In a rather ghastly 19th century experiment, a biologist by the name of Heinzmann found that if he placed a frog in boiling water, the frog immediately leapt out but that if he placed the frog in tepid water and then gradually heated it, the frog stayed put until he was scalded to death. Are we like the frog? I see disturbing elements of that process today as we watch events unfold in the Ukraine confrontation. They profoundly frighten me and I believe they should frighten everyone. But they are so gradual that we do not see a specific moment in which we must jump or perish. So here briefly, let me lay out the process of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and show how the process of that crisis compares with what we face today over the Ukraine.
* * *
Three elements stand out in the Cuban Missile Crisis: 1) relations between the USSR and the US were already "on the edge" before they reached the crisis stage; each of us had huge numbers of weapons of mass destruction aimed at the other. 2) the USSR precipitated the Crisis by advancing into Cuba, a country the US had considered part of "area of dominance" since the promulgation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. 3) some military and civilian officials and influential private citizens in both countries argued that the other side would "blink" if sufficient pressure was put on it.
Allow me to point out that I had a (very uncomfortable) ringside seat in the Crisis. I was one of three members of the "Crisis Management Committee" that oversaw the unfolding events. On the Monday of the week of October 22, I sat with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under Secretary George Ball, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council Walt Rostow and Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and listened to President Kennedy's speech to which we all had contributed. The account Kennedy laid out was literally terrifying to those who understood what a nuclear confrontation meant. Those of us in that room obviously did. We were each "cleared" for everything America then knew. And we each knew what our government was seeking -- getting the Russian missiles out of Cuba. Finally, we were poised to do that by force if the Russians did not remove them.
Previous to that day, I had urged that we remove our "Jupiter" missiles from Turkey. This was important, I argued, because they were "offensive" rather than "defensive" weapons. The reason for this distinction was that they were obsolescent, liquid-fired rockets that required a relatively long time to fire; thus, they could only be used for a first strike. Otherwise they would be destroyed before they could be fired. The Russians rightly regarded them as a threat. Getting them out enabled Chairman Nikita Khrushchev to remove the Russian missiles without suffering an unacceptable degree of humiliation and risking a coup d’état.
Then, following the end of the crisis, I wrote the "talking paper" for a review of the crisis, held at the Council on Foreign Relations, with all the involved senior US officials in which we carefully reviewed the "lessons" of the crisis. What I write below in part derives from our consideration in that meeting. That is, it is essentially the consensus of those who were most deeply involved in the crisis.
Shortly thereafter, I participated in a Top Secret Department of Defense war game, designed by Professor Thomas Schelling of MIT in which he set out a scenario of a sequence of events -- ironically placed near the Ukraine -- to show that the USSR would accept an American nuclear attack without responding. It was, as he said, in our "post mortem" discussion of the game, a vindication of an extension of the theory of deterrence. It was to prove that we need not fear a reaction to a limited nuclear attack. Henry Kissinger had popularized this idea in his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.[1]
In the post mortem discussion of the Game I argued, and my military, intelligence and diplomatic colleagues on our war game team agreed with me, that the idea of limited nuclear war was nonsense. No government could accept a devastating attack and survive. If it did not retaliate with a "victory-denying response,"[2] it would be overthrown and executed by its own military and security forces. And the original attacker would in turn have to avenge the retaliation or it would face a similar fate. Tit for tat would lead inevitably to "general war." Twenty years later, in 1983, a second Department of Defense war game (code named "Proud Prophet") in which I did not participate and which was heavily weighted to the military confirmed what I had argued in 1962: there was no such thing as a "limited" nuclear war if both sides were armed with nuclear weapons. Limited nuclear actions inevitably ended in all-out war.
So, to be realistic, forget "limited" war and consider general war.
