The Brothers and the Others - Kieran Wanduragala

 

The opposition to Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood was, until last week, fragmented. 

The ‘revolutionaries’. Savvy, networked activists, graffiti artists, hardened leftists, football hooligans, democratic idealists, frustrated people with nothing to lose. The unifying element is a rejection of both the old regime and political Islam, and a willingness to go into the streets, protest, clash, and risk one’s life in the cause of radically transforming society. They are revolutionaries all too painfully aware that what has happened in Egypt since January 2011 is not a revolution (it is those who do not want to see a revolution, who insist that it has already happened). This is the street force that set Mubarak wobbling, spearheaded resistance to SCAF in running battles in places like Mohammed Mahmoud St., and is now taking on Mursi and his supporters in the streets. They are at once the most influential and most powerless element: influential in their ability and determination to instigate crises and set the agenda; but losers in the post-Mubarak struggle for legitimate power in the new political system. They are a vanguard, with quality and energy, but not yet numbers and organization, on their side - hence a leading role in events, along with complete failure at the ballot box. 

The ‘remnants’. In this category fall, firstly, the decapitated leftovers of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party. These remnants visible in political life, however (capturing perhaps 7% of the vote in parliamentary elections) are complemented by business interests, long-established systems of patronage, and a large slice of traditional officialdom, particularly the police. ‘Remnants’ networks were popularly believed to be engineering crises such as fuel shortages and violent incidents with the aim of destabilizing the country and returning to power. At the grassroots level, there are very many ordinary people who have started to feel that things were better under Mubarak. This started out as mere grumbling, but culminated in the surprise entry of Ahmad Shafiq, a ‘remnant’ if there ever was one, into the presidential runoff. This result can be seen as, firstly, discontent with the economic consequences of the ‘revolution’, secondly, fear of the Brotherhood, and thirdly, the continuing efficacy of NDP networks. 

The ‘liberals’. The people we like to call ‘liberals’ in the Middle East are often not very liberal at all. Indeed, to impose liberal ideas in Egypt would require a very illiberal dictatorship. ‘Liberal’ in this context is better understood as secular and capitalist. In this category you will find Western-educated intellectuals, re-branded old-regime billionaires, Christians fearful of Islamist domination, as well as professionals and businesspeople preoccupied with the dire state of the economy. Some parties in this category are distinctly ‘Western oriented’; others, like the Wafd, have more of a nationalist aftertaste. They have considerable means at their disposal and a strong media presence. Nonetheless, ‘liberal’ parties did not receive more than around 20% of the vote in parliamentary elections. 

Mursi’s actions are molding these disparate forces into an increasingly coherent secular opposition. The frontline street activists, the old-regime patronage networks, and the ‘liberal’ money and media are making common cause against the threat of MB domination. 

The presidential campaigns before the first round of voting in May 2012 saw various efforts to appeal to these groups. Amr Musa’s campaign, widely expected to triumph only to end with 11% of the vote, straddled the ‘liberals’ and the ‘remnants’. Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, waged an intriguing if quixotic campaign, winning the support of both the Salafist Nour Party and many revolutionaries and liberals, gaining 17.5% of the votes. Hamdeen Sabbahi, a charming leftist and former TV host, was the big surprise, drawing votes from across the spectrum to receive over 20% of the vote. Nonetheless, Ahmad Shafiq, Mubarak’s last prime minister, and Mohammed Mursi made the second round with, respectively, slightly less and slightly more than 24%. At this point, any pretense of a battle of ideas was dropped, and the campaign became a struggle of two political machines of a sort which cannot be entirely unfamiliar to Americans, based largely around cheap tricks to win over the illiterate masses and efforts to persuade more politically conscious voters that one or the other was “the lesser of two evils”. As with other rounds in Egypt’s months-long elec-stravaganza, the actual voting and counting of the votes seemed to be more or less fair, but the further one zoomed out, the worse the whole process looked. In any case, Mursi won the second round against Shafiq with 51.7% as opposed to 48.3%.

