BLAST FROM THE PAST: Expanding on operation "Mermaid Dawn" in Libya

By Patrick Bahzad

It's the weekend soon, and spring seems to be on its way in this part of the world, so why not have a bit of a light-hearted look at our impeccable record in the Middle-East and North-Africa … I'm kidding of course ! In recent exchanges I had with SST contributors and readers, the topic of the fall of Tripoli in August 2011 was mentioned. Almost four years have passed since operation "Mermaid Dawn" and it looks now as if the Pentagon algorithm that comes up with those unbelievable code names would have done a better job calling this "Dawn of the Evil dead" or, maybe more cynically, "Black Hawk Dawn" … Libya is a "Charlie Foxtrot" of epic proportions, that the acronym "FUBAR"  fails to describe with sufficient intensity.

Those who have been in the country before, during and after the toppling of Gaddafi will probably have a better idea of what's been going on – and going wrong – but before turning to an expanded description of what happened, why it happened, and what the consequences are going to be, Let's just have a look at a tiny aspect of the military campaign that managed to oust the leader of the Libyan "Jamahiriya".

During the four months of intense NATO airstrikes that took out almost anything that could be bombed between Benghazi and Tripoli, neither the rebellion nor the Western coalition or their Gulf States' allies managed a breakthrough. What was officially a "No Fly Zone" operation carried out under the umbrella of the United Nations (pursuant to resolution 1973) was in fact a campaign of targeted airstrikes aimed at knocking out Gaddafi's armoured units and opening the way for the rebel and insurgent groups from Eastern Libya to drive into Tripoli in their Toyota pick-up trucks … A masterpiece of tactical and strategic planning again, no doubt, one that was probably whispered into our leaders' ears by people with brilliant credentials, deep pockets and – supposedly – great connections to the opposition inside the Libyan Security apparatus itself.

Much to the dismay of the Chiefs of Staff in D.C., London and Paris though, Gaddafi didn't seem very impressed and neither were the troops that remained loyal to him, contrary to what had been expected and anticipated. The West – and the token nations of the Arab Gulf – seemed to head for a dead-lock. Fortunately – from a military point of view – the French came up with a plan.

French tactical thinking

As much as one enjoys a joke about the "military prowess" of the French – courtesy of German Wehrmacht in WWII – anybody familiar enough with the way French armies have conducted operations over the centuries know that their sometimes suicidal sense of arrogance and overconfidence can only be toppled by one thing, which is the absolute cynicism and "do or die" approach, whatever the costs or consequences, of their way of war.

Asked one day what the difference had been in fighting first the French and later the US, Vietnamese general Nguyên Giáp stated that in a guerrilla war – something we call today "asymmetric warfare" – fighting the Americans was "peanuts, compared to fighting the French". Not that the US grunt was less of a fighting man, but the French – probably due to their having to do more with less – used every dirty trick in the book to get the job done. They still failed after the debacle of Dien Bien Phu, which was another of those examples of overconfidence that French military history is riddled with.

Regarding the war in Libya however, the traditional ability for "out of the box thinking" that is sort of a trademark of French COs on the ground was key to unlocking a situation that looked dangerously close to heading for compromise at the negotiating table.

The situation in Libya in the summer of 2011

What had happened despite months of heavy airstrikes was that the pro-Gaddafi forces had kept their defensive posture and had been able to cut off any advance of the rebels from the East along the Mediterranean Coastal strip. With supply lines for the government forces still open through the Western border, there was no end in sight for the war. People in high places were getting nervous and impatient …

The only way to circumvent this tricky problem was to manage somehow to cut-off Gaddafi's supply lines and end the civil war through a decisive push towards Tripoli, which had been infiltrated by a few hundred rebel cells and coalition special operation forces. Qataris in particular were among these groups already inside the enemy's stronghold, but they couldn't do anything without a simultaneous military effort from the outside. The Groups from Benghazi and other areas in the East though seemed unable to get through the government lines, even with strong air support from NATO.

That was the situation in which the French military command took a decisive step that was going to unlock the whole campaign. However, it meant overstepping the mandate of UN resolution 1973 and "getting real" rather than "sticking to the book". The Brits, needless to say, were not amused, but the US – leading from behind – didn't say anything. As for the Gulf States, they had been pushing right from the start for a much more heavy handed and weaponized approach.