Even the great advocate of thermonuclear weapons, Edward Teller, admitted that their use would "endanger the survival of man[kind]." The Russian nuclear scientist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Andrei Sakharov, laid out a view of the consequences in the Summer 1983 issue of Foreign Affairs as"a calamity of indescribable proportions." More detail was assembled by a scientific study group convened by Carl Sagan and reviewed by 100 scientists, A graphic summary of their findings was published in the Winter 1983 issue of Foreign Affairs. Sagan pointed out that since both major nuclear powers had targeted cities, casualties could reasonably be estimated at between "several hundred million to 1.1 billion people" with an additional 1.1 billion people seriously injured. Those figures related to the 1980s. Today, the cities have grown so the numbers would be far larger. Massive fires set off by the bombs would carry soot into the atmosphere, causing temperatures to fall to a level that would freeze ground to a depth of about 3 feet. Planting crops would be impossible and such food as was stored would probably be contaminated so the few survivors would starve. The hundreds of millions of bodies of the dead could not be buried and would spread contagion. As the soot settled and the sun again became again visible, the destruction of the ozone layer would remove the protection from ultraviolet rays and so promote the mutation of pyrotoxins. Diseases against which there were no immunities would spread. These would overwhelm not only the human survivors but, in the opinion of the expert panel of 40 distinguished biologists, would cause "species extinction" among both plants and animals. Indeed, there was a distinct possibility that "there might be no human survivors in the Northern Hemisphere...and the possibility of the extinction of Homo sapiens..."
So to summarize:
1) it is almost certain that neither the American nor the Russian government could accept even a limited attack without responding;
2) there is no reason to believe that a Russian government, faced with defeat in conventional weapons, would be able to avoid using nuclear weapons;
3) whatever attempts are made to limit escalation are likely to fail and in failing lead to all out war; and
4) the predictable consequences of a nuclear war are indeed an unimaginable catastrophe.
These dangers, even if today they seem remote, clearly demand that we do every thing we possibly can to avoid the fate of the frog. We can see that the "water" is beginning to heat up. We should not sit and wait for it to boil. We did not do so in the Cuban Missile Crisis. We and the Russians worked out a solution. So what will we, what should we do now?
* * *
The first step is to "appreciate" the situation as it actually is and to see clearly the flow and direction of events. Of course, they are not precisely the same as in the Cuban Missile Crisis. History does not exactly repeat itself, but, as Mark Twain has pithily said, subsequent events sometimes "rhyme" with those that went before.
Consider these key elements:
1) Despite the implosion of the Soviet Union and the attempts to cut back on nuclear weapons, Russia and the United States remain parallel nuclear powers with each having the capacity to destroy the other -- and probably the whole world. Hundreds if not thousands of our weapons apparently remain on "hair trigger alert." I assume that theirs are similarly poised.
2) Both Russia and the United States are governed by men who are unlikely to be able to accept humiliation -- and almost certain murder by "super patriots" in their own entourages -- and would be forced to act even at the cost of massive destruction to their countries. So pressing the leadership of the opponent in this direction is literally playing with fire. As President Kennedy and the rest of us understood in the 1962 crisis, even if leaders want to avoid conflict, at a certain point in their mutual threats, events replace policy and leaders become bystanders.
3) Both the Russian and American people have demonstrated their resilience and determination. Neither is apt to be open to intimidation.
4) Both the Russians and the Americans are guided in their foreign policy by what they believe to be "core concerns." For the Americans, as the Cuban Missile Crisis and many previous events illustrate, this comes down to the assertion of a "zone of exclusion" of outsiders. America showed in the Cuban Missile Crisis that we would not tolerate, even at almost unimaginable danger, intrusion into our zone. Among the Russians, as their history illustrates,[3] a similar code of action prevails. Having suffered, as fortunately we have not, horrifying costs of invasion throughout history but particularly in the 20th century, the Russians can be expected to block, by any means and up to any cost, intrusions into their zone.
5) We said we understood this fundamental policy objective of the Russians, and officially on behalf of our government Secretary of State James Baker, Jr. agreed not to push our military activities into their sphere. We have, however, violated this agreement and have added country by constituent country of the former Soviet Union and its satellites to our military alliance, NATO.
6) We are now at the final stage, just short of Russia itself in the Ukraine, and, as the Russians know, some influential Americans have suggested that we should push forward to "the gates of Moscow." Those who advocate what the British once called a "Forward Policy," now see the necessary first steps to be the arming of the Ukraine. And finally,
8) There is no way in which we or the European Union could arm the Ukraine to a level that it could balance Russia. Thus, they are likely both to give the Ukrainians unrealistic notions of what they can do vis-à-vis Russia and to be seen by the Russians as "offensive" moves to which they might feel compelled to respond. Consequently, they could lead us all into a war we do not want.
