Afghanistan ─ Reality and the way out (FB Ali)

Watching the United States stumble from one bad policy into another over the 10 years of the Afghan war, one went through a whole gamut of emotions ─ bemusement, puzzlement, anger, sorrow ─ but ending up with bewilderment overpowering the others. How could this great empire, with all the resources of knowledge, experience, intellect, research and analysis at its command, get it so consistently wrong? How could this “greatest democracy in the world” allow special interests to take over its policy-making to the grave detriment of the true interests of the country and its people?

Part of the answer was provided by Andrew Bacevich in a recent article. He wrote: "Strategy is a quintessential American Century word, ostensibly connoting knowingness and sophistication. Whether working in the White House, the State Department, or the Pentagon, strategists promote the notion that they can anticipate the future and manage its course ...... Strategy is actually a fraud perpetrated by those who covet power and are intent on concealing from the plain folk the fact that the people in charge are flying blind”.

Another part of the answer comes from what happened to Bacevich. A former army officer, now a professor of history and international relations, he is one of the sanest people in America writing about current affairs. In recognition of that his writings were always welcome on the OpEd pages of the principal newspapers and in periodicals ─ until he started pointing out the folly in many of the policies being pursued by the US. He was then dropped like a brick. The only ‘experts’ who are now featured in both the MSM and scholarly journals are those who push the reigning narrative. Presumably, they are the only ones now read or heard in the corridors of power.

That is why it was such a pleasant surprise to come across an article that offered a remarkably clear-eyed view of the reality of the situation in Afghanistan today, and proposed a way out for the United States.

Not surprisingly, it was not written by an American. The author is Anatol Lieven, professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College, London, and a fellow of the New America Foundation. He also has an excellent claim to be regarded as the foremost Western expert on Afghanistan and Pakistan (I certainly think so). His article in the New York Review of Books deserves to be read in full. However, for those who cannot do so I give below some of its highlights.

This is how Lieven depicts the US’s current situation in Afghanistan: “The United States and its allies today find themselves in a position in Afghanistan similar to that of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, after Mikhail Gorbachev decided on military withdrawal by a fixed deadline. They are in a race against the clock to build up a regime and army that will survive their withdrawal, while either seeking a peace agreement with the leaders of the insurgent forces or splitting off their more moderate, pragmatic, and mercenary elements and making an agreement with them”.

Dr Lieven does not see much of a future for the plans for a viable Afghan regime and military to take over and hold the country (with some military and a lot of financial support provided by the US and its allies) after the West leaves. Noting the weaknesses of the Karzai government (and its possible successors), Lieven believes that, following a US withdrawal, “it is highly probable that government-equipped military forces of one group or another will sooner or later stage a takeover of much of the country. The willingness of the US Congress and public to go on subsidizing Afghanistan would then be gravely undermined. If the coup were seen to be led by Tajik officers, there would be a counter-coup by Pashtun officers, and so on. If the Pashtun parts of the army lost in Kabul, many would defect to the Taliban—replicating in many ways the pattern of the civil wars that followed the Najibullah regime’s fall in 1992.The Afghan civil war would then intensify drastically and continue indefinitely”.

While such an outcome might not be unappealing to many US policy-makers, Lieven considers it extremely dangerous for the US, mainly because of its impact on the situation in Pakistan. As he puts it: “For it is no exaggeration to say that the tension between the Pakistani military and the United States now poses a threat to US security that dwarfs either the Taliban or the battered remnants of the old al-Qaeda”.

Lieven believes that the best way out of the Afghan imbroglio for the US is to come to a political settlement with the Taliban. However, he does not see much evidence that the US has come to this conclusion; its current parleys with the insurgents seem to be largely tactical.

Based on his conversations in recent years with people close to the Taliban leadership, Dr Lieven believes that “a peace settlement between the US, the administration in Kabul, and the Afghan Taliban would probably have to be based on some variant of the following elements:

(1) complete withdrawal of all US troops according to a fixed timetable;

(2) exclusion of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups from areas controlled by the Taliban;

(3) a government in Kabul headed—at least nominally—by men the Taliban would see as good Muslims and Afghan patriots;

(4) negotiations on a new Afghan constitution involving the Taliban and leading to the transfer of most powers from the center to the regions;

(5) de facto—though not formal—Taliban control of the region of Greater Kandahar, and by the Haqqanis of Greater Paktika;

(6) a return to the Taliban offer of 1999–2001 of a complete ban on opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in the areas under their control, in return for international aid”.

