THE "HYBRID" TERROR CELL BEHIND THE PARIS ATTACKS: How it all began (1)

By Patrick BAHZAD

Less than a week has passed since the deadly terror attacks in Paris and intelligence agencies in France and around the world are probably still scratching their heads in disbelief, at what might have possibly been the first "joint" attack by a hybrid AQ-ISIS cell in a Western country.

Saïd Kouachi (aged 34) and his brother Sherif (aged 32) attacked the French newspaper "Charlie Hebdo" on Wednesday, January 7th, killing 12 people, and claimed right away they were acting in the name of "Al Qaeda in Yemen" (aka AQAP – Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula), a local branch of AQ central and long-time home to infamously notorious US cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Both brothers died in a final shoot-out with French special forces two days later.

While the Kouachi brothers started their deadly attacks, one of their associates prepared another wave of attacks and went about his bloody work on Thursday the 8th, one day after the "Charlie Hebdo" attack. Amedy Coulibaly (aged 32) ambushed two police officers in central Paris, killing one and seriously injuring another, before managing to escape and finally deciding to launch a synchronised assault on a Kosher supermarket in Eastern Paris, on Friday the 9th, just as his terrorist buddies were being cornered by French SWAT, a few miles further north.

He managed to shoot and kill four Jewish customers as he made his entry into the store, and was finally killed almost at the same time as the Kouachi brothers, as French SWAT stormed the building. In a phone call made during the "siege" he stated very clearly he was acting in the name of ISIS and had pledged allegiance to its "Caliph", Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In a video that surfaced on jihadi social media two days after he was shot and killed by police, he reiterated these statements.

AQ and ISIS collusion ?

Now to some, it may not seem surprising that two jihadi terrorist organisations with the same agenda, similar methods and a common hatred for the West would join forces and try and strike a blow to the "enemy". However, Al Qaeda and ISIS have not been on good terms for a couple of years and have actually never staged a joint terrorist attack in the West.

ISIS had started as a local offspring of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and later in Syria, but a rift between leaders of both groups appeared soon afterwards, and the now notorious Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decided to split from Al Qaeda’s central leadership and start his own thing. We all know what ISIS became in the months and years that followed. Relations between both groups have been tense ever since on the ground in Syria, where they are fighting a common enemy in the person of Syria's Bashar al-Assad, but there have been scuffles and shoot-outs between ISIS militants and Jahbat al-Nusra fighters (Al Qaeda's franchise there), with casualties on both sides. Furthermore, in Iraq itself, it now seems that this is Baghdadi's show only, as ISIS is trying to consolidate the ground it gained there and defend it against the US-led coalition.

That is, in brief, the reason why some analysts, experts and intelligence officers must be perplexed at the picture of the two main competitors for leadership in global jihad having possibly staged a joint attack, uniting assets and resources of both organisations in an effort to strike the "Crusaders".

But of course, the first question that needs to be asked is about the credibility of any claims made both by the terrorists and the organisations they pledged allegiance to. At the moment, it is obviously impossible to say with any certainty if these claims indeed reflect the truth. But if one looks not only at the statements and videos issued, but also the respective MO of the attackers, the evidence found in their cars and homes, as well as the way in which both ISIS and AQ acknowledged their actions, a picture is starting to emerge that makes this prospect look like a distinct possibility.

The fact that police and intelligence agencies in various countries are now also trying to piece together the puzzle of these three men's movements over the years, their connections to other jihadi militants or radical fundamentalist preachers also points to a desperate search not only for the puppet masters who are behind these attacks but an answer to the question that has everyone on their toes: could AQ and ISIS possibly have acted jointly on this one?

Details of the current investigation can't be discussed of course, and are obviously beyond the reach of the author of this piece, but looking back at the lives of the three attackers and connecting the dots between them and other jihadis who are well known and well connected to them makes for a very interesting insight into the small world of French, and maybe European or even global islamic terrorism.

The "post 9/11" jihadi network in Paris

Going back to how it all began would take us far back into the mid-1990s, back to some unsavoury characters whose names are still known to us today. However, that would over-complicate things for a short piece such as this, so let's focus on the main players and how they turned out to be what they became.