* * *
So what to do?
In a word: stop. What we are now doing and what we contemplate doing is not in our interest or in the interests of the Ukrainians and is perceived as a threat by the Russians. We cannot deliver on the policy we would encourage the Ukrainians to adopt by arming them without a war. Economic sanctions are a form of that war, but they are unlikely to accomplish what we have been proclaiming. So, the logic of events could force the Russians and us to the next step and that step also to the next and so on. Our moves in this direction could cause massive death and destruction. We should stop doing what does not work and is not in our interests nor in the interests of either the Ukrainians or the Russians.
But stopping on what terms?
Having myself helped to negotiate two complex but successful ceasefires, I have learned two things: first, a ceasefire cannot be obtained unless both parties see it as less bad than the alternative and, second, a ceasefire is merely a necessary precondition to a settlement. So what might a settlement involve?
The elements of a general settlement, I believe, are these:
1) Russia will not tolerate the Ukraine becoming a hostile member of a rival military pact. We should understand this. Think how we would have reacted had Mexico tried to join the Warsaw Pact. Far-fetched?
Consider that even before the issue of nuclear weapons arose, we tried to overthrow the pro-Russian Cuban government in the Bay of Pigs invasion and tried on several occasions to murder Cuban Head of State Fidel Castro. We failed; so for two generations we have sought to isolate, impoverish and weaken that regime. We would be foolish to expect that the Russians will not react similarly when challenged by an anti-Russian Ukrainian government. Thus, to press for inclusion of the Ukraine into NATO is not only self-defeating; it risks overturning a generation of cautious moves to improve our security and increase our well-being and is pointing us toward at least a cold -- if not a hot -- war. We need to adopt a different course.
2) We must recognize that the Ukraine is not part of our sphere of influence or dominance. It is neither in the Western Hemisphere nor in the North Atlantic. On the Black Sea, the concept of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an oxymoron The Black Sea area is part of what the Russians call "the near abroad." The policy implications are clear: Just as the Russians realized that Cuba was part of our sphere of dominance and so backed down in the Missile Crisis, they will probably set their response to our actions on the belief that we will similarly back down because of our realization that the Ukraine is in their neighborhood and not in ours. The danger, of course is that, for domestic political reasons -- and particularly because of the urging of the neoconservatives and other hawks -- we may not accept this geostrategic fact. Then, conflict, with all the horror that could mean, would become virtually inevitable.
3) But conflict is not inevitable and can fairly easily be avoided if we wish to avoid it. This is because the Russians and Ukrainians share an objective which the United States also emotionally shares. The shared objective is that the Ukraine become a secure, prosperous and constructive member of the world community. Becoming such a member can be accomplished only by the Ukrainians themselves. But as all qualified observers have seen, Ukrainian society and political organization have far to go to reach our joint objective. This is true regardless of the Russian-American dispute. Its government is corrupt, tyrannical and weak. The best we can do is to remove outside deterrents to the growth of a healthy, secure and free society.
The way to do this is two fold: first we need to stop our military intrusion into Ukrainian-Russian affairs, so diminishing Russian fears of aggression, and, second, wherever possible and in whatever ways are acceptable to both parties to assist the growth of the Ukrainian economy and, indirectly, the stability and sanity of the Ukrainian governing system. A first step in this direction could be for the Ukraine to join the European Union. This, in general terms, should be and for our own sakes must be, our strategy.
William R. Polk
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
[1] Kissinger realized his mistake and partially repudiated what he had argued in a later, 1961, book, The Necessity for Choice.
[2] This was apparently embodied in Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive 59. It was carried forward in President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1984-1988 Defense Guidance. And it was emphasized by Albert Wohlstetter, a former colleague of mine at the University of Chicago and one of the leading neoconservatives in the June 1983 issue of Commentary.
[3] I have laid out the Russian experience in a previous essay, "Shaping the Deep Memories of Russians and Ukrainians" which is available on my website, www:williampolk.com.
