By Patrick BAHZAD
About a month ago, the US were taken over by some kind of metaphysical frenzy. A lengthy piece about "What ISIS really wants" – published by Graeme Wood in "The Atlantic" – caused quite a stir, not just among its readers. The article focused in part on interesting facts and truths about the religious nature of ISIS and the beliefs of its followers, but the reason it probably echoed so well with "average" Americans was because of its references to the supposedly messianic and apocalyptic ideology of ISIS. Some of the observations made by the author were quite relevant, but he also missed basic clues as to real symbols the "Caliphate" is trying to conjure up. Listing up the rights and wrongs of Wood's article would be complicated and require long explanations, some of them debatable, but it seems appropriate to seize this opportunity in order to examine the points raised and analyse them from a different angle, especially regarding the article's central piece about the myth of "Dabiq".
First of all, credit has to be given to Wood for not shying away from tough questions we need to ask ourselves with regard to the rise of the Islamic State and its "Caliphate". Wood also adopted a laudable approach in the sense that he apparently tried to understand the religious rationale behind some of ISIS' actions. But however interesting and refreshing such an attempt may be in a media landscape that seems obsessed with gruesome descriptions of ISIS atrocities only, Wood's account about the motivations of the Jihadists was deeply flawed.
Trying to understand what makes ISIS fighters "tick" – that is, what they fight for and why they kill – is quite difficult when you don't get to speak to a single one of them. Talking to scholars and recruitment agents of various Jihadi movements may help, but it certainly isn't equal to tapping the source. Admittedly, in Wood's own words, getting access to such source equals almost to a "mission impossible". Nonetheless, Wood is thus compelled to put forward other components of the supposed ISIS narrative, some of which would cause head-shaking among the hard core of the group's ideologists.
An interesting but partial background piece
The highly perilous exercise Wood engaged in – that of deciphering the ISIS symbolism – put a lot of emphasis on unveiling the apocalyptic message behind the organisation's ideology. By doing so, Wood left out elements in the "Caliphate" narrative that are of much higher importance. At best, this points to a good marketing strategy for the article published by "The Atlantic", aimed at raising interest and creating a buzz among readers more familiar with messianic Christian sects rather than Takfiri and Wahhabi groups. At worst, it could be seen as part of an information war with ISIS, attempting to produce a counter-narrative about the group's real motives and interfering with its credibility among potential supporters.
As was already observed long ago by a well-known think tank working closely with the US government, one angle of the war against the Jihadi groups is to attack their ideology, the goal being to "deny extremists the high ground of Islamic politico-religious discourse", thus prevailing in the war of ideas and "empowering moderate Muslims to counter the influence of the radicals". For this reason alone, one can't dismiss the notion that something might have been at work here that didn’t just have to do with an objective and neutral description of the beliefs of the "Caliphate" supporters. The link established between the ISIS online magazine's title "Dabiq" and some obscure references to an End of time battle occurring in a place of that name raises questions as to how seriously the article was researched and what purpose it was supposed to serve in that regard.
After all, presenting ISIS as an organisation hoping for Jesus to come and save them from the Antichrist is not exactly a statement likely to encourage conversions among fundamentalist Muslims. Furthermore, describing this as a central piece in the group's ideology is quite disturbing. It is this imbalance between aspects totally ancillary to the Caliphate symbolism and basic clues that should not have escaped a trained eye that is particularly striking.
The Proclamation of a new "Caliph"
In his article, Wood mentions among other things the first sermon given by the self-proclaimed Caliph in the Great Mosque of Mosul on July 5th 2014. As a side-note, it has to be said that the aforementioned sermon actually took place one day earlier, on July 4th, during Friday Prayer. This may sound like a detail, but details matter, in particular when it comes to ISIS. Wood also fails to notice that the "Caliphate" itself was proclaimed a few days earlier, on June 29th, another symbolic date, as it was the first day of the holy month of Ramadan.