The Ibadhi "rebels" in the Nafusa Mountains

Just about 50 miles South of Tripoli, a small piece of Libyan territory had been taken over by the rebels from day one of the insurgency and it had remained under their control despite sometimes furious counter-attacks by the pro- Gaddafi forces.

This area is known as the "Djebel Nefoussa", the Nafusa Mountains, although it is actually more of a plateau of baren and desert land, some 600 to 800 meters above sea level, with a very steep slope, making it look indeed like a long mountain range when coming at it from Tripoli. The people in this part of the country are not Arabs and they're no Sunnis either. They are part of the Berber people, an native population that has been living in North Africa – From Eastern Libya to Western Morocco – since the stone age probably. They have their own languages, but most of them also speak Arabic.

The various Berber tribes have converted easily to Islam during the Conquest of North Africa in the 7th century, but not all of them have accepted the Sunni version of it. The Berber tribes of the Nafusa Mountains in particular still adhere to a very old dissenting group among Muslims, the Ibadhis. Today, this version of Islam is most prominent in Oman, but there have been pockets of it in various places from Zanzibar to Morocco … and Libya.

In a sense, the Ibadhi Berbers of the Nafusa Mountains were predestined to become part of the rebellion. They had been discriminated against by the Gaddafi regime for both religious and ethnic reasons. It shouldn't have come as a surprise that this small but tight-knit group took up arms against their oppressor. Looking back at the historic achievements of the "Infusen" Berber Tribe of the Nafusa Mountains, one cannot but wonder at some striking similarities to the Houthis of North Yemen.

A strong community sense, with a history of successful military resistance against overwhelming force (the Berber crushed several Abasid and Egyptian armies over the centuries), this group surely could be counted on if given the proper support.

Building-up the rebel groups

As it became gradually clear, over the spring of 2011, that the airstrikes didn't have the intended effects, the French forces started preparations for another tactical move and dispatched several teams of their Special Operations Forces to the Nafusa Mountains, in order to train the mostly inexperienced and disorganized groups that were desperately clinging to their ancestors' land.

As the front-line was consolidated, the French air force organized air-drops of weapons, ammunition and equipment, which in turn gave the rebels some extra fire-power that proved crucial in repelling the pro-Gaddafi armoured columns from entering the mountain range. At the same time, the border to Tunisia was seized and controlled by the rebels. The Djebel Nefoussa Berbers were beginning to loosen the tight grip pro-government troops had on them.

By early summer, the situation had been turned so completely, that two airfields were built in the region and planes with Qatari ID numbers were flying in more and more weapons and equipment. What had started as a very difficult enterprise looked now like a realistic prospect at rapid success through a decisive battle in the country's capital.

Dancing with the Devil

What the French High-Command had been able to sell its allies was a bold, but also cynical operation. The Nafusa Berber groups were brave warriors, but lacked the experience and training to carry through a full on assault on Tripoli. More battle hardened troops were needed, if that operation was to be a success.

Unknown to most at the time, there was only one group within the rebel troops that had the credentials for such a move: the "February 17th Martyrs Brigade", under the command of a former Al Qaeda fighter, Abdelhakim Belhadj. His brigade size group had been training for weeks in Qatar, in anticipation of an attack against Gaddafi's troops along the coastal road.

Now, with two large airfields operational in the south of Tripoli, while the most experienced fighters loyal to Gaddafi were stationed East of the capital, it became clear how the " February 17th Martyrs Brigade" could be used. Belhadj's men were airlifted in total secrecy to the Nafusa Mountains where they joined forces with the Berber groups and the Arab militias from Zintan, a town traditionally hostile to the Gaddafi clan.

In July 2011, these forces descended from their mountains and gradually pushed back the government army, cutting off its supply lines to Tunisia, in the West, and closing in on the center of Gaddafi's power, Tripoli.

Operation "Mermaid Dawn"

To achieve quick and decisive victory though, the capital was not just attacked from the outside, with the Islamist brigade of Belhadj as a spearhead, but also from within. The so-called "Tripoli Brigade", a mixture of Libyan exiles, Qatari and Western Special Forces as well as government informers acted from inside Tripoli to forward crucial intelligence to the advancing troops and the Western pilots who were striking from the sky.

The rebels from the Nafusa mountains attacked from the west, and went straight for the government forces' main compound at Bab al Azizyiah, where they joined with Belhadj's "February 17th" Brigade pushing up north.

