ISIS: A Black Hole in the Heart of the Middle-East – The Syrian Adventure

By Patrick Bahzad

 

The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into
a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity
and honour. Things have been far worse than we have
been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient
than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our imperial record,
and may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure.

T.E. LAWRENCE, "Report on Mesopotamia",
Sunday Times (August 1920)

 

By the time ISIS – then still ISI – launched its 2010 offensive against Baghdad and Central Iraq, preparations were well underway for the tidal wave of "Arab Spring" revolutions that swept across North Africa and the Middle-East. Although this is not the subject of this essay, there's a lot to be said about what seemingly started as spontaneous mass demonstrations of disorganised youth who rallied under slogans coined by "Facebook", "Twitter" and other social media, in a movement that spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and finally Syria.

Suffice to say that these revolutions were neither fully spontaneous nor totally disorganised. To those with an eye for that kind of detail, they seemed like a distant echo of the colour and flower revolutions that did away with authoritarian, anti-US regimes from Belgrade to Kiev and Tbilisi in the early 2000s. Based on a similar 2.0 template of democratic revolution, with the insurgency option as a contingency plan, this rudimentary approach proved to work out rather well – at least in the short run – in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, but it would show serious shortcomings in Libya and even more so in Syria, where the deep flaws of this regime change strategy camouflaged as a peaceful movement for democracy and a "moderate" brand of Islam revealed its true nature.

Fact is that for all the social causes of unrest in Syria, which were very similar to Tunisia and Egypt, there were also fundamental differences in the ethnic and religious fabric of the country, as well as a totally different power structure, that made Syria an alltogether different proposition. Before turning to the central topic, which is ISI/ISIS involvement in the civil war and the implications of that move, it seems rather fitting to briefly summarize the context and the specifics of the Syrian case.

Back to the future

Contrary to Tunisia and Egypt, which both share a pretty high degree of religious and ethnic homogeneity, despite the presence of a Christian Copt minority in the latter case, Syria used to be both a multi-ethnic and a multi-confessional State in which Sunni Arabs only represented roughly 60-65 % of the population. In other words, it is a State whose various minorities, whether religious (Alawis, Christian, Shia, Druze) or ethnic (Kurds and Assyrians for example) totalized over a third of the population.

It is also a country whose ruling Alawi minority has a history of persecution by Arab Sunnis, dating back to a 14th century "fatwa" by Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, which still fuels a sense of paranoia and schizophrenia among Alawis today, whenever the mere idea of power sharing with the Sunni majority is being considered. This "fatwa" is still valid today and applied very much to the letter when Fundamentalist brigades of the "Free Syrian Army" deal with Alawi soldiers, not to speak of the treatment prisoners or even civilians receive at the hands of Al Qaeda's "Jahbat al-Nusra" or ISIS. To these foes, Alawis are apostates at best, probably worse than Iraqi Twelver Shia, and deserve to be put to the sword without mercy.

To the first wave of peaceful demonstrations that took place in March 2011, the Baathist regime of Damascus replied with the brutal ferocity that is the trade mark of authoritarian regimes trying to nip in the bud any attempt at social or political emancipation. Claims of that sort have been heard over and over again on CNN, the BBC and other networks, and while they're not exactly false, they don't tell the whole story either.

The "Long campaign of terror"

Indeed, to many among the Alawis, especially in the security forces, the current civil war hasn't begun in March 2011, but during the "long campaign of terror" that started in 1976. Back then, the "Muslim Brotherhood" – spiritual ancestors to many of the Fundamentalist groups among the Syrian rebels – kicked off a campaign of political assassinations, with the help of various sponsors, some of whom are probably behind the insurgents of today's.

The campaign escalated after the slaughter of the Alawi cadets at Aleppo's Artillery School. Having rounded up the barracks, the attackers – a spin off group of the "Muslim Brotherhood" – proceeded to sort out the cadets according to their faith and took it upon themselves to butcher the about 80 Alawis they had found out.  A scene that could just as well have happened anywhere in Syria today, as  part of the bloody routine of the current civil war …

The massacre of the cadets marked the kick-off for a large scale onslaught on the regime, with guerrilla attacks and targeted assassinations of Baathists and Alawis taken to another level. The security forces replied as could be expected, trying the crush the uprising with overwhelming military force, but after a failed assassination attempt of President Hafez el-Assad, in 1980, the army under the command of Hafez' brother Rifaat decided to put a bloody end to the rebellion, whatever the costs.