Of course, political reasons may also have played a role in ISIS and al-Baghdadi's decision to proclaim the Caliphate. The group even carried out some market research on social media prior to its decision, but failing to mention the date of June 29th and its relevance is a mistake, as it carries huge symbolic and religious weight. Al-Baghdadi's sermon may have taken place on July 5th – or rather July 4th – and it was recorded in HD resolution, but what iscrucial, is the designation of a new "Caliph" on the first day of Ramadan, the month in the Islamic calendar during which the first verses of the Quran were revealed to the Prophet (Sūrat al-ʿAlaq, verses 1-5).
The name this new "Caliph" picked for himself is also very interesting: to his supporters and followers, al-Baghdadi is now "Caliph Ibrahim". Although Ibrahim is part of al-Baghdadi's birth name, he probably chose it for an altogether different reason, one appealing to the high standing of the Patriarch Abraham (Ibrahim in the Quran) among Muslims. Ibrahim embodies the archetype of the good Muslim, in his absolute submission to God. As a reward for his unwavering faith, Ibrahim was even promised the leadership of all nations on earth, according to the Quran.
But there's more meaning still to that name. By proclaiming to be "Caliph Ibrahim", Baghdadi may also have sent a message to the Saudis, laying claim to the Holy places of Mecca, in particular the Kaaba, which – according to Muslim faith – was rebuilt by the historic figure of Ibrahim/Abraham. This is also the reason why Mecca is sometimes referred to as the "City of Ibrahim", with Medina being the "City of Muhammad". Whether current "Caliph Ibrahim" was trying to articulate any particular claim over the rightful ownership of the Holy City is unclear, but the Saudis certainly will not have missed the clue.
Now, one might argue that going this much into detail about names is actually splitting hairs and bordering on the schizophrenic, but it certainly isn't when you're dealing with someone as paranoid and careful about his every move as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This is why there's one last point worth mentioning in relation to the symbolism of Islamic names that ISIS and their "Caliph" are trying to exploit.
The man we know as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Details about the life and works of the man at the head of the "Islamic State" are a bit sketchy, and sometimes contradictory, depending on whether or not you buy into the organisation's narrative or you're a staunch adversary of it. What is undisputed is that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is already a "nom de guerre", which again wasn't picked randomly.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi only chose this name after he joined the burgeoning Jihadist scene in Iraq, following the American invasion of 2003. This name of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is significant for two reasons, which relate both to what we would call the given name of "Abu Bakr" and the surname "al-Baghdadi".
For one thing, Abu Bakr was the name of the first Caliph, the first "successor" to the Prophet, after Muhammad disappeared in 632. That is actually the meaning of "Caliph", i.e. the successor or steward, a name derived from the Arabic word "khilāfa". Abu Bakr became the first of the four Rashidun Caliphs, the rightly guided Caliphs, and the historic figure of Abu Bakr was the oldest companion of the Prophet and father of his favourite wife Aisha.
That an anonymous student of Islamic law, or maybe cleric at the time, picked such a prestigious name shouldn't go unnoticed. There might not have been a plan at that time, but there certainly was an ambition already and that ambition is confirmed even further by the surname al-Baghdadi.
Ibrahim al-Badri and his family
In Iraq, studying Islamic law for at least four years gives a Sunni man the right to add "al-Baghdadi" to his name. It doesn't mean that the person is from Baghdad but that here is a man who studied (Islamic) law in Baghdad, making this something of a honorary title among Iraqi Sunnis. The only trouble is, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi probably never studied Islamic law in Baghdad.
Born into the al-Badri family, a sub-clan of the Prophet's Quraishi tribe, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim grew up in Samarra, a town about 25 miles north of Baghdad. As a young man, he joined the Iraqi Salafi groups after Gulf War I and studied Islamic law in Fallujah – not Baghdad – following the advice of his grand-father, a professor of Arabic and fervent Salafi Muslim himself. The reason he first appeared on the US radar in the city of Fallujah in 2003/2004 is probably related to him having studied and made friends there.