After the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003, a radical cleric in the Paris’s 19th district gathered a small crowd of followers around him and started doing what he does best: indoctrinating disgruntled Muslim youths, feeding their hatred for the West with inflammatory speeches and references to the holy Quran. Soon, an informal network was formed, funnelling money and fighters into Iraq. Sherif Kouachi, one of the two attackers on "Charlie Hebdo", was the leader of this network. Up until then, he had been growing up in foster homes with his brother Saïd, before being moving to Paris and working as a pizza-delivery boy, and occasional petty criminal and thief. But the calls made to help his oppressed brothers in Iraq stirred something inside him. He would never join in on the ground, in Fallujah or elsewhere, leaving it to others to do the fighting, but he would get more and more involved in organising things from France. Several of his associates however, left France and joined Al Qaeda in Iraq, taking part in the battles for Fallujah, some of them ending up as suicide bombers, others coming back maimed for life, but with the aura of a fighter and more determined than ever before to keep on fighting.

In 2005, French police managed to put an end to became known as the "Buttes-Chaumont" network, named after the area of Paris in which they come to jog or get together. Seven men, among them Sherif Kouachi were imprisoned and later sentenced for their involvement in this network. Interestingly, the older Kouachi brother ­– Saïd – was not among them, even though he was already known for his radical beliefs.
While in prison, Sherif Kouachi continued his indoctrination and radicalisation, the only difference being that now he could get in touch with the "big boys" of radical Islam. He got promoted to the big league of global jihad behind prison bars, which is the sad truth behind the story of many European-born would be jihadis, who get in to jail as small fish in a big pond and get out with a sense of purpose and determination they might not have had before.

Prison as an Al Qaeda recruitment ground

The man who's going to make all the difference in Sherif Kouachi's life is the Algerian-French Djamel Beghal, then serving time in the same prison for his attempt at blowing up the US embassy in Paris in 2001. The encounter with Beghal is a major step up for Sherif Kouachi. In the 1990s, Beghal has lived in the United Kingdom and has been a frequent visitor to London's Finsbury mosque, home to figures such as the infamous hate preacher Abu Hamza, who was extradited to the US in October 2012 on charges of hostage taking, conspiracy to establish a militant training camp and calling for holy war.

Beghal had initially been a member of "Jama'at al-Muslimin" (aka "Takfir-wal-Hijra"), an organisation so radical in its views and actions that even Osama Bin Laden distanced himself from them. But for several years in the 1990s and early 2000s it is believed that Beghal acted as a recruitment agent and organiser of Al Qaeda cells in various European countries.

By the time he met Sherif Kouachi in the French prison of Fresnes, in 2005, Beghal had been jailed for 5 years already. He finally got out in 2009, before causing trouble and being incarcerated again in 2010. However, it was in the years 2005 and 2006, while Kouachi was serving his sentence, that Beghal guided him on the path towards global jihad. Interestingly, another of the Paris terrorists was also jailed in the same prison: Amedy Coulibaly, the hostage taker of the Jewish supermarket in Paris.

Making new "friends" in jail

By the mid-2000s, Coulibaly was nothing but a thug, drug dealer and bank robber. He had already been sentenced for several robberies or attempted robberies when he met the other two in the Fresnes prison, and had no background in radical islam. He actually only converted to the "takfiri" brand of Islam during or after another stay in prison, in 2007-2008.

But Coulibaly was by no means the only small-time thug that Beghal, Kouachi and his associates from the "Buttes Chaumont" network met in jail. Prison is a small world. And for jihadis in prison, it is an even smaller world... And there was yet another man in that same prison who, just like Coulibaly, was not a radical at that time, but would turn out to be on the US "most wanted" list in 2014: Salim Benghalem, a gang member, sentenced to 10 years for homicide.

At the time, in 2005-2006, Benghalem was a nobody in the world of Al Qaeda, and ISIS didn’t even exist back then. But Benghalem shared a cell with a friend of Kouachi, a man who had wedged war on the American "infidels" in Iraq, a man who had taken part in the battle in Fallujah, who was injured three times in combat and who'd lost an eye and an arm on the battlefield. Benghalem, no doubt, looked up to his cell mate and buys into the romanticised "war veteran" stories . . . Once he'd bought into it, there's also Beghal the ideologist, who was going to finish the job, bringing him over to the "Dark side".