In June 1980, they gunned down around 1200 Islamist inmates at the Prison in Palmyra. In August, they randomly picked 80 residents of an Aleppo neighbourhood, where soldiers had been attacked, and shot them. The "tit for tat" killing spree continued with the Muslim Brotherhood answering with car bombs and more assassinations, until the conflict reached its climax and bloody end with the siege of Hama.

Hama ...

Taking the Army and security forces by surprise, the "Muslim Brotherhood" was able to seize control of the city, a traditional Islamist stronghold, in February 1982, and proceeded to kill or execute anybody with potential links to the regime or the Alawi community. But the hammer was about to come down on Hama in such a way that neither the city nor the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Syria would recover from it until … well until 2011 if you ask the Alawis.

What happened in Hama in February 1982 would go down in history books as the "Hama Massacre" and in truth, there's no other way to describe it, despite around one thousand Syrian military being also among the casualties. The city was levelled to the ground by artillery fire and a subsequent systematic assault by Rifaat al-Assads troops made sure none of the insurgents escaped. But scores of civilians also lay among the dead, which numbered between 10 000 and 20 000, depending on the sources.

In the Middle-East, people don't forget easily and while the destruction of the "Muslim Brotherhood" in Syria was finally achieved through this operation, the ghosts of Hama continued to haunt the memories on both sides. The "long campaign of terror" was over by the end 1982, but the country never went back to the way it had been before, and it's with images of Hama and the cadets of Aleppo in mind that both sides probably jumped head first into the trap of the civil war.

Early Days of the "Syrian Spring"

The Syrian version of the "Arab Spring" started off not in the capital city, like it had in Tunisia and Egypt, not even in a major regional city, like in Libya, but in Deraa, a small desert town on the border to Jordan. Arguing that this was merely a coincidence would be both futile and naïve. Deraa was one of the clandestine hotbeds of Fundamentalism during the early 2000s, a place used largely to funnel fighters to Iraq after the start of operation "Iraqi Freedom", all of this with tacit knowledge of the Baathist regime.

It's now an open secret that the planning for regime change through mass upheavals, strikes and demonstrations that should have put the Assad regime on its knees, started as early as 2009, as has been publicly acknowledged by former French foreign minister, Roland Dumas. One might even argue that the Al Qaeda networks established in Syria as a logistical base to fight the US in Iraq were also reactivated by their sponsors in the Gulf when the need for it became apparent. 

Needless to say also that the geopolitical implications of the alliance between Damascus and Tehran – the so-called "Shia Crescent", reaching as far as South Lebanon through "Hezbollah" – was a serious thorn in the side of the whole Neo-Con establishment in D.C. and any attempt at breaking up this continuum did probably get their approval and full support, after it became clear that the US were on their way out of Iraq.

The probably expected reaction of Damascus at the demonstrations in Deraa, in March 2011, with local police firing indiscriminately into the crowds, opened the way to phase two of an operation in which genuine Syrian democrats and credible opposition figures didn't have their say.

Reality Check

The opinions that mattered in D.C., Ryadh and Doha were those of long time exiles and retired generals whose authority depended more on Saudi or Qatari money and US weapons, rather than on genuine support among ordinary Syrians, regardless of their faith. Nonetheless, the conditions for the narrative of a legitimate armed insurrection against the blood-thirsty tyrant Bashar al-Assad were being put in place and the media and propaganda machinery went ahead full speed.

This time however, the one dimensional thinking that prevails now in Arlington and Langley did not have the desired effect. Bashar al-Assad and his Alawi regime were not defeated in a matter of weeks by the pro-democracy forces of the "Free Syrian Army", a sort of Middle-Eastern equivalent to the peasant armies of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, with less charismatic leaders and much less numbers and determination …

The story that was being fed through every major network in the Western hemisphere during most of 2011 and 2012 was basically nothing more than a pipe dream, designed to be served to public opinion as the politically correct version of what was going on between Damascus and Aleppo. The old "good vs bad", "us against them", "democracy vs tyranny" or "civilisation vs Evil" still had enough traction to keep people guessing, but when it really mattered, after the alleged Chemical Weapons attack in East Ghouta, in August 2013, the "red line" drawn in the sand by President Obama became just that, a line in the sand blown away by the Shamal winds of the Middle-East. It probably also helped that this time, part of political and military establishment that still had a few ounces of common sense said "no" to what looked dangerously close to another Gulf of Tonkin incident.