Mohammed el-Baradei’s decision to boycott presidential elections now looks wise to the full spectrum of Mursi opponents. He has won the support of Musa, Abul Futouh, and Sabbahi, among others, and is emerging as the leading figure of the opposition. He is too Western for the taste of many Egyptians. Nonetheless, Mohammed Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood are, from the point of view of the same ‘sofa party’, too stridently Islamist. The fact that almost half of Egyptians voted against Mursi is extremely significant (most of these votes were hardly for Shafiq). Furthermore, a substantial chunk of the votes for Mursi were votes against the old regime represented by Shafiq, not a vote for Muslim Brotherhood domination. Even more saliently, turnout barely exceeded 40%. It is true that Islamist rhetoric has strong appeal to many Egyptians. Perhaps even more appealing, especially to the masses of poor who decide Egyptian elections, is the campaign largesse offered by the well-financed Islamist parties - oil, sugar, sacks of flour (made possible, it is thought, by Gulf money). Nonetheless, a majority of Egyptians are wary of the Muslim Brotherhood. Mursi’s actions have allowed this seed of suspicion to germinate. Now the MB has lost the halo of an oppressed opposition, and is forced to take real decisions and bear the consequences. 

In addition to the overt political opposition to Mursi must be considered the main institutions of the state.  

The Egyptian judiciary is an elite institution whose members possess enormous pride in their professional role and corporate identity. It is second only to the army in terms of its institutional history and traditions, and views itself as a guardian of those traditions; the fact that the profession tends to run in families does not hurt. Much of Egypt’s legal system is of European, particularly French origins, a system to which sharia, given lip service, in fact stands in awkward relation. Judges are widely respected by ordinary Egyptians, who contrast the often-disinterested professionalism of the mustashar with the corruption and caprice of bureaucrats. Since 1952 judges have been a frequent source of resistance to the executive, and a frequent object of attempts to bring them under control of the dictatorship. From standing up to Nasser in 1968-69, to challenging Mubarak in 2005, Egyptian judges have proven collectively resilient; although regimes were generally able to get what they wanted with a stable of ‘reliable’ judges and some loyalists at higher levels to game the system, they never succeeded in stamping out judicial independence. Mursi’s decree initiating the latest crisis was justified by the not implausible claim that some old regime loyalists remained in key positions, but in historical context looks like another effort to cement presidential power at the expense of an independent judiciary. He has picked a tough opponent. The status of judges only increased due to their role in supervising every ballot box nationwide during the post-Mubarak parliamentary and presidential elections; in a divided country, they were broadly seen as independent, trustworthy figures. They will furthermore, it seems, oversee the Constitutional referendum, despite boycott threats. Inside the polling room, their word is law. In a vote, like any in Egypt, that will be swayed by masses of illiterate village voters, how judges choose to interpret regulations and assist voters (or not), how rigorously they prevent Muslim Brotherhood party agents from ‘guiding’ voters in and around polling stations, and other such matters within their purview, could influence the outcome. 

The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces has faded into the background, and its most prominent leaders, Defense Minister Mohammed Hussein Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Anan, were dramatically retired by Mursi shortly after taking office. The new Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff (and head and deputy head of the SCAF, which still exists) are touted as ‘religious men’ amenable to the Muslim Brotherhood. Together with other high-level personnel changes, this reshuffle was widely interpreted as a successful political defanging of the military by Mursi. Nonetheless, there are reasons for skepticism that this behemoth, with its vast economic interests as well as military power, has been tamed. A chief function of Egyptian Military Intelligence was to keep the officer corps free of Islamist penetration, carefully weeding out Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers; it is difficult to believe that an individual, let alone a clique, with serious Islamist tendencies could have risen past the intense scrutiny of the mukhabarat to leading positions. More likely, the generals and the Muslim Brotherhood arrived at a series of understandings upon which to base a modus vivendi. Considering the military’s own corporate interests, the fact that the cohesive, secular culture of the military cannot be changed overnight (with sufficient self-regulation may not change at all), and the fluid political situation in the country, the disappearance of the military from the political scene should be regarded as provisional rather than a done deal. 