In this regard, Benghalem and Coulibaly can be seen as two perfect examples of the interaction between jihadi indoctrination of what were originally crooks, thieves bank robbers or gang members ... in short, criminals with no radical pasts, but a "bright" future in Al Qaeda's or ISIS fight against the West. Both these men, Benghalem and Coulibaly, met each other and became friends in prison. Their paths would cross each other several times after and they probably always stayed in touch, ever since jail time.

Why is this so crucial ? Benghalem's name may not ring a bell to many, but in the intelligence community, red lights go on as soon as his name is mentioned: in September 2014, the US State Department put him on a list of 10 "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" under Executive Order 13224. In other words, he's one of the 10 most wanted foreign terrorists the US is looking for.

Having fled France in 2012 after he was released from jail, now with a strong ideological foundation, after the years spent with Beghal, Kouachi, Coulibaly and co., he went to Syria and joined ISIS, rising to prominence in the terrorist organisation through his accomplishments as fighter, executioner and henchman ... This link between the now-infamous ISIS terrorist, Salim Benghalem, and his then prison buddies Coulibaly and Kouachi may later prove crucial in the explanation and answer to the question about Al Qaeda and ISIS collusion in the Paris attacks.

Back to "business"

But we've only reached as far as 2010 now and nothing regarding the Paris attacks is in the pipeline at that time. The stage however, has been set for act two in the build-up to last week's tragedy. The main players are now all islamic radicals, ready to move into action, ready for the "adventure" of global jihad. Some of them may still have been in jail in 2010, but soon they would be getting out and starting to plot again, under the leadership of Beghal, the former Al Qaeda recruiter and terrorist cell organiser.

Strangely, one central figure of the Paris attacks, Sherif Kouachi's older brother Said, has never been suspected or arrested of anything at that point. He had passed totally under the radar of all the intelligence agencies. But that was going to change soon afterwards, as he too was finally going to cross the Rubicon and meet his "spiritual leader" in Yemen ... a leader no other than Anwar al-Awlaki, the US-born cleric, who preached to three of the 9/11 hijackers, had extensive e-mail exchanges with Fort Hood mass killer, Malik Hasan, and coached Umar Faruk Addulmatallab, the so-called "underwear bomber" who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines Flight in 2009.

Now comes the time when all these players definitely enter the big league, and they're intend on making a lasting impression ...

Comments

[Akira]

The strategy behind this attack appears to be the work of Al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri.

https://sites.google.com/site/jihadismstudiesnet/publications/architect-of-global-jihad

[Patrick Bahzad]

Abu Musab al-Suri's strategy of "nizam, la tanzim" (structure, not organization) could be seen as a blue print for this type of operation, but this could be said of other attacks as well that aren't the work of AQ. Even Gen. Wesley Clarke's assessment of the tactics used for 9/11: "low technology, high concept" are a variation of the same idea.
Thus I don't think there's too much to be read into al-Suri's strategy in relation to the Paris terror attacks.

[C L]

It strikes me that the inter-jihadi squabbles lose their importance once outside the middle east or 'areas of jihadi dominance'
It could be that the western born Jihadis find it just as complex & difficult as us to understand the nuanced theological/allegiance differences between the various jihadi groups. Thus pledging to any jihadi group is pledging to the movement as a whole.

It could be that far from their base of support the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend, doctrine kicks in.
What does seem clear is their desire to go out in a blaze of glory, to gain post-mortem recognition from their jihadi-movement peers and whatever rewards? they expect to reap in an afterlife?.

The Kaouchi brothers attack was so poorly planned that it succeeded by element of surprise and audacity, the brothers probably being the most surprised by their success than anyone, hence the chaotic manhunt and last stand, they had no plan and improvised to the end which makes those pursuing them left in the dark since logic can't be applied in the chase. The lack of planning meant there was no plan to be discovered in advance by security forces.

The Coulibaly attack was piggybacking on the Kaochi success. He chose spontaneously to participate after the security forces started looking for all known associates of the brothers, him included. His attack was even less planned than the brothers. He randomly shot cops who he probably perceived as a threat then attacked a soft jewish target without any preparation. He had no idea of the layout, egresses or an exit plan except for the 'blaze of glory' scenario. Was this a last stand to buy time for the wife to escape?

