Habakkuk on 'truth and honor', the MH17 shootdown, and the centenary of World War I

Congratulating Colonel Lang on the 10,000,000 page views this blog has attained, Ishmael Zecariah described it as 'one of the few venues where "truth and honor" still have meaning.'

When, more than nine years ago now, the Colonel initiated this blog, he wrote that he would 'tell the truth as it is given to me to know the truth.' As one of the 'old lags' who has been reading and commenting on SST since those early days, I have always hoped that among its audience would be people in the U.S. intelligence community – and perhaps indeed the British – for whom the concepts of 'truth and honor' do still have a great deal of meaning.

The presence of honest and competent analysts in the U.S. intelligence community was readily apparent at the time when both our countries were lied into the catastrophic invasion of Iraq – in part because such people were 'stabbed in the back' by MI6 and the British Joint Intelligence Committee's endorsement of the claim that Saddam Hussein had sought uranium from Niger.

Subsequently, however, such analysts succeeded in frustrating attempts to misrepresent the Iranian nuclear programme so as inveigle us into another disastrous war. And while the JIC were quite happy to collaborate in attempts to lure both our countries into an attack on Syria, honest and competent analysts at the British defence science laboratory at Porton Down, if Seymour Hersh's account is to be believed, supplied their colleagues in the Defense Intelligence Agency with the evidence which enabled General Dempsey to frustrate the attempt.

For some time, the veteran journalist Robert Parry has been suggesting that what U.S. intelligence analysts know about the shooting down of the Malaysian flight MH17 on 17 July does not mesh with official claims that there is unambiguous evidence that the insurgent forces were responsible.

Yesterday, he claimed that U.S. intelligence analysts now believe that the atrocity was likely to have been the result of a deliberate attempt by extremists in the new regime in Kiev to shoot down a Russian plane.

It was at 7 pm (GMT) on this day one hundred years ago, a little after the time at which I am posting this, that, following the German invasion of Belgium, the British Government delivered the ultimatum which led to its declaration of war four hours later. Some reflections on 'truth and honor', on the claims and counter-claims about MH17, and on Europe's rush to catastrophic war a century ago may be timely.

An 'unfounded theory' ... or perhaps not.

It had for some time seemed to me to that the obvious possible explanations for the MH17 were a blunder by the insurgents, and a 'false flag' operation by elements among the Kiev authorities, and that the publicly available evidence was not adequate for anyone who was trying to keep an open mind to judge which was the more plausible.

The explanation which Robert Parry suggests is actually different. It begins with the argument – made on this blog by 'TTG', who has an abundance of relevant expertise on these matters – that the suggestion that MH17 was shot down by the Su-25 plane which the Russians have claimed was in its vicinity at the time of the shootdown cannot simply be dismissed.

Moreover, the suggestion from Parry is that U.S. intelligence analysts are treating seriously a theory which appears to have been disseminated on state-controlled Russian media, according to which the intended target was Putin.  This hypothesis was dismissed by the 'Guardian'  as an 'unfounded theory', which did indeed seem a reasonable response at the time.  However, what Parry is now suggesting is that U.S. intelligence analysts are no longer convinced it can simply be dismissed.

According to Parry:

'Some independent analyses of the initial evidence from the crash site suggest the jetliner may have been destroyed by an air-to-air attack, not by an anti-aircraft missile fired from the ground. Yet, the working hypothesis of the U.S. intelligence analysts is that a Ukrainian military Buk battery and the jetfighters may have been operating in collusion as they hunted what they thought was a Russian airliner, possibly even the plane carrying President Vladimir Putin on a return trip from South America, the source said.'

The notion that elements in the Kiev regime would deliberately target an airliner, unless the object was to blame it on the insurgents, has always seemed somewhat difficult to believe. However, according to Parry the finger of suspicion points to 'more extremist factions, possibly even one of the Ukrainian oligarchs who have taken an aggressive approach toward prosecuting the war against the ethnic Russian rebels in the east.' Can one simply rule out the possibility that some of the 'extremist factions' are crazy enough to do what Parry suggests U.S. analysts think they may have done?  It may seem unlikely, but it certainly cannot be ruled out as impossible, if the evidence does seem to point strongly in that direction.

A strange briefing.

And Parry goes on to hark back to the very strange briefing given to journalists on 22 July about the evidence obtained by U.S. intelligence:

'The Los Angeles Times article on the briefing took note of the uncertainties: ''U.S. intelligence agencies have so far been unable to determine the nationalities or identities of the crew that launched the missile. U.S. officials said it was possible the SA-11 [the Buk anti-aircraft missile] was launched by a defector from the Ukrainian military who was trained to use similar missile systems.''

'That reference to a possible ''defector'' may have been an attempt to reconcile the U.S. government's narrative with the still-unreleased satellite imagery of the missile battery controlled by soldiers appearing to wear Ukrainian uniforms. But I'm now told that U.S. intelligence analysts have largely dismissed the ''defector'' possibility and are concentrating on the scenario of a willful Ukrainian shoot-down of the plane, albeit possibly not knowing its actual identity.'

The 'possibly', of course, would suggest that the 'false flag' hypothesis has not been simply ruled out.

A great deal of what has been claimed since the shootdown of MH17 turns out to be problematic on closer inspection.  So, according to the report in which Robert Parry first introduced the notion that those who at that stage it was suggested had fired a Buk missile wore Ukrainian uniforms, it was suggested that 'what looked like beer bottles were scattered around the site.' It appears however that the resolution of satellite imagery would not be adequate to identify a beer bottle. Of course, it would be possible that there was also imagery from drones, which might actually provide a better explanation of why U.S. intelligence was reluctant to acknowledge the source.

As Parry brings out in his most recent report, however, one of the best reasons for scepticism about the conventional wisdom in the West about the downing of MH17 are the sheer amount of dogs that have failed to bark, to hark back to the famous Sherlock Holmes story.

Dogs that haven't barked.

As regards the Russian side, one needs to distinguish between claims made in media which may be state-controlled, but for which the authorities do not have to take responsibility, and claims made by official spokesmen, supported by evidence which will have in due course to be submitted to international investigators.