At that time, he joined "Jaish al Sunna", one the of many burgeoning Jihadi groups that would confront the Marines in the two battles of Fallujah. Baghdadi however never served as frontline soldier in the ranks of the Al Qaeda franchises. He became a Sharia judge, one who made a name for himself through his particularly rigorist implementation of the law and its penalties.
What this illustrates, is that we are dealing with a man who had great ambition from the start, didn't refrain from embellishing his "resume" and was calculating enough to avoid putting himself in harms' way. In 2005 already, it seems that Baghdadi had long term goals, even though only as a distant dream.
Change of perspective
And a dream is actually what ISIS had in mind, when it proclaimed its "Caliphate". But that dream is miles away from what "The Atlantic" article tried to make it look like. The topic of the Apocalypse and the End of time seems quite a popular one to address. From Christian Millenarism to the Maya Calendar, there are lots of examples of the Doomsday scenario that have been popularized successfully in recent Hollywood movies. So why not contemplate and examine its Islamic variation ? There's nothing wrong with that of course, only ISIS ideology is not about acting as a catalyst towards the end of times. Quite the opposite, they are all about going back into time, back to the early days of Islam.
The major myth they're trying to resuscitate is that of a return of their "Golden Age", not some obscure Christian style Judgement Day. That is also why an often heard criticism of the Jihadis must ring so hollow to them: wanting to implement a medieval life-style, turning back the clock and reviving the Middle-Ages is exactly what they want ! But to them the Middle-Ages is not the equivalent to our "Dark Ages". To them, for right or wrong, the Islamic culture and civilization that is emerging in 7th century is something to emulate, because it is the period in their history they consider the most achieved.
As Westerners, such a line of thought might be difficult to comprehend, rooted as we are in the belief of progress and development. We may disagree with that logic, but there is no arguing about its merits with those who believe in it. This is where the discussion about the Islamic or un-Islamic nature of ISIS is heading off the tracks. It only leads into a dead-end, because it means adopting conventional Western cultural references as a benchmark and not looking at things from the point of view of deeply religious people, who believe in transplanting into the present a distant mythical past.
We have to take ISIS at face value. In that regard, Wood and "The Atlantic" are right. ISIS and the supporters of Takfirism live in a world where the precepts of 7th century Islamic faith have to be taken and applied literally, with no room for interpretation or contextualisation. However, it doesn't mean that their views cannot be challenged, as the world they trying the bring about didn't even exist back in the days they claim to be re-establishing.
What history tells us
The truth about the first Caliphs, the "rashidun", is that they may have been rightly guided, but that their rule was never undisputed. Out of these four Caliphs, three met a violent death, killed by religious opponents or disgruntled supporters. It all started with the unexpected disappearance of the Prophet, who had not left any instructions on how his succession should be handled.
Two groups soon emerged with radically different views on who should preside over the Umma, the community of believers, at the time a rather small crowd really. The first group advocated for the most faithful of Muhammad's companions, the venerable "Abu Bakr". The other group favoured a member of the Prophet's family (the "Ahl al-Bayt") who claimed a spiritual leadership position through his relation to the Prophet, his cousin and son-in-law Ali.
These two men and their claim to the Caliphate are at the root of the two main groups within contemporary Islam, the Sunnis –the followers of the tradition, as prescribed by the teachings and actions of the Prophet – who pleaded for a consensus to designate the successor of Muhammad and the Shia – the party of Ali. It was Abu Bakr who won that contest, not least because Aisha, the widow of the Prophet, was a staunch adversary of the Family of Muhammad, in particular Ali, ever since he recommended the Prophet should divorce her after some unproven rumours of adultery surfaced during a journey through the desert.
Even though Ali and his supporters accepted the election of Abu Bakr, the ferment of the coming schism was already starting to bubble. Abu Bakr died two years later of natural causes. He should be the only of the four rashidun Caliphs to go peacefully. The second Caliph, Umar – a great captain and conqueror – was stabbed to death by a Persian slave. His successor, Uthman, was probably killed by a group of more recent converts who had accused him of what we would call "nepotism".
