Ragtag Revolts in Parts of Afghanistan Repel Taliban - NY Times

"In small mountain villages on Taliban turf in eastern Afghanistan, Pashtun tribesmen took up arms to fight the insurgents this summer, fed up with their heavy-handed tactics of closing schools and threatening families whose sons had joined the Afghan Army. Connect With Us on Twitter Follow @nytimesworld for international breaking news and headlines. Twitter List: Reporters and Editors . The New York Times Ghazni and Laghman provinces have fought for the Taliban. “They wanted to make our children illiterate and miserable,” Malik Ghulam Rusal, a district elder, said about the Taliban. “We told them that if you want to wage jihad, go and fight the foreigners, not ordinary people. But they did not listen "  NY Times

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Afghans will be Afghans.  This error on the part of the Taliban is much the same as the gross error made by AQ in Iraq.  The Wahhabi salafism of the jihadis does not allow for local variants of Islam.  The attempt to impose uniformity of practise was a fatal mistakr in Iraq.

My advice to the NATO command would be to stay away from this revolt.  If you touch it you will contaminate it in the eyes of the counter-insurgents.  pl

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/world/asia/ragtag-revolts-in-parts-of-afghanistan-repel-taliban.html

Comments

[toto]

"My advice to the NATO command would be to stay away from this revolt."

Would this still be the case after US soldiers have "left" Afghanistan (at least symbolically)? Could we see something like the tactical alliance of Iraqi Sunnis with US forces against the foreign jihadis?

Off the top of my head, one important difference is that while AQ are foreigners to the Afghans, the Taliban are not, so that might complicate things. "My brothers against my cousins, my cousins against the world".

[turcopolier]

toto

Yes, that would be possible within the context of a new model, CT oriented strategy. The work would be vary dangerous forthe Americans involved, but it could be supported out of the enclaves left behind for the purpose of sustaining a regional CT effort. Green Berets could do this while the JSOC types went on with their raids. The US abandoned the "Sons of Iraq" to their fate when the Maliki government demanded it. How would this be different? Would an Afghan government, any Afghan government accept such an effort on our part? pl

[Hard Hearted Empath]

"Bring them the help they need," wrote a great mind in "How to Work with Tribesmen." It seems a shame to hold back the Jim Gants of this world... but I see your point and it is the advice I would also give if asked... but, most regretfully. I guess it's too late to "un-recognize" the Govt in Kabul and "recognize" some tribes instead?

Aside. I think the reason the Sons of Iraq got disbanded is that they were a US (Petraeus) rather than an Iraqi creation. The sons were an attempt to build on earlier the Ramadi Awakening... which was locally created... We then had the job of not screwing it up... and we mostly didn't. Also... the Govt paid the Ramadi Sunnis, and they all went on the Ministry of Interior payroll after returning from their four months of police training in Jordan. Whereas we (USA) paid the Sons of Iraq, and they never went on the MOI payroll, so the central govt did not regard the militia in question as having "bought in" or been "bought off." The Sons were on our teat and not theirs... if you don't take the king's shilling then I guess he questions whether you do his bidding. The Ramadis then despite all by 2010 fragmented on their own once AQIZ had been destroyed. This at least is the gospel according to retired Iraqi MG Al-Jabouri.

Also, once the Sunni awakening thing began to spread across provinces it could be more of a threat to the central government...

So if Al-Jabouri is credited, two possible lessons in re Afghan tribal help would be: (a) Let Kabul pay the tribal militia we train and (b) Keep it small and province based rather than looking to build big tribal alliances. This should be like micro lending to locally owned businesses.

[mbrenner]

Tot6o

I do not understand the phrase 'foreign jihadis.' In Afghanistan even the US officials admit that they number in the two figures. In Iraq, they got the press but the large majority of al-Qaeda were Iraqis - again, as under reported official testimony confirmed.

Whatever is happening in that corner of Afghanista, there is no reason to think that villagers across the country are rising up against the Taliban - the term anyway being a pronoun with multiple antecedents. They are suspect in most places - so what? This story reads like a plant from ISAF. Passing it on is Alissa Rubin's speciality. In Iraq, she never left poolside in the Green Zone for more than two years. She never even skated over to the end where the Iraqs hung out.

The real story is the growing importance of the Haqqani network which has the potential even to eclipse al-Qaeda. You don't learn much about that when devoting yourself full-time winning brownie points with ISAF and Central Command. Anyway, Afghanistan's future is more to determine than has been Iraq's. let's get over it.