Although the possibility cannot totally be discounted, it seems to me highly improbable that evidence of this latter kind is unreliable – although suggestions made on the basis of it may be. In support of the claims that Ukrainian forces had Buk missiles deployed in the relevant areas at the time of the shootdown, and also that two Ukrainian planes were present at the site, the Russian authorities produced some detailed imagery. Moreover, last Friday they provided a detailed analysis of images provided by the Kiev authorities which were supposed to refute their claims – contending supposedly conclusive evidence was patent disinformation which could only have been sourced from U.S. intelligence.

The unavoidable implication, if their analysis cannot be refuted, is that a cover-up is being undertaken by elements in the Kiev regime and elements in U.S. intelligence, acting in collusion.

Given the seriousness of the doubts raised about the conventional wisdom, some attempt to provide hard evidence in support of it really does seem long overdue, as Larry Johnson and his Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity colleagues suggested a few days ago. But not only has no evidence been provided – no reasons as to why it cannot have been provided have been given.

As Buk launchers are large and distinctive in shape, if they have been supplied from Russia, there ought to be clear visual signs. No relevant satellite imagery has been produced. It is indeed possible that the kind of imagery from 'social media', on which the U.S. authorities seem to rely heavily to support their case, could be conclusive. But such evidence, if it is to carry any weight, needs to be provided in presentations by officials, supported by cogent and detailed analysis of the material demonstrating that it does really prove what it is claimed it proves, which those who want to disagree have the opportunity to refute, if they can.

A broken trail.

It was claimed that such evidence located the source of the Buk, on the basis of a trail of 'flare' which went 'vertically upwards'; such evidence was not however presented by authoritative spokesmen, but an image of a broken trail of smoke, which did indeed appear to rise straight up, appeared on the net.

A BBC Russian Service journalist travelled to the site, and produced a report suggesting that other explanations of the trail of smoke were possible – this was removed, but it is suggested that it has been reposted in revised form.  (A good account of this confused history, with links, is here.)

If however the report is accurate, it would follow that U.S. – and also Russian – satellites must have imagery of the battery in question. And it might – or might not – be expected that some conclusive evidence could be provided of a missile having been fired from it, rather than us having simply to rely on claims unsupported by much in the way of evidence which in any case contradict each other.  The flight path shown in the presentation on 22 July had the missile rising from the same location, but at something like a 45% angle to the ground rather than vertically.

One of the claims made by the Russians was that the radar on a Ukrainian Buk battery was operational at the time MH17 was shot down. When they made the claim, on 18 July, it was suggested that this battery could have been supplying tracking information to another battery at another location. However, the suggestion now being made by Robert Parry is that U.S. intelligence analysts believe that a Buk battery was operating in collusion, not with another similar battery, but with an Su-25. And this 'meshes' with a speculation recently put up by 'the Saker'.

Records confiscated – and, does one need to trust the Brits?

At the moment, all I am attempting to do is to grope towards a view of how the version provided by Robert Parry might fit different elements together. In its favour, however, are two matters which have been puzzling me. Different hypotheses about how MH17 was shot down are likely to entail different implications about what should be on the records of the communications between it and Kiev air traffic control.  It has been reported that the relevant records have been confiscated by the Ukrainian security services.

Such hypotheses are also likely to entail different implications about what should be in the 'black boxes'. After the insurgents handed the boxes to the Malaysians, these were handed to the Dutch, who handed them to the British. So far, I have seen no explanation of what measures have been taken rule out any possibility that the evidence could be tampered with by the British.

Given the performance of the JIC and MI6 over the past few years, it would be reckless to assume that all British investigators can be relied upon to display the kind of integrity apparently shown by the Porton Down experts.

What the version put forward by Robert Parry would also suggest is that one would expect to see radar activity from a Buk, but no evidence of a missing missile on any battery that had been observed. It would seem quite likely that by now both American and Russian intelligence have worked out whether there are any batteries capable of having fired a missile which have one missing.

His version could also provide a coherent explanation of what the Su-25 – and the shadowy companion plane which the Russians also claim to have identified – could have been doing. And it could provide a possible explanation of the behaviour of the Russian authorities: it may well be that they have simply put into the public domain evidence that they genuinely have, at a stage where they have not been certain how apparently contradictory elements fit together.

Clearly, however, one of two things are now going to happen. It could very well be that irrefutable evidence will emerge either that Parry's claims about what his intelligence sources told him are false, or that they are accurate, but the intelligence analysts are barking up the wrong tree. If this does not happen, however, we are liable to be back to a much more radical version of what happened in relation to the Ghouta chemical weapons atrocity.

If indeed elements in the Kiev authorities are responsible, Western intelligence services and governments are likely to find themselves with little alternative but to cover up what has happened. At the same time, however, to those who are interested in ascertaining the truth, their behaviour will necessarily bring out the fact that a cover up is at issue, which in itself will be very strong evidence that elements within the Kiev authorities were responsible.

Reckoning with 'Regulus'.

And this brings me naturally back to the events of August 1914, and also questions to do with 'truth and honor'. As to the latter term, it is not without its ambivalences. In April 1917, Kipling published the story 'Regulus', a recollection of his own schooldays at the United Services College at 'Westward Ho!' in North Devon. It was an institution set up largely on the initiative of not very affluent servants of empire, military and otherwise, to provide an affordable education for their sons.

The story is framed around an elucidation by a classics master for those preparing for their Army exams of an ode by Horace. The teaching – also inculcated by team sports, and corporal punishment – is clear: the status of 'gentleman' is one that involves willingness, if it becomes necessary, to die.

Months after the story was published, the soldier-poet Wilfred Owen, who like Kipling's own son would not survive the war, wrote a poem about a gas attack, which concluded by referring to another ode of Horace, and describing his famous line 'dulce et decorum est pro patria mori' - which means 'it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country' - as 'that old lie'.

