“Can General Linder’s Special Operations Forces Stop the Next Terrorist Threat?” - TTG

Eliza Griswold wrote this story in the 16 June issue of The New York Times Magazine. She is a poet, reporter and author, who has done serious field research across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. She does seem to understand the difference between special operations forces and the Special Forces. In an interview about her article, Griswold was asked if there was anything about seeing U.S. Special Operations forces on the ground that surprised her. She responded:

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Well, their degree of ingenuity was fun to watch. They built picnic tables and Adirondack chairs, and magazine racks in latrines, in order to enhance their forward positions. What did impress me deeply, though, was the level of expertise that some have on local subgroups of subgroups, commands of history, language capabilities.

And our Hollywood image of them is of door-kickers. These are the guys who do the Bin Laden raid, knock down doors, come in the night and unilaterally do what they are doing to seize people. That’s how Hollywood has sold them to us. That is a major distortion. What’s going on in Africa has been going on since World War II. It’s really what the Green Berets, in particular, were built for, and that is training indigenous militaries — either helping “freedom fighters” rise up against undemocratic governments or training the indigenous forces of what the U.S. deems “legitimate governments.” I had one operator say to me, “We are teachers before we are door-kickers.” (NYTimes Blog)

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Brigadier General James B. Linder is the current commander of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA). He obviously knows the difference between the operators and the Green Berets. He was both. He refers to all his troops as Special Operations Forces which is technically correct and, probably more importantly, politically correct in today’s DOD. We Green Berets have always been treated like red headed step children. Griswold tells this story of Linder’s time in the Philippines were she first met him.

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In 2005 and 2006, Linder served as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines. His job was to root out the militant group Abu Sayyaf from the islands in the nation’s south. Linder, then a colonel, set up operations on an Abu Sayyaf-controlled island called Jolo. There was no how-to manual; he fought the enemy however he saw fit. Linder thrived in this jungle environment. He employed the methods he learned and taught at Fort Bragg. The emphasis, as it would later be in Africa, was on building relationships with local people. “This isn’t something that we learned in Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said. “That’s S.O.F. 101.”

Abu Sayyaf occupied a strategic ridge above the small town where the commandos were based. Linder’s men set up medical and veterinary clinics. They built roads to help isolated farmers bring their goods to market. They installed solar panels and an Internet connection at a local school. They created and distributed a comic book in which a heroic merchant marine came home from his travels and defeated the kidnapping thugs who’d taken over his home. These methods helped draw the local population away from the militants, Linder said, but the bad guys were still on the ridge. One day, a visitor asked him what success would look like. He replied: When the Abu Sayyaf guy up on the ridge looks down and sees the new school, store and road and decides to leave the fight and come home, then we know we’ve succeeded.

“I thought it was a metaphor,” Linder said. Two weeks later, he received a phone call that an Abu Sayyaf defector had just come down off the mountain. “When you mature,” Linder said, “you see it’s a far better way to get people off the battlefield.”

To Linder, the art of special warfare is exactly that: an art. “Nobody is born with the natural skill for this art. It comes from years of study.” At Fort Bragg during the qualification course, operators are thrown into an exercise called Robin Sage. Their “survival” depends on their ability to influence a guerrilla chief who controls when and whether they eat, sleep and succeed at their objective. What makes special operators special, according to Linder, has nothing to do with high-tech gear. Linder tells his men, “You can win buck naked with a butter knife.” (NYTimes Magazine)

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The first time I was called an operator was shortly after Colonel Potter took command of Tenth Group. He came to us straight from Delta where they’re all called operators. We just got a chuckle out of it. I still find it odd. Linder is definitely right about Robin Sage and the nature of a Special Forces soldier. Gaining the confidence of the guerrilla chief was the most challenging part of the Special Forces Qualification Course.

Linder says his” job is to look at Africa and where the threat to the United States is. I see Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Libyan problem set, Al Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, Benghazi and Darna.” His primary tool in addressing these problems is the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercise, in which SF teams teach indigenous forces a range of military and intelligence-gathering techniques usually over several months. He also has the annual FLINTLOCK exercise. This was once the Special Forces version of REFORGER where 10th Group and special operation units from most NATO countries exercised from Norway to Italy and Turkey. FLINTLOCK is now a SOCAFRICA exercise which includes humanitarian and civic action projects along with military training. 

In spite of an increased focus on Africa and an influx of resources, Linder realizes that “we can’t afford to fix everyone’s problems. They have to be fixed to their standards, not our own.”  He is also aware that if security forces abuse the local population, they alienate their best source of intelligence. That’s a serious problem with most African military forces. Linder notes that, “One of the first lessons that Special Operations teaches in Africa and other places is that a good soldier serves the population, not the leader.” He clearly has a tall order.