[FB Ali]

"Would an Afghan government, any Afghan government accept such an effort on our part?"

I doubt it. Once US forces depart (either back to the US, or into their Afghan bases), any Afghan government will endeavour to show its lack of connection to the US in order to maintain its legitimacy. Of course, that won't make much of a difference as far as this particular issue is concerned.

For a long time to come, the people who will call the shots in different areas of Afghanistan will be the local tribal chiefs/leaders, warlords, militia chieftains, etc. Some of them will undoubtedly welcome US assistance in fighting their enemies. All that will achieve is for the US to become a party in the endemic civil conflict that is likely to persist in Afghanistan post-2014.

It is doubtful if this development (or any JSOC campaign against the Taliban) will achieve any worthwhile benefits for the US. But it will certainly suit those whose aim is perpetual war (currently the GWOT ).

[turcopolier]

HHE

Yes, with the exception that Petraeus did not in any way create "the awakening" or the SOI. These were started by sergeants and junior officers of the green Berets and marines in response to Sunni disaffection with AQ. Petraeus had the wit to understand the opportunity provided by this occurrence and took advantage of it. Afghanistan is a different place. General principles must yield to particular circumstances. As FB Ali say in this thread, any post US main force withdrawal will seek to distance itself from the US. If it is possible to run UW operations along with CT from small bases, the government wile lbe opposed to that. the time has passed. pl

[Basilisk]

Brigadier Ali,
I presume we both know that the GWOT, by whatever name, is an important profit center for many. How it will ever cease, I cannot imagine.

It is said Ronald Reagan recognized the competition against the Soviet Union fulfilled the same requirement—a raison d'etre for defense industries and all their familiars. He mused about an invasion by space aliens:

"Near the end of his lunch with Shevardnadze,"
wrote Barnes, "Reagan wondered aloud what would happen if the world
faced an 'alien threat' from outer space. 'Don't you think the United
States and the Soviet Union would be together?' he asked. Shevardnadze
said yes, absolutely. "And we wouldn't need our defense ministers to
meet,' he added."

Bizarre, I know, but linking back to GWOT, it's easy to see how he got there.

[Babak Makkinejad]

I agree.

[turcopolier]

Basilisk

I do not doubt the truth of what you say of profits in the GWOT and the fact that the US has now become a warfare state, a state in which the war(s) have become in USAF terms "self licking ice cream cones." The implication of this situation as applied to the post COIN Afghanistan of FB Ali's musing is that the US will become a partisan in one or more of the tribal wars that will cover the land after the Army and marine main forces depart. Some places in this world of sorrow are prone to such wars. Afghanistan, the Yemen, Somali, the sect ridden ME as a whole. To participate in this nonsense with no real stake in the outcome is the fate of US forces in the perpetual war age. pl

[Babak Makkinejad]

Until another Nixon shows up and get US out of that...

[FB Ali]

Basilisk,

Yes, it is hugely profitable for many. In earlier times it was profitable mainly for the military-industrial complex, but now we also have the whole security complex and the tribe of defence and security analysts, pundits and commentators.

It seems to me, however, that there is another constituency that supports 'perpetual war', not for profit but for ideological reasons. Some are straightforward religious fundamentalists (end-of-timers etc), while others harbour other agendas, seeking to push the US to 'conquer' the world so that they can then impose their own ideology on it.

[FB Ali]

Col Lang,

"...the fate of US forces in the perpetual war age".

For the soldiers who do the fighting, the killing and the dying, it is a sorry fate indeed. It is saddening to read of the numerous shattered bodies, minds and lives, the breakdowns and suicides that occur so frequently.

It is also sad to see that among the upper layers of the military many support this constant warfare as a path to promotion and position.

It was different when a soldier went to war in defence of his country and his people. They still tell them that, but those hollow words have little resonance.

[optimax]

Even Reagan wouldn't stay. He left Lebanon when the neocons and neoWilsonians would have doubled-down.

[zanzibar]

If history is any indication then perpetual war cannot extend into perpetuity. We have passed the apogee of our ability to finance both warfare and welfare. Each new "unfunded" expenditure now is like a grain of sand being added to the sandpile of financial instability. How it ends is known - great suffering for the average person. When it ends is anyone's guess.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organized_criticality