At the roots of Shia Islam
Finally though, came the turn of the other party's champion, Ali. He became both the fourth Caliph of the Sunnis and the first Imam of the Shia. But his opponents in Syria, members of Uthman's Banu Umayya clan – sponsored by Aisha – insisted on the new Caliph finding and sentencing the killers of his predecessor. This demand however was only an excuse for the power and religious struggle that was going on behind the scene, thus setting the stage for the first civil war within the Umma, one that has consequences until the present day.
After being initially successful militarily, Ali had to a fight a decisive battle near the city of Raqqa in Syria, currently the capital of the "Islamic State". That battle ended in a stalemate, with Ali negotiating with his adversaries. That negotiated end to the war caused displeasure in both camps, but particularly among a group who would become the first dissidents of Islam, the Kharijites, who had walked out of the civil war and had announced being opposed altogether to the concept of a Caliphate. They plotted to kill both challengers to the position of Caliph, but in the end, they only managed to kill Ali with a poisoned blade.
Thus, the fourth andfinal of the supposedly undisputed rashidun Caliphs died at the hands of yet another group of Muslims, in a context already marked by deep running political divisions and religious arguments. The martyrdom of Ali's son Hussein a few years later, at the battle of Kerbala, would mark the final step into making the schism between Sunni and Shia final and irreparable, with the de facto establishment of two separate institutions, the imperial Caliphs on the one side (mostly Sunnis) and the less "flashy" Imams of the various branches of the Shia.
Religion as a means to implement a political agenda
The purpose of this short historic overview is not to engage into a theological battle about right and wrong, but to show that the idealized worldview the Islamic State is trying to purport about the "Caliphate" is more a figment of their imagination rather than actual truth. But sometimes a myth and its appeal are stronger than any actual fact or evidence.
In the context of ISIS and its "Caliphate", one might argue therefore that even though religious beliefs – whatever they are – play a central role in the group's dynamic, religion can also be used by those in power to achieve goals that are not necessarily related to religion. This is called "power politics" or Realpolitik in its German variation. It was true in the times of the Rashidun Caliphs and it is true also for ISIS.
That is where Graeme Wood's article is fundamentally missing the mark, because he's not looking beyond the "official" message ISIS is standing for. True, many of ISIS members and supporters are genuine proponents of the form of Islam the organisation is preaching. Takfirism and Wahhabism are not just empty vessels, they are based on solid foundations and sometimes gruesome facts.
But it is also true that men in high positions, such as a "Caliph" for example, might see the advantage of having a solid religious and ideological foundation on which to build a political reality that is only remotely linked to the beliefs of the ISIS stormtroopers. Wood seems to be ignoring the fact that ISIS as an organisation is the result of a merger between Al Qaeda type groups and former Baathist and Iraqi nationalist elements.
To us, it may seem that the religious takfiri/salafi component is in the driving seat, therefore bringing the religious fundamentalism of the organisation to the forefront, but on the ground in Iraq – not so in Syria – the "Caliphate" is looking a totally different animal.
Sectarian divide as reflection of cultural fractures
In the Sunni heartland of Western Iraq, ISIS were seen as liberators from a corrupt and alienated regime. Sunnis in the provinces of Anbar and Nineveh may not have agreed with ISIS form of Islam, but they still felt much closer to them than to the representatives of the hated Shia regime in Baghdad and its leader, Nouri al-Maliki.
The picture we have is that of a bloodthirsty and cruel group of barbarians, which is certainly how they behave in relation to certain populations, but one has to understand that ISIS message is a message intended to be heard first of all by Iraqi Sunnis, and to a lesser degree Sunnis in Syria. From an operational point of view, their whole strategy bears the hallmark of typical Saddam era "scare" and "scorched earth" tactics. ISIS may be a monster, but it is a hybrid monster, the product of the marriage between Sunni Iraqi Baathism and the takfiri/salafi legacy the US invasion left in Iraq.