I highly doubt any coordination between the parties or their jihadi 'mentors' and affiliates The perpetrators allegiance was to the jihadi movement and their own perceived self-worth through the lens of indoctrination they received by choice.

The jihadi movement intra-fighting reminds me of a remark by Lenny Bruce (I think) on the Irish troubles: 'In the absence of jews and blacks the irish will improvise'

[confusedponderer]

There is something to what you write. The attacks struck me as chaotic also. Yes, the had an RPG, they had learned some shooting.

Clarke on tv said that the shot clustering that could be seen on one car in which the brothers murdered a cop indicated training.

Yes, it does. That said, I was a consript and when I made my Schützenschnur, I shot like that with the machine gun. I was not highly trained, I was a signaller.

When one compares these attacks with the 2004 Madrid bombing and the 2005 tube bombings the comparably lower lethality is striking. Good for the French.

[William R. Cumming]

Anyone notice MSM now limiting use of word "terrorist" until they find a link to ISLSAM? Is this propaganda? Supported by US government?

No longer my "terrorist" your "freedom fighter"?

[Patrick Bahzad]

You're raising several points to which there can be several, different answers, that's what the investigation is going to be about ... as well as analysing possible blunders and lapses in intelligence. My take on it:
1. allegiance to any group that's part of the movement is up for individuals to decide, but could also be seen as having priviledged links to members of said group.
2. poorly planned attack on Charlie Hebdo, maybe, but this could also be considered a tactic that has been promoted by the group they claim affiliation too.
3. coordination between individuals involved makes absolutely no doubt, what needs to be explored is how much coordination was there with their handlers in AQ and ISIS (if they had any) and if there was any form of coordination at a central level between these two organisations (much less likely indeed).
But more about those points in part 2 of this piece !

[jr786]

"In order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel and red men scalped each other by the great lakes of North America."

Rightly or wrongly, I take Macauley's comment on Frederick the Great as a useful rule for understanding the difference between strategy and tactics, understanding that no analogy is perfect.

What I don't get here is what al-qaeda 'might' do based on the operation carried out by its followers. I see tactics, but can't grasp any of the potential strategies (recruitment, spreading terror) as making best use of what must be limited resources, i.e. reasonably well-trained people like the Kuoachi brothers.

[confusedponderer]

" 2. poorly planned attack on Charlie Hebdo, maybe, but this could also be considered a tactic that has been promoted by the group they claim affiliation too."

You mean this? From a security point of view - when you don't plan at all, but simply store some weapons and then improvise, there is no planning that can be detected?

[Amir]

Do you mean that the MSM has given up on being "objective"? If so, was there ever really any attempt, made by MSM, to be informative?!

[Amir]

I think the backlash against the 3rd- & 4th generation Harkis in France will be great and as a response, borderline individuals will cross the line as an act of defiance & vengeance without really caring about consequences for the self-imagined pseudo-"community".
That is a viral strategy and a goal by itself to grow the movement and respond at the same time.

[Amir]

Or no longer my "freedom of speech", your "hate speech": Dieudonné interrogated by French police for his joke/hate speech (
http://www.demorgen.be/buitenland/franse-komiek-dieudonne-opgepakt-voor-verheerlijking-terrorisme-a2181516 )

[LeaNder]

C L, "What does seem clear is their desire to go out in a blaze of glory" reminds me of the virgins waiting in heaven.

What does not quite fit into that scenario, which not exactly the way the myth tells us, surely was present in the 911 case.

Notice that the presence of Bengalem, the war veteran, in Patrick's account does not quite fit into any variation of the theme.

That's why as Patrick writes a careful look into possible connections to the larger network is very important.

Simply imagine a future case in which the escape routes are planned very, very carefully relying on established networks. Or for that matter figures that have not appeared in any way on any radar so far.

***********

Big thanks to Patrick for his contribution here.

[LeaNder]

I wondered about that, while reflecting Adam Silverman's comments and the comments on others in the comment section of his own recent article here.

My admittedly not seriously checked impression is that German TV news use neutral terms, for even the recent events in Afghanistan.

[LeaNder]

Amir, it no doubt gets difficult once the inquisitional approach kicks in. I am no Dieudonné fan. But in his case taught me it may well be more dangerous than helpful to create intellectual martyrs.