There are yet deeper strata at work in Egyptian political life. There is an overwhelming desire for stability on the part of most ordinary people, especially the ‘sofa party’. People are sick of chaos, turbulence, and insecurity. Many blame the revolutionaries. For some, this results in a desire for a ‘strong leader’. Perhaps it was the prevalence of this sentiment that led Mursi to believe that tough measures would win broad approval; indeed, the “enough!” sentiment is probably the biggest asset in favor of ramming through a constitution now. Nevertheless, a protracted crisis may work against the MB. For even more importantly, ordinary people are suffering from the fact that Egypt’s economy is on the rocks. Before the revolution, a respectable growth rate belied high unemployment and mass poverty; much of the growth accrued to a narrow elite. After the revolution, a collapse in tourism and foreign investment aggravated the situation dramatically, although massive deficit spending has staved off the worst consequences until now. The budget deficit is presently above 11% of GDP. Reserves, once $35 billion, are down to $15 billion. While there are those willing to keep Egypt afloat - friends in the Gulf and friends in the West eager to rent Egyptian foreign policy - even this aid will not suffice to prevent cuts in fuel subsidies, currency devaluation, and inflation. The obvious target for public anger will be Mursi and the MB. 

Among the deeper strata of Egyptian politics one might also place the ‘big families’ (thousands, tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands strong) who dominate the political life of Upper Egypt. The Mubarak regime cultivated this kind of patrimonial politics as an ideal instrument of social control; by supplying the ‘omda with enough patronage to keep hold of his tribe, one could buy huge blocs of votes and support in one swoop. This was buttressed by electoral districts gerrymandered to allow for the domination of single families. The post-Mubarak election law dispensed with these small districts in favor of large districts difficult for a single family to dominate (a boon for ideologically based parties, particularly Islamists). Nonetheless, in many areas of Saidi Egypt, the ‘families’ remain the dominant fact of social order, and if you scratch many an ‘Islamist’ in the area, you may find a family guy underneath. 

The biggest weakness of the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential monopolist of power lies in a paucity of tools at its disposal with which to forcefully repress dissent. The intelligence services and the army may be willing to live and let live, as far as the Muslim Brotherhood is concerned, on condition that they are unmolested in their spheres of action, but it is unclear why they should wish to stick their necks out on the Muslim Brotherhood’s behalf by undertaking active repression against people for whom, culturally, they have greater affinity. The police in Egypt are totally demoralized. After their role in shooting demonstrators against Mubarak, they have been broadly vilified across Egypt. They are, by institutional culture, ‘remnants’ of the old regime. There are many areas, particularly in Saidi Egypt, where they do not dare go. Their lackluster efforts to defend the Presidential Palace against opposition demonstrators illustrates the seriousness of the problem, as does the burning of MB offices nationwide. In the event, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to rely on its own demonstrators and street thugs as a counterforce - a dangerous action that could easily backfire by exposing what many Egyptians are all too ready to recognize as the ‘real face’ of the MB. 

As for the Salafis: one imaginative analyst has analogized them to the Tea Party in the US in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Republican establishment. Their strong showing in parliamentary elections was a surprise. They are more energetic and less organized. They are very good at scaring up votes at a grassroots level, but are politically naive at the national level. They are capable of surprising alignments across the political spectrum, such as the decision to support Abul Futouh in the first round of the presidentials. On a personal level, they are much easier to deal with than the Muslim Brotherhood - they will often tell you exactly what they think, especially if you don’t want to hear it, whereas the MB are polished in the arts of dissimulation. So far, the Salafis are sticking with Mursi - but the intensity of that support, and what strings may be attached, have not been tested. 