I think Linder faces another threat that is not mentioned in this piece. Too much focus from Washington and too many resources are bound to screw things up in Africa… probably more that too little focus and resources. For example, in the hunt for Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army, a team of four Green Berets and 22 Ugandans flew within three miles of their objective by V-22 Osprey and then moved by foot through the bush. The enemy was long gone by the time they reached the objective. I hear Ospreys quite often flying in support of The Basic School at Quantico. You are not sneaking up on anybody in an Osprey. We should learn to live in the bush and the jungle for extended periods of time like the locals. Learn from local hunters how to track. Hell, use the hunters to track. The Ugandans were on missions in the bush for 30 to 60 days at a time. The Americans had to be resupplied every four days. With patience, Linder can change this. Patience and no more #Kony2012 and #Bringbackourgirls twitter campaigns.

TTG

Comments

[Medicine Man]

The more I learn about the Special Forces, the more I love them. Hard men who - paradoxically - are looking to defeat their enemies, though not necessarily kill them. It really sounds like it is more dangerous work than kicking in doors.

[FND]

It seems to me that there is something wrong with the Seal team recruitment criteria, training, or both. A large number of them are public braggarts. Green Berets tend to be highly professional, low key, and have a sense of humility. Most people outside the Army would not even realize they were Green Beret. Admittedly, this is anecdotal based on my own very limited acquaintances with a few Green Berets. Still, I think the Seal program should look at the Army Green Beret training for lessons learned. I realize the purpose of the Seal is different as well, but they need to can the macho BS.

[turcopolier]

FND

SEALS and Delta are muscle bound commandos. Green Berets are not. pl

[JM Gavin]

COL Lang,

On use of the term "operators," USSOCOM has been referring to all SOF shooters as "operators" for a few years now. The MOS title for a MARSOC 0372 is "Critical Skills Operator."

I still don't use the label "operator" to refer to Theater SOF, and never will, but "operator" can now be properly used to refer to all SOF shooters, although I believe it is better used for employees at the phone company.

DOL,

JM Gavin

[turcopolier]

JM Gavin

Green Berets are Special Forces soldiers. That is what Aaron Bank would have wanted. As for the rest, I don't care what they call them. pl

[The Twisted Genius]

I'm pretty sure the term operator in the SOF community came from Charley Beckwith's exchange tour with the SAS. Somebody from o'er the seas can tell us if that term is common in the SAS and SBS. He borrowed a lot from the SAS in establishing SFOD-D (Delta) including organizing into troops and squadrons. That spread to the special mission unit (SMU) that I was in. I figured it was just SMU terminology. Now JM Gavin points out that USSOCOM has been referring to all SOF shooters as operators. Goes to show the pervasiveness of the commando mentality. Like I said, the Green Berets have always been the red headed step children of the DOD. I'm with Colonel Lang, "Green Berets are Special Forces soldiers."

Here's what Aaron Bank, himself said on the matter:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kg6-udJ_OTs

[Medicine Man]

I want to ask why the Green Berets are the red headed step children of the DOD. Intelligence and subtlety just aren't big ticket items?

[The Twisted Genius]

Medicine Man,

In many ways Special Forces are the mirror image of conventional units and even the various "commando" units. They focus on those outside themselves, those they teach, train and fight beside. They are open to the ways and customs of others and often embrace those ways. They are warriors in the sense of the Samurai and chivalric knights as expressed in our motto, De Oppresso Liber. The exact translation is debated, but I take it as a command, Liberate the Oppressed. This is a far more nuanced warrior ethic than that expressed by the rest of our armed forces and definitely more nuanced than the "brainless Hulk smash" image expressed in the MSM. Don't get me wrong. The Green Berets are also capable of visiting extreme and effective violence upon their enemies.

Special Forces soldiers are comfortable with who they are. They are professionals, but they reject the careerism of conventional forces. Until the establishment of the special operations career field, the Green Berets took a big hit to their career progression. They don't care. They'd rather do what they do. They are not impressed by the trappings of rank and higher positions. This does not sit well with those of higher rank and position.

[Medicine Man]

TTG,

Thank you for the explanation. It is depressing that the GB's rejection of vanity is a prominent cause of their status in the US armed forces.

[Tyler]

Related anecdote about the cost:

Trying to get back to Afghanistan from Qatar while on R&R, I was in Kuwait heading to the big PX on the shuttle bus. The staff sergeant sitting behind me noticed my patch and asked if I was out of Salerno. I replied in the affirmative and turned to face him and we began to talk, as he had worked out of FOB Chapman a bit and had gone on a few missions with my company when he was there.

I told him I was interested the work they did and asked some questions about the language training, and then related a story about how when the SF recruiters came to our company. We had been told by our platoon sergeant to shut our word holes and not say a word if they asked for questions. All four platoons in formation had apparently gotten the same speech because no one said a word. The recruiters, non plussed, told us they'd be in the Education Annex if anyone wanted to do 'Army work and not babysit NTC'(which at the time seemed the limit of what we would ever do). When I showed up there were about seven other members of my unit there - I had not been the only one who had the same thought.