There are ambivalences which some of us still feel, almost a century later. One the one hand, there is the sense that the culture of war and sacrifice which Kipling celebrated was part of the background to Europe's suicide in 1914-18,  on the other the knowledge that elements of these values remain indispensable. This was painfully born in on us when it became apparent that the aversion to war which ran throughout British society in the Thirties was not shared by enough people in Germany to prevent Hitler indulging his lust for destruction, although it was by many senior figures in the Wehrmacht.

One then comes to the relation of 'honor' and 'truth'. At the beginning of his classic 'Drinking the Kool-Aid' article, dealing with the intelligence failures that led to the Iraq war, Colonel Lang recalled the phrase 'I will fall on my sword over that.' The saying, which again has roots in Roman times, implies that a commitment to personal honour entails a readiness to risk career, if not literal, death, if what superiors want an analyst to do is corrupt.

The saying was, the Colonel suggested, no longer commonly used in the DIA. And he noted the appearance of the infinitely sinister remark that gave his essay its name: 'I drank the Kool-Aid.'

Believing one's own lies.

Disregard for objective truth is not new, obviously, but a remark which has been echoing through my head is an aphorism of the brilliant Viennese Jewish satirist Karl Kraus, an implacable opponent of the war from the outset: ''How is the world ruled and led to war? Diplomats lie to journalists and believe these lies when they see them in print.''

Conditions today are very different from those at the time Kraus wrote. However, in relation to MH17, as earlier in relation to Iraq and to a very substantial extent in Syria, the sense of a kind of echo-chamber where claims by the authorities and the mainstream media are mutually reinforcing, and create a conventional wisdom which in some sense almost everyone involved in disseminating it actually believes, is strong.  Once people have committed themselves to such a conventional wisdom, they acquire the strongest possible of 'rational' reasons for not abandoning it.

Concluding his most recent article, Robert Parry writes:

'It may seem cynical to suggest that the powers-that-be in Official Washington are so caught up in their own propaganda that they would prefer the actual killers of innocent people – whether in Syria or Ukraine – to go unpunished, rather than to admit their own mistakes. But that is often how the powerful react. Nothing is more important than their reputations.'

Of course this is so. If Obama and Kerry, or indeed Cameron and his new Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, were to come out and say that in fact it was a pro-Maidan Ukrainian oligarch who instigated the shooting down of MH17, it would not only leave their own personal reputations in tatters: the whole of their policy towards Ukraine, and indeed towards Russia, would be called into question.

And precisely the fact that the atrocity has been used to justify an intensification of sanctions on Russia, clearly intended, at the minimum, to force Putin into a total and humiliating climbdown on Ukraine, makes it more difficult for those who advocated this response to concede that the intellectual basis for it may have been wrong.

A second observation, or rather series of observations, which have been echoing through my mind come from a book I encountered quite late in life – the short 'Autobiography' published in 1939 by the British philosopher-historian R.G. Collingwood. The book was among other things an attempt to set Collingwood's impassioned opposition to 'appeasement' in the context of his philosophical ideas.

But the history it told was interestingly ambiguous. In the war whose anniversary we commemorate today, Collingwood had served in Admiralty Intelligence – in the later stages, on the preparations for the peace treaty. He adhered strongly to what has always been one view of the origins of the war – that, as he put it:

'It happened because a situation got out of hand. As it went on, the situation got more and more out of hand. When the peace treaty was signed, it was more out of hand than ever.'

History is 'with us and in us.'

The peace made at Versailles, Collingwood thought, had not been a wise one. And the experience of the war pushed him into reflecting on the extraordinary gulf between the increase which the growth of the hard sciences had caused in man's ability to control nature, and the complete absence of any corresponding increase in man's ability to understand and control human affairs. The sense of the magnitude of this gulf led Collingwood to write that at the end of the war 'I seemed to see the reign of natural science, within no very long time, converting Europe into a wilderness of Yahoos.'

The answer which Collingwood gave to this problem was emphatically not that the 'human sciences' could and should attempt to emulate the 'hard sciences'. The art of politics, as he saw it, was in the management of specific situations. And specific situations could only be understood in the context of their history. What he provided was a philosophical elaboration of the insights contained in two quotations which Stephen F. Cohen placed at the outset of his 1985 study 'Rethinking the Soviet Experience.'

One was the famous remark of William Faulkner: 'The past is never dead. It's not even past.' The other was a comment by one of the best of officially-published Soviet writers, Yuri Trifonov: 'History is not simply something that was. History is with us and in us.'

A critical point that Collingwood sought to draw out was that the presence of the past in us is commonly complex and contradictory.  And he also stressed that  it is precisely the way the past lives on that gives us some kind of ability to recreate it, from which it follows that the faculties of imagination which enable us to link past and present, both ways, are ones which we should seek to cultivate, not suppress.

It was a discussion which I found immensely illuminating, in part because it helped me to make sense of my own ambivalences: to grasp that the culture which Kipling celebrated, and the culture which grew up in reaction to it, in part out of the accounts of First World War experience given by figures like Owen, are both part of me.

Two views of August 1914.

As a programme for managing human affairs, moreover, it seems to me that Collingwood was fundamentally on the right lines. However, it also seems that both much of the Western 'clerisy', and also of our administrative and political elites, have moved in precisely the reverse directions to those he recommended.

On 'rational choice' theory, I and many others have commented at length over the years at this blog. However, as regards the relationship of history and politics, I was fascinated by two sets of observations relating to the origins of the First World War, to which 'Ingolf' referred me in an exchange of comments not long ago.

Asked what the British government can do ' to help stop Putin and support Ukraine', David Cameron explained that we were not 'about to launch a European war', but went to answer – to quote the 'Telegraph' – by 'alluding to the lessons Britain learned about dealing with Germany’s aggression before the two World Wars.'

As to what those 'lessons' were, Cameron explained:

'Mr Cameron said: ''Where do you want to start? I think of all we need to be clear about what is happening on our Continent.

'''This year we are commemorating the 100th anniversary of the First World War and that war was about the right of a small country Belgium not to be trampled on by its neighbours.

'''We had to learn that lesson all over again in the Second World War when the same thing happened to Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. In way this is what we are seeing today in Europe.'

