As I have related to some, I am a former enlisted sailor (67-71), a lifelong reader of Aviation Week, Jane’s Weekly and of Proceedings (US Naval Institute), a former Martin Marietta and Lockheed Martin employee. My family has deep Navy roots, both in service and as workers at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, in Kittery, Maine and at Kings Bay in Georgia.
I decided to try to create a picture of where Naval strategy and technology have come from and seem to be going, from service experience and personal observation. I am going to leave the submariner part to someone with operational experience in that branch. I avidly read specialist media in my areas of interest. Information Dissemination is one good site for things naval, USNI news, Aviation Week and Janes are others that I read constantly.
Above all the following is very much IMHO, as an enthused amateur & observer.
During my service, serving on a ship that was part of the US Sixth Fleet, we were a unit of the the American Cold War commitment to making the Med an “American Lake”. Those technologies around me had been developed or repurposed for all the functions required for that duty. ASW (anti-submarine warfare) destroyers and destroyer escorts, flagships, fast attack subs, carriers, amphibious ships, oilers and other support ships were in abundance.
Repurposed was a real thing. Many destroyers were of WW2 vintage, which had been treated to the FRAM mods to give them real ASW capabilities against Soviet nuclear subs. ASW hunter/killer groups had modified Essex class carriers as the center of the anti-submarine warfare action group. They served well as ASW platforms, filled with Grumman S-2 Trackers and Sea King helicopters. My own ship, the USS Grand Canyon, a destroyer tender/repair auxiliary, was switched to repair only (AD 28 to AR 28) while I served on her. She was launched in 1946, as part of the WW2 building program. Activated in 1948, she was scrapped as she hit her 30th year in service. Swords (or sword repair) to plowshares.
Note: One of the things no one openly spoke about on our ship was that we kept on practicing ‘broken arrow’ drills. That is the primary response to an accident involving nuclear weapons. At my first duty station, a naval airbase, we practiced these and were called out to standby on one of our runways for a ‘maybe/maybe not’ issue with a plane that could not verify landing gear lock and which we assumed carrying a nuke depth charge. On our destroyer tender, the only armored compartment was ‘the depth charge locker’. We made an assumption that, from time to time, we had nukes stored in it, particularly while we were in the Med.
1960s/1970s
Like the Army and Air Force, the Navy did double duty during Viet Nam. Fought that war and faced off with the Sovs in the Cold War. Altogether, the Navy seemed to be more satisfied than the other services with their experience in Viet Nam. However, the heavy use placed on some assets did push the end of their usable service closer than anticipated. That very much applied to the older carriers and supply vessels, as well as the WW2 era cruisers, destroyers and destroyer escorts.
After Vietnam, the Navy was left with the Cold War and the never ending task of keeping SLOCs (Sea Lanes Of Commerce) open. During the 60s, a vision had emerged of nuclear powered carriers and submarines and a conventionally powered ‘rest of the fleet’. The impact, then as now, is you have to continue to provide at sea (or forward base) refueling for all surface ships other than the carriers.
Note: A lesson from WW2: during the Guadalcanal campaign, the Navy could have used battleships. The repaired Pearl Harbor battleships were, in fact, ready to fight once more. What the Navy could not do is keep them fueled. Until the mighty WW2 logistics tail was created in later years, there were simply not enough oilers to keep these older, fuel hungry ships in the fight. And in Ironbottom Sound, what was in essence the pre-war US Navy fought the pre-war Japanese Imperial Navy to a standstill, without the aid of the repaired battlewagons.
During Viet Nam, new build vessels were introduced but the Navy struggled to keep up with the numbers of vessels it thought it needed. And, also with the number of sailors it needed. Example: we were tied up alongside the USS Belknap, (shown) doing major repair work on her machinery. Their sailors told us tieing up alongside a pier meant daily showers, rather than every 2 or 3 days. It turned out that ship’s manning was so low, they could only run the smaller of two evaporators for ship’s fresh water, while underway. It was the backup to the main system and incapable of supplying all the fresh water demand when everyone took a daily shower.