He laughed and related his own story, about how when he went to SFAS and passed, he came back to find all of his stuff in the company area, with the First Sergeant telling him that if he didn't want to be part of them, he could go fuck himself and find somewhere else to live. So for a while he lived in the Group's support barracks until he passed Selection. This was with the 82nd ABN in 1999. Far cry from nowadays.

I've heard some VN Vets say that it seemed like the Special Forces were "the biggest damn unit in the Army" post-Vietnam, as everyone claimed it. Any truth to that observation?

[Jim Ticehurst]

Our Son in Law was a Navy SEAL ..He was killed on Active duty just before their baby was Born..He was Humble..and a Great Young Man We were Proud of Him..He was about 5'8" tall...slender to medium Build and was Know as the Iron Man in BUDS..No Bulging muscles..Just athletic ability and Will..I did some Partys with the Seals..A few had Big Guns..The rest were medium build like Rick..No Braggarts..Just an Air of Confidence..I admire them..The Green Berets and Anyone else willing to Serve Honorably in the United States Military..Most do their Jobs well..

[Tthe Twisted Genius]

Tyler,

It's a rare first sergeant or commander that welcomes his best troops being siphoned off for SFAS or any other school/assignment. Even those who support their troops trying for something better are never thrilled about losing a good soldier.

As for the poseurs claiming to be Special Forces in Viet Nam when they weren't, that's all part of the "stolen valor" phenomenon. It's usually just sad and pitiful wannabes sitting on their barstools. In the worst cases, it's sleazy and criminal grifters in it for illicit gain.

[turcopolier]

tyler

SF expanded a lot during the VN war and by the end there were people in SF who would not have been acceptable before. I did not serve in SF after the war. I went into the strategic intel business focused on the Islamic World. pl

[John Minnerath]

I was in the 1stSFG in the early 60's when the big expansions began and new groups were being created. We had guys coming in who had no clue what we were about. Many of us didn't like this one bit.
All the senior people were WWII or Korea and were so pissed off were just waiting for the right moment to turn in their retirement requests.

[The Twisted Genius]

SF went lean again after Viet Nam. Only the 5th, 7th and 10th were active. In the 80s, the 10th only had five teams in a company instead of six, even during our Lebanon MTTs. We started seeing a few guys coming in on SF option enlistments. That didn't sit well with a lot of the older troops. I had to jump between my heavy weapons leader and one of the newbs one day. The newb was not showing proper deference to the toughest SOB in the Group and I feared a murder in the making or at least a serious injury and a ruined career. Years later we met again in a SMU. My old heavy weapons leader was now a sergeant major. He thanked me for keeping him out of Leavenworth for murder. We had a good laugh and a few beers over it.

The GWOT expansion brought a huge expansion in SF. All the old groups were brought back. The companies all had six teams and a fourth battalion is being added to the groups. I knew a few SFQC instructors who were extremely stressed from trying to keep up standards in the face of the demand for more graduates. I don't know how that's working out.

[Tyler]

I don't know about Q course stuff but I heard from a few guys back in 03 04 that the requirement was "fogging up a mirror if you breathe on it" in SFAS.

[John Minnerath]

TTG
Yes lean indeed. Mid (?) '64 D Company in the 1st became provisional. Some time after I left the entire Group was deactivated. I don't recall just when it was activated again.

[Fred]

TTG,

FWIT in the nuclear navy field we faced the same problem of " trying to keep up standards in the face of the demand for more graduates" in the '80s (the 600 ship Navy). The problem is the risk of losing a team (or a ship) due to a mistake by someone who's skills and abilities were better used in another MOS.(Where they would excel rather than be a borderline performer)

[Tyler]

Did any of you SF gentlemen ever participate in a dog lab?

I've read this book:

http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/564337.Sympathy_for_the_Devil

And its sister book, Night Dogs (where he covers what I assume is his experience in a dog lab), to pieces. I thought some of you here might enjoy it.

[John Minnerath]

In the early years the training for a Special Forces Medic was the longest and toughest of any of the jobs on a team. Dog lab was a part of it where actual gunshot trauma was practiced. It was all kept fairly quiet, but we all heard about some personal experiences there. They weren't only trained to handle battlefield injuries of the team but also provided medical aid to the local civilians.

Next toughest was the radio training. Back then everything was Morse code, no satellites for relays, lots of complicated electronics for that day and age. The word "cell phone" didn't exist.

[Tyler]

Mr. Minnerath,

I believe its still that way, as iirc SF Medics are the equivalent of a PA when they get done with their training pipeline. I remember when I was at the SF in doc they looked at my GT score and said "Hope you like medicine, troop".

We did some goat labs in Afghanistan and that wasn't too bad, but I don't like goats either. I can't imagine doing that to a dog though. Those men have some nerves of steel.