This is the most simplistic crude, and sanctimonious version of a British nationalist historiography one can imagine, which proceeds from a reading of the events of 1914 which few if any serious historians in this country would today defend, through a simplistic reading of the events of 1939, to a preposterous conclusion about what is happening in Ukraine today.

A different reading of the events of August 1914 and their implications is given in the speech which Putin gave on 1 August at the unveiling of 'a monument to World War I heroes'.

A 'typical Soviet radish'?

This is certainly a Russian nationalist interpretation of the origins of the First World War, and much could be said in objection.

That said, it is a fascinating study in the ambivalent ways in which the present continues on into the past. Having remarked that in Soviet times the World War 'was erased from our country’s history and was labelled simply ''imperialist''', Putin goes on to claim that the victory of the Brusilov offensive of 1916  was 'stolen by those who called for the defeat of their homeland and army, who sowed division inside Russia and sought only power for themselves, betraying the national interests.'

This remark is at once a denunciation of the Bolsheviks, and also of the 'oligarchs' of the 1990s – people like Khodorkovsky and Berezovsky, with whom Western elites have been happy to identify themselves.  It reminds me of what Paul Robinson – an historian now based in Ottawa who spent some years in the British Army Intelligence Corps –wrote about Putin in an article back in January 2004: that he was 'a typical Soviet radish – red on the outside but white at the core.' 

If the White General Denikin could rise from the dead, he would most probably say something not far removed from what Putin has said – which is, indeed, part of the point of the 'Vineyard of the Saker' blog, whose author claims, quite accurately in my view, to come from a Russian military family which emigrated at the Revolution.  The coming together of former Soviet officials who concluded that the Revolution was a disaster with elements in the emigration is a quite natural process.

There is certainly no reason why one agree with Russian nationalist views of the events of August 1914 – be they expressed by Putin or 'the Saker'.  However, I think it would be wise to pay attention to what is being said.  In his speech, Putin continues as follows:

'This tragedy reminds us what happens when aggression, selfishness and the unbridled ambitions of national leaders and political establishments push common sense aside, so that instead of preserving the world's most prosperous continent, Europe, they lead it towards danger. It is worth remembering this today.

'World history gives us so many examples of what a terrible price we pay for refusing to listen to each other, or for trampling on others' rights and freedoms and lawful interests in the name of our own interests and ambitions. It would be good if we could learn to open our eyes and to calculate at least a step ahead.

'It is long since time that humanity learned and accepted the single great truth that violence breeds violence. The road to peace and prosperity is built out of goodwill, dialogue, and the memory of our past wars, the people who started them and why.

'This monument to the heroes of World War I is not just a mark of tribute to their feats but is also a warning and reminder to us all of our world’s fragility. It is our duty to look after peace and remember that the most precious thing on earth is peaceful, calm and stable life.'

'We cherish the memory of World War I heroes. Glory to Russian arms and to our hero-soldier!'

Part of what makes all this important is that, ever since it happened, debates about international relations, and how to maintain a viable international order, have reflected interpretations of the origins of the First World War. This was a subject I studied, not in great depth, as a student in the late Sixties and early Seventies. Since then I have read intermittently on the subject, but not had time to keep up recent arguments.

An out-of-date understanding.

From a review of these by the Professor of the History of War at Oxford, Hew Strachan, in a recent issue of the Chatham House journal 'International Affairs', however, an irony emerges.

The interpretation put forward by Cameron is, to be blunt, not only crude and simplistic, but totally at variance with how recent historiography on the conflict has moved.  When I was a student, the kind of view taken by Collingwood was being replaced, largely as a result of the work of the German historian Fritz Fischer, by the emphasis on the prime responsibility of Germany Cameron adopts. More recently, however, the intellectual pendulum, in Anglo-Saxon as well as German historiography, has shifted back to something closer to Collingwood's view.

The implications of this reading of the origins of the First World War for an understanding of current events is actually a large subject, which would take me beyond the limits of what is already a long post. However, one thing that is clear is that if, as Collingwood did, one puts the emphasis on events running out of control, it follows that crisis management necessarily involves an understanding of how other actors see situations.

In an interesting discussion of the thinking and actions of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in the fateful days leading up to the British ultimatum in the 'Telegraph' two days ago, Professor Strachan remarks that:

'The cardinal error committed in July by Sir Edward and his officials was their refusal to distinguish between Germany and Austria-Hungary. He could not accept that the Balkan policy pursued by Vienna after the Archduke's murder was not made in Berlin.'

When Putin referred to the 'terrible price we pay for refusing to listen to each other' he is making a quite valid point. It would have been better had the British, in August 1914, listened more carefully and been conscious of the ambiguities of German attitudes to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian elite to use the assassination of the Archduke as an occasion for eliminating the threat from Serbian nationalism once and for all.  Likewise, it would be a help if Western leaders took the trouble at least to listen to Russian explanations of their policy in Ukraine – rather than repeating the familiar comparison which has been applied time and again to leaders they dislike, with Hitler. 

But this leads on to other questions to do with intelligence failure. This is a subject which has been much discussed. A critical point is often ignored – that one reason why analysts get things wrong is that their task is commonly difficult, and that even if one is seriously attempting to get at the truth, it is very easy to get things wrong: particularly if one is attempting to analyse new and unanticipated situations under the pressure of time.

What however also follows from this is that to make fundamental decisions on policy towards another country – as has happened in relation to the ratcheting up of the sanctions campaign against Russia – on the basis of a premature rush to judgement on a matter, such as MH17, where it seems clear the evidence does not warrant it is folly.

A further point that emerges, however, is that, if crisis management is difficult, a critical question ought to be that of crisis avoidance. And when Putin says that 'it would be good if we could learn to open our eyes and to calculate at least a step ahead', he quite patently has a point.

The 'monstrous ifs' …

As Professor Strachan also brings out, it remains an open question whether, confronted by the German challenge to British naval power, Grey and others would have done better, rather than committing themselves to 'containment' based on an alliance with France and Russia, to pursue that strategy in conjunction with an attempt to seek some kind of compromise with Germany. As Churchill wrote in his account of the first battle of the Marne, 'the terrible ifs accumulate.'