After Ghouta, the masks – and the gloves – definitely came off. Tens of thousands had already been killed, on both sides, but driven by the obsessional desire to oust Bashar al-Assad, the West and their Gulf allies unleashed their most fearsome weapon onto the Damascus regime. Unleashing, in this context, should be taken figuratively, as neither the US, nor any of the Middle-Eastern powers that had influence over the Islamist insurgents, had actually enough control to reign in these organisations, once they had smelled blood.

ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra enter the fray

As in any conflict in which local, regional and global actors have a role to play, the reasons for an organisation such as ISIS to enter the theatre of war may be manifold, sometimes even contradictory. These reasons shall be addressed in the coming third piece on Abubakr al-Baghdadi's "Islamic State". In the meantime, we shall focus on the gradually stronger attraction the Syrian civil war had on ISIS, with the ensuing consequences. 

Reflecting on the history of the Middle-East, there are numerous examples one could compare ISIS with, whether rightly or not. Regarding the Syrian situation however, it's difficult not to see some kind of mirror effect at work here, a reflection of the old rivalry that existed between the Umayyad dynasties of Damascus and the Abassids of Baghdad.

And in a not so distant past, the antagonism between the Syrian and Iraqi branches of the Baath party, which were one of the reasons behind the "long campaign of terror" of the late 1970s and early 1980s, could also be considered the expression of a deeper conflict for political and religious leadership in this part of the Middle-East, even though the Baath party was actually established by an Orthodox Christian.

The War goes viral

Be that as it may, by the time the peaceful revolution in Syria had escalated into a civil war that went viral within a few months, Al Qaeda chose to open a new front in the area, probably realizing the potential this conflict might have towards achieving its long term goals. At that time, somewhere in the middle of 2011, the "Islamic State in Iraq" didn’t regard Syria as a priority, engaged as it was in a full-scale attack on the official Iraqi State and its Shia rulers.

But Ayman Al-Zawahiri managed to convinced ISI's new leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi to send a small group of loyal jihadis into Syria, to build up a fighting force capable of confronting the Syrian Arab Army. Thus, it was al-Baghdadi's men, lead by Abu Mohamed al-Golani, for years a loyal follower of Ossama Bin Laden, who started the "Support front for the people of Greater Syria", better known as "Jabhat al-Nusra".

Al Qaeda central sent in reinforcements from its strongholds in Pakistan, and encouraged other groups with allegiance to Zawahiri to join in the fight, but the whole operation remained under the tactical, operational and logistical command of the "Islamic State in Iraq". 

The influx of foreign fighters joining "Jabhat al-Nusra" rapidly exceeded expectations. In the wake of the Arab Spring, scores of young men from Tunisia, Egypt,  Marocco, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, but also Chechnya, Somalia and even Europe or North America tried to join ranks with the new and combative Al Qaeda franchise that was trying to rid the Middle-East of an apostate and tyrant.

The Deepening Rift between ISI and Al Qaeda

At that point, ISI's leaders had already realized that what had initially looked like a diversion from their priority  goals in Iraq might entail strategic advantages of a potentially unimaginable scale. Abubakr al-Baghdadi, not a man to tolerate dissent within his organisation, tried to tighten his grip on Syria. In April 2013, he officially stated his will to be put in charge of all of Al Qaeda's operations in Iraq and Syria, when he changed the name of his organisation from "Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI) to "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (ISIS). However, the leader  of "Jabhat al-Nusra", the aforementioned Abu Mohamed al-Golani, stood by his oath of allegiance to Al Qaeda.

Tensions escalated and led to infighting between both branches of the Jihadi movement, with ISIS now gradually taking the upper hand. To Al Qaeda and its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, the growing appetite of the "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" was something he had seen coming for a number of years.

