Any move to retake Mosul requires a much higher level of Iraqi Army (IA), Kurdish peshmerga and Coalition capability, planning and coordination than has been seen to date. Given the lack of alignment on strategy, much less tactics, between these three groups combined with ongoing leadership and combat power issues in each I’d suggest that any move towards Mosul would not occur any time soon. If it did move early, great effort would be needed to ensure sufficient application of combat power and logistical support to the forces involved, and the ability to protect its logistics tail (lines of communication). And it would likely be a slow process unless Coalition forces were engaged to strike key centers of gravity / leadership targets that resulted in a cascade of effects on Daesh forces in Mosul – something not necessarily a high likelihood. Should Daesh choose to stand and fight in an urban environment any engaging force – in particular one split politically and lacking experience and capacity – would find it tough going. Should Daesh withdraw, they would still retain significant presence and disruptive capacity in Iraq, with elements returning to Syria and others reinforcing operations in Anbar. In other words, they would remain a very real threat, one that has significant presence and support. And, absent an even-handed approach to managing post-attack governance in Mosul, revenge killings and harassment against the population by Shia militias and Kurdish forces would set the stage for ongoing conflict.
Of great concern is that the cost to Mosul and Mosulawis would be significant due to the effects of firepower and ethno-sectarian targeting in the urban battlespace. Indeed, it would seem that the public commentary is misdirecting from this and other issues. What needs to be understood on this point is that the Shia government and the various militias involved care little for the welfare of the city’s people, and they have no issue if it is reduced to rubble. While perhaps not at first, the Shia government may see more the potential to grind Daesh down over time with Syrian forces and irregulars (the Shahiba) and their Iraqi counterparts creating a hammer and anvil that will eventually crush the Sunni middle, or at least keep that middle from emerging as a genuine Sunni power center able to threaten Shia interests (to include Iran’s). This type of attitude was made clear to me by a friend who was recently in Najaf with the Hawza – the Shia clerics seemed to see the creation of buffer zones between Baghdad and the south central / southern provinces as sufficient and the lives of those in the buffer zones of little consequence, with Najaf blossoming again as a center of religious scholarship. Discussions about returning Iraq to its pre-2003 unitary days are but a wistful dream of some, and totally divorced from reality. Then, of course, there is the politics of it. Mosul, as is broader Ninevah, is an ancient place quite distinct from the rest of Iraq, with major tribal (ex. the Shammar), ethnic, sectarian and communal interests intertwined throughout. It is also a place where the majority of the Saddam-era senior officer corps emanated, and was the place where Saddam’s sons were killed. In the aftermath of 2003 the Kurds attempted to hold Mosul and its outer suburbs, but were pushed out politically and militarily by Sunni Arab Iraqis. At the same time, Mosul since 2004 has not really been under central government (or provincial government) control. At times it was under the sway of neo-Baath insurgents, with only the US military able to provide credible counter-insurgency, counter-terrorist capabilities – those capabilities are no longer of course. And, on an incident count level, Mosul and greater Ninevah were always in the top 1-3 for weekly security counts as far back as I can remember (Note: I was working between Mosul, Kirkuk and Irbil in 2003-4). Another question is why would the Kurds want to expend their combat power on retaking Mosul when holding onto Kirkuk and defending the expanded borders of Kurdistan is their priority (as is the hoarding of new weaponry for use in any future Arab - Kurdish war)? Of course, the history of Kurdish over-reach is long, as the comments by Kurdish nationalists underscore (they see much of Iraq and Syria as part of their homeland), and the pressure from the US seems to be growing, but Irbil would be foolish to fully commit to such a project. If the Kurds did go forward, they would be better served by letting the IA and Coalition take the lead, and use their involvement to secure control over the areas east, north and Northwest of Mosul to strengthen Kurdistan’s land border with Syria (and the Syrian Kurds) and to support control over oilfields in the area. Any attempt by the Kurds to hold onto power in Mosul would be another seed of a future Arab – Kurdish war. Lastly, it is the Shia sectarian vision combined with an unwillingness to accept second tier status by the Sunnis and the Kurds’ drive to maximize their gains – a true zero sum game – that is underpinning conflict (see work by Joel Rayburn). Ethno-sectarianism has become the framework of action through which the elites compete for power, and that is usurping pre-2003 conceptions of individual and group identity. Some compare Iraq to the Balkans with respect to fragmentation and its effects, but we might also consider the bloody period / experience of partition in the India – Pakistan context, and the bloodshed that still ensues.