If however one looks at recent Western policy, what is evident is a complete lack of any serious attempt to 'calculate at least a step ahead.' That an attempt to wrest the whole of Ukraine away from Russia, and incorporate it in 'the West' would produce essentially the kind of crisis that has developed was obvious to any reasonably rational being years ago. We have here, not simply a crisis of Western foreign policy, but a crisis of our whole system of government, and faith in 'democracy'.

Meanwhile, given the importance of the issues at stake, we can only hope that there will be analysts in the U.S., and perhaps also British, intelligence communities who, if the need arises, will be prepared to 'fall on their sword' to bring the truth about what happened to MH17 to light.

David Habakkuk

Comments

[William R. Cumming]

A brilliant exposition IMO DH! Many thanks! Would the application of the term "civil war" be apt in your opinion to WWI?

[blowback]

FWIW, as technically-oriented civil servants, the air accident investigators at Farnborough are most likely men of honour like those at Porton Down , so I would tend to trust their judgement. The Farnborough team have reported that the flight recorder had not been tampered with, but that is not to say that someone else hasn't a recording of the contents.
The problems if they do come, will most likely come from MI6. I have read news reports from anonymous sources which suggest that as far as the pilots were concerned, they had no idea of what was about to happen to them, which seems to be reasonable as they were flying a civilian airliner with no ECM capability. So, the opportunities for MI6 to "fix" the results are limited, I would have thought. And there is always the threat of another Snowden.
As for the official announcements by the Russians, I think there was another purpose. It was a warning to the British and Americans that they know what actually happened and they are allowing the British and Americans an opportunity to climb back out of the hole they've dug/are still digging for themselves. Unfortunately, American diplomats are too politicized to understand and most British diplomats are to enthralled with Washington to rock the boat or maybe they're all too stupid to see the lifeline the Russians have thrown them.

[VietnamVet]

DH

Thanks, you’ve joined Stephen Cohen with the best analysis of the Ukraine crisis that I have read.

We are on the march to a shooting war with Russia. The similarities to 1914 are frightening. Thanks to old age and being through this before during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the run-up to the Vietnam War, and the Iraq Invasion; I wake each morning surprised that I am still here.

I see no alternatives. The money men need to loot Ukraine and Russia. Their politicians can’t back down and lose face. They believe their own propaganda. I can vow to never vote for a Democrat or Republican again but so what. Perhaps the 1960’s anti-war and anti-nuclear protests will revive; but not likely in the surveillance state. So I wait, read SST, and write these comments.

[Haralambos]

Thank you very much. Mr Habakkuk. This piece helped me recall both Collingwood's _Autobiography,_ which I have read many times over the past 40 years. He emphasized that his view of history was that it is the attempt to imagine the thought process involved in various decisions and to understand them. There are, of course, other views on the task of historians, and many of them are useful. I also recalled several elegant essays by Hannah Arendt found in her book _Between Past and Future._ They are "The Concept of History," "What is Authority?" and "Truth and Politics." Many will know her from her concept of "the banality of evil" and her book _Eichmann in Israel._ For those who have not read "Truth and Politics," I would urge you to do so.

I came across this today that might be of some relevance to the attempts to understand the ongoing discussion of the attempts to explain the downing of the Malaysian flight: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/CEN-02-010814.html I do not know the bona fides of the author, but he seems to hold some credibility among British friends on the ground in the Middle East. There are a number of links to support his analysis. The bit I found illuminating, if accurate, was this claim:

"Meanwhile, the MH17 tragedy is undergoing a fast metamorphosis. When the on-site observations by this Canadian OSCE monitor (watch the video carefully) are compounded with this analysis by a German pilot, a strong probability points to a Ukrainian Su-25's 30 mm auto-cannon firing at the cockpit of MH17, leading to massive decompression and the crash.

"No missile - not even an air-to-air R-60M, not to mention a BUK (the star of the initial, frenetic American spin). The new possible narrative fits with on-site testimony by eyewitness in this now famously "disappeared" BBC report. Bottom line: MH17 configured as a false flag, planned by the US and botched by Kiev. One can barely imagine the tectonic geopolitical repercussions were the false flag to be fully exposed."

I would welcome anyone's comments who might be able to pass on ideas about this journalist's credibility.

Mr. Habakkuk,your reflections on the First World War also prompted this set off my thoughts on it as I ponder the ironies in the names for it in the US and in the UK, where, in the latter case the denomination "The Great War" might puzzle many who do not understand that "great" does not mean "wonderful" but "huge or big." The ultimate personal irony is that my paternal grandfather fled Canada from a physically abusive father and enlisted in the US Army at 15. He was trained and sent to the US border with Mexico to hunt Pancho Villa and then with the US Expeditionary Force to France. There he was wounded and unconscious when the Germans sent the gas. He died at 44 and my father was in and out of orphanages when his father was in VA hospitals. My maternal grandfather was of Pilgrim stock, a chemistry teacher at Boston English School and served in the US Army during this war working on the development of chemical weapons. I still shudder contemplating these ironies, and the cavalier manner in which our leaders seem to be conducting foreign policy and plans for wars.

Apologies for these rather off-topic pieces, but thank you to all who enrich my comprehension of our attempts at what Collingwood thought of imaginative reconstruction of decisions.

[Alan]

What a great way to celebrate the 10,000,000 page views' milestone. Amazing commentary. Thank you so much for this.

[Peter Brownlee]

Thank you, David Habakkuk and Col. Lang, for this immensely thoughtful piece which I will reread with, I hope, growing understanding and appreciation for what it was like to be there when the future was unknowable but we "had to do something".

Edward Grey has been something of a hero of mine for nearly as long as I can remember (and the dynamics of the cabinet that also included Churchill, Lloyd George, Haldane, Morley, and the rest must have been quite delicate for Asquith and everyone else).