Even though he was now compelled to work hand in hand with ISIS on Syria, for logistical reasons, al-Zawahiri – and before him Ossama Bin Laden – had distanced themselves from the jihadi groups in Iraq as early as 2006, when Bin Laden had announced the dissolution of the ISI predecessor organisation "Al Qaeda in Iraq". Back then, the sheikh had not only voiced concern over some of the brutal tactics employed by his subordinates, but had also sensed that the center of gravity of global jihad might shift towards Mesopotamia.

Furthermore, a 2006 report by the RAND-Corporation strengthened Al Qaeda's leadership in the idea that the US might also try and split up their organisation into smaller groups having no more than regional reach, thus making it easier for the US to destroy them. As the report clearly states: "Contradictions inevitably arise between the global vision promulgated by a movement's theoreticians and the national agendas that many local cadres naturally pursue. Exploiting this friction could be part of an effective Western counterinsurgency".

What had implicitly been on Zawahiri's mind for several years finally became reality when he was confronted by ISIS' claim for leadership in both Iraq and Syria. And the personality of Abubakr al-Baghdadi certainly didn't help dissipate any doubts Al Qaeda had about the loyalty of the Iraqi. As early as 2005, when al-Baghdadi was heading a small jihadi group called "Jaish al-Sunna", rumor had it he was behind the murder of other Islamist cell leaders, like "Jaish al-Rashidin", only to take over their manpower, while accusing the Americans or the Shia government of being behind the murders.

ISIS and Al Qaeda go separate ways

In late 2013, with ISI slowly gaining the upper hand in Syria, Al Qaeda attempted to mend fences in a last-ditch effort. Zawahiri sent a personal mediator to Syria, in order to bring back peace between both jihadi branches and work out some sort of agreement as to who should be in charge in each country. But al-Baghdadi had something else in mind. The mediator, Abu Khalid al-Suri, was blown to pieces in February 2014 by an ISIS suicide bomber.

Other prominent figures of ISIS who had disagreed with al-Baghdadi's move also met a violent death. Haji Bakr for example, a long-time associate of al-Baghdadi and co-founder of ISI, died a couple of days before the suicide-attack on the Al Qaeda mediator. Officially, he was killed during a fight with rival rebel groups in Northern Syria. Unofficially, he had been targeted by his own organisation, because he had voiced serious concern about the deepening rift between ISIS and Al Qaeda's "Jahbat al-Nusra".

The ISIS security chief in the region of Aleppo, Abu Ubaida al-Maghribi, met a similar fate several weeks later, when he was officially executed by the Islamic State, for reasons unspecified. Having probably been in charge of the suicide-attack of February, al-Maghribi had possibly turned into a dangerous witness. Not unlike a mafia boss, al-Baghdadi was actually cutting off loose ends.

With such strong "statements" having been made, Ayman al-Zawahiri had no choice but to disavow any connection between Al Qaeda and ISIS. In Syria, the break-up between the Islamic State and "Jahbat al-Nusra" was now consummate, thus giving al-Baghdadi a free hand in his grasp for Statehood.

Comments

[turcopolier]

Patrick Bahzad

A wonderful piece. I would add to the list of MB attacks on the SAG after Hama the several car bomb attacks on public buildings in which the assailant drove into the lobbies of the building before detonation. pl

[anna-marina]

The Vineyard of the Saker's take on the US policies in the Middle East and Ukraine:
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com/2015/02/seven-countries-in-five-years.html

"Unfortunately ... the US will resort to harsher means than the nazification of Ukraine, Kurdistan or muslimification of Europe or the Middle East to achieve their goals. And Putin will resist. And it looks like Turkey will defend itself too."The war to save the petrodollar is already on the way and USA are playing vabanque with the world. And stupid Europe is helping the very third time in its history."

[confusedponderer]

Indeed, a wonderful post. Thanks!

[Charles I]

Divide and conquer. . . or just divide. A tremendous post, thank you.

If only this kind of background were available to the public because for us, while reflecting on the history of the ME, its difficult to see ANYTHING but blood, hate, sand and religion

[Abu Sinan]

Great read. It might seem counter intuitive, but not all Sunnis support the uprising. I know more than a few who do not. It is not that the love Asad, it is because they are well aware of what the other option is.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Absolutely PL ! The interesting point with this MO being that it was similar to the way the U.S. embassy in Beirut was blown up in 1983 ... Strange coincidences sometimes !

[Cee]

All,

You know my thoughts on the origin is these monsters.