Wondeful post and an apt analogy. What Heinzmann's experiment demonstrated was that if the water were heated slowly enough the frog would not jump out. We are not a patient people, I don't believe we have enough patience to prevent this particular frog from jumping out, and this is not the time or occasion to turn up the fire.
Posted by: Dave Schuler | 25 February 2015 at 09:42 AM
"A first step in this direction could be for the Ukraine to join the European Union."
The problem is that I don't think Russia will accept Ukraine joins to EU, like it will not accept Ukraine joins NATO. Russia wants Ukraine join russian federation economic union...
Posted by: João Carlos | 25 February 2015 at 10:01 AM
Dr. Polk:
I agree with you that Peace requires acceptance of the concept of "Sphere of Influence".
But will NATO states accept that?
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 25 February 2015 at 10:12 AM
The "Childrens Crusade" and the media speak as if Putin does not represent the people of the nation of Russia. Somehow Obama represents the great principles and the will if the people of this nation, but Putin is operating purely on his own will and is not supported by the will of the people he governs.
In actuality it would seem the opposite is true, since Obama's popular support is in the 40% range while Putin is enjoys a popularity rating in the 80% range, but let's not let facts get in the way of our war game.
And don't forget that we are being led by children. They do not recall the Cuban missile crisis, Obama was only one year old at the time, and they do not think that such ancient history has any relevance to today's world. Nor do they recall that Russia played any role in WW2, or have any concept of the role that Ukraine played in that chapter of history.
Posted by: Bill H | 25 February 2015 at 10:20 AM
I don't think Ukraine joining the EU would be acceptable to Russia. One of the things this crisis has shown is just how much in the thrall of the US the EU is. So Ukraine joining the EU would essentially be conceding it to the US.
Posted by: Misanthrope | 25 February 2015 at 10:28 AM
Dr. Polki,
there is only ONE state at NATO... USA. It is better don't have illusions.
Posted by: João Carlos | 25 February 2015 at 11:24 AM
Bill H,
I think both Putin and Obama were elected, so both have legitimacy, so popularity is not so much important as you think. Popularity will affect only the number of foot soldiers that will want go to war or how much the population will tolerate impopular measures before revolt, so Russia will have an advantage (yes, I am being very cynical).
And, cynical as I am, I don't think Putin election was more flawed than Bush junior first election...
Posted by: João Carlos | 25 February 2015 at 11:29 AM
Heck, these children don't even think that what they themselves did in 2011-i.e. Libya-has any relevance, even though it helped put them on the road to the confrontation that we're faced with now.
BTE: Very informative piece, Mr. Polk. thank you.
Posted by: Carl O. | 25 February 2015 at 11:45 AM
João Carlos,
I think the problem is that EU is not only a economic partnership. It has security aspects as well.
Posted by: Aka | 25 February 2015 at 11:59 AM
Misanthrope,
I think the problem is that EU is not a purely economic partnership. It has some security aspects as well. At least the EU deal that was offered to Ukraine in 2013 had certain "back doors".
Posted by: Aka | 25 February 2015 at 12:01 PM
I quite agree. There is a clear political divide between the western-looking peoples of West Ukraine and the Russophiles in the South and East. One solution could be to to divide the country in two reflecting their natural inclinations. This would allow the west to join the EU and the rest to seek some form of association with the RF. However Putin has made it clear from the very beginning that his preference is for a united Ukraine, one totally unaligned, and with the regions allowed a fair bit of autonomy. He would like it to be a buffer between Russia and the EU. The Crimea is lost. Even if he agrees to a further vote there under some wholly independent auspices I believe the result would be the same.
The current sabre-rattling by the US and NATO, aided and abetted by the UK government, is not helpful, but positively dangerous.
Posted by: Bryn P | 25 February 2015 at 12:24 PM
Professor Polk,
Thank you for the analysis. Could you tell us why "some" policy analysts insist on using a set of assumptions that can cause the end of the world as we know it?
Ishmael Zechariah
Posted by: Ishmael Zechariah | 25 February 2015 at 12:30 PM
Dr. Polk, it was a privilege to read your post. There is one passage that arrested me for quite a few minutes.
"Both Russia and the United States are governed by men who are unlikely to be able to accept humiliation -- and almost certain murder by "super patriots" in their own entourages"".