Perhaps one of Grey's errors (not unique to him or then) was the assumption that what was said to ambassadors in London would be perfectly transmitted and understood by their distant masters. This was most problematic, perhaps, in regard to Lichnowsky -- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Max,_Prince_Lichnowsky -- and the German ambassador's failure to drink the Kaiser's Kool-Aid.

"Lichnowsky deplored the German alliance with Austria-Hungary (though he owned land in Austria and had served as a diplomat in Vienna), feeling that it inevitably pulled German diplomacy into Balkan crises and tensions with Russia, without any compensating benefits to Germany with its new industries, trade and colonies. 'This is a return to the days of the Holy Roman Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and Habsburgs'.

"The Kaiser had commented on 31 July 1914 about an encircling British diplomacy during the crisis: 'For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves — knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria-Hungary — to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us'.

"In contrast, Lichnowsky outlined how the British foreign minister Sir Edward Grey had helped with two treaties on dividing the Portuguese Empire and establishing the Berlin-Bagdad railway, and had supported Germany's policy in the resolution of the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 that excluded Russia.

"Britain had held back from declaring war until 4 August, after Belgium was invaded, yet in a telegram sent to him from Berlin on 1 August: '... England was already mentioned as an opponent...'

"Lichnowsky summed up his view on blame for the outbreak of war, and the failure of diplomacy, in 3 main points:

"We [Germany] encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German interests were not involved and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us. Whether we were aware of the wording of the [Austrian] Ultimatum is completely immaterial."

"Between 23 and 30 July, Sazonov having declared that Russia would not tolerate an attack on Serbia, all attempts to mediate the crisis were rebuffed by Germany. In the meantime Serbia had replied to the Austrian ultimatum and Berchtold was 'content ... with the Serbian reply'.

"On the 30th July, when Berchtold wanted to come to terms, we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd [Russia] merely because of the Russian mobilisation, although Austria was not attacked; and on the 31st July we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not order a man to march as long as negotiations were proceeding – thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

"In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that the whole of the civilised world outside Germany places the entire responsibility for the world-war upon our shoulders."

Although not mentioned much (at all?) in the current Anglophone commemorations the War seems to me to have begun with the declaration of war by the German Empire on the Russian Empire on 30 July. Russian mobilisation (easier and quicker to say than to do) and the German response to that was the real tipping point. After that, what was happening far to the west compounded things getting right out of hand.

The silence about here may be part of the demonization of Mr Putin in the unending quest for the new bogeyman but it may just be the quest to magnify our significance and control over events.

And there may be another factor -- http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/10991582/Revealed-how-King-George-V-demanded-Britain-enter-the-First-World-War.html

"A note which has remained in private hands for a century details a previously undocumented meeting between George V and his Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, on the eve of the First World War.

"The King, mindful of his position as a constitutional monarch, made no public declarations about the situation in Europe in the lead-up to the conflict.

"But in the newly-disclosed meeting, the King informed Sir Edward it was 'absolutely essential' Britain go to war in order to prevent Germany from achieving 'complete domination of this country'.

"When Sir Edward said the Cabinet had yet to find a justifiable reason to enter the conflict, the King replied: 'You have got to find a reason, Grey.'

(An image of this memorandum of a much later meeting between KGV and Grey's nephew is at http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02987/PX5689635_Lewis-Wh_2987125a.jpg )

[walrus]

Mr. Habakkuk,

Please accept my heartfelt thanks for writing such a Tour de Force of our current situation and the eery parallels with 1914. One can only hope that older and wiser heads might listen.

When I hear President Obama repeating the false "choices" argument I just despair: "In other words, today, Russia is once again isolating itself from the international community, setting back decades of genuine progress. And it doesn’t have to come to this -- it didn’t have to come to this. It does not have to be this way. This is a choice that Russia, and President Putin in particular, has made."

[Norbert M Salamon]

Thank you Sir for this excellent summary!

[bth]

This article from Reuters on the 27th describes immediate changes in leadership of the Donetsk People's Republic.

http://news.yahoo.com/pushing-locals-aside-russians-top-rebel-posts-east-110455468.html

The local Ukrainians are replaced with Russian professional operatives.

[Babak Makkinejad]

David Habakkuk:

US and EU, rather than strengthening the Peace of Yalta after 1991, went about dismantling it.

Now Russia has joined in that activity as well, shredding what was left of the International Law in the process.

I suppose China would soon join that effort as well.

The current moment is comparable, in my opinion, to the 1914 only because the foundations of the Peace of Vienna (a.k.a Congress of Vienna) also had eroded more 20 years before 1914 - just like those the Peace of Yalta.

None of the Great Powers are interested in creating a new Peace to supersede the defunct Peace of Yalta as far as I can tell.

Even small countries such a s France and England think that there is a margin in a zero-sum game of strategy against Russia.

I would not be surprised if a world war breaks out - there is nothing to prevent it - nothing in International Law and nothing in globalized economy or in what is left of the international institutions.

We just need to look for the equivalents of Sarajevo or Italy's War against Ethiopia.

They might already have occurred.

[Vaclav Linek]

I found this interview of Chris Clark (dated March 27, 2014) a few days ago:

http://theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/707-are-we-sleepwalking-towards-war-interview-with-chris-clark-.html

I admit the opening sentence "Looking at the current crisis in Crimea, there is only one sleepwalker—Vladimir Putin," dismayed
me, but things have moved on since this interview. I have yet to read a book on WWI, but would be happy receive suggestions from SST (and any opinions on Clark's book).

The CBC page dedicated to the anniversary is here

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/britain-goes-dark-as-countries-mark-100-years-since-start-of-ww-i-1.2726888

but I saw no mention of Russia anywhere in it.
So I followed the first link on the above page, "Analysis: the 100 year conflict that is WWI", and there I did find one reference to Russia:

"In just four years it [WWI] collapsed four entire empires — the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman (Turkish)."

But still no mention of who the allies were! This
"Analysis" btw was written by a former CBC journalist who is now at the Munk School for Global Affairs at the U. of Toronto.

