THE "HYBRID" TERROR CELL BEHIND THE PARIS ATTACKS: How it all began (1)

By Patrick BAHZAD

Less than a week has passed since the deadly terror attacks in Paris and intelligence agencies in France and around the world are probably still scratching their heads in disbelief, at what might have possibly been the first "joint" attack by a hybrid AQ-ISIS cell in a Western country.

Saïd Kouachi (aged 34) and his brother Sherif (aged 32) attacked the French newspaper "Charlie Hebdo" on Wednesday, January 7th, killing 12 people, and claimed right away they were acting in the name of "Al Qaeda in Yemen" (aka AQAP – Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula), a local branch of AQ central and long-time home to infamously notorious US cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Both brothers died in a final shoot-out with French special forces two days later.

While the Kouachi brothers started their deadly attacks, one of their associates prepared another wave of attacks and went about his bloody work on Thursday the 8th, one day after the "Charlie Hebdo" attack. Amedy Coulibaly (aged 32) ambushed two police officers in central Paris, killing one and seriously injuring another, before managing to escape and finally deciding to launch a synchronised assault on a Kosher supermarket in Eastern Paris, on Friday the 9th, just as his terrorist buddies were being cornered by French SWAT, a few miles further north.

He managed to shoot and kill four Jewish customers as he made his entry into the store, and was finally killed almost at the same time as the Kouachi brothers, as French SWAT stormed the building. In a phone call made during the "siege" he stated very clearly he was acting in the name of ISIS and had pledged allegiance to its "Caliph", Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In a video that surfaced on jihadi social media two days after he was shot and killed by police, he reiterated these statements.

AQ and ISIS collusion ?

Now to some, it may not seem surprising that two jihadi terrorist organisations with the same agenda, similar methods and a common hatred for the West would join forces and try and strike a blow to the "enemy". However, Al Qaeda and ISIS have not been on good terms for a couple of years and have actually never staged a joint terrorist attack in the West.

ISIS had started as a local offspring of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and later in Syria, but a rift between leaders of both groups appeared soon afterwards, and the now notorious Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decided to split from Al Qaeda’s central leadership and start his own thing. We all know what ISIS became in the months and years that followed. Relations between both groups have been tense ever since on the ground in Syria, where they are fighting a common enemy in the person of Syria's Bashar al-Assad, but there have been scuffles and shoot-outs between ISIS militants and Jahbat al-Nusra fighters (Al Qaeda's franchise there), with casualties on both sides. Furthermore, in Iraq itself, it now seems that this is Baghdadi's show only, as ISIS is trying to consolidate the ground it gained there and defend it against the US-led coalition.

That is, in brief, the reason why some analysts, experts and intelligence officers must be perplexed at the picture of the two main competitors for leadership in global jihad having possibly staged a joint attack, uniting assets and resources of both organisations in an effort to strike the "Crusaders".

But of course, the first question that needs to be asked is about the credibility of any claims made both by the terrorists and the organisations they pledged allegiance to. At the moment, it is obviously impossible to say with any certainty if these claims indeed reflect the truth. But if one looks not only at the statements and videos issued, but also the respective MO of the attackers, the evidence found in their cars and homes, as well as the way in which both ISIS and AQ acknowledged their actions, a picture is starting to emerge that makes this prospect look like a distinct possibility.

The fact that police and intelligence agencies in various countries are now also trying to piece together the puzzle of these three men's movements over the years, their connections to other jihadi militants or radical fundamentalist preachers also points to a desperate search not only for the puppet masters who are behind these attacks but an answer to the question that has everyone on their toes: could AQ and ISIS possibly have acted jointly on this one?

Details of the current investigation can't be discussed of course, and are obviously beyond the reach of the author of this piece, but looking back at the lives of the three attackers and connecting the dots between them and other jihadis who are well known and well connected to them makes for a very interesting insight into the small world of French, and maybe European or even global islamic terrorism.

The "post 9/11" jihadi network in Paris

Going back to how it all began would take us far back into the mid-1990s, back to some unsavoury characters whose names are still known to us today. However, that would over-complicate things for a short piece such as this, so let's focus on the main players and how they turned out to be what they became.