The Navy did not appear to suffer as much as the Army during the Carter administration. There were no ‘hollow divisions’ in Naval terms. But ships were aging. And then Ronald Reagan was elected, with a commitment to a 600 ship Navy. And, the money flowed. A measure of that? How about taking the Iowa class battleships out of storage, significantly upgrading them, to make as the centerpiece of SAGs. (Surface Action Groups). It was a masterstroke. Short of a heavyweight Russian torpedo, there wasn’t anything in the Soviet inventory that could seriously damage one of them. A British Royal Navy officer was quoted as saying (while staring at one with envy) ‘all that lovely armor!’ There was serious research into creating a laser target seeking warhead for the 16 inch projectiles. The restored Iowa class ships were an excellent counter to the Kirov class battlecruisers, for a fraction of the cost of developing a similar warship.
A moment here to comment about Navy flexibility and thinking. As a sailor, I found the Navy to be seriously focused on its mission but it retained flexibility and the ability to act quickly. Example: our ship was headed to the Med, with only a WW2 era 5 inch gun and M1 carbines as armament. This was about the time that Mr. Gaddafi got the bright idea of using Donzi speedboats and RPGs to attack ships. In the course of a week, our ship was ringed with 20 MM cannons and a suite of Ma Dueces as well. And, we drilled on them, both day and night. Along with quite a few of my shipmates, I got fire both. It was explained that intent of both gun types was to give us standoff range advantages over the RPGs and we were a much more stable gun platform than a Donzi if we got into a fight.
Post Cold War
The Navy focused on anti-Sov paradigms all the way up to the end of the Cold War. Glimpses into the future came from the Falklands, the Persian Gulf and along the Asian/Pacific Rim. The Russians had fearsome anti-ship missiles for many years. Air, ship or submarine launched, many were hypersonic, with huge warheads. Countering those was always a prime focus. However, many lessons about smaller weapons were learned from the Royal Navy’s experience in the Falklands, from both aerial attack and from sea skimming missiles. While a single Exocet missile caused the HMS Sheffield to burn (the warhead did not explode but the rocket motor continued to burn), two later hit the USS Stark (shown above) without sinking her. In that case, one missile warhead did not go off, the other did. The Stark was attacked during the Iraq/Iran war. Among our Naval counters were the anti-missile CIWS (close in weapon system), decoys and tactics. For the larger ship killer missiles, the prime counter has always been to kill the platform before the missile was launched. The F-4C and the F-14A were specifically designed to detect and shoot down Soviet Maritime Aviation assets before they could launch at Navy battle groups.
Note: the Stark had CIWS systems. In fact, it had two when one was the norm for Navy ships of that size. This was because it was part of the ‘Ayatollah class’, having been built for Iran but never delivered. These were both turned off as they kept on trying to engage the many fishing boats around the Stark, when set on automatic. The attack came from an Iraqi aircraft, in the northern Gulf. This was the Littoral environment that came to dominate much of Naval thought in future years.
With the Cold War ended and Desert Storm done, the money stopped flowing. The Navy shrank. And it had new paradigms to confront. Experiences in the Falklands and the Persian Gulf began to give rise to the Littoral Strategy. Ships and subs operating in shallow waters, against nation states that could buy relatively cheap anti-ship missiles, such as the Chinese ‘Silkworm’. And, as they say, ‘the enemy gets a vote’. It became apparent that the original Donzi boat threat could be significantly upgraded by using fast small boats to swarm warships and either by suicide attack or anti-armor weapons cause great damage. The USS Cole was a victim of a stealth attack, while receiving services alongside a pier in Yemen and the huge damage done to it was a severe lesson.
One of the answers to all this was the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) (shown) and the littoral capability of the Virginia class subs Regarding the LCS, it has been controversial from the get-go, as advocates of blue water requirements considered it to be fragile and under gunned. But some of its attributes were built around the swarming boat attack threat. One is an eye-watering 45 knot speed requirement, as well as a shallow draft. That speed, for a large naval vessel, is really hauling ass. And technical progress in cannon technology at the 30 MM size gives some protection against swarming boats. They are also equipped with a RIM-116 surface to air missile battery for closer engagement of sea skimmer missiles, helicopters, cruise missiles and some aircraft. That is another lesson from the Falklands, where some of the British ships did not have a surface to air weapon and were hit by bombs dropped by Argentine A-4 Skyhawks.