The much talked about end to the "Sykes-Picot" map of the Middle-East, illustrated quite eloquently by ISIS footage of a border post between Syria and Iraq being driven over by a bulldozer, is one more segment in a chain of elements confirming this trend. Contrary to common held belief, the international border between Iraq and Syria was not exactly the result of the famous agreement of 1916 between the French and the British. It is actually in 1925 that the British side forced the incorporation of the Mosul province into the newly formed State of Iraq.
Had that not been the case, the border implemented by the Sykes-Picot agreement might have been the one ISIS is trying to create today. Again, the difference between myth and reality is striking and the appeal of the myth is stronger than anything else.
Long term history through the geopolitical looking glass
Taking Sykes-Picot as an example of the difference between perception and reality, on might review the whole development of the Middle-East under a different angle, a very partial and incomplete one of course, but one that can't and shouldn't be dismissed when dealing with such issues. The symbolic dimension in the success of an organisation such as ISIS is also related to geopolitical nature of the game that has been played in that region of the world for at least 1300 years.
In simple words, the ground rule is that for every action, there is a reaction. In the Middle-East, we could go as far back as the End of the Rashidun Caliphate and see that basic rule at work. At one time, there was the conflict between the Umayyad Caliphs of Damascus and their Abbasid challengers in Baghdad. When the Abbasids Sunnis looked like the dominant force, a counter-reaction occurred in Egypt with the creation of Fatimid Shia Caliphate.
The predominance of Shia Islam in Iran and Southern Iraq could also be analysed under the angle of that "counter-reaction" reflex of a people whose cultural, political and ethnic matrix is too different from that of the dominant force of the time to accept submission and dissolution in that wider group. More recently finally, the same grid can be applied to Nasserism and to the Baathist credo. All ideological constructs, religions included, have a front-office handling the customers and the back-office handling the workload. They are both sides of the same coin, but they don’t represent the same image …
In the case of the Baath party for example, behind the disguise of the defence of the wider Arab nation, it was used both in Syria and in Iraq as a means for a minority group of the population – the Alawis in Syria and the Sunnis in Iraq – to assert their political dominance and ownership over the State. As for ISIS, this distinction between various components of an ideology totally go under, which is quite unfortunate. In short, when talking about the symbols and ideology of ISIS, Graeme Wood seems to consider only what is visible, in pictures, speeches, magazines and videos of the "Caliphate". In that regard, the chapter he devoted to the myth of "Dabiq" is symptomatic of this short-sighted approach, confining even to some kind of intellectual blindness.
The myth of Dabiq
The insistence on the whole Dabiq story is very suspicious, as I wrote already. To underline his point about the apocalyptic nature of ISIS, Wood refers to only one particular passage (hadith) in which "Christ" is presented as the saviour of the last standing Muslims in their fight against the "Antichrist", during a battle supposedly taking place in Dabiq, a place located in Northern Syria. Out of a total of about 70 000 such passages, not all of them recognized by the whole Muslim community, Wood comes up with one reference and builds his whole theory on it, arguing that because "Dabiq" is the title of ISIS' online magazine, there must be some hidden message or symbolic meaning to it …
The Islamic State's ideology is rooted in a takfiri/salafi creed, there's no doubt about that, and as such it has to be taken and considered as a whole, not broken down in individual quotes of the Quran or the Hadiths, especially not when there's only one single occurrence supporting Woods' claim. Words aren't innocent and the choice of words in the article published by "The Atlantic" is no exception to that rule. In the hadiths, which are basically statements attributed to the Prophet according to various sources, "Dabiq" is only mentioned as one of two possible places for a supposed battle at the end of time. Woods' is deliberately cherry picking when he says Dabiq is that place.
