"Munter said he believed that the C.I.A. was being reckless and that his position as ambassador was becoming untenable. His relationship with the C.I.A. station chief in Islamabad, already strained because of their disagreements over the handling of the Davis case, deteriorated even further when Munter demanded that the C.I.A. give him the chance to call off specific missile strikes. During one screaming match between the two men, Munter tried to make sure the station chief knew who was in charge, only to be reminded of who really held the power in Pakistan.
“You’re not the ambassador!” Munter shouted.
“You’re right, and I don’t want to be the ambassador,” the station chief replied.
This turf battle spread to Washington, and a month after Bin Laden was killed, President Obama’s top advisers were arguing in a National Security Council meeting over who really was in charge in Pakistan. At the June 2011 meeting, Munter, who participated via secure video link, began making his case that he should have veto power over specific drone strikes.
Panetta cut Munter off, telling him that the C.I.A. had the authority to do what it wanted in Pakistan. It didn’t need to get the ambassador’s approval for anything.
“I don’t work for you,” Panetta told Munter, according to several people at the meeting.
But Secretary of State Hillary Clinton came to Munter’s defense. She turned to Panetta and told him that he was wrong to assume he could steamroll the ambassador and launch strikes against his approval.
“No, Hillary,” Panetta said, “it’s you who are flat wrong.”
There was a stunned silence, and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon tried to regain control of the meeting. In the weeks that followed, Donilon brokered a compromise of sorts: Munter would be allowed to object to specific drone strikes, but the C.I.A. could still press its case to the White House and get approval for strikes even over the ambassador’s objections. Obama’s C.I.A. had, in essence, won yet again." NY Times
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The basic theme in this piece is the extent to which CIA has been allowed a free hand, a free hand that makes them feel free to defy US ambassadors in their country of assignment and Secretaries of State as well.
This is not a new thing. CIA has always evaded the principle of the "Country Team" in which anbassadors are the leaders of all US Government activites in their country of accreditation, but in the past they have generally just ignored the ambassador while continuing to do what they pleased, but now they are more confident.
BTW. Davis was in the army ten years. He is a former soldier, not a retired soldier. pl
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
SecDef turning to the Secretary of State and saying "you are wrong" during an argument over who is in charge on a foriegn station. Wow.
Posted by: Bill H | 15 April 2013 at 11:27 AM
BillH
I believe Panetta was then DCIA. pl
Posted by: turcopolier | 15 April 2013 at 11:34 AM
The title of the NYT story is catchy but incorrect. The Raymond Davis affair was merely one added negative factor in a relationship that had soured much earlier. This incident merely confirmed for Pakistanis their fear that the US was using them for its own ends, and its protestations of friendship etc were mere talk.
Posted by: FB Ali | 15 April 2013 at 11:38 AM
And Davis, when he got back to the States, got into trouble in short order in beating up a minister who had parked in a parking space that he wanted. The story touches on how the CIA used (and presumably is still using) contractors in sensitive areas. Davis was, in retrospect, a problematic choice to be in the situation he was place in. One wonders how many other unsuitable people are being used in sensitive areas by the Agency, and whether they will bring the blowback that Davis did.
Posted by: oofda | 15 April 2013 at 11:48 AM
This helps explain the inanity of US foreign policy...many agencies, no decider.
It begs the question of just how far the freedom of action of these agencies extends. The Justice Department wrote Rand Paul a memo stating that an American can't be killed by drone in the United States. But CIA controls the drones. And they don't work for the Justice Department.
Posted by: JohnH | 15 April 2013 at 12:55 PM
Wondering who really runs the CIA? A rogue organization historically?
Probably won't happen but the NYTimes article should prompt hearings in Congress!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 15 April 2013 at 01:03 PM
It sure is hard to maintain an empire when the adults have left the building.
Posted by: Tyler | 15 April 2013 at 01:13 PM
I am probably missing something, but if General Clapper is the DNI, why was this matter not brought up for his solomonic judgment?
Posted by: fasteddiez | 15 April 2013 at 01:18 PM
Colonel
Correct . Panneta became Sec Def only in mid-2011.
