Syria, the Levant, and the Real Domino Effect

*

Adam L. Silverman, PhD**

 

As the Syrian Civil War continues into its third year, there are several potential outcomes that we need to look out for and be concerned with.  These are not just limited to Syria, but to the entire Levant, and even to Iran.  So lets run the board in order:

Syria

There are really two key potential outcomes and one sequel for Syria itself: stalemate driven insurgency, the fall of the Assads leading to a Sunni majority takeover, and the withdrawl of the Alawites to Latakia.

It is, in some respects, both surprising and not surprising that the Assad government has held on for as long as it has.  In many ways the Syrian Civil War is both an Assad and Alawite existential fight. which partially explains just how hard the government has responded and how far it is willing to go to survive.  One of the two most likely outcomes to the dispute is that the government is strong enough to survive, but not strong enough to completely put down the rebellion and that the rebellion is not strong enough to overthrow the government, but just strong enough to survive.  If this happens, then we will see a classic insurgency along the lines of what the Philippines has endured with the Moros on Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and similar to what Columbia has faced with the FARC.  In this situation Syria essentially gets carved up into two or more statelets - with government control in some areas and rebel control in others. 

The second potential outcome is that the Assad government does fall and the Sunni majority, or some faction of it takes over.  And it is this latter concept of faction that is important.  There is clearly no good cohesion among the rebel groups, both the domestic Syrian and the foreign fighters/jihadis, as well as between them.  While it may ultimately be a good thing for the region if Assad goes, it will not be a simple transition.  The various factions are likely to try to consolidate power, claim and then establish legitimacy, and will come to blows with each other over who will take control.  This possible outcome has the potential to turn into a Syrian version of the Thirty Years War, where different factions try to and/or actually seize power, seek to consolidate, face challenges to their legitimacy, and then the cycle of violent succession starts all over again.  This would, unlike the actual Thirty Years War, not end in the creation of a secular state, as the Syrian Sunni majority is conservative and devout even though it is not Salafist.  So do not expect a secular Sunni majority Syria to emerge.

In both of these two potential outcomes their is a sequel: the fallback of the Alawites, with or without the Assads, to their traditional lands in Latakia.  Latakia is the mountainous strip of Syria below Turkey on the coast of the Mediterranean.  While it is not completely fortifiable, it is certainly good ground - to paraphrase MG Buford - for digging in and trying to make a stand.  Not only would this prolong the dispute, but it would complicate Syria's claims to their portions of the recently discovered Leviathan petroleum and natural gas field in the eastern Mediterranean.

The one wild card in all these potential outcomes, which is also a great transition to considering the rest of the Levant, are the Kurds.  The Kurds are trans-national, have been seeking both a homeland and a chance to create one for well over a hundred years, and would be able to exploit the chaos of a Syrian implosion - either protracted stalemate and insurgency or Assad defeat and prolonged conflict regarding establishing a new Syrian state - to achieve their own national strategic goals: the establishment of an independent Kurdistan.

The Levant

The biggest concern for the Levant is the humanitarian crisis being caused by the outflow of Syrian refugees - primarily into Lebanon and Jordan. The greatest concern is that Lebanon has had marked, historic difficulty dealing with demographic changes, especially those arising from refugee inflows.  The potential parallels with the run up to the Lebanese Civil War are important to keep in mind, without slaving future outcomes to past ones.  That Lebanon has recently undergone a mini-constitutional crisis, has an upcoming election, and that Hezbullah has a major interest in both exploiting any instability to further both its political aims within the Lebanese government and its illegitimate ones as a proxy for Iran, are all causes for concern in regard to the Syrian Civil War.

Jordan's stability is also a great concern.  As King Abdullah II continues to try to both transition Jordan's Hashemite monarchy into something resembling a Levantine constitutional monarchy and transform the economy into a high tech services and knowledge based one, the stress from both Syria's Civil War and the inflow of Syrian refugees provides the Jordanian Muslim Brothers with opportunities they would otherwise not have. The Hashemite monarchy has been one of the most resilient governments in the Levant and the Middle East even when it appears weak, but a complete Syrian implosion would challenge it in ways it had not previously seen.

