"Yemen People in Sanaa and the North are angry..." Martin J

"Yemen People in Sanaa and the North are angry. People in Aden and the South are ecstatic. Yesterday the Houthis and Ali Abdallah Saleh military stood at the gates of Aden despite resistance. Now they have fled Aden. This is just Day 1. I don't think the Saudis are going to leave it at 3 hours of airstrikes. There has been real damage done to Saleh's military. This makes him vulnerable to his current partners, the Houthis, who have been working with Saleh despite his 5 wars against them since 2004. If they smell blood they may well choose to deal with Saleh first before turning their attention back to the South. The worry is that the Saudis will roll in tanks from Sharurah, and take the town of 'Ataq with its airstrip in Shabwa. They will move then to Marib and secure the strategic refinery/generator of Safer that provides electricity to the whole country. The Saudis see these areas as their borders. They have excellent relations with the tribes there. I do not believe they will countenance fighting the Houthis in their mountains - they would be massacred. At this point I think we are seeing the emergence of an independent South. The cat is out of the bag. Southerners have been engaged in fratricide since at least 1986 but now they are united against the "Shia" Houthis and Saleh. Sectarianism was never an issue here until just a few months ago. This will rip the country apart. The Saudis bear the most blame but the Iranians have been stirring this cauldron very successfully for a number of years. For the Saudis this is akin to the Americans fomenting regime change in Ukraine; its on their border and they can't afford to ignore it. And this all takes place within the regional framework of the greater Iranian-Gulf conflict. The war will take few lives. 60% of Yemenis are food insecure. When the Yemeni Rial tanks those 60% will not be able to afford bread. They will die. Slowly. And quietly. In millions. An utterly pointless avoidable debacle and the US must take much of the blame for the pointless drone programme that kept them interfering in a culture they know nothing of."  Martin J

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An excellent summary by Martin J, who has in-depth knowledge of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  

I agree with his conclusion that what we are seeing now is a break up of the unnatural union of the former YAR and PDRY states.  IMO this was always a kind of "shotgun marriage" brought on by Yemeni delusions concerning some glorious and largely mythic past in which all the peoples of SW Arabia were somehow one.   This was never the case and the belief that it was so at some time in the past is yet another reminder of the often malign power of the nationalist self image in human affairs.

Martin J is inclined to believe that SA, if it tries to intervene on the ground, will enter Yemen from the Rub al-Khali desert and then turn left into south Yemen, a part of the country largely inhabited by Sunni co-religionists of the Saudis.  Martin J asserts that SA forces will not enter Yemen from the north, i.e., from the Wadi Najran.  He states that to do so would risk a very bad outcome for Saudi Forces.  Zeidi tribal guerrillas would likely "massacre" the Saudis in those distant mountains.  I agree with all of that.  It must be remembered that, in spite of decades of US, French and British training the Saudi forces are very much a force of unknown but dubious quality.  IMO the Saudis would not be able to sustain a ground effort in Yemen without massive US logistical support.

Martin J asserts that sectarianism has not previously been an issue in the Yemens.  This does not correspond to my knowledge of or experience in North Yemen where I served for several years.  In fact, the Houthi rebels are nearly all Zeidi Shia Muslims as is former president Salih who is certainly manipulating this situation to his own advantage.  As Martin J states, Salih, when president, waged war against the Houthis with a relentlessness that characterizes any Yemeni central government that wishes to have control over this very tribal country.  The fact that the Houthis are now backing Salih along with the largely Zeidi armed forces is indicative of the essentially ethno-sectarian nature of Yemeni society in both the north and the south.  

I do not think the Houthi Zeidis are tools of the Iranian government but the "one man one vote" crowd in Washington insists that the Zeidi Houthis are illegitimately seeking on behalf of Iran to overthrow a government that corresponds to the "narrative" favored by the Children's Crusade in Washington.  In fact the Houthis are re-asserting their identity as a separate tribal polity in Yemen. 

IMO the Houthis are the natural allies of the United States in the world wide war against Sunni jihadism.  The United States seems blind to that, blinded by its own delusions concerning the "evolution" of history and the dust thrown in US eyes by the Saudis who fear all things Yemeni.

My forecast of the probable course of events somewhat parallels that of Martin J.

- If the Yemenis are left to sort this out, there will be a relatively bloodless (for Yemen) re-separation of Zeidi dominated north from the Sunni dominated south where AQAP is now the leading power.

- On the other hand if the US follows the Saudi lead into intervention in this civil war there will be a protracted three sided (Zeidis, Saudis and south Yemeni Sunnis) struggle in which the US may find itself benefiting AQAP.  pl

Comments

[Babak Makkinejad]

Yup, become a province of KSA and partake of the government oil-money largess.

[Jerry Thompson]

I was intensely involved in Yemen in the early 90's but, since that time, have only followed it for the most part as an extension of Iraq. As you will see, I have used some speculation to fill in the gaps in my specific knowledge of events in Yemen since that experience -- I hope you will agree it is 'informed speculation' but -- comment as appropriate.

From my perspective, this whole tale, from roughly 2001 to the present, makes a lot more sense if we see the Houthi as "Bakil" rather than Houthi. Most of you will know, the Bakil are the 'opposition' tribal confederation in the tribal constellation of the politics of northern Yemen. The dominant confederation have been the Hashid.

Thinking of them as the Bakil confederation helps me enormously in understanding their strength. It also helps explain the conflict in the north by suggesting that what we are seeing is not a "Iranian-inspired Shi'a rebellion against the Sunni government" but rather an internal, tribal-based, civil war between the Bakil confederation and the Hashid confederation, of which the Al-Ahmar are predominant. Both the Hashid and Bakil are predominantly Zaidi which makes them both Shi'a-sort-of. Understanding that they are both Zaidi helps greatly in understanding both the closeness and the distance of Iranian engagement in Yemen.