He is not necessarily wrong to mention this aspect, but he is wrong in omitting to explain that there might be a totally different symbolic value to the word Dabiq: ISIS may have picked the name in reference to the battle of Dabiq in 1516, when the new Ottoman Empire achieved a decisive victory over Egyptian Mamluks, giving them control over Greater Syria at that time and bringing back the Caliphate to Istanbul in the aftermath of that battle. Isn't that what ISIS is trying to do, conquering Greater Syria and Middle-East, and establishing a "Caliphate" of their own in the conquered territories ?
Furthermore, there's no reference to "Christ" and the "Antichrist" in the passage mentioned by Wood. The Islamic texts refer to "Jesus son of Mary" and "Ad-Dajjal" (the "Impostor", i.e. the false Mahdi, or Messiah), no word about the "Antichrist". Examining religious aspects of the figure of "Issa" (Jesus) and "Dajjal" would have required a much deeper understanding of the sacred texts of Islam, and would have called for a wholly different baseline to Wood's article.
Overall, one shouldn't dismiss the possibility that his piece was hijacked in part by scholars wanting to make an impression or by people trying to undermine the "Caliphate'" and ISIS from an ideological point of view. By implying that their belief is based upon Jesus Christ's return to fight the Antichrist, one might certainly try and confuse people into thinking that this can't be Islam, after all ...
July 4 1976 was the day of Israel's raid on Entebbe, where Yonathan Netanyahu was killed, an event which, in Benj. Netanyahu's own words, "changed my life."
July 4-5 1979 was the Jerusalem Conference where Benzion & Benjamin Netanyahu presented the blueprint for the global war on terror. (International Terrorism: Challenge and Response, Benjamin Netanyahu, ed. http://tinyurl.com/nduz9st )
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ISIS destroyed ancient artifacts in Mosul and Nimrod.
Wasn't Abraham's first public act the smashing of all icons except one -- an act of "creative destruction"?
Posted by: Croesus | 27 March 2015 at 01:40 PM
Just as a note:
The biographic elements of Baghdadi in the piece above contradict the ones in this recent piece on "The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi" by Ali Hashem
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/isis-baghdadi-islamic-state-caliph-many-names-al-qaeda.html
That piece says that Baghdadi indeed studied in Baghdad and that he choose the name at a later point than claimed above.
Posted by: b | 27 March 2015 at 01:56 PM
Indeed, this is a different version of al-Baghdadi's biography, and there are quite a few going around, as I mentioned.
What is probably most interesting is not to know who's got it right, but the mere fact there are that many variations of it !
However, according to some credible jihadi sources (not very friendly to the IS though), the Baghdad chapter in his "student life" is not consistant with the truth.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 02:17 PM
I found these maps interesting. The Med East is one confusing jigsaw puzzle.
http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=voxdotcom&utm_content=thursday
Maybe some in SST can add some comments about them. I sure can't evaluate them.
Posted by: dilbert dogbert | 27 March 2015 at 02:31 PM
As an academic, I should be favorably disposed toward exegesis. In the case, I am not. Quite to the contrary, I belief it is misleading to seek the explanation for the movement's genesis in its theology or symbolic expression thereof. In the first instance, we have to differentiate among Bakr al-Baghdadi, his senior companions, and their recruits. What moves one does not necessarily move the others. Second, viewing al-Baghdadi as foremost a prophet is to risk mixing motor force with its vehicle of expression. Were the leaders of the Crusades primarily prophets? Third, there is a salient political context in which all this is occurring. yet it gets short shrift. Fourth, there is a psycho-sociological aspect to the mindset and behavior of the rank-and-file that tends to be slighted.
None of this is meant to disparage the impressive scholarship and perceptiveness of Patrick Bahzad.
Whatever approach we take to interpreting the ISIL phenomenon, one thing is sure. The geniuses in Washington who are directing American foreign relations will not counteract it by massive leaflet drops over Iraq and Syria.
Posted by: mbrenner | 27 March 2015 at 02:57 PM
An informative post! Can we have some detailed info about Patrick B.?