The Real Domino Effect: A Levantine Cascade Failure

And this brings us to the other players: Israel, Turkey, and Iran.  Israel's concerns are its own security and ensuring that nothing happens to the Jordanians, who have become important allies, as well as a buffer state of sorts. Should Jordan appear to be tottering it is likely that Israel will move based on its own interests.  Moreover, should Lebanon appear to falter, especially given Israel's history of intervention there and the bad blood with Hezbullah, expect Israel to move militarily.  Turkey would also have to engage in order to protect its own immediate interests, including trying to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, as well as to protect its ongoing attempt to become the regional hegemon. 

This brings us to Iran...  Iran has a huge interest in what happens in Syria and the Levant.  It views the area as its near abroad - politically, religiously, and strategically.  Syria and the Levant provide a vital corridor between Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbullah and has been one area where its meddling in regional politics, aside from post Saddam Iraq, has been quite successful, unlike the largely failed attempts to stir up the Shi'a pluralities and majorities in several of the Gulf States under cover of the Arab Spring.  Moreover, while Ayatullah Khameini is still the supreme religious authority, there have been ongoing challenges to his authority by Ahmedinihad and a number of his influential supporters, which we can expect to only intensify as Iran fully enters its election cycle later this year.  The loss of an Iranian client in the Assads and Syria, which would cut the life line through northern Syria to Hezbullah in Lebanon, and create a huge crisis of legitimacy for Ayatullah Khameini, the Quds Force, and Iran's attempts to establish itself as a regional power with a Twelver Shi'a sphere of influence.

The Levant, unlike East and Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, has the real possibility of being home to a domino effect.  Unlike the concern that if Korea or Vietnam succumbed to Communism there would be a wave of one East or Southeast Asian state after another falling, the Syrian Civil War, the humanitarian crisis it has created through the creation of a large body of refugees in neighboring states, and the general instability in the region that predated, but was exacerbated by the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, has the potential to create an actual domino effect.  If the outcome of the Syrian Civil War is not handled correctly, regardless of the outcome, it is possible to see several states in the region become destabilized or further destabilized in way that leads to regional crisis in the shape of a cascade of regional warfare, failing and failed states.

* Image can be found here: levanttech.com/images/levantmap.jpg

** Adam L. Silverman is the Culture and Foreign Language Advisor at the United States Army War College.  The views expressed here are his alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Army War College and/or the US Army.

 

Comments

[b]

This recent WaPo story on refugees in Lebanon finds most of them to be pro-Assad. This even as they are Sunni and had their houses bombed by the Syrian army!

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/assad-still-has-backers-among-syrian-refugees/2013/04/24/5037458c-ab5d-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html

[Al Arabist]

Yes, and Kurds and FSA are fighting in Aleppo, according to social media - I suppose the source for this article: http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/20130426/syria-rebels-and-kurds-clash-aleppo

I really hope Cameron and Obama won't be the next Sykes-Picot, doodling a map of new ethnic states that won't work any better than the first time around.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

The two year old regime change war against Syria has been a disaster as Col. Lang and SST readers have noted all along.

Even the New York Times now is forced to admit the radical Islamists are entrenched and dominant in the terrorist ranks. This is not a bad bit of reporting:

"In Syria’s largest city, Aleppo, rebels aligned with Al Qaeda control the power plant, run the bakeries and head a court that applies Islamic law. Elsewhere, they have seized government oil fields, put employees back to work and now profit from the crude they produce.
Across Syria, rebel-held areas are dotted with Islamic courts staffed by lawyers and clerics, and by fighting brigades led by extremists. Even the Supreme Military Council, the umbrella rebel organization whose formation the West had hoped would sideline radical groups, is stocked with commanders who want to infuse Islamic law into a future Syrian government.