Another answer was the Joint High Speed Vessel. It is purpose designed to support Army and Marine deployments. This is the quote from Wiki: The Spearhead-class joint high speed vessel (JHSV) is a United States Navy-led shipbuilding program to provide "a platform intended to support users in the Department of the Navy and Department of the Army. The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) program is a cooperative effort for a high-speed, shallow draft vessel intended for rapid intra-theater transport of medium-sized cargo payloads. The JHSV will reach speeds of 35–45 knots (65–83 km/h; 40–52 mph) and will allow for the rapid transit and deployment of conventional or special forces as well as equipment and supplies.
Today’s Environment
China: From a Naval standpoint, they are the new Soviet Union, albeit with a South China Sea focus. They are busily producing an excellent Navy, both surface and underwater. And, as is their way, they are not afraid to use it. In fact, nations around the region are beginning to see them as quite the bully. Again, for our Navy, the enemy gets a vote. Rather than design a Navy that can go toe to toe with a carrier battle group, they seem to have elected a strategy of denial of their waters, one that provides ballistic carrier killer missiles at a standoff range greater than that of our naval aircraft’s combat radius. It would be hard to support Taiwan in a showdown if we can not get carrier based aircraft close enough. And they have the input of the Russians, with their years of planning on how to destroy a US carrier battle group. That is not to say that we will not develop our own counters but the Navy does not seem to be underestimating the inventiveness or resourcefulness of the potential opponent.
Note: The Chinese seem to be taking an evolutionary, measured approach to building their navy. They bought an aircraft carrier from the Russians, are building another and have a navalized version of the Su-35, the J-15 (shown), to fly from it. However, due to not having a catapult, the alleged range of a fully armed aircraft (military useful load) is rumored to be only 150 nautical miles. Their new build carrier also does not appear to have catapults. This seems to speak to a defensive, home waters focus.
Russia: They are introducing very capable new subs. They appear to be restoring some of their surface units back to proper kit. However, they will be financially constrained for some time. I don’t want to appear to be dismissive and they are rebuilding their military strength but I believe it will take some time for their Navy to even equal the Chinese in capacity.
SLOCs: Sea Lanes Of Commerce need to be maintained, particularly to the Asian shores. That simply requires a significant number of ships. There seems to be few current concerns about the Atlantic and Med. NATO allies are actually of help in that task. East African and Southwest Asian pirate activity will need to be contained. There is actually good international cooperation in these tasks, particularly from the Chinese, who have an escalated stake in Africa and need the deployed and blue water experience.
Money: Like the other services, the sequester mentality continues to pinch the Navy. There has been a real threat that one of the Nimitz class carriers would be laid up, to avoid it’s multi-billion dollar mid-life refueling. That would also save on the air group, manning and logistic tails. There are a lot of folks who are dismayed by the spectre of shrinking our carrier force.
Another proposal sees the majority of the Ticonderoga class cruisers laid up in a ready reserve status. While not worn out, they are in serious need of updating (along with the early Arleigh Burke class destroyers) and the money is not there. Other funds are required for: the F-35 financial disaster, a putting aside of money to replace the Ohio class SSBNs, the development and procurement of UCLASS aircraft (unmanned combat craft) (and the entire training, maintaining and support structures for that), the reconstitution of a robust Marine amphibious capability and the next nuclear attack sub program. The Navy is acquiring the Triton, its version of the Global Hawk, for persistent reconnaissance and continuing to work on cyber capabilities and assured communications for all its needs.
The CBO just released a report that proposes to shrink the Navy yet again and to provide more forward deployment as an answer to fewer ships hulls. The downside is, at least, in retention of sailors and officers, as they would be forward deployed with their ships for many months. The CBO offset for that was to rotate crews (gold and blue crew), as is done with our submarine force. That, in turn, requires additional manning, which seems, in part, to negate the savings gained by building fewer ships.
Future
The mission set for the foreseeable future, in my reading, says this: 1) Pivot to Southwest/East Asia, to counter China’s growing influence and capability. 2) Provide power projection as required (think ISIS, Boko Haram, potential China incidents, etc.). 3) Continue to maintain open SLOCs (this includes fighting pirates). 4. Provide Ballistic Missile Defense for selected areas. (Done using Arleigh Burke class ships with appropriate radars and interceptors) 5) Keep an eye on the Russians. 6) Be ready to use the inherent capabilities of the Navy infrastructure for humanitarian help. A classic reading of the essentials of sea power would be phrased this way : deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.