What does seem clear is that although Islam is IMO a Western Religion it is difficult for non-followers to get their heads around it!
There does seem to be the case that Western Civilization is a fount of religious beliefs including Communism and Capitalism. And most of those religions can only survive by violence.
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 27 March 2015 at 03:00 PM
Good work, Patrick.
initially I struggled with verbal resistance here or there, but you managed to pull me in.
http://tinyurl.com/GraemeWood-Isis
I'll check for my specific resistance-triggers once I read the basis of your critique. Thanks.
;)
http://tinyurl.com/GraemeWood-Isis
Posted by: LeaNder | 27 March 2015 at 03:01 PM
Interesting link thx !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 03:09 PM
Thank you for this excellent analysis!
Americans would be well served by noting the following:
" All ideological constructs, religions included, have a front-office handling the customers and the back-office handling the workload. They are both sides of the same coin, but they don’t represent the same image"
And how it applies to us.
I initially read the word coin as "con".
That would probably work. Especially if you consider many of the individuals involved as belonging to a sociopathic predatory sub species of human. The AbuBakr's, the Bibi's, the Vicki's.
Posted by: John | 27 March 2015 at 03:12 PM
Totally agree with you regarding over-estimation of symbolic interpretation of IS. My purpose was to shift the focus of such analysis on more founded elements rather than sticking to highly hypothetical representations that most of the ground troops of ISIS don't have a clue of.
However, from a psychological point of view, it is interesting to examine what kind of triggers the IS is trying to appeal to.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 03:18 PM
Just for the record, I am Roman Catholic by birth but I have spent many years in Muslim countries.
Getting your head around religion isn't easy, whether it is your own or the dominant one in the country you live in !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 03:24 PM
@ dilbert
Not to be jejune or be a smart aleck but I am surprised to see Iran and Afghanistan being bundled up with the ME.
Posted by: The Beaver | 27 March 2015 at 03:25 PM
It lacks the most crucial map of them all - that of the Seljuk Empire.
Jihadists live outside of that civilizational boundaries.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 27 March 2015 at 03:44 PM
mbrenner
"Were the leaders of the Crusades primarily prophets?" I take it you mean the leaders of the first crusade. They did not think of themselves in that way. they considered themselves to be armed pilgrims, there was a cleric, a papal delegate who was titular leader of the first crusade. He stood in lieu of the Vicar of Christ. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 27 March 2015 at 03:48 PM
'trying to appeal to" . . good comment on the appeal to those more familiar with messianic Christian sects rather than Takfiri and Wahhabi groups. Indeed I'd wager most Atlantic readers knowledge of theology may be as pasty white as mine.
I recall being quite struck with the apocalyptic ascription to ISIS of what I am most familiar with. Which first made it seem reasonable, then generally ended my thinking i was so tickled by the nutty idea.
Thanks for your continued work on this, and my brain.
Posted by: Charles I | 27 March 2015 at 03:50 PM
Many Muslims state that in Islam, politics and religion are inexorably intertwined. A religious project could consist of both political as well as spiritual contents.
The fact of the matter is that men and women from all over the world are inspired to go and join ISIS and might be sharing - to varying degrees - in the temporal and spiritual program of ISIS.
Those who fought against the Spanish Republic and those who fought for the Spanish Republic were almost certainly inspired by non-political ideas and ideals.
This in not any different, in my opinion.
The only qualitative difference that this is a religious war - sucking in Jews, Shia Muslims, Sunni Muslims, Protestant Christians, Orthodox and Catholic Christians, Awaits, Druze, and others.
I think it will be a good idea to call things by their proper names.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 27 March 2015 at 03:58 PM
Sadly, on the matter of IS eschatology, Patrick Bahzad would have done well to consult the magazine Dabiq itself. He writes:
"ISIS may have picked the name in reference to the battle of Dabiq in 1516, when the new Ottoman Empire achieved a decisive victory over Egyptian Mamluks"
On the contrary, the contents page of the first issue of Dabiq is headed with a quote from Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi:
"The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq."