However, one should not forget the famous memo that brought down Amb Hannaqui.
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/17/exclusive_secret_pakistan_us_memo_revealed_ijaz_calls_amb_haqqani_architect_of_sche
Now, who buried whom? Mullen or Hannaqui.
Posted by: The beaver | 15 April 2013 at 01:25 PM
Apart from the NYT editorializing on Davis's physique by word and picture, that was a great read.
Colonel, if both the CIA and State Department are under the Executive, is it the Executive's prerogative to say which has ascendancy?
Posted by: DH | 15 April 2013 at 03:07 PM
The Ambassador is not in charge so long as he can't get a majority of both the immediate bureaucracy and that in Washington to agree. I write from senior State Department experience in Washington and Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere. Problems occur when one doesn't understand this. I would also defend this system. It is slow, hidebound, and often wrong or ineffective, but more often than not, reaches reasonable conclusions and policies.
If your judgement is that the US is all-powerful militarily and should be able to do what it wants, you are forgetting that we "won" only one of the post-colonial wars we have fought since WWII--Korea. "Winning" is hard and never permanent. We are most likely to end with an unsatisfactory compromise as the best achievable outcome.
Posted by: John Bennett | 15 April 2013 at 03:13 PM
A few questions?
1. What was the strategic rationale for the campaign of massive spying/clandestine action within Pakistan against an array of targets? Who designed it? Who approved it?
2. How is it possible for the CIA station chief there to be ignorant of the most elementary facts about the Pakistani government, laws, procedures and personalities?
3. Who decided to give a moron like Davis serious operational responsibilities based on what assessment?Did he receive any training? Does the practice of using people like this provide a hint of what happened in Benghazi?
4. Who if anyone vetted the flotsam and jetsam collected by Blackwater and then shipped over at $200,000 a head?
5. Who decided on what basis to continue to work with those people until this very day?
6. Where is the president of the U.S. when his collection of senior foreign policy officials, all equally ignorant of Pakistan and with no evident idea as to what we are trying to do there, take major decisions on sensitive matters that affect core interests of the United States?
7. How does someone with Panetta's manifest crassness and lack of elementary perception get appointed to the high offices he occupied?
Posted by: mbrenner | 15 April 2013 at 04:05 PM
And a contractor might be getting $200 K a year- it costs the government much more than that- maybe up to $500K for the same person, depending on contract.
Posted by: oofda | 15 April 2013 at 05:57 PM
A couple of other recent articles should help to add some depth and perspective to the issues raised by this NYT article, and commented on above.
The CIA wasn't just rolling over Ambassador Munter in Islamabad. They were doing the same thing to policy makers in Washington. TIME has an article on how Holbrooke's attempts to develop a wider and deeper relationship with Pakistan were torpedoed in Washington, by the CIA among others. Vali Nasr quotes Holbrooke as saying: "Watch them [the CIA] ruin this relationship. And when it is ruined, they are going to say, ‘We told you, you can’t work with Pakistan!’ We never learn".
http://world.time.com/2013/04/14/losing-pakistan-an-insiders-look-at-how-the-u-s-deals-with-its-ally/
For a deeper analysis of what is behind the mindset that guides the strange policies that the US follows, both at home and abroad, in its War on Terror read the brilliant article by Tom Engelhardt at:
http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175687
Posted by: FB Ali | 15 April 2013 at 07:57 PM
re # 7: It's called "Failing Upwards." A common phenomenon in American management circles, whether in government or business.
Posted by: ex-PFC Chuck | 15 April 2013 at 11:54 PM
Ah. My bad, but that makes it perhaps even worse.
Posted by: Bill H | 16 April 2013 at 12:31 AM
Many in CIA are second or third generation employees.
And none call it NEPOTISM?
Posted by: William R.Cumming | 16 April 2013 at 08:40 AM
Thanks for the Tom Englehardt link General Ali!
Posted by: William R. Cumming | 18 April 2013 at 10:29 AM
I see former President Musharraf has been arrested in Pakistan. Does this have any affect on relations with the US?
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-pakistan-musharraf-20130420,0,2015585.story
Posted by: Fred | 19 April 2013 at 08:51 PM