The MB and Salafi sweep of parliamentary elections (the now-disbanded Majlis al-Sha’ab), with 37.5% of the vote for the former and 27.8% for the latter, may have given them the impression that political Islam would henceforth rule Egypt (their even bigger triumph in the Shura elections, in which hardly anyone bothered to vote, can be discounted). The razor-thin margin of victory in the presidential election might have alerted them that things would not be so simple, but, it did not. They not only failed to draw up a constitution that would make Islamist rule tolerable to non-Islamists, but gave a preview of the kind of arbitrary, dictatorial measures they were keeping in store. Now they face a galvanized, united opposition. If they cede ground and play nice, they still have the support and legitimacy to govern, for a time. If they forge ahead they will plunge Egypt deeper into civil unrest. It is difficult to see how this will end: religious-fascist dictatorship, a vibrant two party system? Or, perhaps, a new ‘man on a white horse’ emerging from the army to ‘save the day’. 

Comments

[FB Ali]

Kieran,

Thank you for an excellent review and analysis of the Egyptian political mosaic at this time. I doubt if there is anything of this depth and perspicuity available anywhere. It is invaluable to anyone who would like to make sense of what is happening in Egypt today -- and where it is likely to go.

There are some signs that the MB is starting to backtrack and temporize. Obviously their leadership has both hawks and doves, and this may explain their rather confused and hesitant responses to developments in the crisis. If, as is likely, one of these trends wins the internal argument, we should see them adopt a coherent policy to deal with the situation.

These conflicting views in the MB leadership may have caused them to fall into the present difficult situation. Instead of following a well thought out plan, their moves have been short-term tactical ones, where trying to avoid one looming difficulty (a court-ordered dissolution of the constituent assembly) they have landed themselves into facing a much bigger problem. Tactical thinking is unlikely to get them out of it.

As for their long-term goals, I would assume that these are also the subject of debate and competition in their leadership. Dealing with the present crisis may also solve this question by bringing one faction to the top.

[William R. Cumming]

The ring of truth and real insights! Thanks!

[b]

Good analysis. Now how does this fit into it? Will the army follow the orders given under this law?

http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/morsy-issue-law-giving-military-special-protective-powers

/quote/
President Mohamed Morsy will soon issue a law that will give judicial and protective powers to the military, according to the state-run Al-Ahram website.

Drafted with the participation of army leaders, the law will task the armed forces with maintaining security and protecting vital installations in the state, until a new constitution takes effect and legitimate parliamentary elections are held.
/endquote/

[confusedponderer]

Fascinating insights. Thank you for sharing.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Concise and useful, thank you.

Could you give us a sense of present day factions within the MB and the dynamics therein? Are there significant policy differences among any such factions? Is there external support (Saudi, Qatari, US, UK, France) for particular factions? If there is external support to various factions can such support be identified as to faction?

Who is authoritative with respect to current MB ideology? Is the official line determined by an individual or a group of individuals chaged with ideology. Can these persons be identified by name? Is there a direct relatiomship between ideology and policy? What individuals are decisive as to MB policy?

[Charles I]

Thanks very much for your expertise and effort. I second FB, the analysis here, and many other places at SST, is the acme of content and concision that would take me months to find elsewhere, never mind process it.

B, your report gives the Armed forces something to do, as well as something to be blamed for.

School is definitely in.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Mr. Kieran:

A vibrant two party system in Egypt, in my opinion, is not possible - even in principle.

Nor the kind of religious-fascist dictatorship (again, it seems to me, applying European conceptions out of their context) that you envision.

Reality will fall somewhere in between; further away from the 2-party vision that many clealry favor.

There is a struggle for the definition of the character of the Egyptian state - perhaps going as far as the creation of a new one.

I expect the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour parties to carry out successfully their program of dismantling the secualrist military dictatorship state in Egypt and replacing it with a new non-liberal Islamic state.

My essential concern would be the extent of self-governance and representaive governance in the new state - that is the key, in my opinion, for a better future for Egypt.