He thinks that there is a good chance of the Taliban agreeing to such an agreement; he also believes that a settlement along these lines would meet the security needs of Pakistan and would be acceptable to it. He concludes this topic by saying: “Even if the advantages of a settlement are recognized by Washington, how can the US sell it to its allies in Afghanistan, to President Karzai and his followers, and to the leaders of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups? The answer lies partly in assuring all the other parties that the US will continue to guarantee military support against any future Taliban move to attack Kabul or invade the north; and partly in the approaching train wreck that the simultaneous departure of both US troops and Karzai may cause”.

A train wreck that will not just be confined to Afghanistan, but will envelop the region, and especially Pakistan. For anyone to believe that such an outcome would enhance US security or interests would be sheer lunacy.

Comments

[William R. Cumming]

The USA continues to view its foreign policy and foreign relations through through a domestic prism and its various interest groups. That is a recipe for further disaster and in its striving for national security as opposed to international security reflects badly on the American people and its leaders whether political, economic, military, or religious! There is not even an unwavering support of HUMAN RIGHTS in USA foreign policy IMO!
Bravo General Ali for another helpful to me and perceptive posting!

[Iran crisis]

That is a great piece. I will definitely print out and read the entire thing on Monday. It really is the most sensible set of ideas I've heard. I thought I had read an article in the NY Times that made it sound like the US was seriously looking at this approach, but maybe I'm wrong.

[samuelburke]

excellent read, thank you for the perspective.

[Charles I]

How long would a guarantee for Kabul really be tenable I wonder? For either side(s).

[mbrenner]

I second FB Ali's commendation of Bacevich's writing. He is unusual in combining strong conviction with absolute intellectual honesty. No unspoken assumptions, no cut corners. I recommend his last book, 'Washington Rules," whose theme is the uncritical catechism about America's exceptional place in the world that rules the thinking of the country's foreign policy establishment.

[FB Ali]

As far as the Taliban are concerned, I think they will refrain from moving overtly against Kabul so long as they believed the US promise/threat was credible. That does not mean that they will not try to undermine whatever regime is in power there by suborning the Pashtun elements in it or supporting it.

If Kabul falls to the Taliban due to an internal coup the US would be in a bind about intervening.

[Babak Makkinejad]

FB Ali:

The United States has very many intelligent Civil Servants.

But they are "servants" to their political leaders.

There lies the problem.

In regards to the suggestion:

"...US will continue to guarantee military support against any future Taliban move to attack Kabul or invade the North..." (Afghanistan) it will not happen no matter how sensible it is on paper.

The implementation of that suggestion would mean, in effect, that the United States will be on the same side as the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The fundamental problematic, in my opinion, is the always-assumed-but-never-stated belief in the existence of a unitary state in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan was unified in the person of the Monarch. Once the monarch was removed - by Davoud Khan - any upstart could aspire to be the ruler of Afghanistan.

[UK is also a unitary state in the person of Monarch. If monarchy is abolished in UK, the legal basis for that state disappears and new basis must be found - if possible - to keep Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England parts of the same country.]

In 2002, the restoration of the Monarchy was the most sensible way forward. Now, perhaps, it is too late.

In that case, a de facto partition of Afghanistan between North and South - with a mountain running in between them - is the most likely outcome - in my opinion.

One could look at Somalia - with a functioning state in Somaliland and a Wild West in East and South.

Likewise for Afghanistan; a functioning state in the North with a Wild West in the East for Pakistan's leaders to pursue their brain-damaged "strategic depth" ideas.

The United States is in the process of transferring six maritime patrol aircraft to Pakistan as part of her military aide to Pakistan.

I therefore find the statement "...tension between the Pakistani military and the United States now poses a threat to US security that dwarfs either the Taliban..." not credible.