Finally, as a last destabilizing component, a group of 200 men from the "Misrata" militia - named after the town East of Tripoli that had to bear the brunt of Gaddafi's counter-offensives - was given safe passage by a French amphibious assault ship and landed in the military harbour of Tripoli, near the Abu Sittah racetrack, as well in the civilian harbour closer to the city centre.

Landing operations were was supervised and secured by French navy Seals ("Commando Hubert"), in early morning hours of August 22nd, while the core of the Misrata brigade came from the East, through the coastal road along the Mitiga airport, and joined with the groups that had landed by sea.

With these forces operating simultaneously out of three directions, the push for the pockets of pro-government resistance proved irresistible. After a couple of days of sporadic fighting, it was all over … Khaddafi had fled, the rebellion had finally won, but had it not been for the tiny strip of Berber mountain in the South of Tripoli, the war in Libya might have taken a different turn.

However, the nature of the campaign, the number of the groups and forces present on the ground, the diversity of their sponsors and interests would prove too much for the victorious revolution of Libya … Soon the country would descend into chaos and anarchy and the much vaunted "February 17th Martyrs Brigade" would take part in other less heroic action, on the 11th of September 2012 ...

Comments

[Charles I]

Thanks Patrick, this kind of reporting is why I come here.

[Matthew]

Absolutely fascinating.

[The Twisted Genius]

Patrick,

Very enlightening and much appreciated. I always wondered what help the Berbers received. I knew there were airdrops and I knew a brigade of rebels came from eastern Libya. I had not a clue that they came via Qatar. I just assumed they came across the desert. Nor was i aware that the French went all in. A wonderful example of "système D" or "démerder." It's a shame and a tragedy that the demobilization phase didn't stand a chance.

Can you share any insights on Mali?

[Ishmael Zechariah]

Patrick Bahzad,

Thanks for the analysis. In your opinion what did the West, and particularly the French, expect to realize in return for their investment?

Ishmael Zechariah

[Steve]

What is the evidence for this analysis?

[BabelFish]

Here, here. Well done Patrick.

[Patrick Bahzad]

If you can't find any, I'm afraid you gonna have to take my word for it :-)

[Patrick Bahzad]

TTG, regarding Mali I did some kind of AAR for friends in the US. I can share some of those results online I think. Related mostly to regional alignment, brigade level modularity and force protection on which there is too much emphasis - in my view and experience - in US operations. This can be counterproductive and too high a level of force protection means more civilian casualties and hence on the long run stronger opposition and less cooperation from local population.
I'll see what I can find and how to draft it so nobody's gonnabe bored to death about it ;-)

[turcopolier]

PB

"...the number of the groups and forces present on the ground, the diversity of their sponsors and interests would prove too much for the victorious revolution of Libya" Amen. pl

[FB Ali]

PB,

A clear and succinct account of what presumably happened. However, I wonder what the French motivation for this much increased involvement was. Just to end the quagmire into which the West was being sucked? Or, to just get Qaddafi? (Because he had lavishly funded Sarkozy?).

In any case, Libya serves as a good example of brute military force creating more problems than it solves in limited and complicated conflicts. As do Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, etc.

[The Twisted Genius]

Patrick,

I'm right there with you on our overemphasis on force protection. In my day it consisted mainly of taking advantage of "the minute folds in the terrain"as it was often described. I don't remember hearing the term until the Balkans. It's, indeed, a false god.

[VietnamVet]

Thanks to SST, I still learn something new every day. This is an enlightened explanation of the Libyan take down. The new world order clearly can’t plan beyond today’s destruction. To paraphrase Sun Tzu “Inadequate men become leaders and wage war for no reason at all”

This article reinforces the maxim that air power alone cannot conquer an enemy. It takes men and guns on the ground. With a limited volunteer army and mercenaries for security and logistics, the American Empire has to rely on fanatics from jihadists to neo-Nazis, and local mountain societies from the Hmong to the Berbers to provide the troops. Without a people’s army fighting to defeat an existential enemy and return home to peace, the end result are these forever religious wars.

[Patrick Bahzad]

A all too familiar feeling right ? Imagine what Syria could be like ... Libya times ten !

[turcopolier]

VV

I think it is unfair to refer to logistics contractors as "mercenaries." And what is wrong with arming and helping tribesmen in warfare that concerns them. Would we have been independent from Britain without French help? pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

That's a difficult question to answer ! I think there was a combination of factors that encouraged the west to chose military action. Some of these reasons were humanitarian, others more political.
However, as I wasn't present at the top meetings in which these reasons were discussed, I can't give you any final or founded answer.
I don't think though that a financial return on investment was a decisive element. Getting gaddafi however definitely was !