[Kieran]

Allahu a'lam. As you have suggested the inner workings of the MB are rather opaque, especially at the higher levels. There is certainly something to what FB Ali says about hawks and doves. But I really don't know. As for authority, in theory, the murshid Muhammad Badia' at the head of the Guidance Bureau. Some info on the leadership here (WINEP, sorry):

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/whos-who-in-the-muslim-brotherhood

The truth is even most MB members don't know how things work at the top.

[Alba Etie]

Professor Juan Cole at Informed Consent has some reports that the MB Hdqts has been torched & that the Egyptian military is not protecting MB facililties from 'liberal' protestors . This is happening at the same time as Morsi has 'annuled' the decree that gave him 'supreme leader ' status . Opposition leaders including are still refusing to meet with the MB . And there are reported plans for a General Strike.

[Charles I]

Mursi is just stalling for a week - he's offered amendments AFTER next week's referendum, but the referendum goes on. I have previously commented on the difficulty of amendment as opposed to ratification under the reading Egypt's Constitution post

[Alba Etie]

What happens if the military withdraws support from Morsi ?

[Alba Etie]

One creative analyst called the Salafis the Egyptian Tea Party ? So is their the analog Koch Brothers sponsor of the Salafis - if so who are the sponsors and what is there agenda ?
And if the unrest continues will this not destroy the Tourism trade in Luxor & elsewhere . And if no rooms are rented at the luxury hotels at Sharm al Sheikh want the Generals step in then
to preserve their many interests that require foreign tourist to visit Egypt ?

[Charles I]

another showdown in the streets.

[Kieran]

Good question. There is probably a lot of money from private Salafi sources in the Gulf. Saudi state sponsorship? I don't know. Some say the mukhabarat has helped the Salafis along as a counterweight to the MB - again, don't know. I think that the Salafis are a grassroots phenomenon that all sorts of different actors are trying to harness. The Nour Party itself however may be beholden to some interest or other. There are some interesting rumblings:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/09/201292463212656324.html

As for tourism, it was just picking up again, but now back to square one. The beach resorts struggle along, keeping up occupancy by slashing prices. Luxor and Aswan have been hit hard. A lot of people are out of work.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Kieran,

If the economy is falling back to square one, does this open up any possibilities for opposition parties to detach some of the support for the MB and Salafis in the poor masses?

Another question: the al-Ahram article in the other thread states:

" As Tammam shows, the organizational wing, with many of its chief representatives hailing from the group’s highly secretive and iron-disciplined “special organization”, has been the most regressive, conservative and close-minded section of the Gamaa. Made up as they are of “Qutbis” (in reference to the militant doctrine of Sayed Qutob) and Salafis, this powerful branch of the group had viewed their “political” counterparts as little more than window dressing, useful in jazzing up the image of the group before the outside world, but unrepresentative and irrelevant where its internal reality and deeply held beliefs were concerned."
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/59933/Opinion/The-decline-and-fall-of-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.aspx

Could you give us any insight into the "special organization" of the MB, what it does, who is associated with it? External links? Thanks.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

VOA Interview on situation:

http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2012/12/quicktake-egypt-on-the-brink-again-14411/?from=mevlister

[FB Ali]

CK,

I would suggest that articles and editorials in al-Ahram be read with some caution. They are not an independent paper and are part of the 'remnants' that Kieran has written about above.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

The issue for me is the MB and its leadership in terms of organization and ideology. US policy in the region is hinging on a relationshp with the MB in Egypt and elsewhere it would appear.

There is a substatial academic literature on the MB just as on al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida and all the rest. Considering the present position of the MB in the region, considerable additional current analyis is warranted.

I naturally do not trust any journalism source whether government or private but I do seek data which can be assessed.

What is quite clear is that the Western press has been unable and/or unwilling to furnish serious analysis of the MB in the present situation.

Some years ago, the Washington Post ran a fascinating expose of the MB and its operations in the US. Such reporting today would be inconvenient in light of our present foreign policy.

