself. The much vaunted and publicized "warrior" ethos he claimed to adhere to, was more for show than for real. David Petraeus was never about sticking to any military code, abiding to the same rules as generations of professional soldiers before him. Not that such a "warrior" code had made anybody immune from moral corruption or criminal behaviour. In that sense, the "warrior" ethos is not a heroic fantasy concept for today's adulescents, nor has it anything to do with a romanticised and chivalric view of soldiering.

The "warrior" ethos to which some members of the military still adhere to is something else. It is the belief in the sanctity of the mission, the dedication and commitment to the men you're fighting with, or the men who are fighting for you. It is also the expression of an absolute commitment to never betraying the cause you're fighting for – which may be tricky if your cause isn't exactly compatible with "Humans' Rights Watch" latest list of good and evil. But nonetheless, it is this "warrior" ethos that was sold to us as Petraeus' main qualification for the job he was chosen for. It was all an artificial construct, engineered by PR-firms and all too gladly accepted by the big news outlets.

David Petraeus, or Icarus and Narcissus united

Those who know David Petraeus, or have studied his curriculum, understand this was a man driven. Not so much by the need to uphold the Oath of allegiance, nor by a sense of belonging to an ancient "warrior" class. Even his much talked about injuries, the tell-tale sign of any true soldier, were sustained in peace times. He was first wounded in 1991 on a shooting range, when a soldier tripped over his M-16 and discharged his weapon, wounding Petraeus by mistake. A few years later, he broke his pelvis when his parachute collapsed, during a training jump. Besides, which "warrior" figure takes his biographer with him on field trips, in the middle of an ongoing campaign, let alone in a war ?

At West Point, Petraeus was already member of the "Star men", which is described as an elite group of students. He also featured among 10 out of a 1000 students who got accepted into the Academy's pre-medical academic track. Interestingly, he admitted to not being particularly thrilled about medicine though, rather that "In a lot of ways, I think I climbed that particular academic mountain just because it was the toughest one to climb".

That is probably the key to unlocking David Petraeus' personality. To him, it was never about the journey, but always about the destination. He finished Ranger school "with honours" and supposedly as a legend among his classmates. Always heading for top spot, that seems to have been the common feature in any place he went, whether in a strictly military capacity, or during the intertwined periods of academic teaching and studying.

Some people want to go places rather than actually do things. It is all about climbing the ladder, isn't it ? Whether they have to wear a military uniform or a surgeon outfit is secondary in that regard. True though, David Petraeus served his country for over 38 years, which is more than most people can say in the US, or in any country for that matter. The real question that begs to be asked though, is what mattered most to him, serving his country or advancing his own career and interests ?

In all honesty, one has to cut the guy some slack. Of course, you can serve your country and still be interested in having a career. But when each and everything you do seems to be directed first and foremost at getting some traction and advancing your pawns, like in some sort of chess game against time, you may start to wonder. It's against that example, that the events of April 1961 can be measured.

April 1961 as a counterfactual

On April 21st 1961, in the middle of the Algerian independence war, four French generals took control of all government and military infrastructures in the city of Algiers, which was a the time the capital of the French colonial administration. Backed only by a fraction of the armed forces, they tried to establish a counter-government that was to challenge General de Gaulle's official line, geared towards independence, after a nationwide referendum had gathered a huge majority of favour of the separation from France.

Without proper support from much of the army's regiments in Algeria, and with open hostility from those units that had remained in mainland France, the coup had little chances of success in the first place. In addition to this lack of military unity, General de Gaulle's call onto all French citizens, ordering them to resist what he called derisively a "handful of retired generals", made sure the Algerian house of cards crumbled in a matter of days, albeit in a very tense atmosphere.

The COs and NCOs that had chosen "mutiny" over obedience to a legitimate, democratically elected government, were convinced of having the moral high ground. To these career officers and professional military, the humiliation of defeat at the hands of the Viet-Minh a few years earlier in Indochina had left a bitter after-taste. Never again would they leave a government drive France's armies into the wall. Algeria, the last remaining jewel in the crown of French colonies and home to over a million Frenchmen, should remain French.

It was with these "ideals" in mind that the French army had fought an absolutely brutal counter-guerrilla war for almost 7 years. In comparison to the Algerian war, the US "COIN" operations in Iraq and Afghanistan look almost tame, despite the many tragedies, treasons, reversals of alliances and "collateral damage" it provoked. The Algerian counter-guerrilla war of the French was organised, structured and professional, but it was being implemented without any respect for the rule of law or for human rights. Atrocities – on both sides – defy imagination.

There was systematic torture – not "enhanced interrogation techniques" – on an industrial scale. The Algerian insurgents didn't hold back the fight either, but the French blueprint for military success involved such an amount of gross disregard for anything standing in the way of military victory that, in the end, although having beaten the insurgents militarily, there was no option left but to grant the population the independence it was then craving for.