The following is interesting.

http://gnayabchohan.com/2015/02/18/who-the-hell-are-isis-wesley-clark-says-our-friends-and-allies-funded-isis-to-destroy-hezbollah/

[Patrick Bahzad]

You're welcome ! Count on a follow up to this essay already (hopefully soon) and possibly some piece about ISIS and Al Qaeda recruitment of westerners possibly At a later date ...

[Ishmael Zecharia]

Patrick Bahzad, SST;

IMO oil fields and Mediterranean access for the new court favorites, the Kurds, are two issues at the heart of the current conflict.

Here are two links which might be relevant to the discussion at hand:
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-kurds-kurdish-spring-david-phillips.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/iraqi-kurds_b_1912568.html

"Professor" Phillips appears to be yet another "activist" operative tasked with eliminating "anti-US" regimes. There is no reason why his machinations will fare any better than Sykes-Picot in the long run.

It will be interesting to see how the game plays out this year.

Ishmael Zechariah

[Jonathan]

I don't think this adds much but, apropos Hezbollah, the Saker has posted the full speech of Nazrallah on Feb 16th. Perhaps there is little new in it, but I was impressed by his starting with condemnation of the killings of the Coptic Christians just as I was by his condemnation of the Chalie Hebdo killings.
He is so far from the picture of Hezbollah painted in the MSM that each time I read what he says, I am surprised at how much I have been influenced by the MSM event though I know better. Here's the link to the text published by the Saker
.
http://vineyardsaker.blogspot.com.es/2015/02/hezbollah-secretary-general-nasrallah.html
.
Almost at the very beginning he says:
"However, allow me first to tackle a really grave incident. I find myself obliged to express our as well as your strong condemnation of the brutal and savage crime perpetrated by the Takfiri Daesh organization against the oppressed Egyptian workers in Libya. This crime cannot be tolerated or bore by the mind, heart, conscience, religion or humanity. In your name, we extend our condolences to their oppressed and deemed-weak families, the Egyptian people, the Egyptian government, and the Coptic Church. We also express our consolation and deep sorrow for this calamity which afflicted them. In fact, it afflicted us all - Islam and Christianity, Muslims and Christians, and every human being who has a mind, a conscience, and an intact nature. We will return to this topic again in the course of the speech."

And later in the talk he takes up the notion of 'conspiracy'

"These are new wars and fronts. Whom are they serving? For whose interest are they fighting? Here and for the first time I dare to say: Consider the "Israeli" Mossad, the CIA, and the British intelligence. Previously, we did not pose the theory of a conspiracy. But now we say let's take that into consideration.
Everything that the Takfiri current and Daesh do serves "Israel", "Israel's" hegemony over the region, and the US hegemony over the region."

[Babak Makkinejad]

Yup, create another state out of Kurds and watch it become a failed state over-night; just like South Sudan.

[Ex–PFC Chuck]

Thank you, Patrick!

[Fred82]

Patrick,

This is truly amazing stuff.

Now, approximately how many AQ members or personnel from "elite" al Qaida units have defected to ISIS?

And how successful has ISIS been in recruiting ex Syrian military and intelligence personnel?

[Patrick Bahzad]

Thx for the links Ishmael ! I didn't know this Prof. Philipps, but from what I gathered he thinks the Kurds are now America's best friends in the region ... sure, why not ! After having tried every other option, I guess it is time for a "strategic" alliance with the Kurds. I'm sure America's friends in Ankara were thrilled when they heard about this.
I'll get more into the stakes for the regional powers in my next piece about the Islamic State.

[The Beaver]

@ PB

That's what some people in Israel is pushing for :
here is an example :
http://mida.org.il/2014/08/14/israelis-ones-kurds-trust/
and the mantra that we hear and read:
"It is a society that rejects religious zealotry. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslim and one can hear the five-times-a-day Muslim call to prayer, but it is muted and ignored by most.

Like Israel, Kurdistan is more democratic than any of its neighbors. Like Israel, Kurdistan is surrounded by enemies that wish it did not exist. Like Israel, Kurdistan looks West. And like Israel, Kurdistan has maintained an internal equilibrium though all the world betrays it."

and picked up by Jpost also:
http://www.jpost.com/Experts/The-Kurds-and-Israel-Straws-in-the-wind-361248

However, it is ironic that it was Comverse Infosys who gave Turkey via the Israeli govt or Mossad the location of the PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya back in 1999.