Nowhere in rebel-controlled Syria is there a secular fighting force to speak of. ...

“My sense is that there are no seculars,” said Elizabeth O’Bagy, of the Institute for the Study of War, who has made numerous trips to Syria in recent months to interview rebel commanders.

....“We all want an Islamic state and we want Shariah to be applied,” said Maawiya Hassan Agha, a rebel activist reached by Skype in the northern village of Sarmeen.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/world/middleeast/islamist-rebels-gains-in-syria-create-dilemma-for-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Euro politicians appear as stupid as American when it comes to Syria policy.

There seems to be the same disconnect between the delusional politicians and saner elements of the military and IC:

"....What has German analysts most worried are the experience that these fighters are gaining in Syria, as well the contacts they are making there. As has been the case with Afghanistan and Pakistan, they fear that these guest warriors -- particularly given the usefulness of their passports for all terrorist plans -- will return to their home or adopted countries in Europe with concrete terror missions. "There is a host of disillusioned people," warned Hans-Georg Maassen, the head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany's domestic intelligence agency, a few weeks ago. "We have to particularly keep an eye on these people since they could possibly be returning with weapons know-how."
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-officials-fear-return-of-islamist-fighters-in-syria-a-896745.html

"Weapons know-how" the only thing? How about Islamist terrorist ideology as we just saw in Boston?

Returned veterans just as the Afghansi back two decades ago, this time from Syria. Looking at a map, Syria appears closer to the Euros than Kabul...and those useful EU passports...the joys of multiculturalism...

[bth]

So why is Israel pressing the 'red line' mantra so hard now? Why not 3 months ago? What is triggering the issue today in Israel vs. say 6 mos from now? Has the threat suddenly heightened? I don't see it. Is it fashioinable to embarrass Obama/Hagel; to point out that we won't declare war on Syria without more substantial provocation? Perhaps but to what end for Israel and why now?

[Adam L Silverman]

Sir,

Wasn't meant to be internally contradictory. The Thirty Years war, or rather the crisis of legitimacy in each successive attempt to resolve the dispute by claimants to power, ultimately ended with the establishment of the modern state system, which established the basis, though it didn't happen right away, to separate religion from the state - either formally, as in the US (though we're a partial separation system) or functionally as in Western Europe where many states still have formal official religions, but they have no actual state authority. This, of course, you know. In the case of Syria I was trying to make it explicit that given the fact that as you've correctly remarked here - the Syrian Sunni majority is religiously conservative, and from my understanding is also devout, that even though they're not reactionary or hyper devout like the Salafist foreign fighters/jihadis who, according to news reports, are being funded by the Saudis and the Qataris and others, then should the domestic Sunni opposition ultimately prevail, we would still likely see a more Islamically oriented government. This should either clear things up or make them more confusing...

[Adam L Silverman]

B,

I've either led you to misread what I'm writing or you've read something into it I didn't intend. I did not say that there aren't Sunnis that have been coopted by the Asads - either per or fils - or who decided they had better prospects with them, but it is very clear from every political biogrpahy of Hafez al Asad, and specifically identified in Seale's seminal biography, that a key driver for Asad's seizing power was the protection of the Alawites; that through control and domination of Syria he could protect his people. While the son may not have the same motivation, and the Asad governments have broadened their base, so to speak over the years, should they loose power this won't become a tribal dispute, but given the multi-ethnic (both in terms of ethno-national and ethno-religious) nature of Syrian society the reprisals are likely to break along those lines. Alawites are specifically identified and identifiable with the Assad government, as well as several other Syrian minorities. As is the case when ever social and societal upheaval and breakdown occur, these identifications and identifiers will become very, very important. Both in terms of who to seek shelter with and who to blame and target.

[Adam L Silverman]

R Whitman,

I don't know. I've seen reporting that indicates both pro and against. I'm pretty sure the UNHCR isn't trying to account for this, just make sure these folks are taken care of, and in the case of any US assistance, the Department of State has VERY strict rules in place about what you can and cannot ask refugees about. So any American aid or relief efforts wouldn't be trying to ascertain that either.