[turcopolier]

David Habakkuk

A minor personal note on your splendid piece; My uncle John enlisted in the Canadian Army in 1916, although he was a US citizen. He was seconded to the British Army after arriving in England. He went into the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch. This was the most senior regular battalion of the regiment. by that time they had been so torn by two years of what Clausewitz would have considered total war that men could not be found t fill the ranks with Scots or even Englishmen. He told me that in the third battle of Ypres his company lost over half its strength including the captain commanding. On his way "home" to Canada after the armistice he decided to join the US Navy. The fools who are constructing mythology from spiderwebs of untruth and distortion seem to seek a return to the madness in which Europe tore itself to bits in 1914-1918. pl

[zanzibar]

David

Thanks for this very thoughtful note!

At the link below Pater Tenebrarum writes that an OSCE monitor notes the evidence of holes on the cockpit which seems like machine gun fire. This fits closely with TTGs note of an Ukrainian fighter trailing MH17. Apparently, there is a theory that the fighter aircraft and a missile launcher on the ground were coordinating to bring down an aircraft that had Putin returning from South America.

http://www.acting-man.com/?p=32159

With respect to the lead up to the Great War, I am glad you bring up Colingwood. I agree with two of his points - one, events spin out of control; two, "..the hard sciences had caused in man's ability to control nature, and the complete absence of any corresponding increase in man's ability to understand and control human affairs." I have noted for some time that while the human being has developed his intellect substantially, he himself has not "evolved" much in the past 5,000 years. There is an immense role that ambition, ego, greed, fear, jealousy, hate and other human traits play in decision making. This is one reason why I have diverged from my contemporaries in the field of finance who believe that mathematics trumps and human behavior at least on a macro scale can be modeled. The academic economists who have run our economic policies in the past decades believe that our economy is a machine that can be tuned and turned by omniscient technocrats like them.

IMO, the political class today are good at the game of electoral politics and the use of media and language to "win" at that game. They are not good statesmen. They are not historians or students of the classics and do not have an adequate sense of context. Their motivations seem much shallower. As Pat noted earlier the foreign policy clique in the US are motivated by a sense of imagined imperial supremacy. We see how Clinton & Blair & Petraeus & now Keith Alexander and this big revolving door are caught up in influence peddling to make a fortune, corrupting the decision making process of government.

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/will-president-obama-help-keith-alexander-hide-his-conflicts-of-interest/375354/

What has however baffled me is how the ethos of the American people have changed during my lifetime. How they have traded their independence & common sense for a culture of dependence that is easily manipulated. Tocqueville was prescient - "The American Republic will endure until the day Congress discovers that it can bribe the public with the public's money.”

[Tidewater]

I don't want to respond to such a fine philosphical essay like a police reporter hack--which I have been-- but I have just discovered that an airlines pilot named Peter Haisenko argues that the Malaysian flight was brought down by cannon fire. In a follow-up to his original blog post he reports that he has taken a look at the whole question of this ground attack plane's capabilities. By 1984 Jane's had evaluated the SU-25 as having a maximum flight altitude of 10,670 meters. All a pilot would need would be oxygen; which brings to mind that at 29,000 feet a climber on Everest can survive with an oxygen bottle. Global Research --which I read cheerfully but with caution-- has picked up on Peter Haisenko and on the Canadian investigator's remarks. The photograph of the wing is particularly interesting to me. The impression I get is that the scoring along the wing towards the pilot's cabin seems to be cut by a projectile that is stable in flight and is smooth on its surface. I would guess that shrapnel would have left an entirely different marking line. It would cut more erratically and deeply. I have a piece of wood made into a small table that is a vivid reminder of what a projectile--a rifle bullet in this case--will do when the bullet hits one plane on almost exactly the same plane. Leaving an accident which is a little startling to see. My piece of wood is quite beautifully carved by design on most of it and with an ancient patina; it came from an Buddhist stupa in a temple in Burma that was destroyed in WWII, evidentally burned. It took me a while to figure out why that wing photo bothered me.

I think this thing is going to be as big as the JFK assassination.

[Ursa Maior]

Sir,

what is a legal and/or military issue for you (or even only a financial one), is a question of life and death for us eastern europeans.

We may not like the EU for being more and more undemocratic and oppressive, yet we still dont want another Yalta over our heads.

Soon the decisionmakers in the US and in the EU will have to decide between interests and values. Alas I have serious doubts about any of them.

We are left to our own devices, as always. So dont expect a surge in atlantism soon.

[Ursa Maior]

Colonel,

yet this time thge decision does not come from Europe. I dont see french, german, italian or even polish politicians lining up for more sanctions against Russia. On the other hand american and british ones are being more and more hawkish. We hungarians have a saying: it is like beating the nettle with some else's dick (sry for being rude).

I know that you would prefer a more isolationist US, but so would I. Ne meddling with areas where one has no stake at all.

For me it was one the most biggest shocks of my life, when the US oil company's petrol stations (JET) was bought by the russian Lukoil. I knew the times have changed.

[Xenophon]

Excellent exposition of the shortsightedness of the current western policy toward Ukraine; and of the traps created for the players by the "truths" and "false narratives" created by those players themselves.....

Do Nuland and her ilk have any idea of chess; or even, more simply, the idea of setting up a winning shot in tennis through several preceding shots, rather than just one lunge for a winner? Do she or any of her kind have any comprehension of history? Do they know that effective propaganda is based in truth?

Bending the arc of history has more to do with gentle changes at very obtuse angles/arcs, not sharp changes that fly in the face of historical precedents.

Who sanctioned this Ukraine gambit/plan?? Who knew her plan and allowed her to act, perhaps endorsed her plan?? Do any decision makers in our foreign policy and governing circles read history?? Are there no longer responsible and educated actors in our foreign policy establishment? (One light of hope in this vein….CJCS Martin Dempsey.)

Perhaps the real problem may be that we no longer have a true foreign policy establishment like the one that evolved post WWII, tempered in the common experience of that war and nurtured in the pursuit of international business.