As I was writing this paragraph, a cyclone overran Vanuatu. As with Tacloban in the Philippines, nothing would be better for aiding these poor folks than a carrier and an amphibious assault ship, both using many helicopters and on-board facilities to render aid.
Significant challenges:
Trite sounding or not, the oceans have not shrunk since WW2. Commerce is growing and most of the international trade moves by ocean. There are balances as economies become blended and a nation deciding to threaten a SLOC would probably go along way towards suiciding its own economy. Even at a minimum, it takes a big Navy to keep watch and have influence on all of the SLOCs that are strategic to our country.
Having the best Navy is expensive. The Navy is pretty good at keeping that out of the public debate. While the F-35 is mercilessly pounded, you don’t hear much about the cost of the first new Ford class of CVN (other than from John McCain). And when someone does point and say, “that thing cost 12.8 billion dollars!”, they aren’t counting the R&D, the cost of crew, the air wing and the logistics tail. As an offset, the Ford is designed to operate with up to 1,000 fewer sailors that a Nimitz class CVN. So, the Navy’s cost structure seems to be less controversial than the other services. On the other hand, the Navy wishes the electorate was more familiar/supportive of its role and responsibilities, particularly at budget time. There is a downside with the public thinking the Navy is only carriers and Navy SEALS.
Ultimately, the Navy’s trump card is this. It doesn’t need other services to be portable. It is the height of portability. And it can usually bring with it, with the help of the Marines, everything it needs to execute a short term mission (unless you have mission creep). With the stealth of the submarine forces, significant operations can be accomplished without a large surface component being involved. You can picture a nation threatening an invasion of a neighbor by amphibious investment and having much of its existing support infrastructure and many assets wiped out by two SSGNs, former Ohio class boomers, who salvo over 200 Tomahawks at those targets, launched in just a few minutes.
Strategy: So, is the Navy getting ready to fight the last war, not the next? I think not. But there are factions (blue water versus littoral, submarines versus surface warfare versus air assets) that can make it seem that way. As always, infighting does not produce pretty results. The Navy has had to reconstitute estuary or riverine capabilities several times, including Desert Storm. They keep on decommissioning it. Studying the lessons of the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by an Egyptian patrol boat, using a Russian Styx missile, CNO Elmo Zumwalt commissioned the development of the Pegasus class of hydrofoils (shown), armed with Harpoon missiles. I got to ride on a prototype, the USS Tucumcari. They not only presaged the need for littoral ships, they would have been splendid in chasing pirates in the waters around the Horn of Africa and in Southwest Asia. We do not have a replacement in the inventory.
One of the new phrases that I have seen used is ‘distributive lethality’. The intent will be that just about everything afloat (with enough room) will have a weapon suite that can be used in a netted environment to defend itself and strike targets. The saying is ‘if it floats, it fights’. With new communications and shared control, the ship doing the shooting can hand over control of the weapon to another, more appropriate controller. Equipped with surface to air weapons, and potentially with Harpoons/Tomahawks and helicopters with both ASW and targeting data capability, this also is a counter to declining numbers of surface combatants to serve as escorts for anti-air and ASW. Arming them is an echo of the Falkland lessons. And it also tells you that as the Russians disintegrated, the ship to ship warfare component lost out to the carrier admirals. That now has to be redressed.
Tactics: at least one at sea exercise was conducted with the LCS component being able to sprint out, away from a centralized formation. This was considered very effective at thwarting location and targeting by a potential enemy, while leaving the spread formation in enough contact to share location and targeting data.
Note: The Navy learned many bitter lessons at the start of WW2. The forge of Savo Sound saw weapons proved to be unreliable, tactics outdated or not suited to the fighting taking place and questionable practices of leadership selection. The problems with the Navy’s torpedoes has been well documented but the Navy was also totally unprepared for night fighting, had leaders who refused to use radar in battles, moved the most senior person into formation leadership when much more qualified leaders were available. At one point, the USS Chicago was firing starshell at a Japanese cruiser formation, to illuminate it for gunnery. Almost none of the shells worked properly. In turn, the gun fire from the Chicago helped the Japanese locate her quickly.