[Adam L Silverman]

BTH,

I don't know. Israel does things, obviously, for their own reasons. To quote Bruce Banner from last summer's Avenger's movie trying to explain Loki's motivations in regards to Israel's PM: "that guy's brain is a bag of cats, you can smell crazy on him". Other than the fact that he hates and fears, and in a way that I have trouble fathoming, and he feels that the only way to deal with it is through seeking, obtaining, and maintaining power, I really do not have much understanding for the guy who is setting Israel's red lines. But its important to remember that the guy setting those red lines tried to pressure his security cabinet back in 2010 to attack Iran - they vetoed him, and would stop at nothing to be PM, so much so that he ran a campaign that cast his opponent Yitzhak Rabin as both Arafat and a Nazi and when someone finally bit on that message and took it to its logical conclusion, Rabin was assassinated and the beneficiary was Netanyahu. Link to the 2010 reporting here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/05/netanyahu-more-resolved-than-thought-to-strike-iran-but-israel-might-not-be/

[DH]

"“We all want an Islamic state and we want Shariah to be applied,” said Maawiya Hassan Agha, a rebel activist reached by Skype in the northern village of Sarmeen."

By Skype. That slays me.

How was the Easter fishing?

[William R. Cumming]

Is it accurate that German Knights led the Crusades? And in fact is Germany the key player on anti-Muslim sentiment in the EU today and perhaps the ultimate control mechanism through anti-immigration policy or other applications of force?

What is the de facto policy alignment on MENA from the EU and who leads it?

If NATO ended would this impact EU MENA policies?

And I would argue that FRANCE is largely a coopted nation by Germany economically and perhaps politically and wondering if this trend will continue?

Am I correct that FRANCE has the largest Islamic population of the EU except for KOSOVO and ALBANIA which are not EU?

[William R. Cumming]

Is it tact that the Germans are the largest foreign contracting delegation in IRAN and if so what is the significance of this fact?

[Charles I]

So many opportunities, so many Zionist imperatives, nuclear monopoly, so little time.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Outer Banks surface water temps too cold for the bluefish I was after. Guys were catching sharks and other but weather was beautiful.

Headed down again in a couple of days. Thirty some inch blues being caught now in the surf. Water temps up now and stormy weather pattern seems to have subsided. Large blues good for smoking (alder) small ones good for eating fresh. Shall see, got the tackle ready over the weekend.

Sharia law...well, this is a grim joke as there never has been a codification of Islamic law as far as I know. There are four main schools of Sunni law and one of Shia. The jihadis have set up "sharia courts" in the areas they have seized in Syria. Perhaps the Obama White house could send some Harvard Law grads to advise them as part of our bringing democrazy and freedumb to Syria. Perhaps the president himself could advise them on establishing a law journal given his prestigious tenure as head of the Harvard Law Review.

[William R. Cumming]

Reference the Domino issue!

Should the US have allowed formal partition of Iraq?

Should Syria be partitioned?

If the answer to both questions above is NO then why not?

[DH]

I recall somewhere within the first three years, or so, of the Iraq war, compliance squads circulating who were doing such things as cutting of fingers of smokers and enforcing hijab by extreme measures. Under Hussein, women were not expected to wear hijab.

Happy fishing!

[Clifford Kiracofe]

We can also remember that the Saudi religious police trained same for Taliban in Afghanistan back in the day, 1990s.

I was in Iraq from one end to the other just prior to the first war. The Ba'ath Party was secular and thus women were not required to wear special clothing items. So in the urban areas you did not see much. In the rural areas, you would notice people dressed more traditionally. Kurds were allowed to dress in traditional clothing although when I had lunch with the local governor his officials wore Western style business suits.

The posters of Saddam in Baghdad portrayed him clothed in Western style while posters of him in rural areas portrayed him in more traditional garb.