I understand you went through the passage of President Kennedy's assassination. But do you truly believe President Obama would be prone to assassination should a 'humiliation' occur? And from someone in his own administration? If so, that is breathtaking and leaves me mind boggled.
Posted by: BabelFish | 25 February 2015 at 12:43 PM
Misanthrope,
You are absolutely right. It surprised me that, at the end of a characteristically sagacious essay, William Polk produced a proposal which appears to me to indicate a total blindness to what has happened in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The British scholar Richard Sakwa – of Polish immigrant background – is one of the best commentators on the shambles in Ukraine. A review in the 'Guardian' by Jonathan Steele of his recently published book on the subject is I think worth quoting.
In it, Sakwa argues that, as Steele puts it, 'three long-simmering crises have boiled over to produce the violence that is engulfing eastern Ukraine.'
What Sakwa has to say about the first two crises seems to me wise. However, from an American and European point of view – and, unlike many of my countrymen, I do regard Britain as part of Europe – it is the following section of Steele's summary of Sakwa's view which I think most to the point:
'The third crisis, also linked to the Nato issue, is the European Union's failure to stay true to the conflict resolution imperative that had been its original impetus. After 1989 there was much talk of the arrival of the "hour of Europe". Just as the need for Franco-German reconciliation inspired the EU's foundation, many hoped the cold war's end would lead to a broader east-west reconciliation across the old Iron Curtain.
'But the prospect of greater European independence worried key decision-makers in Washington, and Nato's role has been, in part, to maintain US primacy over Europe's foreign policy. From Bosnia in 1992 to Ukraine today, the last two decades have seen repeated occasions where US officials pleaded, half-sincerely, for a greater European role in handling geopolitical crises in Europe while simultaneously denigrating and sidelining Europe's efforts. Last year's "Fu-k the EU" comment by Victoria Nuland, Obama's neocon assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, was the pithiest expression of this.
'Sakwa writes with barely suppressed anger of Europe's failure, arguing that instead of a vision embracing the whole continent, the EU has become little more than the civilian wing of the Atlantic alliance.'
(See http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2015/02/frontline-ukraine-crisis-in-the-borderlands.html#more .)
If this perception is realistic – as I think it is – it follows naturally that Russia will be as opposed to EU membership for Ukraine as it is to NATO membership: it will conclude, quite realistically, that the one will eventually lead to the other.
For all kinds of reasons, I never thought that Putin's vision of Europe 'from Vladivostock to Lisbon' was realistic.
However, I also thought that there was no reason why the alternative should 'Greater Asia, from Shanghai to St. Petersburg.'
And this, it now seems likely, is what a generation of incompetence from European and American 'policymakers' has given us.
Posted by: David Habakkuk | 25 February 2015 at 01:29 PM
"Both the Russians and the Americans are guided in their foreign policy by what they believe to be "core concerns.""
Fair enough. As it happens, Europeans also have a "core concern" with regard to Russia, which can be summarized as "Stop invading us".
"A first step in this direction could be for the Ukraine to join the European Union. "
Unfortunately, Ukraine moving towards the EU is precisely what started this whole mess. Besides, Russian reaction to the EU-Ukraine association treaty has been quite explicit.
The author evidently accepts the Russian protestation that their main objective was to prevent NATO bases in Sebastopol. Maybe it was.
An alternative interpretation is that this is self-serving rubbish. NATO membership was never in the cards for Ukraine (even if the Ukrainians had asked for it, good luck convincing Europeans to automatically commit ground troops in the case of a Russian invasion in Kharkiv...)
In this interpretation, the Russian objective was to maintain essentially total control of Ukraine by any means necessary. That won't happen. So, barring that, destabilize the rebellious natives, and gobble up as much territory (and industrial infrastructure) as possible. This part is going on pretty well at the moment.
IMO the simultaneous prodding of Baltic countries seems more compatible with the second interpretation than the first.
Misanthrope: "One of the things this crisis has shown is just how much in the thrall of the US the EU is."
One of the things this crisis has shown is that European leaders suddenly found their collective spine, much to the surprise of this European expat.