Since her inception, Pakistan has relied on China and US for aide and succor. I doubt that would change.

One things I would like you to please clarify, if you could, is your concern expressed thus: "...A train wreck that will not just be confined to Afghanistan, but will envelop the region, and especially Pakistan...."

What is that train wreck, in your opinion?

[FB Ali]

The train wreck that Dr Lieven is referring to is, in my opinion, a civil war in Afghanistan that will draw in the neighbouring countries and other powers with a stake in the region.

The confidence with which you declare the opinions of experts such as Dr Lieven as "not credible" is indeed admirable. However, in respect of his statement about the tensions between the US and the Pakistani military (a subject about which I know something), I would prefer his views to yours. I would strongly recommend that you read the basis for his statement in his article before dismissing it so cavalierly.

[Charles I]

This is my concern my friend. I do not think there is much percieved credibility left. How much actual capability, aside from special forces and ops could be re-applied as it were, after the drawdown, the homecoming, and the good riddances.

And then there's Pakistani security "needs" as opposed to many, many parties' many aspirations in that theatre.

[FB Ali]

The one threat that the US can make extremely credibly (anywhere in the world) is that they will bomb the hell out of someone. That threat will be (and remain) very credible to the Taliban, I think.

As for Pakistani security needs, Lieven says that they would prefer the Taliban not to take over the whole of Afghanistan. I would agree with him.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Thank you for your reply.

If the tension is so serious as you (and Dr. Lieven) believe, why does the United States give Pakistan free weapons?

As for the civil war in Afghanistan; that has been the case since the fall of the late Davoud Khan - it is not new and the neighbour's have lived with it.

I do not find it a cause for concern as I do not see Pakistan and Iran being at logger-heads over Afghanistan - India being effectively out of that country.

And no matter how bad things get inside Pakistan, they will never ever be as bad as what obtained in 1948.

[Babak Makkinejad]

Yes, so Pakistan will have the South and Southeast while the Russians, the Iranians, and the Central Asians will have the North.

[bth]

FB Ali, thank you for the thread.

1. Do you think that Afghanistan will then partition into ethnic zones and effectively become two or more countries?

2. Also how do we get our equipment out? The Pak route is closed or closeable and the other routes are 4xs more expensive.

3. It seems we would need to maintain an air base in the area.

[turcopolier]

bth

"Also how do we get our equipment out" What equipment? There are no tanks that I know of. The artillery can leave on trains if they get busy and the aircraft can be flown out.. pl

[FB Ali]

A de facto partition is certainly on the cards. Afghanistan has never been a unitary state (in fact, not in name) till the Taliban took it all over. If there is a political settlement it will have to be based, as Dr Lieven has said, on a revision of the utterly wrong-headed constitution engineered by the US. This revision should lead to restitution of the old system in which the regions were more or less autonomous.

There does appear to be a lot of heavy equipment (including light armoured vehicles) to get out. By then the Pakistan route should be open again.

The Taliban will never agree to an airbase in Afghanistan. However, the US does not need one there in order to exert airpower inside the country.

[zanzibar]

FB

Thanks again for your perspective and the links. The situation in Af-Pak is no doubt very complicated with so many competing interests amid a complex cultural milieu. I can't see how we get a benign outcome.

I too used to be bewildered as I observed and analyzed the financial landscape over the past decades. Now I am just cynical!

Through my limited lens I see growing political instability around the world reinforced by escalating financial instability. In the US, we Americans are unwilling to apply common sense and take a more active role in our governance. Instead, through our apathy we have become susceptible to increased propaganda from the range of interests with the capacity to dominate our political system. We are completely indifferent to the looming train wreck. Even my neighbors who have an innate common sense don't get the severity and believe we will muddle through some how. We are so easily distracted by the Red vs Blue, good vs evil, black and white rhetoric that we can't see straight anymore. Both political parties have brought us here. And we continue to elect the same clowns and expect something different!

I now feel that there cannot be any change until we hit bottom. The next decade will not be pretty in my opinion. I suppose the Kondratieff Winter must unfold as it has in the past. History be damned.