Repurposing: There are some offsets to this cost. One is that Navy assets last a long time. Carriers are “50 years in service” items. Navy ships can be modified and repurposed. The Arleigh Burke class destroyer, really a light cruiser, continues to be modified and upgraded. (it might surprise some to know that many have had their ASW capabilities curtailed (removed) - until the Chinese showed up, who were they going to hunt?) Some have been repurposed as BMD platforms, primarily stationed in the Med. The major issue for the future of the Burkes will be the lack of electrical generation for future weapons.
The four oldest of the Ohio boomers were converted to carry a huge battery of Tomahawk cruise missiles. The USS Florida fired over 90 during the intervention in Libya. The Tomahawk itself is being repurposed to provide a very long range anti-ship capability, something the Navy lacked and needs to confront China. When the Marine F-35B finally gets into squadron service, each Navy LHD (amphibious warfare - ie: flat deck for helicopters) will also become an aircraft carrier. The USS Wasp is pictured.
Innovation: The Zumwalt class destroyers (again, really light cruisers) were limited to a class of 3 but together with the Ford CVNs, they are the first Navy ships with uber electrical generation capacity. They are destined to have electromagnetic railguns and tactical lasers installed as part of their armament. From those ships, lessons will flow to the rest of the fleet and future designs. Tactical lasers require no big magazine full of warheads and rocket fuel. Railguns promise massive destructive power from sheer kinetic impact. The first tactical laser has been deployed on a support ship, for at sea testing in a real world environment. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to retrofit those weapons in older ships due to the electrical generation requirements.
The P-8 Poseidon ASW aircraft, which is taking the place of the venerable and very effective P-3 Orion, is getting very high marks for its innovation and technological success. I’ve spoken with a few ‘old school’ P-3 crew that had serious doubts about the P-8. If the reports from the specialty media are correct, the P-8 is truly effective, at a much higher level than the P-3.
Ship Based BMD defense: With the attendant geo-political headaches that go with basing radars and interceptors in places like East European NATO countries, being able to base them on the Burke class ships is a masterstroke. The ability to shoot down a missile/warhead, from a floating, portable platform like a Burke, gives much more flexibility in basing and does not provide a fixed target, either political or military.
The Navy is serious about the next wave of attack subs being radically different, with such innovations as weapon storage outside the pressure hull. No more torpedo rooms that have to be built with immense strength. The cost of a build can drop dramatically if they can do this.
Note: It might surprise some to know that the Naval station at China Lake, California actually invented the Sidewinder missile, surely the most ubiquitous air to air missile in the Western world. The same organization, in training young engineers, challenged them to come up with a cheap counter to the boat swarm problem. Using the camera from a cell phone and other ‘off the shelf’ parts for the warhead, motor and guidance/controls, they produced a small, short range image-guided missile that could be produced for just several hundred dollars. It was tested and worked well. Ultimately, the Navy elected to use the Hellfire missile on the LCS to help upgun it against boat swarm threats but the spirit of innovation and repurposing is there.
Program Management: The F-35 is a hell created program. However, the Virginia class subs are being built, generally, ahead of schedule and under budget. The Ford CVN is over budget and late. However, it is the lead ship of its class and has quite a few revolutionary technologies on it. Efficient program management for new ships, subs and aircraft (manned and unmanned) will be critical in contributing to the size and effectiveness of the future Navy. If new projects are managed like the Virginia program, there will be more of ships and assets and they will be more effective.
Frigates: As the immediate post-Viet Nam models of surface warships finally leave service, the Navy looked to be left with the Arleigh Burke class destroyer as the main blue water surface combatant (other than the carriers), and not much else. Chuck Hagel was determined to reconstitute frigates and did so by converting part of the LCS build into more robust ships. The LCS will be retained but they will be upgunned, up armored and lose some speed. The quid pro quo is that saves the cost of a scratch design ship, there are yards in production with LCS models and they will be more affordable than the same number of Burkes. The Navy worries about ship numbers. If you have the six best warships in their class but you need them to be in twelve places, you can see the problem.
Logistics: You will hear the expression “the Fat Leonard scandal”. As the Navy diminished its own logistics capability, it has relied more and more on contractors to handle the logistics tail of replenishment, pierside refueling, services such as disposal of solid wastes (not dumped at sea anymore), chandlery, etc. This devolved to a rathole of corruption that has not been fully vetted yet and will possibly damage the reputations of many otherwise decent flag officers. The services are required but, IMHO, this is a major weakness in keeping forward deployed units in many parts of the world. The USS Cole was receiving such services when it was hit with a suicide boat bomb. I mean, what could possibly go wrong putting a US warship at a pier in a place like Yemen?