The "warrior" ethos as a double edged sword

In the aftermath of the coup, several units were disbanded: the "Air Force Commandos", the 14th and 18th Paratrooper Regiment, as well as the famous 1st "Foreign" Paratrooper Regiment (a unit of the Foreign Legion), whose men had turned into an almost fanatical group of soldiers totally committed to their cause and their COs. Almost one thousand officers in the French forces at the time asked to be discharged from the army, in solidarity with the mutineers, or at least out of protest for the official French policy granting independence to what they considered part of France.

The case of the "1er Régiment Etranger Parachutiste" is particularly interesting in that regard. This regiment had turned into structure so impermeable to outside influence, that the only thing that mattered to these men was their "esprit de corps", this sense of a common destiny, shared only by the members of the group.  Although often used and misused as a description of military units' tendency to stick together, one could easily argue that the "1er REP" epitomizes this concept in a perfect way, regardless of the cause that was being served.

While being walked out of their barracks by French MPs, in front of their own troops, all the COs and NCOs  of the regiment were singing the Legion's legendary military song "La Légion marche", which – unknown to most – is a modified version of the German Waffen SS song "SS marschiert in Feindesland", probably taken over into the Legion by the many German légionnaires who fought in its ranks during the war in Indochina.

Some of these officers and their troops, many of them Easter European anti-communists, would turn into the most determined opponents of General de Gaulle, creating their own insurgency and terror organisation, the "Organisation Armée Secrète", which carried on fighting until well after the actual independence of Algeria and attempted to kill General de Gaulle several times.

That is the thing with the "warrior" ethos. It is a double edged sword, that should be handled carefully. The potential conflict between the prevalence of this code, and adherence to the law of the land, as expressed also in the Oath of allegiance, can have serious consequences. In modern day American history, General MacArthur's dismissal by President Truman is probably what comes closest to this dual loyalty the "warrior" may have. Choosing between the cause, the men who are dying defending it, and the political leadership, embodying democratic legitimacy.

But against benchmarks like these, for better or for worse, David Petraeus never was a "warrior". He wasn't even a wolf in sheep's clothing, he was simply a politician in a military uniform. 

 

_________________________________

Link to the Foreign Legion's song, in the version sung by the COs and NCOs of the "1er Régiment Etranger Parachutiste", while walking out of their barracks and being put under arrest: "La Légion marche vers le front"

Comments

[The Beaver]

Patrick

Was "La Main Rouge"ever linked with OAS?

[Patrick Bahzad]

"La Main Rouge" is a still unknown organisation that murdered many supporters of Algerian independence all over Europe as well as in North Africa. But it operated years before OAS was established.
The most commonly accepted explanation about these operations is that the "Main rouge" was used as a cover for the French foreign Intel agency to kill people who were getting in the way, especially nationals of allied governments, like a German arms dealer for example or a Swiss explosives expert who was stabbed to death in Geneva.
What is known is that the "Main rouge" got some help from local police officers in Algeria and Tunisia, who were acting as auxiliaries if you will. While there is no organizational link with OAS, it is possible that some of these local auxiliaries found their way into OAS kill teams. But that is purely hypothetical of course. There's no evidence to back this up.

[tv]

Petraeus is far from being the only politician in a uniform.
Both Dempsey and Odierno certainly fit that description.

[Patrick Bahzad]

That may be, at least in your view, the difference being they were never presented as tactical geniuses who would pull car "USA" out of the ditch it was in.

[Jack]

A hefty fine???

Less than what he makes for a single speech! And lets also not forget that he's at superstar private equity firm KKR.

Compare to how John Kiriakou was nailed. For all the political partisans and lovers of big government there you have it. Both parties in the game of separate application of the law for the plebes vs apparatchiks. Orwell was prescient the people will love their servitude.

[walrus]

The problem with the likes of narcissists like Petreaus is the collateral damage they do to the organisation the infest.

By "collateral damage" I mean the wrecked careers of anyone who they remotely believe may be a threat to their career advancement and the demotivation of anyone unlucky enough to be their subordinate.

Good leaders leave an organisation that is stronger and better for their presence. Narcissists never.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Walrus,
Is that assessment based on first hand experience or hear say ? Or maybe both ;-)

[ex-PFC Chuck]

Thank you, Mr. Bahzad, on this piece on General Petraeus.

When you wrote suggesting that Petraeus was one of those “ . . people want to go places rather than actually do things” it reminded me of the late USAF Col. John Boyd's pitch to recruit promising young officers to his circle of reformers, as described by his biographer Robert Coram:

“… one day you will come to a fork in the road…. And you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go…. If you go that way you can be somebody. You will have to make compromises and you will have to turn your back on your friends. But you will be a member of the club and you will get promoted and you will get good assignments…. Or you go that [the other] way and you can do something – something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. If you decide you want to do something, you may not get promoted and you may not get the good assignments and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors. But you won’t have to compromise yourself. You will be true to your friends and to yourself. And your work might make a difference…. To be somebody or to do something. In life there is often a roll call. That’s when you will have to make a decision. To be or to do? Which way will you go?” (p 285-286, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. bit.ly/sMzVqv)

Petraeus wanted to Be someone.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Thx chuck for pointing that out. Being an infantry man myself, I wasn't aware of Col. Boyd's statements. I mostly know him through his planning for operation desert storm and in particular the "left hook" component ... Guess I was part of that operation without knowing it at the time !
In any case, I fully agree with the substance of the quote you're giving. And by the way, we can keep things here on a first name basis, no worries !