That quote looks to the future, not to the past. And in the Introduction (p.4), the editor gives his own account of the choice of name:
"As for the name of the magazine, then it is taken from the area named Dabiq in the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham. This place was mentioned in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is sometimes referred to as Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles between the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq."
Again, the reference is to the future, not the past.
It's worth noting that the emphasis on Dabiq rather than Khorasan (where another set of ahadith place their focus) corresponds to the shift between Afghanistan and AQC on the one hand, and Sham and IS on the other. The ahadith about Khorasan were useful recruitment tools for AQ, as Ali Soufan noted, whereas those about Sham, extensively described in the final, eschatological pages of Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's _Call to Global Islamic Resistance_, are more potent in the context of Iraq / Syria.
The two texts that Jessica Stern & JM Berger single out in their book, _ISIS: The State of Terror_, as central to IS ideology are Abu Bakr Naji's _The Management of Savagery_ and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's _Call_.
Posted by: Charles Cameron | 27 March 2015 at 04:15 PM
Have to say I'm not very big on reading dabiq other than for information purposes and the reason I mentioned the alternative option as an explanation is because the hadiths don't refer to crusader armies but to the armies of Rome. What is stated in the magazine may very well refer to the future but it is twisting the wording one finds in the hadiths and therefore cannot be accepted without criticism.
So on this matter it is the editors of the magasine who proceeded to put ideology before scripture, just as I described.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 04:42 PM
Agree about religious dimension being the major one in this war but doesn't mean it's the only one ...
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 05:09 PM
Just to make my point clearer, the fact there is mention of Dabiq in a certain context by a certain magasine doesn't mean one has to buy into the story, unless of course one doesn't know the other explanations and references that could be mentioned.
The thing with the ME is that you can look at it from thousand of miles away, restricting yourself to the various media channels available to analyze it, or you can add into the mix what people there say, think and preach. And then you start to realize that nothing is as simple as it seems and there always is a different way of looking at events and understanding them.
As for the IS itself, it is very aware of the kind of PR and propaganda it needs to use for various audiences it is targeting.
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 27 March 2015 at 05:45 PM
Thanks. Fascinating read.
Posted by: bth | 27 March 2015 at 10:25 PM
So if either Aleppo or Mosul is lost by IS is there any significant loss to the ethos that has been created?
Posted by: bth | 27 March 2015 at 10:33 PM
no hero like a beleaguered hero
Posted by: Charles I | 28 March 2015 at 02:54 AM
Aleppo isn't vital to the IS unless they consider that they need territorial continuity up to the Mediterranean, but that has not proven necessary up to now. Aleppo is also an area other opposition groups are trying to control.
Mosul on the other hand is absolutely necessary to the survival of ISIS and any defeat there - however unlikely - would have very serious consequences on the groups long term goals.
Right now they're trying to consolidate the territory they have won and are trying to administer it efficiently. Failure in that department would be worse than losing the area of dabiq in northern Syria as that would be of no consequence.
But losing Mosul and being pushed back and away from Baghdad and there only real political and military goal - taking back Baghdad - would take a big hit !
Posted by: Patrick Bahzad | 28 March 2015 at 01:48 PM
"The truth about the first Caliphs, the "rashidun", is that they may have been rightly guided, but that their rule was never undisputed. Out of these four Caliphs, three met a violent death, killed by religious opponents or disgruntled supporters."
Patrick and Col. Lang,
I took exactly 1 class in the political aspects of Islam as part of Middle Eastern Studies degree 30 years ago. I think I noted this in the first week or so of class.
To this day I am still puzzled as to why any Muslim would consider that period to be the Golden Age of Islam when faced with this widely known, undisputed fact. It is especially puzzling given such a Muslim would surely believe that all the transpires is the will of Allah. Is there any Islamic scholarship that tries to square that circle for the believers?
Posted by: Patrick D | 28 March 2015 at 03:35 PM