The rivalry between the Hashid and Bakil, to my observation, was always manipulated by the Saudis to protect and further their interests in Yemen. The Saudis primary conduit was through the Hashid (Al Ahmar). The Bakil were disadvantaged in this relationship and their resentment grew.

Ali Abdullah Saleh was a Sanhan, a minor tribe of the Hashid. He and the old sheikh of the Ahmar played rather artfully off one another, to the consternation of the Saudis and the frustration of the Bakil.

Then, earlier in the '90's, the paramount sheikh of the Bakil, an Abu Lahum died. Somehow, through the 90's and early years of the 2000's -- I really wasn't watching -- the Houthis seem to have risen above the Abu Lahum and Al Shayef in the Bakil pecking order. Then, when old Abdullah al Ahmar died, the Hashid seem to have similarly begun 'bumping shoulders' to re-order the Hashid.

Ali Abdullah Saleh was increasingly 'odd man out' -- but, he had a 'good buddy', the Al Qai'dia-fixated U.S., which gladly provided resources which marginally sustained his usefulness to the Al Ahmar and the Saudis -- and increasingly frustrated the Bakil (Houthi).

Along came the Arab ?Spring? and, it appears, the Saudis lost patience with Ali Abdullah's "Dancing on the Heads of Snakes" (great book) figureheads and patronage style and decided to take advantage of the opportunity to displace him. The main candidates were all from the Al Ahmar but couldn't agree among themselves -- to Saudi consternation and, from that point it appears that the Bakil began to seriously mobilize to first support the Houthi and then turn full-scale against the Al Ahmar. Can't tell for sure, but it looks like a lot of the Hashid have stood aside.

To the extent there is a Sunni-Shi'a conflict in all this, it exists because the Southerners are Sunni. There are divisions among the Southerners but it is fair to think of the majority as separatists, resenting the authority of the north. So, to the extent there is a Sunni-Shi'a dimension in this dispute, it may be better to understand it as a "One Yemen" vs "Two Yemens" political dispute.

This has really gone a long way and 'walking the dog back' is extremely unlikely. As Martin J and PL have pointed out, the 'way ahead' is to stand aside and let the North and South separate. The Al Ahmar and the Houthi/Bakil are going to have to negotiate.

It would be helpful if the Saudis would stay out of it but this is extremely unlikely as they most likely perceive the Bakil as threatening their hold on Asir -- most likely, it is the Saudi perception of this threat which has been the dominant driver of their policy toward Yemen since the Houthi/Bakil uprising began; the second being to contain and minimize AQAP. So, the Saudis are not going to stay out of it.

It would be best, for everybody, if the Saudis would mediate -- not likely, as it seems King Salman has decided to use Yemen as the proper object of his 'creed sign', internally and externally. Their current intervention will continue until they break it off. This might occur sooner if Saudi 'pragmatists' are able to assert themselves but they seem scarce at present. The longer this intervention persists, the worse this will all get. "Quagmire" seems inadequate to describe its potential because of the potential humanitarian, economic and social consequences which increase the longer the Saudis persist -- 'Great Dismal Swamp' seems a better metaphor.

The only 'player' who may gain from all this is AQAP (which could morph into an IS-affiliate). Everybody hates them: the Hashid, the Bakil, the Southern Separatists, and the Saudis; all of which are presently fighting each other. Things are working out better for them than if they had a strategy of their own.

Any support we are providing to the Saudi intervention seems to me to only prolong the extent and magnitude of the damage to our interests in Yemen and to Yemeni lives.

The only conceivable purpose our support of the Saudis might accomplish would be to validate our credentials as reliable allies of the Saudis and their GCC colleagues and thereby, garner their forbearance in the ongoing 'nuclear file' negotiations with the Iranians. We might, ourselves, convince ourselves that we are garnering this benefit. It is doubtful that the Saudis and their allies think that our performance in this case merits their trust -- to them, this case is likely a poor counter to their perception of our commitment to their interests in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Israel, etc.

[William R. Cumming]

Are any Saudi Arabian borders defensible without US participation?

[FB Ali]

Thank you for this overview. I do not have the knowledge to comment on your explication of the internal politics of the Zaidi tribes. However, some other points you make appear to be valid projections.

I agree that the longer the Saudi intervention lasts, the worse things will get for them (and, of course, the Yemenis). It also seems likely that AQAP will be the sole beneficiary. Your suggestion that AQAP could morph into an IS affiliate is interesting. In my opinion the more instability and conflict there is in the ME, the stronger will IS become.

As for the US, at the moment it seems the only policy it is following in that region is to stoke the conflicts, wherever they are occurring. While this is of obvious benefit to the US military and its suppliers, I doubt if it serves any rational policy objective.

[lally]

So, along comes Nasrallah who lays out a blistering indictment the perfidious Saudis; their attack on Yemen being the trigger. He lays out the evidence via their history of betrayal. During the diatribe, he also out-and-out credits the "retired" Prince Bandar with Daesh. Sounds about right.

This speech was historically harsh with unknown consequences. The actual words matter and It's a tough call to find English transcripts/

http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/173406-hizbullah-chief-sayyed-nasrallah-in-televised-address-on-latest-developments#95958

This article is followed by a simultaneous translation of the SHN speech. It's fairly thorough. The MSM will be running their own specially crafted versions of what Nasrallah said that are tailored for the audience being cajoled and massaged into forgetting who spawned al-Qaeda and 9/11.