[Patrick Bahzad]

As mentioned above various reasons for getting involved, although I always thought it was a wrong move that would do more harm than good.
Not sure about the lavish funding but getting gaddafi was something many French troops were comfortable with. Some of what he did has never been forgotten and ultimately, he ended up in the gutter, which is where he belonged.
Now of course achieving this result at the cost of breaking up a country and destabilizing a whole region wasn't worth it !

[VietnamVet]

Colonel,

Contracting out logistics has downsides. The owners of the contracting business make money from war and will always push for more. Contractors are not a force multiplier. Paid cooks, clerks and mechanics cannot be forced into the line to fill gaps facing the enemy. Mercenaries will hightail it out of Dodge City when the pay stops. Logistics wins wars.

Mountain tribes didn’t end up in the highlands by choice. They were forced there by lowlanders. In the short term it may worthwhile for highlanders to get arms and training and fight the oppressors. But the foreigners are using them and will always leave. If at war, sooner or later, the lowlanders will get their revenge until there is no more land or tribe left.

Washington, Franklin, Jefferson or Adams were not mountaineers. They were very much the Colonial Elite leading a revolt for their own benefit and used the French to their advantage.

Yesterday was the 150th anniversary of the Surrender at Appomattox. I have been around almost half of that time. I do not think I will see America at peace again in my lifetime.

[turcopolier]

VV

"Logistics wins wars." You think I don't know that? Where have you been for the last ten years? Would it be better to have in service logistical people up and down the line? Of course it would, but to call logistical contractor employees "mercenaries" is just awful. You don't like tribesmen and you were in VN. Ah, another big army guy heard from. pl

[turcopolier]

PB

"17 February Brigade" Who trained these bozos in Qatar? pl

[Patrick Bahzad]

I'm afraid it was the French and the UAE.
Together With the "tripoli brigade", the "February 17 martyrs" were the best trained rebel forces in the field. Unfortunately they got picked by people everybody knew had strong ties to AQ and these fighters also came from Benghazi derna and Tobruk, which is - outside of Saudi arabia - the area in the Arab world that sent the highest per capita number of jihadis to Iraq and Afghanistan (1 jihadi per 1000 inhabitants in east libya). That is huge ! Also these Libyan jihadis were known for their determination as measured through a much higher propensity for suicide bombings than other nationals.
In short, "February 17" were made up of many former AQ men who had fought the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan and were then given a "green light" when the business at hand was to get rid of gaddafi. Military and political leadership in the US knew it although the operational responsibility for putting them into the filed lay mostly with the French. As I said cynical and short sighted but achieved tactical success in the short run ... Also one of the reasons i had bad feeling about this whole libyan operation Right from the start.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Just to give you an idea of the caliber of individuals I'm talking about their leader is abdulhakim belhadj: fought against the soviets in Afghanistan in 1980s as an 19 year old, in 1990s back to Libya to plot overthrow of gaddafi. In Iraq with Abu Musab as zarkawi until his arrest by U.S. in 2004. Imprisoned and tortured at Bangkok black site. Rendition to libya, prison and torture again. Released in 2010. Moves out to Qatar ... Maybe in preparation for events to come.
About 1500-2000 men part of his brigade in tripoli now. But other Islamist jihadi brigades as well in particular Ansar al Sharia which didn't take part in insurgency but is a conglomerate of smaller militias mostly in eastern Libya. Several thousand men under arms.

[ex-PFC Chuck]

I dimly recall once reading that, "Amateurs talk strategy and tactics, professionals talk logistics."

[Babak Makkinejad]

One could ask what was their motivation in Rwanada.

I think the French were acting - in both cases - just like Mussolini did in Libya and Ethiopia - living a fantasy and going through the motions of being an empire.

[Fred]

Col.,

"Would we have been independent from Britain without French help?" Probably not, especially given the number of colonials opposed to the war for independence and the naval superiority of the British.

[Poul]

Patrick Bahzad:

Have you any information on Gaddafi's old power structure and their role in the new Libya. In particular the sub-tribes of the Warfalla and the Magarha who constituted a large part of the officer corps.

Have they been shut out of any political influence or are they part of the new power structure?