[Patrick Bahzad]

That would be "one" way of looking at it, from a pragmatic perspective. I intend on getting into all these questions and considerations in a follow-up piece, but an analysis of Sherif Kouachi's computer (which had been seized during another terrorism related investigation in 2010) revealed that he had already downloaded djihadi manuals on how to conduct what they call "Sacrificial Operations" ('suicide missions' in our understanding, with 0% chance of getting out alive, but not to be mixed up with suicide bombings). The idea is to have prepared for entry into target, but not having any exit strategy other than improvisation. This in turn can be linked to the point you're making: less planning = less risk of detection

[LeaNder]

if I may slightly wander off-topic.

Have you ever reflected on the way heaven was 'sold`' to e.g. the Christians over the centuries? My mother after reading Dante's Divine Comedy was left with the impression that heaven seemed much less interesting than hell.

Personally I immediately put it into a larger box, I mentally object to. This box also contained items like sand nigger.

Here is a link:
http://wikiislam.net/wiki/72_Virgins

I somehow would put: "they love to go out in a blaze" also into this box.

Fact is, in this context that a young men with a criminal background may well feel he ultimately does not have much to loose.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I heard of an analogous case under the Dictatorial reign of the Shah:

A man overheard by a SAVAK informer was arrested and was tortured in order to discover where he had hidden then the machine guns.

The poor guy had been overheard using the popular Persian idiom: "so and so talks like a machine gun".

The SAVAK torturers eventually figured that out, the Colonel in charge of the interrogation hit the fellow with the butt of his side arm and broke his jaw; screaming: "son of a whore, why were you mistaken!"

I suppose the Shah of Iran, wherever he may be, is taking comfort in Abu Ghraib, Water-Boarding, and now this case that you have posted.

Truly deplorable...

[Mark Gaughan]

What motivates young men in France to join the jihad and commit acts of terror? Here's an article, that I found interesting, on a possible reason: http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/a_message_from_the_dispossessed_20150111

[shepherd]

Leander,

Having read more church fathers and sermons than I'd have liked, I can say that Christians were rarely sold on Heaven in any detail. They were often sold on avoiding Hell, however. Heaven in a Christian context is usually an abstract concept, a state of being rather than a place. Islamic heaven is extremely different in that it's a place to enjoy many concrete things you've been denied (or denied yourself) on earth.

[confusedponderer]

Patrick Bahzad,
really informative post btw, thanks!

[William R. Cumming]

MSM not just not objective but largely lazy, fat and stupid. But often blonde!

[Ishmael Zechariah]

Patrick Bahzad:
Re: “Having fled France in 2012 after he was released from jail, now with a strong ideological foundation, after the years spent with Beghal, Kouachi, Coulybaly and co., he went to Syria and joined ISIS, rising to prominence in the terrorist organisation through his accomplishments as fighter, executioner and henchman ...”
1-In 2013 and 2014 the current Turkish regime was sending material to the “rebels” in Syria. This was an open secret. The rat line was run by Turkish Intelligence Assets. Gendarme officers who stopped and tried to search the lorries carrying such were cashiered and prosecuted.
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26910261.asp

2-In March 2014, the “now-prime-minister” Davutoglu was outed while planning a false-flag operation to have Turkey enter in to a war with Syria, in support of the “rebels”.
http://muckrakernews.com/2014/04/turkey-plans-false-flag-war-syria/
3-Last week the said Davutoglu went to France to offer condolences and show solidarity against “terrorism”.
http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/world/turkish-pm-to-join-charlie-rally-in-paris-sunday/article/423116

Interesting factoids. Is there a narrative somewhere?

Ishmael Zechariah

[William R. Cumming]

Thanks L.! Satire can be effective when backed by intelligent analysis otherwise when just dismissive is childish, ineffective in promoting change and deeper thought IMO!

An American Herb Block used his political cartoons to advance analysis and be thought provoking. Although deceased for many years Herb's cartoon still carry a solid punch on American leadership and politics. IMO of course.

[William R. Cumming]

My view is the attacks outside MENA {middle East/N. Africa are a sideshow and its all about Islamic politics and who has power.

Could be wrong of course!

[William R. Cumming]

AGREE!