After the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003, a radical cleric in the Paris’s 19th district gathered a small crowd of followers around him and started doing what he does best: indoctrinating disgruntled Muslim youths, feeding their hatred for the West with inflammatory speeches and references to the holy Quran. Soon, an informal network was formed, funnelling money and fighters into Iraq. Sherif Kouachi, one of the two attackers on "Charlie Hebdo", was the leader of this network. Up until then, he had been growing up in foster homes with his brother Saïd, before being moving to Paris and working as a pizza-delivery boy, and occasional petty criminal and thief. But the calls made to help his oppressed brothers in Iraq stirred something inside him. He would never join in on the ground, in Fallujah or elsewhere, leaving it to others to do the fighting, but he would get more and more involved in organising things from France. Several of his associates however, left France and joined Al Qaeda in Iraq, taking part in the battles for Fallujah, some of them ending up as suicide bombers, others coming back maimed for life, but with the aura of a fighter and more determined than ever before to keep on fighting.

In 2005, French police managed to put an end to became known as the "Buttes-Chaumont" network, named after the area of Paris in which they come to jog or get together. Seven men, among them Sherif Kouachi were imprisoned and later sentenced for their involvement in this network. Interestingly, the older Kouachi brother ­– Saïd – was not among them, even though he was already known for his radical beliefs.
While in prison, Sherif Kouachi continued his indoctrination and radicalisation, the only difference being that now he could get in touch with the "big boys" of radical Islam. He got promoted to the big league of global jihad behind prison bars, which is the sad truth behind the story of many European-born would be jihadis, who get in to jail as small fish in a big pond and get out with a sense of purpose and determination they might not have had before.

Prison as an Al Qaeda recruitment ground

The man who's going to make all the difference in Sherif Kouachi's life is the Algerian-French Djamel Beghal, then serving time in the same prison for his attempt at blowing up the US embassy in Paris in 2001. The encounter with Beghal is a major step up for Sherif Kouachi. In the 1990s, Beghal has lived in the United Kingdom and has been a frequent visitor to London's Finsbury mosque, home to figures such as the infamous hate preacher Abu Hamza, who was extradited to the US in October 2012 on charges of hostage taking, conspiracy to establish a militant training camp and calling for holy war.

Beghal had initially been a member of "Jama'at al-Muslimin" (aka "Takfir-wal-Hijra"), an organisation so radical in its views and actions that even Osama Bin Laden distanced himself from them. But for several years in the 1990s and early 2000s it is believed that Beghal acted as a recruitment agent and organiser of Al Qaeda cells in various European countries.

By the time he met Sherif Kouachi in the French prison of Fresnes, in 2005, Beghal had been jailed for 5 years already. He finally got out in 2009, before causing trouble and being incarcerated again in 2010. However, it was in the years 2005 and 2006, while Kouachi was serving his sentence, that Beghal guided him on the path towards global jihad. Interestingly, another of the Paris terrorists was also jailed in the same prison: Amedy Coulibaly, the hostage taker of the Jewish supermarket in Paris.

Making new "friends" in jail

By the mid-2000s, Coulibaly was nothing but a thug, drug dealer and bank robber. He had already been sentenced for several robberies or attempted robberies when he met the other two in the Fresnes prison, and had no background in radical islam. He actually only converted to the "takfiri" brand of Islam during or after another stay in prison, in 2007-2008.

But Coulibaly was by no means the only small-time thug that Beghal, Kouachi and his associates from the "Buttes Chaumont" network met in jail. Prison is a small world. And for jihadis in prison, it is an even smaller world... And there was yet another man in that same prison who, just like Coulibaly, was not a radical at that time, but would turn out to be on the US "most wanted" list in 2014: Salim Benghalem, a gang member, sentenced to 10 years for homicide.

At the time, in 2005-2006, Benghalem was a nobody in the world of Al Qaeda, and ISIS didn’t even exist back then. But Benghalem shared a cell with a friend of Kouachi, a man who had wedged war on the American "infidels" in Iraq, a man who had taken part in the battle in Fallujah, who was injured three times in combat and who'd lost an eye and an arm on the battlefield. Benghalem, no doubt, looked up to his cell mate and buys into the romanticised "war veteran" stories . . . Once he'd bought into it, there's also Beghal the ideologist, who was going to finish the job, bringing him over to the "Dark side".

In this regard, Benghalem and Coulibaly can be seen as two perfect examples of the interaction between jihadi indoctrination of what were originally crooks, thieves bank robbers or gang members ... in short, criminals with no radical pasts, but a "bright" future in Al Qaeda's or ISIS fight against the West. Both these men, Benghalem and Coulibaly, met each other and became friends in prison. Their paths would cross each other several times after and they probably always stayed in touch, ever since jail time.