[turcopolier]

Patrick Bahzad

I don't know about Boyd's influence in Desert Saber. After Schwartzkopf's initial frontal plan was rejected by Powell, a planning cell of "Jedi Knights" was brought in from the second year phase of the General Staff course at Leavenworth. They planned the operation. pl

[different clue]

tv,

Dempsey? A politician in uniform? Wasn't his strong-as-possible opposition and counter-advisement certainly to the Obamazoid efforts to attack Syria undertaken at some "political" risk to himself of Presidential displeasure? Wouldn't that have been rather IMpolitic?

[PirateLaddie]

While in INR, about a decade back, I spent part of a summer at Leavenworth. The experience was useful and much fun was had by all. I particularly remember the views of many of the students regarding General Dave. He was, by and large, referred to as "General Betrayus." Some, apparently, took a pass on the koolaid.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Really ? They told us that we'd been the spearhead of the offense curtesy of someone I later learnt was col. Boyd. Seems now it took a whole team to come up with a flanking/pincher move ! Live And learn i guess ... Thx for that update, I hadn't received the memo :-)

[turcopolier]

Patrick Bahzad
"SAMS graduates served in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and were "remembered most famously in the early days for producing the 'Jedi Knights' employed by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf in developing the famous 'left hook'  ".[24] Wiki on SAMS pl

[Claud_Alexander]

Re contemporary journalists seemingly congenital inability to write intelligently about the kind of career pattern one sees with Petraeus, see also

http://www.thebaffler.com/salvos/passions-of-the-meritocracy

(fittingly, Petraeus's biographer also seems to fit the pattern).

Author of above also wrote about similar journalistic-autism as displayed in biographies of Obama, for instance re what exactly his two parents were doing in Indonesia back in the day,
http://www.thebaffler.com/salvos/party-of-none

[Fred82]

Excellent stuff Patrick,

I didn't know much about Gen Petraeus and never served under him. I did serve under General Mattis though and met him personally several times. General Mattis was very much the real deal and a warrior's warrior IMO.

On another note, have you ever heard the expression "water me" in relation to David Petraeus?

[Patrick Bahzad]

Hadn't heard that expression in relation to DP, although does make sense ...
Regarding Mattis, I agree and I know he's regarded quite highly among Marines. Especially when compared to Amos for example. But some people in the corps have an issue with him about two things: 1. Firing col. Dowdy during the "race" to Baghdad (dowdy probably wasn't combat maneuvering enough in the eyes of "Chaos") and 2. Him joining the board of General Dynamics.

[turcopolier]

fred82

"have you ever heard the expression "water me" in relation to David Petraeus?" Enlighten me. pl

[AbuAbdullah]

Can the author or someone give more info on the beheading of Baghdadi's wife in 2007? I can't find any info or reference to this on the net

[Patrick Bahzad]

I'm afraid you won't find much about it on the Net. if you do, please let me know.

[Ryan]

That is a fine telling of the 1er REP, Patrick. As for Petraeus he has quite a cult surrounding himself.

Some years back around the time of the "surge", I believe, I heard former Reagan administration Sec. Ed. Bill Bennett answer a question about his view on Petraeus. Bennett's response was "I consider him to be another Leonidas." That's King Leonidas of Thermopylae fame.

And there is the story about Petraeus sucking up to the cowardly and despicable Max Boot in an attempted CYA operation over a remark regarding the Israel-Palestinian problem.

http://mondoweiss.net/2010/07/petraeus-fed-his-pro-israel-bona-fides-to-a-neocon-writer-including-pathetic-recitation-of-meeting-wiesel

This sorry affair demonstrates the truth of Patton belief that between physical courage and moral courage that there is far less moral courage than physical.

[Fred]

Col.,

He had an entire desert to maneuver in and air supremacy and Schwarzkopf wanted a frontal assault? Good thing someone had the sense to say no to that.

[Adam L Silverman]

What always goes unnoticed or unmentioned was Petraues's ability to coops his biographers. His brought his biographer to CENTCOM and made her a senior advisor, though she did not have any significant experience with the military or war or security/defense/foreign policy other than being a journalist assigned to cover Petreaus. While he didn't give his second a job, he got unprecedented access. And the third was CPT Broadwell.

[BabelFish]

Should have an official name change to General Hubris. That works on so many levels.

I wonder just when he had that thrilling moment where he said, "I could be president!" You just know he did have it. G. Washington, Andy Jackson, Sam Grant, Dwight Eisenhower, David Patreus! It must of had a shite eating grin on his face for weeks after that moment.

[Charlie Wilson]

Guys, guys, guys,

Give the man some credit. Wrestling a 40 years old well toned and muscled Broadwell requires more than moral and physical courage. More so if he didn't use any chemical force multiplier. In my opinion he should be given a couple of shiny stars and colorful ribbons for the effort...

Charlie