The interests of our mideast allies, the tails that wag this large dog in far too many instances, have led to the creation of a school of foreign policy within the group that now comprises our foreign policy actors. This school of thoughts and beliefs has warped the pursuit of our true national interests. Unlike Cerberus with multiple heads, we have multiple tails....and one voracious maw..... whose juice is well worth the squeeze. (Think what Bandar was trying to pull off in Syria.)

There are agendas at play, but they are not agendas with origins in the true interests of the United States. If one could find one individual responsible for this evolution, this manipulation of the thinking that often seems to underlie our foreign policy, one would deem him/her craven and treasonous. Instead, because these evolutions in our foreign policy are a product of a larger "groupthink", no one will be deemed responsible. It is just something that happened...... too many actors "drinking the koolaid"..... or going along to get along.

The Ukraine imbroglio and its shortsightedness is a byproduct of the flawed and manipulated evolutions that corroded (and continue to corrode) U.S. foreign policy.
By letting our foreign policy be manipulated by schools of thought that did not and do not serve U.S interests, by not thinking clearly and rigorously, we set ourselves up for actions in our policy that are not self serving, but instead are adventurous and dangerous. A kind of "blowback" in our foreign policy...... like Ukraine.

[Jason L]

It is very disconcerting to wake up one day and realize those setting american foriegn policy are like villainous rejects from a Tom Clancy novel. Backing Neo-Nazis, blatantly deceiving the public and having personal conflicts of interest that prevent them from taking the obvious course to avoid war, it is so like a bad movie plot that sometimes I think I am dreaming.

[Babak Makkinejad]

During the Peace of Yalta, Eastern Europe was oppressed but was at Peace. I would think that preferable to million of dead, homeless, injured, raped, maimed, etc.

Like all other human institutions, the Peace of Yalta had a capacity to be improved. That, that road was not taken does not detract from the value of the Peace of Yalta.

Yes, that Peace could not do anything for the Baltic states but was Hungary really in such a bad place? Or Bulgaria?

[Charles Dekle]

VV,
You are inside my head. I have similar thought/fears every day. It appears that the lunatics are on the loose and in charge.
Regards,

[Ingolf]

David,

"Splendid", our host's choice of adjective, feels right. Your essay is full of wisdom and humility, that rarest of combinations.

It saddens me that I now trust Russian statements over those from "my side". They require prudent scepticism too but at least Russia seems to have a rational view of international relations, a fair grip on reality and a recognition that credibility is a precious resource. Long may it be so.

"Blowback" wrote:

"It was a warning to the British and Americans that they know what actually happened and they are allowing the British and Americans an opportunity to climb back out of the hole they've dug/are still digging for themselves."

Makes sense, and fits with the apparent Russian determination to keep their diplomatic door open. This "lifeline" is akin to the one Obama used last year to clamber out of his self generated Syrian debacle. Will he grab this one too? Who knows but I don't like the odds. He, and America, have gone much further out on a limb this time around with a contender of an altogether different calibre.

In searching for explanations for the extraordinary animus against Russia, I'm drawn to Immanuel Wallerstein's recent summary:

"The basic problem is that the United States is, and has been for some time, in geopolitical decline. It doesn’t like this. It doesn’t really accept this. It surely doesn’t know how to handle it, that is, minimize the losses to the United States. So it keeps trying to restore what is unrestorable – U.S. “leadership” (read: hegemony) in the world-system. This makes the United States a very dangerous actor."

http://www.iwallerstein.com/germany-united-states-unprecedented-breach/

Perhaps Russia, by quietly but ever more openly treading their own path, has brought this latent pathology fully into the light of day. Given it a living target, if you like.

If so, it doesn't bode well.

[Charles Dekle]

DH,
Thank you for the excellent article.
Regards

[Vaclav Linek]

Regarding China there are some similarities between China/Taiwan and Russia/Ukraine, and then there is
the "tilt toward the Pacific".

[David Habakkuk]

WRC,

It is a difficult one. One of the reasons I have found it difficult to take Samuel Huntingdon's 'clash of civilisations' theory very seriously is that in both world wars we were fighting Germany, probably culturally the closest of us of the major European powers, and allied with Russia, certainly culturally the most remote.

However, the ambivalence is not new. The argument over 'ship money' which did much to precipitate the English Civil War resulted from the belief of Charles I and his advisors that Dutch naval power posed a major threat. Religious and cultural identification was, I think, a major element in the opposition. But Cromwell ended up fighting the Dutch, all the same.

Conflicts around the Eurasian periphery created a 'realpolitik' basis for Anglo-Russian antagonism -- and indeed one might say still do. However, faced by the prospect of a single power dominating Europe, the two powers would sink their differences.

It is I think fair to say that, for the British, the Cold War order in Europe was as much, if not more, about containing Germany as it was about containing Russia. As you probably know, when belatedly Mrs Thatcher realised that Gorbachev was not doing to continue to hold down the Germans for us, she panicked.

(See http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/112006 .)

An argument can also be made that what is happening at the moment is also to a very substantial extent about 'containing' Germany. A nightmare of many in Washington, as in London, as also in Poland among other places in Eastern Europe, continues to be that of a German-Russian rapprochement.

Recent events may indeed have set back the prospects of such a rapprochement, insofar as they were not already gravely weakened. However, there are interesting questions as to what might happen, if it became clear that the overwhelming burden of evidence suggested that Germany had been inveigled into sanctions on Russia which could be quite costly as a result of an atrocity actually orchestrated by rabidly anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalists.

Of course, Robert Parry may be barking up the wrong tree. But if he is on the right track, an interesting period may lie ahead.

[David Habakkuk]

blowback,

I hope that you are right, but in an investigation of this kind, it should not be necessary for us to have to rely on the integrity of British government scientists.

It is not clear to me whether or not there is any reason why the black boxes should be analysed at Farnborough, rather than centres in a country whose leadership has not committed itself as directedly as ours has to the claim that the insurgents are responsible for this atrocity.

And even if there are good reasons for the analysis to be done at Farnborough, there ought to be provision for independent analysts to be present throughout, to ensure that there can be no conceivable question of evidence being distorted.