Why is this so crucial ? Benghalem's name may not ring a bell to many, but in the intelligence community, red lights go on as soon as his name is mentioned: in September 2014, the US State Department put him on a list of 10 "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" under Executive Order 13224. In other words, he's one of the 10 most wanted foreign terrorists the US is looking for.

Having fled France in 2012 after he was released from jail, now with a strong ideological foundation, after the years spent with Beghal, Kouachi, Coulibaly and co., he went to Syria and joined ISIS, rising to prominence in the terrorist organisation through his accomplishments as fighter, executioner and henchman ... This link between the now-infamous ISIS terrorist, Salim Benghalem, and his then prison buddies Coulibaly and Kouachi may later prove crucial in the explanation and answer to the question about Al Qaeda and ISIS collusion in the Paris attacks.

Back to "business"

But we've only reached as far as 2010 now and nothing regarding the Paris attacks is in the pipeline at that time. The stage however, has been set for act two in the build-up to last week's tragedy. The main players are now all islamic radicals, ready to move into action, ready for the "adventure" of global jihad. Some of them may still have been in jail in 2010, but soon they would be getting out and starting to plot again, under the leadership of Beghal, the former Al Qaeda recruiter and terrorist cell organiser.

Strangely, one central figure of the Paris attacks, Sherif Kouachi's older brother Said, has never been suspected or arrested of anything at that point. He had passed totally under the radar of all the intelligence agencies. But that was going to change soon afterwards, as he too was finally going to cross the Rubicon and meet his "spiritual leader" in Yemen ... a leader no other than Anwar al-Awlaki, the US-born cleric, who preached to three of the 9/11 hijackers, had extensive e-mail exchanges with Fort Hood mass killer, Malik Hasan, and coached Umar Faruk Addulmatallab, the so-called "underwear bomber" who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines Flight in 2009.

Now comes the time when all these players definitely enter the big league, and they're intend on making a lasting impression ...

Comments

[LeaNder]

Abu Sinan,

"If one looks at Germany's Muslims, mostly Turks, until recently it was almost impossible for someone with Turkish background to get a German citizenship."

The laws no doubt were changed recently. But before they were changed Turks could apply for German citizenship after 10 years as everybody else. And many did. One could complicate matters a little. Strictly some would need dual citizenship, since foreigners cannot own ground in Turkey. In other words if they accept German citizenship they may not be able to inherit their grandmas little house by the sea. I know 'Turkish families' where both father and kids are Germans but the mother still only has Turkish citizenship. Maybe for that reason. I never asked.

Of course Turkish dual citizenship was heavily exploited, since it addresses the lower jaundiced spirits of the masses, by a CDU politician, and he won the election. The 'polite circles', maybe I should use Machiavellian instead.

[LeaNder]

Would your distinction work for the 'Golden Age of Islam' too. The tolerance and cooperation between Muslim, Jews, and Christians in Spain e.g.

The scholatics were heavily inspired by the thought emanating from there. Just as the renaissance wouldn't have been impossible without the protection of Greek wisdom by Arab scholars.

Would that fit into your basic model?

What are the Makkinejad theses?

[Babak Makkinejad]

There was no Golden Age of Islam as you describe it.

The Makkinejad Theses states that the areas covered by the old Seljuk Empire have had a distinct cultural, religious, philosophical, artistic, scientific, technical, and literal identity that has persisted to this day.

This civilizational syntheses covering the modern states of Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Central Asian states as well as parts of North and Western Afghanistan is not shared by other Muslims in the world.

A corollary to the Makkinejad Theses is that accommodation with (Western) Modernity could potentially only be developed within those states that partake of this civilizational syntheses.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I do not wish to discuss the merits and demerits of Ahmadinejad - like any other Iranian or American president, I agreed with some of his policies and not others.

We cannot un-live history and I do want to speculate here - it would take too long.

I would like to point out that on the issue of Shoah, Europeans and Americans have - as the English language idiom goes, "lost" Muslims.

May be with a lot of work and pleading you can undo the damage done, but I am rather doubtful.

[Babak Makkinejad]

My point about Swabia was this:

How many centuries did it take for Germans to consider Swabians German?

I cannot expect them to be more accommodating to Muslims.

[Eric Dönges]

Babak, just what are you talking about ? Which "Germans" do you refer to ?