I still think this will continue to bedevil the Navy into the future but given the cost of substituting Navy support, I can’t see a change coming.
Carrier Air: If you had done a flyby of a Nimitz carrier just prior to Desert Storm, you would have seen the following aircraft on the flight deck and hangers: the F-14D (fighter), the S-3A (anti-sub with some anti-ship potential), the A-6E (air to ground or anti-ship), EA-6B Prowlers (electronic attack), the F-18 A/B & C/D (both air superiority and ground attack with anti-ship potential), the E-2C (AWACS), the A-7 (ground attack), the C-2A (cargo) plus Seahawk helicopters (rescue and ASW). 9 different airframes.
Today, the same flight deck would be dominated by the F-18 C/D E/F & G (electronic attack) and the E-2C (D on the way), plus helicopters and the C-2A, which will be replaced soon. Until the F-35C and the UCLASS arrive, the F-18 E/F is the king. It is much bigger than the C/D and was actually a new aircraft. The G model for electronic attack is an F model (2 seats) with the attendant wiring for the suite of sensors, jammers, etc. required to do that job. That carrier deck is down to 4 airframes.
The upshot of this 25 year evolution is a simpler squadron structure consisting of a very capable aircraft, with the loss of some roles, primarily ASW and a dedicated tanker. The lack of capability of these two functions bother naval aviators and planners a great deal. The newer E/F Hornets are flying many more hours than planned due to the need for ‘buddy tanking’ fuel transfer, fighter to fighter. They will wear out all the sooner if that is not addressed.
This simplification will provide benefits in cost, as the support for aircraft is far less complicated by the dominance of the F-18 E/F to do just about anything left. The tradeoff for losing specialty aircraft was to take the F-18 C and create a substantially bigger version (more range, room for fuel, avionics and ordnance) that could take the place of many of the aircraft on the first list. The Hornet production line is scheduled to close in 2017.
There has been a fierce debate about the use of unmanned combat aircraft on carriers but it seems that they will finally be acquired and used. Their complete role is still TBD. In the picture, you can see what the elimination of a cockpit and associated life support can do. No O2 system, no ejector seat, canopy, displays, cooling for the displays, etc. and much more room for fuel, weapons and a shape that doesn’t have to worry about pilot vision.
The Navy and Air Force just announced that they are going to cooperate on a joint FX effort, designed to field F-18 and F-22 replacements in the 2030s. Good luck with that. Navy CNO Jonathan Greenert states that the next Navy fighter might not need either high speed or stealth. This speaks to the Navy’s preference for electronic attack (jamming) over stealth. The head of Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works states stealth is imperative (I took that as his speaking in proxy mode for the Air Force). The Navy has been in love with the ‘missile truck’ concept since the 1950s. You need fabulous detection ability, long range and loiter capability and really great weapons that can shoot down anything, preferably at an exceptional beyond visual range (BVR). The F-14 was the ultimate expression of that set of capabilities, with the agility to dogfight as well. The Navy is still seeing its #1 fighter priority as fleet defense. As we have seen repeatedly, they and the Air Force have significantly different needs and programs that try to satisfy both are a disaster.
Note: John McCain suggested the Navy seriously consider using the UCLASS aircraft in a combat mode. He further suggested that they contain smaller aircraft that could act on a semi-autonomous mode, for attack. If any of you are Dale Brown fans, you might recognize that his protagonist, Patrick McClanahan, while helping to create a highly modified B-52, called a Megafortress (Flight of the Old Dog), had it armed with small, agile, unmanned, semi-autonomous aircraft, called Wolverines. It seems the senator, or someone on his staff, are fans.
Summary
Like other SST members, I thought the “Global Force For Good” slogan was a bit silly, like some Marvel Comics movie. However, I believe the point was that the commitments of a modern US Navy are global and, in the case of SLOCs, are not shrinking. The Navy is struggling to maintain 300 ships in the fleet, even without the sequester. Many doubt that technology will take the place of the presence of US ships, exerting influence and, when needed, power projection. And so the Navy is adapting to both the financial and geopolitical realities that its missions involve. And, as always, time will tell us if it is enough!
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