[Patrick Bahzad]

In reply to both your questions:
- difficult to give realistic numbers about defections, because of general lack of [reliable] information about what goes on on the ground in Syria. It's safe to say though that ISIS has gained a lot more influence especially, among the foreign fighters. According to some estimates around 40% of JaN personnel defected to ISIS after Caliphate proclamation, but the situation is fluid, things can change quickly and individuals - particularly among small brigades - can join another group, so I wouldn't venture into any personnal estimate of defection towards ISIS. At the moment, they have certainly gained in strength as opposed to JaN, which is still a very structured and consistent force. That's all I can say with certainty;
- regarding second question, plenty of defectors from Syrian military (SAA) joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the early stages of the uprising. Ever since the war has reached its current intensity level, with a polarization of allegiance on both sides, things have stabilized, meaning the number of Syrian army defectors to ISIS is close to zero (unless they have a death wish). ISIS has been much more successful with recruitment of ex-Iraqi military.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Thx for the links ! I will have a look ... but it seems in line with traditional Israeli foreign policy in the region, i.e. looking for alliances with actors on the periphery of the area that's of interest to Tel Aviv, with possibility of a "back door" entrance into hostile countries or as a platform for long distance power projection, which isn't something they're very comfortable with.
Now that they blew it with Turkey and still are on a counter-productive collision course with Iran, there aren't many options left. Kenya is one in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia maybe too), links with Caucasus republics like Azerbaijan and Georgia are being strengthened, but in the ME itself, the Kurdish regions are about the only thing left, other than genuine insurgent groups.

[Charles I]

Patrick, apropos of our apocalyptic angle discussions and your, and others I now recall, the references to the secular Baathist element, the disbanded Iraqi officer element evident in initial ISIS success, how do these 'secular' warriors view the barbarism being employed?

[Patrick Bahzad]

I think the Baathist element in ISIS sees this barbarism in a very pragmatic way, as means to achieve political domination over a territory and it's population through terror and fear. It's nothing new to them, that's how they managed to quell any unrest in the days of Saddam Hussein (remember how they broke the Shia and Kurdish uprising after operation "desert storm" ?) ... Those of the former Baathist who have found comfort in salafi faith will refer to passages of the Quran suggesting to terrorize the enemy in the early stages of battle until he submits.
Overall however I think this debate about ISIS' barbaric acts is blown out of proportions and is not the real issue. Usually in any war, especially a civil war, atrocities are being committed. Nowadays these atrocities are also used more and more as a propaganda tool on both sides. But I don't seem to recall anybody protesting against the use of white phosphorus as incendiary weapon by the Marines in Fallujah ...

[The Beaver]

@ PB

With respect to Roland Dumas, he has been involved in quite a few "magouilles" under Mitterand ( sorry in French) and most probably during the Cohabitation :
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affaire_des_otages_du_Liban

And he figures prominently in this episode also: The merc for the secret services - the journalist , hostage , agent and diplomat: Roger Auque

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4627312,00.html

[Patrick Bahzad]

I think the most controversial episode in Dumas' career was the weapons sales to Taiwan in the early 1990s. I'm not aware of his personal involvement in the hostage crisis in Lebanon though.
in any case I don't think it hurts the credibility of his public statements regarding Syria. I only mentioned him because his interview can still be found on YouTube but there are enough other statements by public figures with the same baseline

[Charles I]

I think you're right about war, proportions and real issues, that focus obscures the larger picture, which has so many moving parts we need to be cognizant of.

It takes me a bit to separate the fighting and reporting from the analysis and prognostication of wtf is actually going on and is to come.

W/r/t white phosphorous, etc, we just went through this parsing barrel bomb vs bomb. It does seem to work though, one can read analysis that the horrors inflicted on the Jordanian pilot were symbolic of and analgous to a drone strike explosion and building collapse in support of the plaint that when a state with uniforms and high tech does it its war and when a tinted local irregular does it its barbaric terror.

[Poul]

Turkey have evacuated the tomb of Suleyman Shah. Apparently they don't trust IS not to attack and defile the grave.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/22/us-syria-crisis-turkey-idUSKBN0LQ03U20150222