What is today Germany has been settled by various Germanic tribes with similar but not identical languages and culture. The idea that there is a single German nation first came up seriously during the so called "wars of liberation" against Napoleon 1813-1815. And you can rest assured that the Swabians where considered part of this nation since the idea first came up. For proof, take a look at the "Befreiungshalle" built in 1848 (see the German Wikipedia page at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Befreiungshalle, since the English page doesn't have all the pictures). The monument contains 18 statues for each of the German tribes, and the Swabians are represented (as are the Austrians and Tyroleans, who are not part of Germany today).

In my opinion, the primary reason for German xenophobia today is that it is impossible to have a mature discussion about German national identity. But unfortunately, not talking about issues doesn't make them go away.

[LeaNder]

Why do you pick out Swabia. I have no idea what you may have in mind, or what time in history:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swabia#History

The German south was 'pacified' by Bismarck, only from there on it was part of a united Germany.

Did I once mention it was difficult for me as a descendant of the 'tribe' of the Alemanni, another southern 'tribe' at least I am born there, although I grew up all over Germany, when I was thrown into Swabia at the age of nine?

I have to admit that I had problems there with the kids. A friend from there, later told me that they liked to do that too. They enormously exaggerated their dialect and since I had moved there from the North, I simply could not understand. Some of my best friends were from there later. But it was difficult, I developed a minor epilepsy at the time.

Northern people even have trouble without these child games. Friends of my parents despaired asking for directions, they finally bought a map.

But of course TV had an impact over time and moderated vernaculars too.

[The Beaver]

Abu Sinan

A good example was/is Zizou when he was still a teenager.
No one was really interested in him when he was playing football in the northern area of Marseilles and he was not good enough for the coach of the Algerian team for international cups until ... ( well everyone who loves the beautiful game knows the end of that story)

[LeaNder]

Beavor, I am not a big football fan, but I have one close to me. Thus I am mostly up to date, to the point of watching more important games, at least partly. Watching needs company. ;)

Zinedine Zidane burned himself into my brain, and I hated the footfool rules or behavior codes at that point.

When exactly did it happen? Couldn't we place that game perfectly into the height of media discussion of "the Arab mind"?

[Charles I]

Herb Block was a treasure indeed.

[Charles I]

"a curious little statistical enterprise. . ."

Not the first nor last example of an Israeli facility with and penchant for moral calculation by the numbers. Apparently armed with the Holocaust and some Charts and Graphs, one can, especially if the comparator happens to be your immediate enemy, profitably shrug off accountability for one's present crimes by contrasting them with an historical numerically superior figure.

I can't find cites for this just now. I have repeatedly heard different hasbara MSM talking heads offer up China with a stray reference to Tibet as a shining exemplar of real mathematical achievement as in "The Chinese killed millions, we only killed a few thousand".

Cellphone video would eventually expose what Palestine is but agree 911 shone a light on it all. shame some of the light is so blinding

To all what a great thread, thanksa

[Charles I]

There does seem to a ready supply of errant unsuccessful youth dabbling in dysfunction susceptible to a buzzing in the ear, be it from imam, internet, or internal self-loathing. Remorsefully, remorselessly sacrificing/redeeming their miserable selves "for the cause" has a pathetic grandiose appeal to alone wolf loser. It seems to be partly at work in the attack on the Canadian Parliament.

Very difficult to surveil and arrest prior to offense even when on the radar is emerging as a theme. Monitored connection/communication with designated terrorist groups or websites may be too low a threshold for preventative arrest in the West yet enable just the identification with the cause required for self-sacrifice, over and above any tactical instruction or support.

Those type of lone wolves don't scare me much although the disruption they cause and attention gleaned seem staggering. 70 Canadians kill themselves every week without a peep.

What I'd fear most is if small self-identified groups manage to acquire technology and training, apparently as available as weed, enabling an attack on a toxic industrial target that could cause mass casualties and real disruption with minimal input or warning.

[Charles I]

or one in which some perpetrators escape and some remain to die.

[Patrick Bahzad]

Turkey's role in the support of anti-Assad "rebel" groups would deserve much more than a brief reply to your interesting links, so I'm afraid but I won't get into it at this point.
Might certainly be enough matter for at least a specific piece on this issue.
I would just like to add that even though arms are being funneled to anti-Assad groups through Turkey, it doesn't mean that Turkey is the actual or only player that provides theses weapons.
Another aspect that has to be taken into account, is that the people who decide and organise these weapons deliveries may think they're arming a group they have deemed "respectable" enough, while in fact, the materail goes in the end to some totally different end-users.