Europe cannot prevent Russia from drifting back into Soviet mode. But what we can do is attach a price tag. "Tough luck Ivan, it's not 1968 any more. This time, invading uppity countries who try to break free is going to cost you a bit more than just the petrol for the tanks. Enjoy your economic meltdown."
Posted by: toto | 25 February 2015 at 01:36 PM
Since the Space Kidettes are impervious to this logic and the neos are hostile to this goal, what can the rest of us do to force the Space Kidettes and the Neos into surrendering to policy based on this logic in pursuit of this goal?
What pressure points can the rest of us kick, sprain, stick hatpins into, etc. to cause our Deciders such intense pain that they are forced to do what this post suggests just to make the pain stop?
Posted by: different clue | 25 February 2015 at 02:00 PM
Agreed -- can't think why this otherwise sensible analysis goes wrong right at the end. Apart from anything else, joining the EU is not likely to benefit Ukraine economically: look at the fate of Greece.
Posted by: [email protected] | 25 February 2015 at 02:15 PM
"When what must be said can’t be said, multiply your risk by ten. If the denial is tainted by arrogance or fear, multiply your risk by ten again."
http://redteamjournal.com/2015/02/two-recent-laws-44-and-45/
Posted by: YT | 25 February 2015 at 02:52 PM
"Somehow Obama represents the great principles and the will if the people of this nation"
No, no, Americans have over the Cold War come to see themselves as far more than that - leaders of the free world.
That self image has practical consequences beyond the conceit.
They speak for us, too. Since the world is flat, in the West - the free world - anyone is alike, there is no need for consultation. Everybody is essentially American under the surface.
That's why dissent always causes such puzzlement.
Clearly there was no flaw in the policy they could object to. Think of the invasion of Iraq - a splendid idea that Europoe irrationally rejected.
That was the time of the joke, made in earnest in the US, that Europe was isolated from America and their New Europe clients and the fabled coalition of the willing.
When Europeans objected, it must be because of fatal flaws of character - cowardice, girlishness, being a weak-kneed leftist or terrorist lover and naturally Anti-Americanism - and in 2003: people generally hating George Bush.
The archives of Nationa Review Online and the Weekly Standard are full or that.
Posted by: confusedponderer | 25 February 2015 at 03:48 PM
Forget Mexico joining the Warsaw Oaxt; think "Zimmerman Telegram."
We can't even get Turkey to let us use Turkish bases to run our air operation against ISIS. How do we run an operation in the Ukraine over the objection of Angela Merkle?
Posted by: Thaumaturgist | 25 February 2015 at 03:52 PM
To Dr. Polks excellent paper, I would like to make one further observation - anomie and boredom among the young is I believe a great danger to all us. I suspect that during the Cuban missile crisis older and wiser heads were in charge. By that I mean leaders who had proximate experience of continental general war in all its horrors. Today we do not.
I am concerned that the disconnect between the reality and fiction of war is growing. There are too many glib commentators, their acolytes and sections of the younger community who think war might be adventurous fun (as has happened before). Continental America has not been touched by war since The War Between The States.
I think I understand that memories may also be fading in Europe but I am not sure.
We seem to be replaying August 1914.
Posted by: walrus | 25 February 2015 at 04:02 PM
I think that the statement: "...the EU has become little more than the civilian wing of the Atlantic alliance.." is not accurate.
EU pushed 20 million people into poverty in Iran as it waged an economic war against her.
Likewise against Syria.
Civilians they are not.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 25 February 2015 at 04:03 PM
Because they can.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 25 February 2015 at 04:04 PM
West or Urals, Russia has a population of 115 million - larger than Germany's.
And if the other states East of the Theosious line (extended vertically North) could be part of EU, so could Russia - as an economic common market.
Posted by: Babak Makkinejad | 25 February 2015 at 04:08 PM
IMHO, the problem with EU is that they made sanctions against Russia, so Russia is no more seeing them as friendly, but as unfriendly. That is the reason is moving the economy in direction to East (China) and said they will stop to use Ukraine for transport the gas after the Turkey's nat gas pipeline is ready.
And take note, the only thing Ukraine have for UE was the chance of transport that gas, the european companies were to take that pipelines out of Grazpon control. Now Ukraine is a "grande mico"...
Posted by: João Carlos | 25 February 2015 at 04:19 PM