Security vs Sharing

 

In the context of the Boston massacre (2) we are back to the discussion of "stove pipes" and "dots."  After 9/11 there was a general frenzy about information sharing between agencies.  This frenzy was largely misguided.  The major problem in the 9/11 intelligence failures was not compartmentation and poor thinking.  The problrm was poor collection of information especially the lack of effective aggressive clandestine HUMINT persistently targeted at penetration of AQ and friends.  Don't tell me that this would be hard to do.  If it can't be done because it is difficult then get rid of the expensive agencies that say they can't do it. 

Basic Rule:  You can't connect dots (data points) that you don't have.

In the eagerness for sharing that existed in the post 9/11 world, compartmentation barriers were torn down and huge networked data bases were built with very wide access given to anyone who conceivably might have  a use for the information.

The result was that Private First Class Bradley Manning sitting in an airconditioned hut in Iraq was able to download millions of documents that had nothing to do with his assigned tasks and then disclose them to whomever he wished.

Just remember that there is an unending trade-off between ease of access to material and the security of that material.  pl

Comments

[mbrenner]

Colonel, if one were serious about remedying these kinds of flaws in the structure and behavior of our intelligence/security apparatus, what would you suggest as steps in a reform strategy. Where do you begin - appointemnts, necessary new legal mandates?, organization, stipulation of aims & purposes, administrative rules of the road, problem-solving with specific references.

[The Twisted Genius]

The measurement of effective clan HUMINT always seemed to come down to numbers. First it was the number of intelligence reports produced. Then it was the number of reports evaluated as high value or of major significance. Then it was the number of recruited assets than can be written up in the most sexy, over inflated manner. This was more in line with the CIA's number of scalps collected. All this was overshadowed by a general reluctance to embark on any operation where the payoff wasn't immediate or near term. Everyone seems to recognize the problem, but the will to change the reliance on "metrics" is lacking. I wonder if recruiting more case officers from Special Forces would change this?

[turcopolier]

mbrenner

It is not a question of structure or legal authorities. The aftermath of the community re-structuring that created the DNI is just fine. The problem is that the IC is generally led by bureaucratic politicians rather than by creative inelligence offciers. see my article Artists and Bureaucrats (or the reverse). pl

[The Twisted Genius]

There seems to have always been an over reliance on number to measure the effectiveness of clandestine HUMINT. First it was the the number of intelligence reports produced. Then it was how many of these reports were evaluated to be of high value or major significance. That was a little better until it was just a matter of finding a willing analyst. Then it was the number of recruited sources that can be written up in the most sexy and overinflated manner. That was similar to CIA's scalp count. The trick is to move the measure of effectiveness away from immediate metrics to something that accepts delayed gratification as well as the acceptance of the risk and hard work in going after the hard stuff. I wonder if recruiting potential case officers from the Special Forces community would help?

[mbrenner]

If that numerical nonesense metric was (is) actually the way the CIA analytical side judged effectiveness, then we are in worse shape than I could have imagined. The same is happening at universities. Here in Texas, as well as other places, the Regents seemingly want to do something similar: how effective is a professor or a department? Measure how many majors get jobs within a certain period of graduation - and at what pay. Yes, this is the truth.

Frankly, insanity of this type defies reasoned explanations. A potent virus of the encephalitis variety seems more likely.