IMO, the analysis cannot be evaded on the excuse that the organization is "opaque."

I imagine one could mine the WikiLeaks material from our Cairo emby for some nuggets.

Mitchell in his classic study of the MB offers some data on the "Special Apparatus"/Secret Apparatus. Of course, there are denials of its existance, disinformation and the like. But again, the issue is the organization of and ideology of the MB and this is a naturally a complex matter.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

In academic settings across the US the issue of the MB is often taken up in Middle East studies related courses and topics.

For example, here is a website from Mt. Holyoke College on the MB for students there:

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~orr20l/classweb/worldpolitics116/index.html

Why is it so difficult for US journalists to write about and analyze the MB in Egypt (or Syria)? Journalists from leading US papers and news services are based in Cairo...what is the problem?

[FB Ali]

Clifford K,

Previous academic studies of the MB would be useful to understand its background and history but would be of limited value in fathoming its functioning today, and where it is heading. I have not studied the MB, but based on general observation of similar organizations my sense of its present state is as follows.

As stated in the literature the main leadership groups in the MB's hierarchy were those representing the 'special organization', the political organization, and the ideological wing. During the period when the MB was being repressed and attacked by the state, the 'special organization' held primacy. The ideologues were also influential, while the politicians were in eclipse.

This situation has radically changed with the overthrow of the Mubarak regime. Now the leadership role has been thrust upon the political wing, for which it was not properly prepared. There is also a tussle going on among the three groups to influence policy and determine tactics. These two factors explain what has appeared to be the MB's ineptness in handling the post-Mubarak transition and the current crisis.

The politicians are probably prepared to go along with establishing a democratic order in which the MB vies for ascendancy with other political parties. The 'specials' wish to use the MB's current leverage to rig the system so as to guarantee continued MB dominance. The ideologues wish to introduce sharia as soon as possible; the other two are not so keen, especially the politicians, who see its potential for alienating a lot of voters and arousing strong opposition. It is not at all clear how this tussle will play out, but while it is ongoing the MB's course is likely to be erratic.

In terms of my categorization of Islamists as either Political or Religious, the politicians would generally be in the former category while the ideologues are in the latter one. The 'specials' probably consist of people of both tendencies.

[Charles I]

I must say again the Genvieve Abdo Book, No God But God 1999 is invaluable in fathoming the MB's functioning today, and where it is heading.

She's journalist. She spoke to primary sources all over Egyptian society. She's now done the same in Iran.

[Charles I]

I did hear an interesting nugget on some CBC show forgot which interviewing a journalist who was detained, beaten, abused by MB types during the first Presidential Palace protests last week in a little barricade thingy set up right against a wall of the Palce, wherein protesters were dealt with.

Everyone was great pains at every juncture to state their particular position within the MB and its sundry apparats.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

FB Ali,

Thank you for your insights.

There would be another factor in the mix I imagine. The role and influence of foreign governments upon them.

Historically, the MB has acted at times as a tool of foreign interests, the British, the US, NATO. Thus, how biddable might they be in the current situation would be a consideration. And factors of deception and dissimulation can play into the mix as well.

I found over a thousand articles on the MB in just one academic data base. These are scholarly articles generally more than 3 years old/English language. There are a number of other data bases reflecting analysis of the recent and current situation. If I had the time, it would be interesting to review all of them.

[Clifford Kiracofe]

Charles I,

One of the leading European analysts, Brynjar Lia of Norway, has written on a Syrian terrorist who became a major AQ ideologue and operative in the global jihad. The book provides helpful data linking the Egyptian MB, the Syrian MB, and AQ.

http://www.amazon.com/Architect-Global-Jihad-Strategist-Columbia/dp/0231700288

Lia, retired from the Norwegian Defense establishment has a website with colleagues:
http://www.jihadismstudies.net/

[Charles I]

Thanks, Clifford, you are indefatigable with the cites.